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A b st r a c t
Theory of mind (ToM) describes the ability to represent internal mental 
states. We propose that using ToM in practice depends upon the inteiplay of social, 
cultural and cognitive factors. The argument is divided into two parts.
First, we studied whether people with an Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) 
may have deficits, which impair acquisition of the cultural knowledge necessaiy to 
use ToM in practice. The acquisition of shared beliefs, such as social norms, might 
indirectly rely on metarepresentational capacities. Moreover, a piecemeal processing 
style -  Weak Central Coherence (WCC) - might translate into difficulties in the 
acquisition of scripts of routine events, which are normally represented as holistic, 
hierarchically organised Icnowledge structures. In four experiments we show, first, 
that WCC may be specific, but not universal to individuals with ASD and that WCC 
and ToM deficits firequently overlap. Of the ASD gi'oup with different levels of 
ToM abilities, only those with ToM deficits had greater impahments in drawing 
inferences fiom social noims than matched control gi'oups. Script abnoimalities 
ranged fiom a profound lack of event Icnowledge to more subtle qualitative 
peculiarities. Especially ASD with WCC and ToM deficits showed a tendency to 
ti'eat optional and very specific event acts that could occur as should be occuiring.
The second part of the argument investigated whether power relations affect 
ToM usage in ordinary adults. A method to track and categorise ToM in ordinary 
talk was developed to study adults’ accounts of real-life experiences in multi­
VI
cultural settings. Key findings were that the quality and quantity of ToM talk 
differed when people accounted for experiences of situated powerlessness (that is, 
experiences of being discriminated against) compared to when they considered 
episodes in which power relations were equal. Preliminary data fiom an 
experimental study suggests that adults were more inaccurate in inferring the mental 
states of less powerful as opposed to equally powerful others.
We conclude by suggesting that an integrated social, cultural and cognitive 
framework of ToM in practice may contribute to our understanding of the social 
phenotype of ASD as well as it provides a new perspective on social phenomena 
such as intergroup relations.
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X lll
O u t l in e  o f  a  ‘c o n t e x t u a l is e d  pe r spe c t iv e  o n  Th e o r y  o f  
M e ®  IN PRACTICE’
1.1. Introduction
How do we perceive and make sense of the world we live in? A good part of 
this gigantic question, enormous in itself, is how do we understand our social world? 
Over the past two decades, psychology has seen the rapid development of a sub­
discipline that suggests that to be able to interpret and predict others actions’ 
(including our own) we need to have the ability to represent internal mental states, or 
in other words, to have a Theory of Mind’. The Theory of Mind approach’ has 
brought together developmental psychologists studying typical and atypical 
development and primatologists. By joining forces, these pai allel research strands 
set out to unravel primarily two questions: what is the nature of a Theory of Mind 
and how does it develop?
Although in line with this tradition, the proposal put forward in this thesis is 
to think of Theory of Mind not only in terms of a capacity but also beyond that, to 
consider how people use Theory of Mind in practice. To explore this question, we 
will be concerned with two phenomena: social dysfunctions in autism and cognitive 
processes involved in intergroup relations. The main task of this first chapter is to 
map out the fr amework that guided the work on these two seemingly disparate lines 
of research. In doing so, we shall first take a step back and give a brief review of 
relevant previous research.
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The beginning of the ‘Theory of Mind’ tradition is usually credited to the 
primatologists Premack and Woodmff, who asked in their seminal paper of 1978 the 
now famous question “Does a chimpanzee have a Theory of Mind?” In his peer 
commentary, the philosopher Dennett (1978) pointed out that strictly one can only 
attribute someone with a Theory of Mind if he or she displayed evidence of 
understanding that another person can have a false belief A false belief is a belief 
that is firstly, distinctly different from one’s own belief and secondly, it does not 
need to match the states of reality. Demonstr ation of the ascription of a belief of that 
kind was argued to be the crucial ‘litmus test’ for a Theory of Mind, as otherwise it 
could not be ruled out that the chimp, or human being for that matter, was only 
making predictions based on their own representations of the world.
Some five years later, two developmental psychologists, Wimmer and Perner 
(1983) developed an elegant paradigm to test experimentally the imderstanding of a 
false belief, albeit not in chimpanzees but this time in three to four year old childr en. 
The following story is related to a participant child: Maxi, the protagonist, is 
presented with two drawers A and B. He puts some chocolate in drawer A and then 
goes away. In his absence, Maxi’s mother moves the chocolate to drawer B. Maxi 
then comes back, wanting to eat some of his chocolate. At this point in the story the 
child is asked to predict where Maxi will look for his chocolate. The consistent 
finding is that at aroimd four years of age childr en begin to conectly appreciate that 
the boy will look for the chocolate in the place where he left it because he is holding 
a false, or now ‘out-of-date’ belief about its whereabouts. By contrast, most three- 
year-olds suggest that the boy will look in the new place -where thev know the 
chocolate is.
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Wimmer and Pemer’s seminal paper inspired a whole generation of 
developmental psychologists to study socio-cognitive development in preschool 
years. It was foimd that around the same age as preschoolers pass false belief tasks, 
they display a whole range of new social competencies. For example, children begin 
to recognise that their own beliefs can be wrong (Gopnik & Astington, 1988), they 
distinguish between appearance and reality (Flavell, 1988; Flavell, Flavell & Green, 
1983), understand informational access as a sour ce of knowledge (Wimmer,
Hogrefe, & Sodian, 1988) and they understand and engage in deceptive 
manipulation (Sodian & Frith, 1992). As all these skills are typically mastered by 
the age of fom-years but failed by three-year olds, a number of authors suggested 
that around the age of four* years, a fundamental conceptual change takes place in the 
mind of young children (e.g. Flavell, 1988; Forguson & Gopnik, 1988; Pemer,
1991).
Clearly, understanding of false beliefs cannot be seen as the end-point of a 
child’s socio-cognitive development. Around five to six years, children begin to 
grasp more complex second order beliefs constructions, such as inferences of the 
kind ‘Peter believes Mary believes the ice cream van is in the park’ (Wimmer & 
Perner, 1985). Moreover, only between eight and nine years do children begin to 
tr ack speakers’ communicative intentions in non-literal forms of language, such as 
irony or metaphor (Sullivan et al., 1995).
However, of greater interest to researchers has been how children younger 
than four develop the understanding of representational states of minds in the first 
place. Of comse, these abilities do not miraculously appear aroimd their fourth
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birthday. Younger children display a variety of social predispositions and 
competencies before they pass false belief tasks, such as imitation, joint attention, or 
pretend play (Scaife & Bruner, 1975; Trevarthen, 1980; Meltzoff & Moore, 1983, 
1989). These early social competencies have been linlced to a representational 
understanding of mind in the sense of representing early developmental precursors 
to it (see Gomez et al, 1993, for a discussion of different ways of conceptualising 
‘precursors’).
The vital role of Theory of Mind abilities has been fui*ther highlighted by the 
finding reported in a seminal study by Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1985) that the 
majority of their participants with autism failed to understand a false belief.
Autism, or as it will be refened to in the rest of this thesis. Autism Spectrum 
Disorder (ASD), is a neuro-developmental disorder, characterised by deficits in 
social interaction, communication, imagination, and repetitive behaviours. 
Individuals with ASD often show a strong resistance to changes in routines, and 
some people with this condition have distinctly circumscribed ar eas of special 
interests or even talents. Critically, the failiue of childr en with autism to pass the 
false belief test appeared to be a specific deficit, as the majority of a control group 
with learning difficulties who functioned at a compar able intellectual level, mastered 
the test.
What is more, a wealth of studies conducted since the study of Baron-Cohen 
et a l suggest that yoimg children with autism often fail to display, or show severe 
impairments, in their eariy social behavioius such as pretend play, joint attention, or 
imitation (Mundy et al., 1986; Mundy et al., 1994, Lewis & Boucher, 1988;
Charman et al., 1997). The Theory of Mind deficit hypothesis of autism has been
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one of the most influential cognitive accounts, as it generated precise and testable 
predictions of impairments in key areas defining tliis disorder, namely, the social, 
imagination and commimication deficits. Moreover, this hypothesis has brought 
autism to the forefront of cognitive science. Researchers felt that enquiries into the 
minds of people with autism not only serve to understand the relation between 
cognitive abnormalities and behavioural impairments in this rare condition, but also 
provide an indirect avenue to obtain insists  into the nature and development of 
cognitive abilities in general (Baron-Cohen et al., 1993; Baron-Cohen, 1995).
A number of theorists have used the empirical findings of the developmental 
course of eariy social competencies, in typical or atypical development, to formulate 
theories on the nature of a Theory of Mind. Differences between these proposals 
refer mainly to the extent to which childr en’s imderstanding of mental states is seen 
as innate versus socially learnt, domain specific versus part of a more domain 
general intellectual ability, or whether a Theory of Mind is, at its core, a cognitive 
ability or develops firom a more basic emotional understanding of people (see 
Caiinthers & Smith, 1996, for a review of the debate).
Welhnan (1990) was amongst the first who imported the term ‘Theory of 
Mind’ from the primate literature to start a systematic programme of research with 
children. The theory-theory view he advocates talces the notion of a Theory o f Mind 
literally, because mental states are not directly obsei-vable, and because they form a 
system that can be used to generate predictions of futme states (see Premack & 
Woodruffs original definition). Moreover, this view suggests that children’s 
metacognitive understanding develops witliin a process of theory construction and 
change, not unlike the way scientists develop theories and replace them with other
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ones that better fit the empirical data (Welhnan, 1990, Gopnik & Wellman, 1994). 
Meltzoff argued that early imitation behaviour in toddlers gives evidence that they, 
and even still younger infants, understand others Tike me’. This, he suggested, 
provides the crucial precondition that fosters children’s progress in this theoretical 
understanding (Meltzoff & Gopnik, 1993).
Pemer postulated a metarepresentational ability - defined as the ability to represent 
the representational relation - (Pemer, 1993, borrowed from Pylyshyn, 1978) to be a 
key feature of a Theory of Mind. He suggested that two to three year olds cannot as 
yet conceptualise the representational process, therefore they interpret mental states 
as relations to situations, and not as relations to person’s representations of 
situations.
The ability to form rpetarepresentations, albeit conceptualised in a different way, is 
also thought to be the cmcial cognitive substiate in the view of modularity theorists 
(Leslie, 1987; Bai on-Cohen, 1995). This view postulates that a Theory of Mind is an 
ability specifically dedicated to the understanding of the social domain; a capacity 
that is innate, haid-wired, ingrained in the human genetic code. Conceptualised as a 
module, it is fiuthennore thought to work automatically and unconsciously, 
mandatorily and fast, and to be encapsulated from other cognitive processes. This 
view suggests that with development, this ability merely ‘matures’, as opposed to 
being actively acquired. The modularity view has been most fervently put foiward 
by researchers studying Theory of Mind deficits in autism, since autism presimiably 
involves an innate neuro-biologically based deficit. Baron-Cohen (1993,1995) has 
sti'essed the role of joint attention in the development of a Theory of Mind, and 
Leslie (1987, 1994) argued that the same metarepresentational capacities that are 
necessary for the computation of mental states ai e first evidenced in pretend play.
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A number of neuropsychologists, also departing from a consideration of 
deficits seen in autism, have suggested that Theory of Mind abilities might rely on a 
set of more general information processing skills, the group of executive functions, 
that are associated to the frontal lobes (e.g. Russell, 1997).
At the other end of the theory spectrum, simulation theorists argue that 
children derive concepts, such as belief and desire, fr om inspection of their own 
personal experience with these states, which they can then use to predict other’s 
behaviour by mentally putting themselves in their shoes (Harris, 1992; Goldman, 
1989; Gordon, 1986). These and other debates, although here presented only in a 
mdimentary and highly simplified way, are still ongoing (see Carruthers & Smith, 
1996, also Astington & Gopnik, 1991). In recent years, they have been enriched by 
new perspectives, such as the emerging field of social cognitive neiuoscience 
(Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, & Cohen, 2000).
In summary, the work discussed so far has been predominantly concerned 
with the investigation of the nature and development of the capacity to understand 
other minds in young children or individuals with a profound developmental 
disorder.
1.2.THE ORIGINS OF THE PRESENT APPROACH: TWO APPARENT PARADOXES
Two separate phenomena suggested to us that a metarepresentational ability 
per se might not in all circumstances guarantee that someone has a frill 
imderstanding of others’ mental lives, and of how these are related to their social 
actions.
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1. Theory o f Mind and social adaptation in high-functioning individuals with 
autism or Asperger’s Syndrome
The first puzzle is related to the finding that a minority of intelligent 
individuals with high-functioning autism or Asperger Syndrome perform well on a 
variety of experimental Theory of Mind tasks (Bowler, 1992; Dahlgren & 
Trillingsgaard, 1996). Still, they display a variety of social incompetencies in their 
everyday life (e.g. Frith, 1989; Klin et al., 2000; 2002). Hence, the first question that 
concerns us is what are the factors that might prevent these talented individuals fi*om 
translating their apparent Theory of Mind skills into natur alistic situations?
2. Theory o f Mind usage in intergroup relations
A second apparent paradox emerged fi-om considerations of a phenomenon 
in a rather different area. Within the Theory of Mind approach, relatively little work 
has explored Theory of Mind in typical adults. However, a handful of isolated 
studies suggests that adults sometimes display curious ‘mistakes’ on Theory of Mind 
tasks. Mitchell et al (1996; in submission) showed that adults sometimes displayed 
a ‘realist bias’, as they tended to make judgements about whether or not a character 
would believe a message depending upon whether they themselves knew the 
message was true. Nelson, Plea and Henseler (1998) reported that a minority of their 
adult participants seemed to ‘fail’ the standard Maxi false belief task, but not 
because they did not have a genuine understanding of mental states. Instead, some 
adult participants predicted that Maxi would look for the chocolates in the place 
where they actually were by drawing on real-world Icnowledge and personal 
experiences.
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More consistent evidence for adults’ fallibility comes from different 
approaches within social psychology. For the past forty years, attribution theory has 
occupied a central place in social psychology (Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967). 
Although this theory shares with the Theory of Mind approach its ancestry in 
Heider’s (1958) ‘folk psychology’, the further development and application of this 
theory followed a rather different path. Whilst Theory of Mind researchers assume 
that people understand social behaviour on the basis of belief-desire inferences, 
attribution theorists divided perceivers’ causal inferences into two categories: 
dispositional and situational (see Malle et al., 2000, for a critical review). This 
research suggests that adults tend to attribute actors’ behaviour to their 
predispositions and neglect information of the situation, (Ross, 1977), they readily 
stereotype members of other groups (Fiske & Taylor, 1984), and assumptions 
concerning the current state of reality contaminates their recollection of prior 
information (Fischhoff, 1982).
Studies investigating the construct of ‘empathie accuracy’ (Ickes, 1993;
Klein & Hodges, 1998), the ability to accurately infer what another person is 
thinking or feeling, may be influenced by motivational factors and the familiarity 
between the perceiver and the target, hr other words, this research suggests that 
differences in empathie accuracy may not, or at least not only, lie in stable inter­
individual differences, but emphasises the effect of factors that characterise the 
relation between perceiver and target.
What is more, the possibility that adults do not in all circiunstances 
understand others’ thoughts and feelings, or the meaning of their actions, is 
dr amatically illustrated by accounts of historical real life events. Survivors of the
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holocaust, such as Primo Levi or Simon Wiesenthal, have documented horrors and 
sufferings inconceivable to those of us fortunate enough to be bom into a ‘civilised’, 
‘free’ world. In Hitler’s concentration camps, in Auschwitz, Bergen-Belsen, Dachau, 
Treblinka and many others, human beings were imprisoned, on the basis of their 
race, their religion, their disability or political views, discriminated against and 
dehmnanised in the most extreme ways: degraded to beings less than human, to 
objects. To what extent do people in these situations understand the minds of the 
other? Staub (1989), for example, wrote of Amos Goeth, SS commandant at 
Auschwitz:
“This man, who was even more cruel and sadistic than his SS role required, 
apparently had no capacity to see his behaviour* from the perspective of 
others (...). He was unable to appreciate that his prisoners, these ‘objects’ in 
his possession, had feelings and needs of their own that did not fit his needs 
and preferences -  a not uncommon human blindness but in this case extreme 
in degree” (p. 128).
The depiction of an oppressor as unaware of the mental states of those who 
he suppresses does not appear to be a single case. Similar* impressions can be found 
-  albeit to varying degrees - in the commentaries of various other real-life intergr oup 
relations, ranging fr om analyses of the relation between the colonisers and the 
colonised (Kiernan, 1996; Memmi, 1990; Sartre, 1961/1967) through to ‘everyday 
racism’ in contemporary societies (Essed, 1991). By contrast, the oppressed, whose 
fate is dependent upon the actions of their oppressors, have often been poi*tr*ayed as 
having a better understanding of the mind of their oppressors. Despite historical and 
other differences, one common factor of these accounts is strildng power 
differentials between the groups involved, i.e. the amount of power that members of
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one gr oup have over members of another one. When considering these accoimts, the 
question that emerged was whether Theory of Mind usage may be modulated by 
social factors, and may vary across different social relations, specifically group and 
power relations.
Taken together, the puzzle that people with autism who pass Theory of Mind 
tasks may not be able to translate their Theory of Mind into commensurate social 
adaptation, and the possibility that adults, too, might not always be ‘perfect 
mindr eaders’, led us to formulate a critique of some of the ‘tacit assumptions’ of the 
traditional Theory of Mind approach.
1.2.1. Critique of sope assumptions of the Theory of Mind approach.
Our critique involves five points:
1) A focus on the structure o f a metarepresentational mechanism, paired with a 
developmental perspective, led to a neglect o f issues o f on-line usage.
The lines of inquiry into the typical and atypical acquisition of a 
representational understanding of mind, as well as the parallel research avenue 
investigating the origins of Theory of Mind in non-human species, shares a 
developmental (ontogenetic or phylogenetic) perspective. The flipside of viewing 
Theory of Mind as a gradually developing capacity, however, is to construe it as a 
competence and therefore to neglect issues of on-line usage. Par adoxically, in this 
view. Theory of Mind abilities are only seen as flexible within relatively broad 
developmental time windows, say between three and four years, but on a moment- 
to-moment (or processing) time scale, they are construed as rather static. However,
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every time we think about what someone believes, we perform a mental act in 
practice, which is situated in a particulai* physical and social context. Hence, 
following Chomsky’s (1968) original distinction, we argue for the need to 
distinguish between Theory of Mind competence and performance (see also Lillard,
1998, for a similar argument).
2) Structure oriented theories o f a Theory o f Mind have largely neglected a 
consideration o f content.
As mentioned earlier, theorists such as Leslie (1987) and Baron-Cohen 
(1993,1995) made important contributions in showing that in autism, the cognitive 
architecture essential for the human capacity to compute metarepresentations, that is, 
to atti'ibute mental attitudes., is impaired. Linguistically, mental attitudes aie 
expressed in mental state terms, such as ‘believing’, ‘wanting’, ‘intending’ or 
‘expecting’, as for example in the sentence “(I think) he doesn’t want [x]”. Hence, 
as is common in cognitive science (see Shweder, 1984), the concepts of ‘Theory of 
Mind’ and ‘metarepresentations’ thus construed involved a central concern with 
process and structure. This entails, however, a second criticism; the relative 
indifference to content, the [x] in the above formula.
3) Cultural decontextualisation
In contrast to many other modular systems as initially proposed by Fodor 
(1983), a Theory of Mind is not an input system (such as visual processes), but a 
central system. If we ask the question “What does X thinlc Y thinks?” we need to 
consider the nature of that “what”, the prepositional content. This prepositional
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content may rely on observations directly obtained from the immediate environment. 
However, our argument is that this content often relies on cultur al knowledge.
4) Cognitive decontextualisation
A neglect of content furthermore implies that a metarepresentational system 
is seen somewhat in isolation. Instead, we argue that mindreading functions may not 
only be the product of a metarepresentational mechanism, but also of other cognitive 
mechanisms with which Theory of Mind is articulated. Therefore, we need to 
specify the nature of that propositional content also because this leads us to identify 
on what other cognitive processes their representation relies. (For example, 
attentional processes, visual processes, memory processes and so forth -  anything 
that can act as an ‘input system’, using the modularist model). This proposal does 
not deny the possible existence of domain specific Theory of Mind mechanisms as 
suggested, for example, by the modular accounts of Leslie or Bai on-Cohen, but 
emphasises that, when carrying out mindreading functions, these mechanisms must 
work in collaboration with other cognitive mechanisms.
5) Social decontextualisation
Theory of Mind research has neglected to view the participants as truly 
social agents. In the endeavour- to map behavioural abnonnalities onto cognitive 
deficits, and to relate those in turn to biological abnor*malities, behaviour, and 
especially social behaviour, has come to be viewed as something isolated, or 
decontextualised from its socio-cultmal environment. As Ames et al (2001) have 
noted, participants in experimental situations have been portrayed- at least implicitly 
- as ‘lone mindreaders’. In this way, traditional Theory of Mind research has
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consistently neglected a consideration of the identity of those who engage in social 
actions, the ‘bearers’ of this Theory of Mind capacity. As a consequence, his or her 
relations to the ‘targets’, those minds they read, have been neglected. This research 
has thus firstly, disembodied a cognitive capacity fiom a person, and secondly, 
persons firom their social environment. Therefore, the possibility that social 
contextual variables may moderate Theory of Mind usage has been left unexplored.
1.3. F irst steps tow ards a  contextualisbd  view  o n  Theory  of 
M ind  IN PRACTICE
How does Theory of Mind usage operate in practice? We argue that on the 
one hand, we need social-contextual knowledge, i.e. information obtained from 
immediate cues, such as facial expressions, but most relevant here, cultural 
loiowledge of norms and routines, for a Theory of Mind to operate effectively in 
practice. On the other hand, it is suggested that social contextual factors, such as 
power relations, may influence or moderate how Theory of Mind works in practice.
In order to study Theory of Mind in practice, it is therefore necessary to 
integi ate the social, cultural and cognitive levels. The remainder of this section is 
devoted to expand on this proposal, as we intioduce the concept of cultiual 
knowledge, imported from cultural psychology, and discuss the identity of the 
mindreader, as derived from Social Identity theory.
We suggest that integrating the cultural and cognitive levels may open up a 
further way of studying social abnonnalities in autism. More specifically, this 
approach may allow us to address why even people with ASD who pass Theory of 
Mind tasks might not be able to translate this skill into fiill social understanding and
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adaptation. We fmther propose that integrating a Theory of Mind with the social 
level may provide a new way of approaching traditional issues of social psychology, 
such as intergroup behaviom; power and discrimination.
1.3.1. Cultural contextualisation
It is argued that for a Theory of Mind system to be hilly operational, it has to 
work in collaboration with other systems to acquire its contents or inputs. A good 
part of such contextualised loiowledge must be ‘cultural knowledge’. Following two 
recently developed lines of research, ‘cognitive anthropology’ and ‘cultural 
psychology, cultural knowledge is seen as a mediator between cognition and specific 
behaviour, which we need in order to fi-ame and order our experiences and to imbue 
them with meaning. Different authors have used different teims for what is here 
called cultural loiowledge. For example ‘cultural models’ (Quiim & Holland, 1987), 
‘liigher-order cultui'al artefacts’ (Cole, 1996/Wartofsky, 1973), ‘cultural meaning 
systems’ (D’Andrade, 1984) ‘social knowledge’ (Schütz, 1970), a ‘frame’ in which 
symbols are related in a ‘web of significance’ (Geertz, 1973) or ‘cultural 
representations’ (Sperber, 1996). Quinn & Holland (1987) defined cultural 
loiowledge as “[...] presupposed, taken-for granted models of the world that are 
widely shared (although not necessarily to the exclusion of other, alternative 
models) by the members of a society and that play an enormous role in their 
understanding of that world and their behaviour in it” (p.4).
As an illustiation of the role of cultural knowledge for our understanding of 
the meaning of social actions, consider this fictitious anecdote about the Tibetan and
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Mongolian belief in the Nagas: in traditional Tibetan myth, Nagas are mystical 
beings, half man, half snake, who dwell in water regions and are believed to control 
all natural phenomena including the weather. As many Tibetans and Mongolians 
lead a Nomadic existence and thus strongly depend on their natural environment, a 
range of customs and traditions seiwes the purpose of keeping the Nagas in a 
friendly mood. They will keep shrines to worship the Nagas, perform ceremonies 
and offer incense and butterlamps to keep themselves in favour and take particular 
care in keeping the water clean and pure, since this is the home of the Nagas. 
Another part of this belief is that all fish are children of the Nagas, consequently 
they should not be harmed or eaten.
For the Western modem mind, these beliefs and customs are little more than 
naïve superstitions of apparently ‘undeveloped’ people. After all, we know that 
forces other than a Naga in a gentle or angiy mood influence the weather, and that it 
is beyond the control of human beings to influence these forces. Similarly, the belief 
that fish ai e descendants of the Nagas appears doubtful in light of evolutionary 
theory. If taken out of the (cultui al) context, a practice such as not eating fish may 
seem iirational, as fish may enrich their very simple diet with essential proteins. The 
point, however, is, that this practice makes a great deal of sense, it is internally 
coherent, considered within the more global frame of beliefs in the Nagas. If one 
Mongolian obsei-ved another Mongolian carefully emptying a jar of sand in a stream, 
the observer may infer that the actor believes that the Nagas are angry. By 
performing this little ritual, he hopes to put himself and his family in favour before 
embarldng on a long journey. However, if a Western visitor observed the same 
behaviour, the Mongolian’s activity may remain opaque; it might be seen as 
iirational, strange or simply stupid. Although both the Western and the Mongolian
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observer can reasonably be credited with a Theory of Mind capacity, their 
interpretations of the activity are very different, and heavily depend on the degree of 
knowledge of the cultural frame in which the Mongolian actor’s behaviour takes 
place. Hence, the example highlights the relevance of cultur al knowledge for the 
interpretation of experiences.
How is cultural Imowledge acquired and organised?
hr Bmner’s (1986,1990) view, culturally shared meanings are negotiated 
through shared modes of discourse. He argued that narrative thinking is one 
fundamental mode of thought (the other one being the paradigmatic mode). 
Knowledge of routine events, ‘the canonical’, develops through children telling 
others and themselves little stories about the happenings of the day, which aids them 
in establishing meaning of what happened and in forming more general knowledge 
structures of those routine events (Nelson, 1989).
Not contiadicting Bruner’s proposal, but more radically, Shweder (1984) 
asserted that cultural loiowledge does not comply with the principles of logical 
reasoning, because the mind does not always work according to these 
‘enlightemnent’ principles. If that was so, he argued, then the ethnographic record 
would expose many people as ‘deficient logicians’, ‘faulty statisticians’, and 
‘muddled empirical scientists’, as they hold ‘false beliefs’ and engage in 
institutionalised practices that strike us as highly irrational. Shweder argued that 
cultural ideas and practices are neither founded in logic nor empirical sciences, that 
they fall beyond the scope of inductive and deductive reasoning, and that they are 
neither rational nor irrational, but best described as ‘nonrational’. Sperber (1985), by
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calling cultural beliefs, for example religious beliefs such as in the holy trinity, 
‘apparently irrational beliefs’, made a similai* argument.
In sum, according to these authors the meaning of human actions and human 
beliefs does not solely depend upon logical reasoning abilities but also, and most 
fundamentally, upon the ability to situate them in their proper cultural context. For 
this, one needs to possess the appropriate cultural knowledge.
Do people with ASD have impairments in their acquisition of cultural Imowledge?
Could it be that people with an autistic condition navigate through their own 
culture - perhaps not exactly like an ‘anthropologist on mars’, as half-jokingly 
suggested by Sacks (1995) - but like a foreigner who lacks knowledge of routine 
events, social rules and conventions necessary to understand individual actions? 
Consider again the example of the Monglian Nagas. The Theory of Mind deficit 
hypothesis of autism tr aditionally predicts that people with ASD have equal 
difficulties interpreting a Mongolian’s and the Westerner’s actions, because of 
problems understanding the nature of their underlying mental states. However, 
perhaps people with autism may beyond this also experience difficulties similar to 
those of the Western observer confronted with the strange actions of the Mongolians 
whose cultural meaning he is imaware of. Because of problems with the background 
Imowledge they might not be able to interpret the significance of pariicular 
behaviours as embedded within cultrual fr ames. To stretch the example even further, 
the proposal is made that a Mongolian child with autism might not only have a 
deficit in Theory of Mind, but would also have difficulties acquiring the belief in the 
Nagas in the first place, with all its implications and entailments for the 
rmderstanding of associated social practices.
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The consequences of lacking cultural knowledge would be profound. A cognitive 
frame that imbues actions with meaning would be missing or dysfunctional.
What suggests that people with autism might have difficulties acquiring 
cultural loiowledge? If, as has been argued above, cultural knowledge cannot be 
fully understood on the basis of logical reasoning abilities only, perhaps other 
distinct cognitive abilities participate in this acquisition process? Based on 
considerations of developmental theories of how typically developing childi en 
acquire cultmal Imowledge, we reasoned that two distinct cognitive abilities might 
be involved in this acquisition process. First, theorists, such as Bruner (1990) and 
Sperber (1996) have suggested (albeit in somewhat different ways) that the 
acquisition of shared cultural beliefs, such as social norms or real world knowledge, 
might rely on metarepresentational capacities. This would predict that specifically 
individuals with autism who lack such a Theory of Mind ability might also have 
difficulties with the acquisition of those shared cultmal beliefs.
A second facet of cultm al knowledge consists of event knowledge or scripts 
of routine events. These have been argued to be represented as holistic knowledge 
structm es (Schank & Abelson, 1977; Nelson, 1986). In addition to Theory of Mind 
impairments (and possibly independent from them), it is currently assumed that 
people with ASD might also have a tendency to process information locally, in a 
detail-focused fashion (Frith, 1989; Happé & Frith, 1994). We reasoned that such a 
cognitive style might disadvantage people with ASD to grasp the holistic character 
of script knowledge. Consequentially, this might impair even those individuals with 
an autistic condition who have a Theory of Mind capacity, as measm ed by standar d 
tests, and who, therefore, should be expected to be more able to make sense of
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others’ actions in everyday life. These me the fundamental hypotheses underlying 
the first part of this thesis.
1.3.2. Social contextualisation
The proposal we put forward in the second part of this thesis is that social 
contextualised factors defining the social relation between self and other, might 
modulate Theory of Mind usage in practice. To push this proposal forward, it is 
necessary to consider why people might use Theory of Mind flexibly and differently 
across different social relations, hi doing so, it is necessary to take the adult 
mindreader out of his or her social isolation and to place him or her in a social 
context. Wlio me these adult mindreaders? And how are they related to others?
A lot of work in social psychology is concerned with group behaviour. One 
important question is how the individual and the group me related. The writer Levi, 
ex-prisoner 174517 in Auschwitz, wrote to his editor: “I do not understand, I cannot 
tolerate the fact that a man should be judged not for what he is but because of the 
gioup to which he happens to belong (Levi, 1986: p. x). Two related lines of 
research. Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1982) and Self 
Categorisation Theory (Turner et al., 1987) suggest that -  depending on the social 
context -  this is exactly what people do. A core concept of this theory is that the self 
is multi-levelled, defined at different levels of abstraction. On the personal level T’ 
differentiate myself from ‘you’, on the gioup level ‘we’ differentiate ourselves from 
‘them’, members of another group, and on superodinate level my identity as a 
human being (in contiast to other species) is stressed. Social Identity researchers 
have been primarily interested in the inteimediate group level, with the idea being
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that through identification with different social groups or categories, the group is 
located in the individual. Moreover, Tajfel (1979) assumed that people are driven by 
the desire to obtain or maintain a positive view of the self. Membership of different 
groups contributes to that positive self-evaluation, as long as one’s own group, the 
ingroup, is evaluated as ‘better’ in comparison with some other outgioup. Social 
Identity Theory has been one of the most influential approaches to intergroup 
behaviour and discrimination. The Social Identity approach serves as a fr amework to 
place the mindieader in a social context and to argue that power differentials are 
flexible across different social contexts and social relations. To this approach, which 
has hitherto neglected a consideration of cognitive processes, we import a Theory of 
Mind perspective.
Our main hypothesis is that it is strategically beneficial for those who are 
powerless to take the mental perspective of those in power, as well as it might be 
beneficial for those in power to neglect or even deny an independent mental 
perspective of those whom they suppress.
Talcen together, to study these two distinct phenomena we suggest adopting a 
contextualised perspective of Theory of Mind in practice that considers how social, 
cultural and cognitive processes are at play in the mindreading process.
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1.4. Outline  of thesis organisation
The empirical research presented in this thesis is divided up into two parts: 
in the first part we will explore whether people with autism might lack cultural 
knowledge, and whether hypothesised impairments might be related to distinct 
cognitive abnormalities associated with this disorder.
hi Chapter 2, we will give an introduction to autism and Asperger’s 
Syndrome. Two of the cuirently most prominent cognitive or psychological accounts 
will be reviewed: the Theory of Mind deficit account and the theory of Weak 
Central Coherence. We will discuss the contributions of each account for the 
understanding of Autism Spectrum Disorders, as well as some limitations, as 
pointed out by other researchers. We will propose one possibility of addressing some 
of the outstanding questions in a different way, by starting from the concept of 
cultural knowledge. Two facets of this concept will be examined: the understanding 
of real world knowledge of social norms and event scripts. Alternative hypotheses 
will be discussed that suggest that either Theory of Mind or Central Coherence or 
both may paiticipate in the acquisition of these forms of cultuial loiowledge. 
Therefore, a first empirical study, presented in Chapter 3, is devoted to the 
characterisation of our participants with autism or Asperger’s Syndrome, as well as 
control gi'oups comprising individuals with learning difficulties and typically 
developing children and adults, in terms of their abilities in these two domains. In 
Chapters 4 to 6, we will investigate whether people with ASD might have relative 
impainnents in two facets of cultural knowledge and how these ai e related to 
different degrees of Theoiy of Mind impairments and Weakness in Central 
Coherence. Study 2, presented in Chapter 4, will deal with social norms and real
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world knowledge. In Studies 3 and 4 we will investigate generalised representations 
of routine events (Nelson, 1986, Schank & Abelson, 1977). In Chapter 5 we will 
present the results of a qualitative and quantitative study in which participants were 
asked to produce narratives of common and routine events. Chapter 6 will be 
concerned with a new Frequency Rating Task in which participants were asked to 
rate whether actions and elements that aie central or optional to the event occur 
‘always’ througli to ‘never’ in specific instances. Chapter 7 summarises the results 
and gives an outlook for friture research.
With Chapter 8 we turn to the second part of this thesis. Starting with our 
intuitive impressions of historical accounts of extreme intergroup situations, we 
review the extent to which social psychology has been concerned with the issues of 
power, intergroup discrimination and cognitive processes involved in these. Whilst 
by and laige, power -  despite its central role in social relations -  remains a relative 
lacuna in social psychology in general, we will draw on a recent research stiand 
within the social cognition paradigm that investigated the influence of power on 
impression formation. Whilst acloiowledging its advances, a number of assumptions 
of this approach will be criticised. Therefore, a different view is proposed that 
imports a Theory of Mind perspective to the Social Identity approach to intergroup 
behaviour.
Within this firamework, two empirical studies were conducted. In Study 5, 
will explore how adults use Theory of Mind in natui alistic language, and how 
different social conditions, notably power differentials, might affect Theory of Mind 
usage. As a starting point, it seemed reasonable to suppose ‘race’ or ‘ethnicity’ as 
one social category that entails different degi ees of power (see Essed, 1991).
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The study consisted of ethnographic inteiviews in which informants from 
different cultural and ethnic backgrounds were asked to talk about their experiences 
with members of their own and other ethnicities. However, race was not 
presupposed as defining someone as relative powerful or powerless, rather we were 
interested in the participants’ subjective constnial of power across different 
experiences. This initial aim could only partially be piursued as participants -  
independent of their ethnicity or any other socio-structural variable - tended to 
subjectively construe them as powerless. However, the material allowed us to 
explore a related question. A number of participants talked about experiences with 
different forms of racism. Hence, we could compare possible differences and 
patterns of Theory of Mind usage as manifest in situated power usage.
But in conducting the analysis, we faced an immediate challenge; how can 
we track and categorise Theory of Mind usage? As far as we are aware, no method 
has been published that allowed us to adequately address the questions at hand. 
Therefore, a first task consisted in devising a methodological instrument that 
allowed us to organise and quantify differential Theoiy of Mind usage. This method 
is presented in Chapter 9, and applied in Chapter 10 to the qualitative and 
quantitative analysis of the interview material. Patterns of differential Theoiy of 
Mind usage in accounts of experience with discrimination will be compared to the 
way participants accounted for other kinds of experiences. Moreover, we will 
analyse how for the powerless, Theory of Mind usage is related to their own 
subsequent behaviour -  the extent to which participants also acted from the 
perspective of those who were in power. Chapter 11 presents a first endeavour to 
explore the possible effect of power on Theory of Mind usage experimentally. In 
doing so, we integrated the ‘Reading the mind in the eyes task’, an advanced test of
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Theory of Mind (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997,2001) in a role-play scenario in which 
students were either assigned to a powerful or powerless position. Chapter 12 
summarises the findings of the second part of this thesis and gives an outlook for 
futm e directions in studying Theory of Mind in adults’ intergroup relations.
In the final chapter, we will critically assess the extent to which these two 
empirical research strands have served as a vehicle to attain a more complete 
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2.1. Introduction
Autism is a severe and pervasive developmental disorder, first recognised by 
the American paediatrician Leo Kanner as early infantile autism in 1943. In a 
collection of case studies, he insightfully described the stiiking behavioural 
abnomialities shown by his young patients that remarkably differed from the clinical 
pictures displayed in any other then known psychiatric condition.
In the absence of an identified biological cause, autism has since been 
characterised and clinically diagnosed on the basis of behavioural abnormalities, 
many of which still bear on Kanner’s original observations. Abnormalities in social 
and communication development, alongside a display of repetitive interests and 
activities, cmi-ently foim the essential core diagnostic criteria (DSM-IV, American 
PsychiatiTc Association, 1994; ICD-10, World Health Organisation, 1993).
Abnormalities in all three areas may be manifest in a variety of different 
ways among different individuals with an autistic condition as well as tending to 
change their expressions within any one individual over the com se of his or her 
development. Although autism has often been discussed in terms of ‘autistic 
cliildren’, the term ‘pervasive’ suggests that it is a life-long condition that does not 
‘go away’ when adulthood is reached. Social abnormalities range from an aloof 
avoidance of others to ‘odd’ attempts to establish contact, say by giving a
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monologue about a specialised topic such as trains, oblivious to the signs of 
disinterest in the other (Wing & Gould, 1979). Children with autism typically show 
abnormalities in eye contact notably in commimicative situations, a lack of symbolic 
play, or show severe impairments in responding to others’ emotions. People with 
autism often develop language with a considerable delay, and even where verbal 
language is acquired it is sometimes used in an echolalic fashion (repeating phrases 
instead of giving an answer). Most language difficulties relate to the pragmatic 
aspects of language usage, manifest, for example, in a tendency to inteipret 
utterances in an overly literal sense, a failure to understand jokes and lies or failures 
in initiating or sustaining a conversation (Tager-Flusberg, 1981; 1993). The category 
of repetitive interests and activities includes relatively low level stereotypic 
movements, such as hand flapping, activities such as lining up objects or spinning 
toys around (instead of playing with them), as well as a strong insistence to 
sameness or the adherence to particular routines.
However, arguably, the puzzle and fascination with autism is that it does not 
present a blanket picture of impairments. Against the backgr ound of social 
impairments, many people with autism show areas of relatively preserved abilities. 
About ten times more often than in other developmental disorders, people with 
autism have special talents or skills, for example in memory, drawing, calendar 
calculation or music that exceeds the performance of most of us (Rimland & Hill, 
1984).
The different symptom manifestations are fiuther contributed by the 
individual’s general intellectual level, as autism can be accompanied by varying 
degrees of learning difficulties. Two thirds of affected individuals ftinction
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intellectually in the range of moderate to severe learning difficulties (De Myer et al, 
1974; Lockyer & Rutter, 1969; Wing & Gould, 1979), but a ‘talented minority’ 
(Happé, 1994a), often refeiTed to as people with high-functioning autism (HFA), 
have intelligence in the normal range. Hence, more severely learning disabled 
people with autism who function at the mental level of a young child may continue 
to display in adulthood behaviours that more able individuals with autism tend to 
display only in childhood.
From the above it was hoped to convey the impression that despite the 
emphasis on behavioural abnonnalities, there is no single behaviouial feature that is 
universal to all people with autism at all times (see Frith, 1989). The current trend to 
speak of autism as the ‘autistic spectrum’ (Wing, 1988), the ‘autistic syndrome’, or 
the notion of an ‘autistic continuum’ (Wing and Gould, 1979) highlights the 
diversity among children and adults with such a diagnosis.
Asperger Syndrome
In a seminal paper, Wing (1981) intioduced the work of the Austrian 
Psychiatrist Hans Asperger to a wider English speaking conununity. Only one year 
after Kamier’s publication, but independently fi*om him, Asperger had published an 
account of four patients that resembled remarkably those described by Kanner.
These patients too displayed awkward social naiveties and conununication problems 
in conjunction with intensely pursued bizane or idiosyncratic interests and inflexible 
routines. The term he chose to describe these children was autistic psychopathy in 
childhood. Wing (1991) suggested to reserve the label Asperger’s Syndrome (AS) 
for individuals who fimction at the high-end of the autism spectrum. However, she 
did not provide explicit guidelines for diagnosis, and subsequent attempts at
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definition differed in terms of what was seen as necessary or integral to this 
diagnosis in distinction fi-om a diagnosis of autism (Gillberg & Gillberg, 1989; 
Szatmari, Bartolucci, & Bremner, 1989; Tantam, 1988; Klin et al.,1995). At the time 
this thesis is written, the status of Asperger Syndrome and its relation to autism is 
the subject of a vivid debate (Pomeroy, 1998). Most researchers agiee that 
Asperger’s Syndrome falls within the autism spectrum, but there is disagi'eement as 
to whether or not it deseives a separate label in distinction fi-om individuals with 
high-functioning autism (see papers in Klin, Sparrow, & Volkmar, 2000, for the 
debate).
Currently, the diagnosis of Asperger’s Syndiome is reserved for those 
individuals for whom a diagnosis of autism is excluded specifically due to an early 
histoiy of relatively normal language acquisition as well as intelligence in the 
normal range (DSM-IV, APA, 1994; ICD-10, WHO, 1990). Impairments shown by 
individuals with Asperger’s syndrome in the thiee diagnostically relevant areas are 
usually more subtle than in the more severely affected persons with autism of 
Kaimer’s type. People with Asperger’s Syndrome have a significantly higher chance 
of leading an independent or semi-independent life, and to channel their specific 
interest into a professional cai eer. However, in these individuals, social naivety and 
a lack of common sense may stand out even more sharply against the background of 
otherwise nonnal intelligence. It is as yet unclear, whether or not autism and 
Asperger’s syndrome may differ in terms of their aetiology or their cognitive profile. 
In addition, Autism Spectrum Disorders also include individuals with the somewhat 
vague sounding diagnosis, PDD-NOS; Peivasive Developmental Disorder -  Not 




A number of family and epidemiological studies suggest that both conditions 
involve a high genetic component. One indicator for this is that males aie more often 
affected than females (3-4 ;1, Wing, 1976; Rutter, 1978). The gender ratio is even 
more strongly biased towards males in both high-functioning autism and Asperger 
Syndrome, (9:1 in milder forms of high-functioning autism, Wing, 1981, and 8:1 in 
Asperger Syndiome, Ehlers & Gillberg, 1993). Secondly, a tendency of more than 
one family member having a diagnosis of autism or Asperger’s Syndrome is much 
higher than the prevalence of both conditions in the population at large (Gillberg, ■ 
1989; Folstein & Santangelo, 1998). And a final indicator for a genetic/ heritable 
link as well as the suggestion that autism and Asperger’s Syndrome are part of the 
same spectrmn is the finding that autism and Asperger Syndrome sometimes co- 
occm* in the same families.
The relation between the genotype, brain abnomialities and the cognitive or 
behavioural phenotype do not appear to be straightfoiward. Rather, genetic factors 
are seen as a predisposition, which miglit in combination with environmental factors 
(pre-, peri- or postnatal) or mere chance factors then cause brain abnoimalities 
(Gillberg, 1991). Frith & Happé (1994) suggested that these different factors might 
channel into one common final pathway that affects the same specific components 
of the brain.
The work presented in this thesis is aimed at contributing to the 
understanding of abnormalities in cognitive mechanisms involved in autism 
specti'um disorders. It is currently assumed that the complex behavioural picture is 
not the result of one impairment only, but that the cognitive profile of autism 
spectrum disorders involves three distinct cognitive abnormalities: a deficit in
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Theory of Mind, a wealaiess in Centr al Coherence and centr al executive 
dysfiinctions (see, for example, Baron-Cohen & Swettenliam, 1997; Happé, 2001). 
As noted in Chapter 1, a deficit in Theory of Mind describes impairments in the 
rmderstanding that others’ behaviour is based on representational mental states 
(Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985; Baron-Cohen, 1995). Frith coined the term 
Wealaress in Central Coherence to describe a tendency to process information 
locally rather than holistically (Frith, 1989; Frith & Happé, 1994). Executive 
fimctions is an umbrella teiin for a group of neur opsychological skills associated 
with the fiontal lobes, which ar e assumed to be involved in plaiming, flexibility, 
particularly set shifting, and to be necessary for the inhibition of prepotent 
responses, (e.g. Hughes & Russell, 1993; Ozonoff, Rogers & Pennington, 1991; 
Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999; Ozonoff, 1995; Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996; Rumsey & 
Hamburger, 1988; Russell, 1997).
The Theory of Mind hypothesis and the Centr al Coherence Theory provided 
the backbone of the studies described in subsequent chapters. In the following 
sections, how they have contributed to fire understanding of different parts of the 
autism syndrome will be reviewed. As the executive fimction theory was not 
specifically investigated in the present research, the reader is referred to current 
research findings within this perspective and excellent reviews documented 
elsewhere (e.g. Hughes, 2001; Ozonoff & Stiayer, 2001; Russell, 1997).
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2.2. The Theory  of M ind  hypothesis of autism
2.1.1. The success story
The Theory of Mind deficit hypothesis postulates that core impairments in 
autism spring fi-om a specific cognitive deficit in representing mental states (Baron- 
Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985; Frith, 1989; Baron-Cohen, 1995). As reviewed in 
Chapter 1, the theory was built on the seminal finding reported by Baron-Cohen et 
al. (1985) that around 80% of participants with autism failed to understand a false 
belief in the ‘unexpected transfer’ task while the majority of people with learning 
difficulties of compar able mental age passed the task. In this view, the primary core 
impairment is essentially cognitive in nature, and not the result of emotional or 
affective deficits, as for example the alternative accoimt of Hobson (1989) suggests. 
The Theory of Mind theory has arguably been one of the most stimulating theories 
for research fiom the mid eighties. Not only does the idea of ‘rnindblindness’ 
(Baron-Cohen, 1995) fit intuitively well with the triad of social, conununication and 
imagination impairments that are an essential pari of the clinical picture. The 
str ength of this theory is also the capacity to generate precise and testable 
predictions of which behaviours in the three above mentioned areas should be 
impaired or relatively intact in autism.
A great deal of research has shown that people with autism typically fail the 
whole set of standard false belief tasks (see Table 2.1.), they also fail to understand 
the appearance-reality distinction (Baron-Cohen, 1989c), and use mental state terms 
to a much lesser extent in narratives than verbal mental age matched control groups 
in narr atives (Baron-Cohen et al., 1986). Wliat is more, many of the early 
abnormalities in social interaction that form part of the diagnosis -  pretend play.
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social referencing, imitation, joint attention -  can be theoretically accounted for as 
early signs or developmental precur sors of a Theory of Mind.
Further evidence for the role of Theory of Mind deficits for the behavioural 
phenotype of autism comes fi-om linking a range of language, especially 
communication deficits, to underlying Theory of Mind impairments. Notable is the 
work by Tager-Flusberg who foimd that people with autism rarely use language to 
share attention, they fail to provide new information that the listener cannot know, or 
to express intentions and other mental states in their language (Tager-Flusberg,
1992,1993, 1997, 2001). Drawing on Sperber and Wilson’s (1986) Relevance 
Theory that suggests that communication heavily relies on the understanding of 
speakers’ informative and commmiicative intentions, Happé (1993) has shown that 
most people with autism have difficulties understanding non-literal speech, such as 
jokes, irony, white lies etc., that are part of pragmatic language.
Particularly illuminating for the specific consequences of Theory of Mind 
impairments has been research that employed ‘the fine cuts method’ This term was 
coined by Frith & Happé to describe empirical investigations that pit against each 
other behaviours that only differ in the involvement of a mentalistic component. 
Other cognitive demands (e.g. in executive fimctions, the understanding of linguistic 
instructions or motivational incentives) are sought to be kept at a similar level.
Sodian and Frith (1992), for example, showed that people with autism 
performed poorly on tasks involving deception, which require the manipulation of a 
competitor’s belief by telling a lie or pointing to a wrong location. However, these 




In a similar vein, the failnie of people with autism in understanding mental 
representations were found to contrast with performance on tasks that required other 
types o f ‘external’ representations. Leekam and Pemer (1991) used an ingenuous 
scenario created by Zaitchik (1990) in which participants witnessed how a picture of 
a toy cat was taken with a polaroid camera. The photo was then placed face down, 
meanwhile the cat was removed from location A, say, a chair, to a new location, say 
a bed. The test question then asked, “In the photo, where is the cat sitting?” In 
contrast to their poor appreciation of false or out-of-date beliefs, the participants 
with autism showed all intact understanding of the ‘out-of-date’ photograph. 
Interestingly, normal children younger than foui* years were as much impaired on 
this task as on the false belief version (Zaitchik, 1990), which suggests that the 
autism group and typically developing 3-year olds may struggle with false beliefs 
for different reasons.
Challenging the idea that autism involves an across-the-board deficit in 
understanding emotions, people with autism were found to be able to accurately 
identify basic emotions, such as happiness or sadness. At the same time, they 
struggled with complex ‘cognitive’ emotions, such as surprise, that require an 
understanding that something conti’asting a person’s belief had occurred (Baron- 
Cohen, Spitz, & Cross, 1993). Table 2.1. gives a summary of research findings that 
lent support to the Theory of Mind deficit hypothesis in autism.
In summary, the success story of the Theory of Mind account of autism is 
mainly due to its precise predictions regarding differential impaiiments in social 




Table 2.1. Selection of empirical findings supporting the Theory of Mind deficit 
hypothesis
Display of deficits in early precursors of Theory of Mind
Mundy et al. 
(1986, 1989), 
Mundy, Sigman & 
Kasari (1994)
Autism group showed impairments in referential looking, 
joint attention deficits were found to relate to impairments 
in language development
Lewis & Boucher 
(1989)
Impairments in ‘spontaneous’ pretend play
Loveland & 
Landry (1986)
Autism group showed deficits in ‘protodeclarative’ pointing 
but not in ‘protoimperative’ pointing
Representational Theory of Mind deficits
Baron-Cohen et al 
(1985)
Majority of autism group failed the Sally-Ann version of 
the ‘unexpected transfer’ paradigm
Baron-Cohen et al 
(1986)




Autism group failed to distinguish between ‘appearance’ 
and ‘reality’.
Perner, Frith, 
Leslie, & Leekam. 
(1989)
Autism group failed to understand that ‘seeing-leads-to 
knowing’
Perner et al 
(1989)
Autism group failed ‘Smarties’ -  unexpected content task
Theory of Mind deficits in communication
Happé (1994b) People with HFA failed to understand non-literal language 
in ‘strange stories’, e.g. lie, white lie, double bluff, irony, 
sarcasm related to level of Theory of Mind competence 
measured on standard tasks





Rare use of language to join attention, few usage of 
mental state terms in narratives.
Sudan,et al. 
(1996)
Autistic Theory of Mind failers failed to adhere to Gricean 
Maxims
Loveland et al. 
(1990)
Children with autism did not consider their listeners’ 
needs when telling a story and produced bizarre or 
inappropriate utterances
‘Fine cuts’ distinctions
Sodian & Frith 
(1992)
Autism group failed to understand deception but not 
sabotage
Leekam & Perner, 
1991; Leslie & 
Thaiss; Charman 
& Baron-Cohen
Autism group failed to understand ‘false belief but not 
‘false photographs’, ‘false maps’ or ‘false drawings’
Baron-Cohen et al 
(1993 a)
Autism group failed to recognise ‘cognitive emotions’ (e.g. 
surprise) but understood ‘basic emotions’ (e.g. happiness)
Baron-Cohen
(1989b)
Autism impaired in use/ understanding of protodeclarative 
pointing, but relative intact of protoimperative pointing
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2.1.2. Limitations of the Theory of Mind hypothesis:
However, despite the success of the Theory of Mind hypothesis, a number of 
limitations have been noted both at the theoretical and the empirical levels:
1. Mentalising impairments are not universal to all people with autism,
2. Mentalising impairments are not unique to autism.
3. Mentalising irapainnents cannot explain the entire range of symptoms that define 
the autistic syndr ome.
Mentalising impairments are not universal to all people with autism.
One of the first challenges of the Theory of Mind hypothesis relates to the 
requirement of a ‘good’ theory to account for universality. Remember that even if 
around 80% of people with autism failed to talce a character’s false belief into 
account to make predictions, this means that a small minority of around 20% passed 
the test! Likewise, some children with autism or Asperger’s Syndrome were found 
to display some of the ‘precursor’ behaviours. However, where people with autism 
or Asperger’s Syndrome passed the test, they were usually chronologically older, 
and cmcially, had a higher mental age than typical children who master the task. 
Hence, fi'om a developmental perspective, the universality issue could be rescued by 
the somewhat weaker claim that autism or Asperger’s Syndi'ome involves a gi'oss 
delay in Theoiy of Mind acquisition (Baron-Cohen, 1989). What is more, false 
belief imderstanding cannot be seen as representing the end-point in Theory of Mind 
development. In school years and tlnough to adolescence, children make further 
improvements, such as being able to represent recursively embedded second and 
higher order mental states (see Chapter 1). Could it be that higher functioning
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individuals with ASD fail to understand higher-order mental states, which is 
necessary to understand real-life communication, such as irony? A number of 
studies have established that a minority of people with autism and Asperger 
Syndrome also successfully pass second order false belief tasks (Ozonoff et al.,
1991; Bowler, 1992; Dahlgren & Trillingsgaard, 1996). This suggests that at least a 
minority with this condition may have insight into the mind at the level of a normal 
6-8 year* old. Again, people with an autistic condition who passed the test were older 
and that leaves the possibility their Theory of Mind development was delayed at an 
earlier point. Nonetheless, these findings suggest individual differences between 
people with an autistic condition in terms of the level of their Theory of Mind 
impairments.
What are the moderating variables for success on false belief tasks in people 
with ASD? Happé (1995) reviewed a large number of studies using false belief tasks 
in autistic populations prior to 1995. Her meta-analysis suggests that for people with 
autism the probability of passing false belief tasks was related to their general level 
of development, notably their verbal mental age. Individuals with autism needed a 
far higher full scale IQ than those with learning difficulties in order to have a chance 
of passing the tasks.
Yiimiya, Solomonica-Levi, Shulman, & Pilowsky (1996) found that for the 
autism group, verbal ability correlated with Theory of Mind performance, whereas 
for a conti'ol group of individuals with learning difficulties. Theory of Mind 
correlated with non-verbal IQ. Tager-Flusberg (1997,2000) found language, and 
specifically syntactic ability, to be the single best predictor of false-belief 
performance for children with autism. Moreover, people with a diagnosis of 
Asperger’s Syndrome on the whole pass false belief tasks more often than those with
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autism (e.g. Bowler, 1992; Ozonoff, Rogers, & Pennington, 1991). It is currently 
debated whether differences in Theory of Mind performance may represent a 
cognitive domain that possibly distinguishes high-functioning autism from Asperger 
Syndrome (Ozonoff & McMahon Griffith, 2000).
Theory o f Mind deficits are not unique to people with autism.
Delays in the development of the ability to represent mental states have been 
found in other conditions, for example, in children who were bom deaf (Peterson & 
Siegal, 1995), and children with general learning difficulties (Yiimiya, Erel, Shaked, 
& Solomica-Level, 1998). ‘Hard to manage’ children with dismptive conduct 
disorder (Happé & Frith, 1996; Dunn & Hughes, 2001; Hughes, Dunn & White, 
1998) showed biases towards a theory of ‘nasty minds’, and in conjunction with 
executive function deficits, slights ToM impaiiments were related to violent pretend 
play. Additionally, Theory of Mind deficits have also been found in adults with 
schizophrenia (Corcoran 2000; Langdon & Coultheart, 2001) and people with 
acquired right hemisphere damage after stroke (Happé, Brownell, & Winner, 1999). 
These conditions do not shai'e the characteristic social, imagination, and 
communication deficits with the autism syndrome.
Mentalising deficits cannot explain the entire range o f symptoms defining the 
autistic syndrome
As a domain-specific ability, dedicated to the social domain, the Theory of 
Mind account has trouble generating predictions for the presence or absence of the 
non-social features that form part of the syndrome. For example, from a Theory of 
Mind perspective, repetitive behaviours and restricted interests, which foim an
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essential diagnostic category, are assigned the status of ‘secondary symptoms of 
Minds’—the by-product or consequence of an attempt to re-establish order in an 
otherwise confusing and unpredictable world (e.g. Frith, 1989; Joliffe et al., 1992).
Moreover, as Happé (1997,1999) has pointed out, as a deficit account its 
weakness becomes particularly appar ent in relation to preseived or superior skills 
and the fascinating unusual talents. For example, why and how could a deficit in 
Theory of Mind relate to good rote memory drawing abilities, absolute pitch or 
astoimding abilities in calendar calculation?
Researchers have been most concerned with the first and third criticism. The 
criticism that Theory of Mind deficits have been found in other populations may be 
less challenging. Possibly, their difficulties with false belief tasks might have 
different reasons or their mentalising deficits take a different developmental course, 
and are not -  as in autism - accompanied by the earlier deficits in ‘precursors’ to a 
Theory of Mind.
Let us now consider different suggestions concerned with the imiversality 
issue. Not only is the finding that some people with ASD pass Theory of Mind tasks 
a challenge for the universality claim, it raises another important question: why does 
good perfonnance on standard Theory of Mind tasks not translate into 
commensurate social competence in unstructiued naturalistic situations?
A first suggestion was that task success might not reflect genuine 
mentalising competence. Perhaps people with autism use compensatory strategies, 
which allows them to ‘hack out’ the conect solution (see Frith, 1989) but this does 
not mean that they have an intuitive understanding of the characters mental states.
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This possibility was given fiirther room by the critique that standard experimental 
Theory of Mind tasks might have more the char acter of an explicit problem solving 
situation - where the problem to be solved is explicitly spelled out in form of the 
test question (Klin, 2000). Crucially, the character of most naturalistic situations is 
quite different. Participants in real life are required to spontaneously detect the 
relevant aspects of the social situation, as for example emotional expressions, and to 
quickly respond to them.
hi order to account for the possibility that task success may be an artefact of 
a problem-solving situation, some authors have sought to create more naturalistic 
situations, as well as they have begun to investigate subtler mindreading difficulties. 
These include to present people with ASD with stories of everyday life (Kaland et 
al, 2002), using movies instead of static stories as stimuli (Heavey et al., 2000), or to 
present them with situations, such as embarrassment (Hillier & Allinson, 2002). As 
a good slice of the high-fimctioning group with ASD were now caught as failing 
these naturalistic tasks, the possibility remains that their Theory of Mind 
competence might have been fragile. This might have allowed them to show 
relatively good performance on tasks in which the to-be-computed mental state is 
presented in a more explicit way, but does not reflect a full intuitive understanding 
of more demanding social situations. However, a smaller minority has been found to 
perform relatively well across a range of different task situations, which suggests 
that a small proportion of people with ASD might after all possess true Theory of 
Mind competencies.
A second possibility could be that what these high-functioning individuals 
experience is not so much be a competence, but rather a performance problem in the
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sense that the difficulty for them consists of using their existing Theory of Mind on­
line in a complex, rapidly changing environment (Vinden & Astington, 2000; Klin, 
Schultz & Cohen, 2000). Here, we shall distinguish between two different types of 
accounts of such a perfonnance difficulty.
Recently, a number of authors have suggested thinking of Theory of Mind in 
a broader sense. Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan (2000) suggested a ‘componential 
model of Theory of Mind’, which consists of two components. These two 
components are assumed to depend on distinct underlying neuio-cognitive 
mechanisms and to have different developmental trajectories. A ‘cognitive 
component’ refers to what has traditionally been regarded as a representational 
Theory of Mind in the nanower sense. A second ‘ social-perceptual component’ 
includes immediate or on-line facets of social perception, such as the ability to 
distinguish between people and objects and emotion processing, especially the 
recognition of facial expressions of emotions. Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan (2000) 
refeiTed to earlier independent suggestions by Baron-Cohen and Hobson that the 
cognitive Theory of Mind component develops firom tins social-perceptual 
component -jo in t attention mechanisms and eye direction detection in Baron- 
Cohen’s model, and basic emotions in Hobson’s proposal. The suggestion is that the 
social-perceptual component may remain impaired in high-functioning people with 
autism or Asperger’s syndrome even after they have acquired a representational 
imderstanding of mental states.
Evidence that the perceptual component may be impaired comes from 
studies by Baron-Cohen et al (1997, 2001) that foimd that people with high-
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ftmctioning autism or Asperger’s Syndrome had difficulties reading mental states 
fi-om photographs of the eye region. Although this task required participants to 
understand the cognitive component of mental states, such as expressions of 
embarrassment, it is possible that their difficulties related to impairments in 
perceiving the cues emitted by the eyes, rather than having a deficit in teims of the 
mental lexicon of the expressions involved.
Klin (2000) asked high-functioning individuals with autism who had passed 
standard Theory of Mind task to watch a silent cartoon modelled on Heider’s famous 
par adigm. It has been repeatedly found tliat people without a clinical condition 
readily anthropomorphize the stimuli (composed of moving geometrical shapes), 
and attribute mental states to the geometric figures, as for example “the small 
triangle was jealous of the big triangle etc”. By contrast, Klin et al found that about 
three-quar ters of the participants with autism restricted their narratives only to 
physical geometric descriptions.
In a recent study using sophisticated eye-tr acking technology, Klin et al 
(2002) fomid that typical viewers of film sequences depicting complex social 
interactions focused on the eye-region, whereas viewers with autism predominantly 
focused on the mouth region. This study implies that not attending to the relevant 
social perceptual cues emitted by the actors might be -  on the processing scale -  a 
precursor for difficulties integr ating relevant input information with mentalistic 
computations.
Another possibility for deficient usage of Theory of Mind in practice could 
be that these social impairments in people with high-functioning autism or 
Asperger’s Syndrome may be due to other cognitive abnormalities associated with
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these disorders that are of independent origins but participate in the on-line 
mindreading process. There is mounting evidence that beside Theory of Mind 
impairments, further cognitive abnormalities associated with the autistic syndrome 
are centr al executive dysfunctions and a weakness in Central Coherence. For 
example, it has been found that people who pass Theory of Mind tasks still display a 
weakness in Central Coherence (Frith & Happé, 1994). These cognitive 
abnormalities might impair individuals with autism or Asperger’s Syndrome to 
compute relevant input information on which a specialised Theory of Mind 
mechanism relies to make mentalistic inferences.
hr summary, most researchers agree that a substantial delay in Theory of 
Mind acquisition is a central cognitive abnormality in autism spectrum disorders but 
few would maintain that it can accoimt for the entire autistic syndrome.
Disagr eement is as to whether Theory of Mind deficits ai'e the core impairment or 
whether, alternatively, difficulties representing mental states may be part of a wider 
cognitive or emotional abnormality. Whilst earlier research mainly concentrated on 
the exploration of between-group differences, evidence that some people with 
autism pass so-called standard theory of mind tasks calls for the need to consider in 
more detail the reasons for individual differences in Theory of Mind amongst the 




2.3. Seeing  the  pieces bu t  ignoring  the  w h ole :
Th e  Central Coherence Theory
2.3.1. Origins of Central Coherence Theory: classic findings
At a time when most research with autism concentrated on the social part of 
the syndrome, Frith (1989) developed an ambitious theory that aimed to relate the 
social and non-social featuies on the basis of one common imdeiiying cognitive 
peculiarity: weak Cential Coherence. This term describes a preference to process 
incoming information in a featural manner, with an eye for detail but at the expense 
of integrating information into a coherent whole. Frith's theory was built on a 
number of empirical findings, whose significance laid dormant during the decade 
during which most research concentrated on social dysfimctions. For example, 
pioneering experimental work by Hermelin and O’Connor (1967) showed that 
people with autism had a relatively good memory for imconnected word strings. In 
contrast to contiol groups, who maikedly improved when words were presented as 
meaningful sentences, the participants with autism did not seem to benefit fiom 
meaning in the same way (Hermelin & O’Connor, 1967). Most influential, however, 
was arguably the imexpected result by Shah & Frith (1983) who gave relatively low 
functioning children and adolescents with autism the children’s version of the 
Embedded Figures Task (EFT). This task requires locating a simple shape, for 
example, a triangle, within a larger and more complex figure. The challenge is that 
the complex design is arranged so as to obscure the location of the simple shape. 
Contrary to the expectation that autism might involve visuo-spatial deficits, the 
autism gr oup excelled on this task, performing significantly better than both normal 
children and children with learning difficulties matched in terms of their mental age.
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This suggested that autism caimot in all respects be seen as a disability, particularly 
as even individuals with autism at the lower-functioning end with accompanying 
learning difficulties demonstrated this superior performance. Moreover, the study 
also indicated that autism might involve abnormalities in information processing in 
the non-social domain (see also Joliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997).
Another commonly reported ‘islet of ability’ of the cognitive profile of people with 
autism is good performance on the Block Design sub-scale of the Wechsler 
hitelligence Test, relative to both performance on other sub-tests and the person’s 
overall mental age (Lockyer & Rutter, 1970; Prior, 1979). Although Wechsler used 
the task as a measur e for abstract conceptualisation and visual spatial skills, the task 
was first developed by Kohs (1923) within the Gestalt tradition and the intent to 
measure the ability to break up overall patterns into their logical units. Only if this is 
achieved can the participant successfirlly reconstruct the pattern from the available 
blocks.
In an early study. Frith and Snowling (1983) compared children with autism and 
dyslexia on a series of tasks that required integrating words by using the semantic 
context. For example, on a ‘Homographs Task’ (words with one spelling but two 
different meanings and pronunciations, as for example “hr her dress there was a big 
tear”, and “in her eye there was a big tear”) participants were simply asked to read 
the sentences. Frith and Snowling found that children in the autism group showed 
impairments in using the preceding sentence context to determine the pronunciation 
of the homographs.
In order to account for the above-mentioned series of findings, Frith drew on 
insights from Gestalt psychologists who have argued that we normally have a ‘drive’
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to process the holistic properties of a stimulus prior to its constituent parts. Only if 
this drive is overcome, can we detect a part that is embedded within the holistic 
percept (Koffka, 1935; Kohler, 1929). If normal information processing is 
characterized by a ‘force’ that pulls together large amounts of information to extract 
a gist, establish coherence, or give ‘global meaning’, what would happen if such a 
drive were weaker than normal? Information might be processed more locally, in a 
piece-meal fashion and with a focus on details over the whole. Frith suggested that 
such a tendency might penetrate information processing across different domains, 
but with rather different consequences for each. In the non-social domain, a 
tendency to attend to local information, paired with a resistance to context 
information, might at times be advantageous. However, the same tendency would 
inevitably lead to disadvantages in situations where it is necessary to integrate 
information in its context in order to extract meaning: the social domain.
In recent years. Centr al Coherence Theory has stimulated a considerable amount of 
empirical research. One of the appeals of this theory is that it seems to fit with 
intuitions about a “good eye for details”. For example, many children with autism 
are good at putting together jigsaw puzzles and ar e often as quick when the pieces 
are upside down than when they are upright. When looking at a picture they might 
remark on a little ball in the left comer, but not on the global scenery. Another clear 
asset of Central Coherence Theory is that it has the potentiality to account for those 
parts of the syndrome that are spared or skills and abilities at which people with 
ASD aie good. Before Frith’s proposal, this interesting part of the autistic syndrome 




2.3.2, The current state of the art
In recent years, a considerable amount of research generated by the Central 
Coherence Theory was particulaiiy motivated by the aim to specify the nature of 
cognitive abnormalities related to the strength of the autistic intellect in the visuo- 
spatial and perceptual domains. Yet a parallel research avenue further explored the 
predicted impaiiments in extracting meaning in the semantic domain. Table 2.2 
gives a summary of empirical findings in these three meas. Shah and Frith (1993) 
replicated earlier findings that people with autism performed better on the Block 
Design test than their mental age would predict. Even more telling for a fragmented 
cognitive style were the results on a second condition, in which the patterns were 
presented as pre-segmented. Unlike typical control participants who markedly 
improved in this condition, the autism group was not to the same extent aided by 
pre-segmentation. This suggested that they already spontaneously resisted the 
Gestalt force and might also have perceived the line drawings as segmented into 
block units in the unsegmented condition.
Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen (1997) replicated peak performance on the 
Embedded Figures task in adults with either high-functioning autism or Asperger’s 
Syndrome. Complementing Shah & Frith’s (1983) earlier findings, this result 
showed that a good eye for detail might be prevalent across ability levels.
However, talcing the idea of Central Coherence fur ther, it could be predicted 
that normal people find it harder to spot a target shape when hidden in a meaningfirl 
gestalt than when it is embedded in meaningless or abstract figures. On the contrary, 
people with autism - who are expected to have this drive for meaning to a lesser 
extent - should not be disturbed by the meaningfirl shape in the same way.
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Table 2.2 Selected findings supporting and challenging Central Coherence Theory
Task Finding
Block Design Task (Shah & Frith, 
1993)
Autism group performed superior to controls
Embedded Figures Task 
(Children's version) (Shah & Frith, 
1983)
Autism group performed superior to controls /
Embedded Figures Task (Adult 
version) (Joliffe & Baron-Cohen, 
1997)
Autism group performed superior to controls /
Modified version of EF task 
(Bryant & Brison, 1996)
As controls, ASD group was also slower in 
finding a target figure when hidden in a 
meaningful design
Navon’s task
(Mottron & Belleville, 1993)
Autism group showed efficient global 
processing when letters were congruent on 
the local and global levels, but impaired 
efficiency in processing the global 
component in the incongruent condition
/ /
Navon’s task (Ozonoff, Strayer, 
McMahon & Filoux, 1994)
People with autism showed as much global 
advantage as normal participants
-
Navon’s task
(Plaisted, O’Riorden & Baron- 
Cohen, 1998)
Autism group made global errors in a 
divided attention condition, but was as quick 
in responding to the global target in the 
selective attention condition
y/
(Rhinehart et al, 2000) Faster response to global, as compared to 
local stimuli, slower response to local stimuli 
when global form was associated with 
different response, incongruent local 





Low-functioning individuals with autism 
succumb under visual illusions
y
Thouless paradigm 
Ropar & Mitchell (2002)
Autism group exaggerated circularity to a 
smaller extent in the prior knowledge 




Ropar & Mitchell (1999, 2001)
Autism group was susceptible to visual 
illusions measured by manual adjustment 
and verbal responses
Homograph task (Frith & 
Snowling, 1983)
Children with atuism fail to use sentence 
information to disambiguate pronunciation 
of homographs
y
Homograph Task (Frith & 
Snowling, 1986)
Children with autism improve when being 
instructed to read for meaning
y
Homograph Task (Happe, 1997) Replication of Frith & Snowling in older and 
higher-functioning individuals who passed 
Theory of Mind tasks
y
Sentence Completion task 
(Happe, 2001)
Children with autism complete sentences 




Brian and Bryson (1996) tested this prediction with results challenging for 
Centi'al Coherence Theory, as the participants with autism were also slower in finding 
the embedded figure in the meaningful picture.
Of particular interest is the question whether a putative weakness in Centr al 
Coherence indeed translates into preserved or superior skills, for example, the 
sometimes occumng extraordinary drawing talents or the musical ‘absolute pitch’. 
Pring, Hermelin and Heavey (1995) gave the Block Design Test to people with autism 
with or without a considerable dr awing talent. The two autism sub-groups were then 
compared with typical children who were also divided up depending upon whether or 
not they had an artistic talent. Both ‘talented’ groups (including those with and without 
autism) outperformed the children (with and without autism) who did not have a 
drawing talent in performance speed. Whilst there was no difference between the 
performance of the two talented gr oups, in the ‘non-talented’ groups, the children with 
autism performed better than those without autism, which replicates Shah and Frith’s 
finding discussed above. Interestingly, this finding points to the possibility of individual 
differences on the Block Design Task both within the normal and the autism population.
In summary, with the exception of Brian and Bryson’s finding, the Block Design 
and Embedded Figures Tasks have produced the most robust results.
Given that Weak Central Coherence is conceptualised as an amodal force.
Happé (1997) reasoned that this cognitive style could also affect very low levels of 
perception. It has consistently been found that healthy individuals succumb to visual 
illusions, such as the famous Muller-Lyer illusion in which a line appears shorter when
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bracketed by arrows pointing away than aiTows pointing to the line. However if people 
with autism had fragmented perception, they may mainly focus on the instiiicted part 
without integrating it with the illusion-inducing context. Hence, Happé predicted that 
people with autism would be better at resisting visual illusions. She asked participants 
with and without autism to compare a number of standard visual illusions with a 
comparison element (e.g. line, triangle, circle) and to indicate whether they looked the 
same. In line with her prediction, she found that people with autism significantly more 
often resisted the illusion than comparison groups. However, recently, Ropar and 
Mitchell (1999, 2001) have criticised the methodology used in Happé’s original study. 
They pointed out that the procedure lacked a condition in which participants could score 
correct for answering ‘different’, which therefore raised the possibility that the result 
might have been an artefact of the questioning. The same predictions were tested using 
a more sophisticated computer method that relied less heavily on verbal responses, as 
participants were asked to manually adjust the size of one of the inner circles of the 
Titchener illusion so that it matched the other. With two separate samples Ropar and 
Mitchell (1999, 2001) failed to replicate Happé’s finding -  their participants with 
autism were just as susceptible to the visual illusion as controls. Moreover, when 
performance on the Block Design and Embedded Figures task was also tested, 
conelation analyses showed little or no evidence for the suggestion that WCC was the 
common factor accounting for susceptibility.
Further research investigating visual-perceptual abnormalities in Autism 
Spectmm Disorders was motivated by a rival account, the Absence of Global
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precedence Theory” (also called Hierarchical Deficit account) (Mottion & Belleville), 
which was developed from Navon’s (1977) Global Precedence Theory. This account 
suggests that normally the perception of global stimuli precedes the perception of local 
stimuli, and that global processing is normally not interfered with by local details. Much 
of this research has employed Navon’s ‘hierarchical letter paradigm’, in which a large 
letter is composed of smaller ones. A global advantage effect would be manifest if the 
participant responded faster and more accurately to the large ‘global’ letters, whereas a 
‘global interference effect’ would be demonstrated by slower and less accurate 
responses.
A number of studies using this paradigm (see Table 2.2) have produced mixed 
results. Suggestions have been made that inconsistencies in these findings may be 
related to differences in population characteristics (Rhinehart et al., 2000) or task 
administration, such as the duration of stimuli (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997), In 
summary, the inconsistency in performance shown by the autism group on this line of 
research represents a challenge for Centr al Coherence Theory, which suggests global 
processing may be deficient in autism in some conditions (Mottron and Belleville,
1993) but normal under others (Ozonoff, Strayer, McMahon & Filloux, 1994; Mottron, 
Burack, Stauder & Robaey, 1999).
Research investigating weakness in Central Coherence in the semantic domain 
include Happé’s study (1997) who replicated Frith & Snowling’s (1983) original 
finding that people with autism have difficulties using preceding sentence information 
to disambiguate pronunciation of homographs in a higher-functioning gr oup that passed
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Theory of Mind tasks. Jolliffe (1997) designed an Inference and an Ambiguous 
Sentence Task. Here, people with autism demonstrated failure to select the most 
coherent bridging inference and to use context to interpret an ambiguous sentence.
More recently, Happé (2000) used a Sentence Completion Task that consists of a set of 
sentence stems (e.g. the sea tastes of salt and...) and the participant is required to 
complete the sentence with whatever first comes to his or her mind. It was found that 
people with autism more often completed the sentence locally with a common associate 
to the last word, for example, salt and pepper, ignoring the preceding sentence context 
which results, as in the above example, in meaningless sentences.
In summary, curr ently a wealth of research that supports the notion of weak 
Central Coherence in ASD in the visuo-spatial, perceptual, and semantic domains 
stands alongside a mounting number of studies that failed to find a preponderance for 
featural processing.
2.3.3. Outstanding questions
1. Is WCC as a relative tendency? As acknowledged by Happé (1997), a 
wealaiess of the theory in its curr ent conceptualisation lies in the loose definition of the 
very notion of Central Coherence and the mechanisms involved. Clearly, the tenet that 
people with autism perceive the world in a fragmented, piece-meal fashion cannot be 
absolute; Individuals with autism see houses and not only windows and doors, and they 
perceive people and not only individual body parts. Hence, it appears more plausible to 
think of a fr agmented perceptual style as a relative tendency (see also Baron-Cohen &
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Swettenham, 1997). If their preference for details is relative, however, it remains 
unclear as to ‘what’ it is relative to.
2. Are there individual differences in CC amongst people with ASD and in the 
typical population? Although Central Coherence Theory has been studied in people 
with an autistic condition at very different levels of intellectual abilities, it remains 
unclear whether amongst the autism/ Asperger Syndrome groups, there may be degrees 
of weakness in Centr al Coherence, perhaps akin to levels of Theory of Mind 
understanding. Large inter-individual differences on more standard tests, such as the 
Block Design Task or the Embedded Figures Test, suggest considerable variability 
within the ‘normal’ range.
3. What is the developmental trajectory of Central Coherence in the normal 
population? What is lacking to date, are clear guidelines for comparison -  Central 
Coherence Theory has mainly been developed in relation to its putative.abnormality in 
autism -  so that at this moment relatively little is known about how this cognitive style 
develops in normal children. What is the normal developmental trajectory of Central 
Coherence, or else could it be a relatively stable tendency? One interesting possibility, 
discussed by Happé (1999) relates to Takeuchi and Hules’ (1993) suggestion that 
absolute pitch can be learned by most children before about 6 years of age, due to their 
‘ability’ to perceive individual features. Happé (1999) suggested that a local processing 
bias might remain pervasive in autism throughout development, thus enabling the high 
frequency of absolute pitch seen in this condition whereas in normal children there 




4. Within-subject data: is CC an amodal force, penetrating at once infomiation 
processing in different domains? Most studies to date have employed between-subject 
designs but little is actually known about Frith’s central claim that Central Coherence is 
an amodal force, which influences at once different areas within individuals. 
Consequentially, the prediction would be that there should be a high correlation 
between the performances of different CC tasks tapping on different domains. One of 
the few relevant studies was conducted by Happé, Briskman and Frith (2001), in which 
parents of children with autism, dyslexia or normally developing children were 
compared on a battery of tasks that involved visual illusions, the Embedded Figures 
Task and the Sentence Completion Task. Although for fathers of children with autism, a 
tendency towards weakness in Central Coherence mainly yielded advantages, in line 
with Frith’s original theory, they too, showed relative impairments on the semantic 
Sentence Completion Task.
5. A neurofunctional account? A neurofunctional account for the hypothesised 
drive for weak Central Coherence is as yet missing.
6. How does Weak Ceritral Coherence affect social behaviour? Central 
Coherence Theory also generates predictions about social abnormalities. As Klin et al 
(2002) have noted, research on Central Coherence Theory has so far made few attempts 
to substantiate the distinct association between weak Central Coherence and the social 
dysfunctions in autism.
To sum up. Central Coherence Theory is unparalleled in the effort to account for 
an important aspect of the clinical picture of autism spectr um disorders -  spared or even
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superior skills -  that none of the deficit accounts, as the Theory of Mind hypothesis or 
the executive dysfunction theory, can adequately address.
Considerable empirical evidence lends support to the prediction that a piecemeal 
processing style leads to advantages in the perceptual and visuo-spatial domains, but to 
disadvantages in the semantic domain. Futuie work is needed to address outstanding 
questions on the empirical and theoretical levels.
2.4. A  NEW APPROACH: S tu d y in g  c u l t u r a l  k n o w le d g e  w ith in  th e
FRAMEWORK OF A CONTBXTUALISED PERSPECTIVE ON THEORY OF MiND IN 
PRACTICE
The aim of the empirical research presented in subsequent chapters was to 
investigate the extent to which individuals with an autism spectrum disorder might have 
deficits or abnoimalities in the acquisition of different facets of cultural knowledge. The 
approach put foi*ward acknowledges the possibility that a few people with this condition 
could have genuine metarepresentational capacities, but it is suggested that their 
remaining difficulties (as well as difficulties for the more severely affected individuals) 
may lie in the disability to connect those with relevant ‘input’ or content information.
On a meta-theoretical level, both the Theoiy of Mind and Centr al Coherence 
accounts assume a causal model of three levels of explanation. The diversity of 
behavioural manifestations is caused by one (or more) cognitive abnormalities which 
are in turn rooted in one (or more) biological abnormalitie(s) (Morton & Frith, 1994).
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The present proposal is that we need to add another level to the picture -  the 
cultural level - , which is thought to mediate between cognition and specific behavioural 
manifestations.
Chapter 1 introduced cultural psychology, which argues that culture influences 
how and what we think. Recall Quinn and Holland’s definition of cultural knowledge 
(1987) as some “.. .presupposed models of the world that are widely shared by the 
members of a society and that play a cmcial role in their understanding of that world 
and specific actions in it.” (p.4). By putting culture in the middle, the overarching 
question that concerns us is thus: Could it be that autism spectmm disorders involve 
impaiiment in the acquisition of those facets of cultural laiowledge? To make this 
concept more tangible, let us think of it as real world knowledge of social noims and 
customs, a set of beliefs that guide us in what social actions are expected, acceptable or 
inappropriate in different situations, and as event knowledge, or scripts.
To avoid misunderstandings: the present proposal does not suggest that 
individuals with autism or Asperger’s Syndrome are in every respect ‘acultural’. As 
Baron-Cohen (1993) has pointed out, many people with an autistic condition can even 
be innovative in creating novel cultural artefacts, such as paintings, or in the 
construction of systems, such as in the domains of engineering or physics (Baron- 
Cohen, 2003). In Tomasello’s account, creation and innovation are, however, only one 
facet of cultural advancements. The other part, he suggests, consists of the ability to 
faithfully pass on those inventions and iimovations to other members of the community. 
Our proposal relates to this second facet of cultural learning, specifically to the more
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naiTow part of it that we, following the above definition, call cultural knowledge or 
cultural representations.
Why should we expect cultural knowledge to be impaired in ASD? So far, we 
know very little about the exact cognitive mechanisms necessary for the acquisition of 
cultural knowledge. Of course, there is a first possibility that cultural knowledge is 
acquired on the basis of general learning mechanisms. However, as discussed in 
Chapter 1, theorists have argued that the representation of cultural knowledge might not 
follow logical reasoning principles but that cultural knowledge is organised in a 
different, ‘non-logical’ way. In this light, a ‘paradigmatic mode of thought’ (Bmner, 
1986), as for example, deductive and inductive reasoning skills, might not lead one the 
whole way to cultural knowledge acquisition.
A second possibility would be that cultural knowledge acquisition might rely on 
distinct cognitive abilities. Several authors -  albeit coming fi-om different departure 
points -  have argued that in fact Theory of Mind might play a role in cultural 
knowledge acquisition (e.g. Mead, 1934; Theory of Mindasello, Kruger & Ratner, 1993; 
Theory of Mindasello, 1999; Sperber, 1996, 1997). Tomasello suggested that Theory of 
Mind or its precursors (imitation, joint attention) enable the child to engage in cultural 
forms of learning that may be beyond the reach of other non-human species: imitative 
learning, instructive learning and collaborative learning. Through these cultural learning 
processes, the child can actively learn about the culture in which he or she is raised.
Bmner (1986) suggested that Theory of Mind may be part of a broader mode of 
thinking: the interpretive mode. Sperber has argued that a metarepresentational ability
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might be necessary to acquire shared beliefs. The content of these beliefs, often 
downplayed in the Theory of Mind literature, is, as Sperber has pointed out, non-trivial, 
because they are so widely shared. Addressing the question “how do beliefs become 
cultural?”, he suggested (Sperber, 1996, 1997) to distinguish between two ‘types’ of 
beliefs, both of which can either be descriptive or normative but they fiindamentally 
differ in teims of the way in which they are acquired. Intuitive beliefs (e.g. “Charcoal is 
black”) are acquired either through perceptual experiences or inferences thereof; they 
are common and widely shared within and between cultures, because as humans, we 
share a similar perceptual apparatus. Reflective beliefs, on the contiary, are of an 
altogether different nature: reflective beliefs are acquired vicariously, not through one’s 
own experience, but they are communicated to us by others, whom we trust, for 
example the belief that ‘the earth is round’, that ‘god sees everything’ or that ‘there are 
male and female plants’. These beliefs are often only half-understood ideas (Sperber 
calls them semi-propositional representations, 1985b), beyond the realm of full 
understanding of the child or sometimes even the adult (as in the case of religious 
beliefs, or scientific beliefs, such as relativity theory e=mc2). However, they are 
reflectively represented in the mind in the sense that they are believed in virtue of 
second-order beliefs about them. (e.g. “What Mum says is true. Mum says God is 
everywhere”.)
hi brief, Sperber’s suggests the possibility that the Theory of Mind deficit 
involved in autism may impair individuals with this condition even in the acquisition of 




Yet a third possibility could be that some facets of cultural knowledge might be 
impaired in autism due to factors independent from Theory of Mind. More specificially, 
previous theories (Schank & Abelson, 1977; Mandler, 1983; Nelson, 1986) have 
established that one facet of cultural knowledge; scripts (also called ‘generalised event 
representations’) are hierarchically organised, holistic knowledge structures. It could be 
expected that people with preponderance for piecemeal processing might be 
disadvantaged in grasping the character of those laiowledge stmctures.
Hypotheses;
Based on these different arguments, a number of alternative hypotheses were 
generated:
1) The null-hypothesis would be that cultural knowledge is acquired thiough 
general learning mechanisms, or that it might be mediated by language. In this case, we 
would expect cultural knowledge to be relatively intact in ASD and only contingent on 
the individual’s general intellect, especially verbal intelligence. In other words, we 
would expect to see a continuous impairment in cultural knowledge from high to low 
functioning autism; and at each level of intellectual functioning, it should be at a similar 
level in people with ASD as in people with corresponding learning difficulties but 
without autism.
2) If some aspects of cultural knowledge (i.e. event scripts) relied on distinct 
cognitive abilities that are abnormal in ASD independent from Theory of Mind 
impaiiments - Weak Central Coherence - then we would expect to find a between-group
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difference. The ASD group as a whole, including those who pass Theory of Mind tasks, 
would be predicted to show more impairment in cultural knowledge than control groups 
who do not have this processing preference.
3) If the acquisition of some aspects of cultural knowledge (real world 
knowledge of social norms and customs, scripts to some extent) relied indirectly on 
Theory of Mind, then individual differences amongst the ASD population would be 
expected. People with ASD who fail standard Theory of Mind tasks should show 
greater impairments than individuals with this condition who pass the tasks.
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Th eo r y  of M in d  a n d  c entr a l  c o h e r e n c e :
A re  there  in d iv id u a l  d iffer en c es  a m o n g st  in d iv id u a l s  
WITH AN A u t ism  Spec tr u m  D iso r d e r ?
3.1. Introduction
The overall aim of the main studies, reported in Chapters 4 to 6, was to 
investigate whether people with an Autism Specti'um Disorder (ASD) would show to a 
gi'eater extent difficulties in their understanding of cultural knowledge than individuals 
who function at a similar intellectual and developmental level but who do not have an 
autistic condition. Since the argument was that possible abnormalities in the 
development or usage of cultural knowledge may be related to distinct cognitive 
abnoimalities in Theory of Mind (Theory of Mind) or Cential Coherence (CC), the 
present study involved two experiments that were aimed at assessing the extent to 
which participants who took part in this research showed abnoimalities in these two 
cognitive abilities.
3.2. O verv iew  o f  P a r t ic ip a n ts  a n d  g e n e r a l  p ro c e d u re  o f  s tu d ie s  1 -4
3.2.1.Participants
In all studies that comprise the empirical research of the first part of this thesis, 
four participant groups took part. These included overall twenty-five individuals with an
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Autism Specti'um Disorder (ASD), ten individuals with moderate global learning 
difficulties* (of which one girl had Down’s syndrome), sixteen nonnally developing 
children aged six to ten years and sixteen adults. Since we aimed to compare potential 
impaiiments in cultural knowledge between people with ASD with different levels of 
Theory of Mind competence and previous research has shown that Theory of Mind 
abilities require higher chronological age and intellectual abilities (Yirmyia et al., 1996, 
1998; Happé, 1994c. 1995, see Chapter 2), we deliberately targeted individuals from the 
very high to the medium functioning range of the autism spectium.
Of the autism spectrum group, thirteen individuals had received a diagnosis of 
Asperger’s Syndrome (3 females, 10 males) and twelve a diagnosis of autism (2 
females, 10 males). The gender ratio of the present sample roughly corresponds to the 
male-female ratio typical for this population (Wing, 1981; Ehlers & Gillberg, 1993). 
Participants with ASD were diagnosed by experienced clinicians according to either 
DSM-III or DSM-IV criteria. For four individuals with ASD, the criteria underlying 
diagnosis could not be ti aced back. None of the participants in the autism specti um 
group had received a diagnosis of PDD-NOS.
Participants were recruited through a number of different avenues. Participants 
with ASD attended an independent special needs school specifically for
' Further eleven adolescents with learning difficulties were screened for suitability as controls for the 
Asperger’s Syndrome group by initially giving them the standard false belief task and a simple sorting 
task. None of these individuals passed the memory control questions, and the majority even struggled 
with a task that required to sort simple shapes. Consequentially, these individuals had to be considered as 
functioning at an intellectual level too low to be suitably matched with the Asperger Syndrome group 
who had intelligence in the normal range or bordering the normal range.
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children on the autism spectrum, or were recruited via two support groups for 
adolescents or adults with Asperger’s Syndrome and the Scottish Society for People 
with Autism. Most of the adolescents and adults with Asperger’s Syndrome are or have 
been in mainstream education.
The participants with learning difficulties were recruited via two special needs 
schools and one support group for adults. Typically developing children were drawn 
from a local primary school, and the adult control group was recruited from amongst the 
St Andrews student population.
The experimenter was familiar with the adolescents and adults recruited fiom 
the support groups prior to the testing sessions. The childr en with ASD and learning 
difficulties were selected in consultation with their teachers who were informed of the 
intent of the study and the verbal and cognitive demands of the task battery. With the 
teachers’ permission, the children had the possibility to become familiar with the 
experimenter during 2 to 3 full days of classroom and playtime observation.
3,2.2. General procedure of studies 1 to 4
The majority of children with ASD or learning difficulties were seen at their 
school; the adolescents and adults with Asperger’s Syndrome were visited at home or 
were tested at the Psychology department at St Andrews University. Control adults 
were tested at the Psychology department. With the exception of the adult control 
group, from whom written consent was obtained, all other groups were seen with 
written consent of their parents or caregivers. In addition, before each session, 
participants were verbally asked whether or not they wanted to participate.
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The number of testing sessions varied according to individual preferences and 
abilities. Adolescents and adults with Asperger’s Syndrome were seen on average on 
two separate occasions for approximately two hours each. Breaks in between tasks were 
given when required. For the typical children, children with ASD and with learning 
difficulties, testing sessions were split up into half-hour sessions. The typical children 
were seen on average on five occasions, the children on the autistic spectrum and with 
learning difficulties each six to seven times.
Some participants could not be given the whole task battery. Amongst the 
autism spectrum group, one child had left the school after the first testing phase, one 
child only entered the school after the testing sessions had already begun, and two 
adults were no longer available after the first home visit. In addition, for some children, 
data on some tasks is missing because they were not available on a particular testing 
day. Across the different groups, participants showed high motivation and willingness 
to cooperate. Of the whole sample, only one individual with Asperger’s Syndrome 
refused to further co-operate half-way tluough the test batteiy after she had felt that she 
had not performed well on the Block Design Task. Therefore, exact participant details 
will be given for each task separately.
3.2.3. IQ estimates and group matching
To prorate the level of intellectual functioning of the two clinical groups, 
participants were given a short-form of the revised Wechsler Intelligence Test for
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children or adults, respectively (Wechsler, 1974,1981). The short form employed two 
verbal sub-scales (vocabulary, similarities) and two performance sub-scales (object 
assembly, picture completion). The choice of giving a short form, rather than the full 
test, was motivated by time constraints. Short forms have been reported to show a high 
validity in predicting full length IQ (ranging from .84 to .96, see for a review, Crawford, 
Allan and Jack, 1992), and have previously been employed in the literature (e.g. Happé, 
Briskman, & Frith, 2001). We are, however, aware of the limitations of IQ-prorating. 
Despite this, since om* aim was not to specifically investigate the intelligence profile in 
these groups, but only sought to approximately match the two clinical groups in terms 
of their intellectual level, the decision of employing proratings seemed justified
Due to time constraints, the WISC-R was not given to the typically developing 
children, so it was assumed that their mental age roughly corresponded to their 
chronological age.
The ASD group had on average a verbal IQ (VIQ) of 82.6, a performance IQ 
(PIQ) of 99.8, and an estimated full-IQ (FIQ) of 85.6, while the learning difficulties 
group had on average a VIQ of 72.3, PIQ of 69.3, and FIQ of 66 (see Table 3.1). Three 
independent t-tests showed that the scores obtained by the ASD gr oup were 
significantly higher for PIQ,( t (26) = 12.71, p <.002) and FIQ, (t (26) = 6.90, p < .015), 
but not the VIQ, (t ( 26) = 1.84, p = n.s.).
The autism spectrum group was then subdivided into individuals with either a 
diagnosis of autism or of Asperger’s Syndrome. Each sub-group was compared with the 
learning difficulties group on the verbal IQ, performance IQ and full-scale IQ measures.
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Verbal mental age estimates were 6.3 years for the autism group, and 6.9 years for the 
learning difficulties group. However, regarding PIQ, the subgroup with autism was 
functioning at a significantly higher level than the group with learning difficulties (t 
(17) = 3.1,p<.01). This is consistent with previous findings of an uneven intelligence 
profile in ASD (Frith, 1989; Rumsey & Hamburger, 1988; Szatmari et al., 1990; Happé, 
1995). In addition, the autism group also showed a trend for higher FIQ estimates (M= 
78.8) than the learning difficulties group, (M = 66), t (17) = , p=07) but the two groups 
did not differ significantly from each other in terms of either their chronological age 
(CA) (t (21) = .18, p = n.s.), or VIQ, (t (17) = .21,p = n.s).
The autism group was therefore adequately matched with the learning difficulties group, 
and based on verbal mental age estimates, with the ‘younger’ typically developing 
children, aged 6 to 7 years.
On average, participants with Asperger’s Syndrome had an estimated VIQ of 87, PIQ of 
106 and Full-IQ of 97, which falls within the normal range (defined as > 85). The 
Asperger Syndrome subgr oup was therefore matched only with the older typical 
children (9 to 10 years) and typical adults. Matching the AS gr oup with children aged 9 
to 10 years was motivated by the aim to later compare their understanding on an 
advanced Theory of Mind task that is typically passed around this age (Happé, 1994).
A comparison between the autism and Asperger’s Syndrome subgroups showed 
that those with Asperger’s Syndrome had a significantly higher VIQ, (t(16)= 9.88, < 
007), and FIQ (t (16) =4.98, p < .04) than the autism subgroup. In addition, the 
Asperger Syndrome subgroup was also on average older than the participants with
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Table 3.1, Participant Characteristics: Chronological age (CA), verbal IQ (VIQ), 
performance IQ (PIQ) and Full-IQ (FIQ) estimates; means, standard deviations and 
ranges in brackets
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Adults 16 M27.1 
SD 7.46 
(19.06-46.01)
® Verbal mental age estimate’, combined from WISC and BPVS.
*from 9 autistic individuals only
Trom 10 Asperger Syndrome individuals only
from 19 individuals with ASD only
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autism. Therefore, these two subgi'oups are not directly comparable in the sense that 
differences in performance cannot be attributed to a diagnosis of autism or 
Asperger’s Syndrome.
Hence, in subsequent studies presented in Chapters 4 to 6, the autism group 
will be compared with the ‘young’ 6 to 7 year old typical children and the group with 
learning difficulties, whilst those with Asperger’s Syndrome will be compared with 
the ‘older’ 9-10 year old children and typical adults. Where the Autism Spectium 
group is considered as one group, the comparison with the learning difficulties group 
and the typical children aged 6 to 10 years, reflects a conseiwative stance.
3.3. Experiment 1 : A ssessing Theory of M ind competence
In order to assess the level of Theory of Mind competence in the present 
sample, participants were given an unexpected transfer ‘False Belief task (after 
Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985) and six of Happé’s (1994) ‘Stiange Stories’.
Both tasks have been widely used with typically developing children and children 
with autism and are regarded as ‘standard tasks’. As discussed in Chapter 2, the 
False Belief task taps onto first order Theory of Mind competence, and is usually 
passed by typically developing children around 4 years of age. The ‘Strange Stories’ 
were designed as a test for Theory of Mind at a more advanced level, pitched at the 
level of typical childr en aged 8 to 9 years.
On the basis of the combined performances on these two tasks, a total 
‘Theory of Mind’ score was computed that allowed us to assign participants to ‘no
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Theory of Mind’, ‘first order Theory of Mind’ and ‘second order Theory of Mind’ 
groups.
3.3.1. Method and materials 
False Belief task
A slightly modified version of the classic ‘unexpected transfer’ paradigm 
(Wimmer & Pemer, 1983; Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith, 1985) was used in which a 
verbally naiTated story was accompanied by ten photographs. The full story plot is 
given in Appendix 3.1. Three test questions were asked: a prediction question 
“Where will Sam look for the chocolates?”, a think-question “Where does Sam think 
the chocolates are?”, and a justification question “Why does Sam look into the 
red/blue box?” (dependent upon participants’ responses on the prediction question). 
Two control questions were asked before the justification question “Where were the 
chocolates in the beginning?” and “Where are the chocolates now?”
Participants’ responses were only included if they had passed both memory 
control questions conectly. Otherwise, their response was coded as ‘memory 
failure’. For each conect answer on the three test questions, the participant was 
awarded one point, which resulted in a maximum score of 3.
Strange Stories Task
Six out of Happé’s (1994) original twenty-four stoiy vignettes were selected 
that included situations of sarcasm, lie, white lie, double bluff, persuasion, and figure
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of speech (see Chapter 2). The sarcasm and double bluff stories were chosen as 
Happé found them to be amongst the hardest challenges for individuals who passed 
even standard second order Theory of Mind tasks. The persuasion, joke, lie and 
white lie scenarios were selected because Happé found them to discriminate best 
between the no Theory of Mind, first order Theory of Mind and second order Theory 
of Mind groups.
Procedure
The stories were played back on a tape-recorder and - following Happé's 
original procedure - each accompanied by a picture. Two modifications from the 
original procedure were intioduced. Firstly, we treated the Ts it ti*ue’-questions as 
test questions. Although Happé intended them to be a check for story comprehension 
we felt that these questions might actually go beyond mere comprehension, as they 
require the appreciation of the non-literal nature of the utterance. For example, in the 
white lie story, a girl says to her parents “it’s lovely thank you, it’s all that I wanted”, 
when she is given a set of boring encyclopaedias whilst in fact all she really wanted 
was to have a rabbit. Given the common pragmatic language problems commonly 
associated with ASD, a person may incorrectly say ‘it was true’ what the girl said 
despite having con ectly comprehended and memorised the elements of the story 
vignette, because she precisely failed to grasp the speaker’s attitude (i.e. to spare her 
parents’ feelings). In three of the stories employed in the present study, the correct 
responses were ‘yes’, and in three stories ‘no’, which reduces the possibility of 
someone showing a ‘yes’ bias succeeding by chance.
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Secondly, whilst Happé had a separate set of ‘physical’ control stories which 
deteimined whether or not a participant was included for the ‘Stiange Stories’, we 
felt that a more accurate check for comprehension of the story plot would be to add 
for each story a memory contiol question. The memory control questions tapped onto 
the crucial component underlying the joke, lie etc. (e.g. “who knocked the vase 
over?”) and were always asked after the test questions. The control questions, as well 
as the original story material, are given in Appendix 3.2.
Scoring svstem
Responses on the ‘Is it true’-questions and ‘why-questions’ were scored as 
either correct or incorrect. For each correct response, one point was awarded which 
resulted in a maximum score of 12. For the justification questions, conect responses 
included both appropriate inferences about the characters’ thoughts and feelings and 
correct ‘physical’ explanations, referring to relevant aspects of physical appearance, 
action or objects (see Happé, 1994).
Responses scored as inconect included justifications that were altogether 
wrong or vague, as well as mentalistic explanations that did not correctly capture the 
speaker’s communicative intention. Following Happé, only one score was given per 
story. In the few cases in which participants’ responses entailed both a correct and an 
incoiTect justification, they were credited for their “best” answer.
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Total Theory of Mind score
To compute a total Theory of Mind score for each individual, scores obtained 
on the False Belief (max = 3) and Strange Stories Tasks (max =12) were combined 
(max total = 15).
- No Theory of Mind group. Someone with no Theory of Mind would be expected to 
fail the False Belief and the Strange Stories Tasks. This would be expressed in a total 
score from 0-2.
- Advanced (Second Order) Theoiy o f Mind group. As Happé reported that the 
‘irony’ and ‘double bluff scenarios were most difficult to pass, a passing criterion 
for the ‘advanced Theory of Mind group’ was to pass the False Belief task, and at 
least four of the six Stiange Stories, including the ‘irony’ and ‘double bluff 
scenarios. This would be expressed in a total score from 12-15.
- First-order Theory o f Mind group. Following from the definition of the ‘advanced 
Theory of Mind group’, participants were assigned to the first order Theory of Mind 
gi'oup if they passed the False Belief Task and up to four Strange Stories but failed at 
least either the ‘irony’ or ‘double bluff stories (total score 3-12).
3.3.2. Participants
All participants as described in section 3.1., with the exception of the typical 
adults, participated in this experiment. Furtheimore, two individuals with ASD were 




3.2.3.1. Theory o f Mind group assignments
Due to space limitations, only the results of the Theory of Mind groupings, 
shown in Table 3.2., are reported in full. Group assignments followed largely the 
rules established earlier. However, the performance of four participants in the ASD 
group was such that group assignments in these cases deviated from the rule. The 
reasons for group assignment of these exceptional cases are specified below.
One individual with Asperger’s Syndrome passed the ‘think’ question but 
failed the ‘look’ and justification questions on the False Belief Task. However, this 
relatively poor performance on the False Belief task contested with her relatively 
good performance on the Strange Stories Task on which she gave two conect 
answers on the ‘is it true’ question and five correct justifications. Having obtained a 
total score of 8 she was therefore assigned to the first order Theory of Mind group. 
Likewise, one boy with Asperger’s Syndrome passed the ‘think’ and ‘justification’ 
questions but failed the preceding ‘look’-question. Having cornectly answered all six 
‘is it tme questions’ and having given four correct justifications, he obtained a total 
score of twelve. Despite his inconsistent performance on the False Belief task, he 
was therefore assigned to the first order Theory of Mind group. One boy with autism 
failed the False Belief task but gave three correct responses on the ‘Is it true’- 
questions. As this score markedly differed from the average score obtained by the 
first order Theory of Mind group, and given that he could not give a correct 
justification, he was assigned to the no Theory of Mind group.
74
Table 3.2. Theory of Mind groups
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ASD (A/ =25) 3(12%) 8 (32%) 7 (28%) 8 (32%)
Autism {N 
=12)
2(16.6%) 7 (58.3%) 2(16.6%) 1 (8.3%)
AS(/V=13) 1 (7.6%) 1 (7.6%) 5 (38.4%) 7 (53.8%)
LD (A/=10) 3 (30%) 0 3 (30%) 4 (40%)
Children (A/ 
=17)
0 0 10(58.8%) 7(41.2%)
6-7 yrs (A/ 
=10)
0 0 9 (90%) 1 (10%)
9-10 yrs (A/ 
=7)
0 0 1 (14.3%) 6 (85.7%)
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Finally, another individual with autism completely failed the False Belief task, but 
answered six ‘is it true’ and four* justification questions on the Strange Stories 
conectly. Despite his poor performance on the False Belief task, due to a total score 
of 10, he was assigned to the first order Theory of Mind group.
Based on their performance on the False Belief Task only, two individuals 
with autism who could not be given the Strange Stories were assigned to the no 
Theory of Mind group, and Theory of Mind failer + memory failer group, 
respectively.
3.2.3.1. IQ and Theory of Mind correlations
A set of Spearman’s rank correlations was performed to explore whether 
Theory of Mind categories corr elated with age or IQ. When the individuals with an 
autism spectrum disorder were considered together as one group, verbal IQ 
corr elated with Theory of Mind categories, (r (18) = .88,/? <.01, two-tailed). 
Likewise, high coinelations between Theory of Mind and VIQ were found for the 
autism subgroup (r (9) = .87,/? < .01), and for the individuals with Asperger’s 
Syndrome (r (9) = .12, p  < .027). For neither of these two subgroups separately or 
combined were FIQ estimates, PIQ estimates or chronological age related to 
performance on the Theory of Mind tasks (autism (PIQ; r (9) = .19, p = .61; FIQ: r 
(9) = .56, p=.ll; CA: r (12) =.06, p =.86); Asperger’s Syndrome (PIQ: r (9) = -.31, p 
= .53; FIQ: r (9) = -.60, p = .20; CA: r (13) = .17, p = .60).
For the learning difficulties group, Theory of Mind groupings cornelated with 
VIQ, (r (10) =.80,/? < .01), and FIQ (r (10) = .76,/? < .01), and there was a trend for
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a coiTelation with PIQ (r (10) = .64, p = .064). However, Theory of Mind groupings 
did not con elate with age. As expected, for the normal children, Theory of Mind 
groups con-elated with age, (r (15) = .75, p  < .01).
3.3.4. Summary
The main puipose of Experiment 1 was to assess levels of Theory of Mind 
competence in our participant population. The present results replicate those ' 
obtained in recent studies suggesting that some high-functioning adolescents or 
adults with autism and especially with Asperger’s Syndrome can be attributed with 
Theory of Mind competence at the first or even second order levels (e.g. Bowler, 
1992, Ozonoff et al., 1999). In addition, supporting the findings reported, for 
example, by Yirmyia et al. (1996), for both individuals with autism and Asperger’s 
Syndr ome, verbal IQ alone appeared to be strongly related to Theory of Mind 
competence.
3.4. Experiment 2 A ssessing central coherence
The aim of Experiment 2 was to investigate the possibility of individual 
differences amongst people with an autistic condition in terms of their assumed 
tendency towards Weak Central Coherence. Important to the notion of this cognitive 
style is the characterisation as an amodal force, which predicts that an overall 
tendency to either ‘weak’ or ‘strong’ Central Coherence leads at the same time to
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advantages and disadvantages in different domains. As reviewed in Chapter 2, a 
number of studies using between-group designs lent support to the predicted 
advantages of WCC in ASD in the perceptual/ visuo-spatial areas and -  separately -  
to expected disadvantages in the semantic-conceptual domain. Moreover, a single 
study has found a positive relation between task performance on the Embedded 
Figures and Block Design Tasks in the visuo-spatial domain has been found (JaiTold 
et al, 2000). However, as far as we are aware, the relation between good 
performance in the visuo-spatial domain and difficulties processing information for 
meaning, has not been directly tested within individuals with ASD, using a repeated- 
measures design. Hence, we set out to investigate possible individual differences in 
Centr al Coherence as measured on the basis of the combined performance on tasks 
supposedly tapping onto the two facets of this constr uct.
3.5. M e th o d
3.5.1. Materials
To assess Central Coherence in the visuo-spatial domain, the Embedded Figures 
and Block Design Tasks were used which have, as reviewed in Chapter 2, produced 
the most consistent results (e.g. Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997; Lockyer & Rutter, 
1970; Prior, 1979; Shah & Frith, 1993,1993; Venter, Lord & Schopler, 1992). For 
the Embedded Figures and Block Design Tasks, two versions were employed: the 
standard children and adults Versions of the Embedded Figures Task (Witkin,
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Oilman, Raskin and Karp, 1971), and the WISC-R (children) and WAIS-R (adult) 
versions of the Block Design Task (Wechsler, 1974; 1981).
To assess Central Coherence in the semantic domain, we used the Sentence 
Completion Task as this task can be easily administered to people with ASD across 
ability levels (Happé, personal communication).
3.5.1.1. Embedded Figures Task (EFT, CEFT)
The Embedded Figures Task requires locating simple shapes within more 
complex figures, with the twist being that the complex figures are organised so as to 
obscure the simple shapes. An example is given in Figures 3.1a + b.




Only the task stimuli differed in the childr en and adults versions. Procedure, 
instructions and scoring system were the same. Over 25 trials, the children’s version 
requires finding either a triangle or a house shape in complex designs. Adults were 
only given Form A of the standard Embedded Figures Task (Witkin et al., 1971), 
which comprises 12 complex figures cards and 8 cards with simple shapes.
In the task administration we followed a modified procedure, introduced by 
Shah and Frith (1983). Participants were given the simple figure on a transparent 
sheet and were asked to place it over the complex form (also employed by Jarrold et 
al., 2000, Happe, Briskman & Frith, 2001). This task administration has the 
advantage that it does not pose the additional requirement to hold the to-be-found 
figure in memory, as the standard procedure does.
Scoring
The number of errors and the time taken for each item was recorded. A time 
limit of 75 seconds was given.
3.5.1.2. Block Design Task (ED)
The Block Design task requires to segment each design into its logical 
units and then to reconstruct it using blocks, which are each red on two sides, white 
on two sides and red/ white on two sides. Examples from the children’s version are 
given in Figure 3.2. The adult version consists of 9 trials, in the children’s version
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there are 11. In both versions, the participant is instmcted to assemble the blocks as 
quickly as possible in order to make them look like the pattern on a picture card.
Figure 3.2. Examples of the Block Design task (from WISC-R, Wechsler, 1974)
Scoring
Following the WISC-R and WAIS-R manuals, respectively, the first two 
tiials were scored with 2 points for passing on the first attempt, and with 1 point for 
passing on a second attempt. After these, only one attempt per pattern was allowed. 4 
points were given if the participant assembled the blocks within the given time limit 
(45-180 seconds, depending on trial), plus a maximum of three bonus points for 
faster performance. In the children’s version, a maximum of 62 points can be 
achieved, in the adult version, a maximum of 51 points.
In addition, from the raw score a scaled score (that takes the chronological 
age of the participant into account) was recorded. For both WISC-R and WAIS-R 
versions, scaled scores range from 1-19.
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3.5.1.3. Sentence Completion Task
We used the Sentence Completion Task as previously employed by Happé 
(2000, Happé, Briskman & Frith, 2001). The Sentence Completion task consists of 
15 sentence stems and the participant is instructed to complete each sentence with 
the first word that comes to his or her mind. For 10 sentence stems, the last word is 
fr equently associated with another word as a pair (e.g. salt and pepper). The task 
assesses whether individuals use the preceding sentence context in order to complete 
the sentence in a meaningful way. If one ignored the preceding sentence context and 
instead focused locally on the last word, context inappropriate and meaningless 
associations, as for example, “the sea tastes of salt and.. .pepper/ vinegar”, would be 
the expected result. In addition, the task includes 5 control sentences, in which a 
local completion would be appropriate and meaningful within the sentence as a 
whole, as for example “the vet cares for cats and. ...dogs”, (see for a full list of task 
items. Appendix 3.3.)
S corin g
Following Happé (2000), for the test items, we distinguished between 
meaningful global completions, specifically local completion erTors and otherwise 
inappropriate completions, unrelated to the sentence stem (e.g. don’t know 
responses). A time limit was set at 15 seconds. If the participant did not respond at 
all within this allowed time, responses were also scored as ‘otherwise inappropriate 
completion’. As suggested by Happé, for a total sentence completion score, the 
number of global (denoted by 0 points), local (denoted by 2 points) and otherwise
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inappropriate completions (denoted by 1 point) were added up. In addition, the 
numbers of global, local and diverse inappropriate responses were scored separately. 
As a participant inclusion criterion for the sentence completion task, a minimum 
score of 6 on the control items, that is at least three correct responses out of five, was 
required.
3.5.2. Participants
Participant characteristics are shown in Table 3.3. Participants in the clinical 
groups were given either the childrens’ or the adults’ version of the Embedded 
Figures and Block Design Tasks in accordance with their mental age estimates. As 
the children and adults versions of the EFT and BD tasks are not directly 
comparable, we compared the children^ with ASD with the learning difficulties 
group and the typically developing children as described in section 3.2. The adult 
ASD group, who mainly comprised individuals with AS, was compared with the 
normal adults. To this group, one adult with mild learning difficulties was added.
 ^The terni ‘children’ is used here to facilitate the reading. In fact, some of the individuals with ASD 
and learning difficulties comprising this group were adolescents up to 16 years, but they were given 
the children’s versions of the BD and EFT due to lower Full-IQ estimates and lower verbal mental not 
be disturbed by the meaningful shape in the same way. ages. Tlie terms ‘children ASD group’ and 
‘young ASD’ group are used interchangeably in the text. ‘Young typical children’, by contrast, refers 
to the normal 6 to 7 year old control group.
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3.6. A n a ly sis
The data obtained from performances on the three tasks were analysed in 
thi'ee different ways:
1. For each of the three tests, separate sets of between-group analyses were 
performed in which the mental age matched groups (e.g. children to children and 
adults to adults) were compared to one other.
2. To investigate the predicted relation between good perfoimance on the visuo- 
spatial tasks and relatively bad performance on the semantic sentence completion 
task in the ASD gioup, for each of the three children’s groups and the two adults’ 
groups, separate coiTelation analyses were perfoimed.
3. Raw data were collapsed into categorical data to compute for each individual a 
‘Total Cential Coherence score’.
3.7. Results
3.7.1. Results of between-group analyses
3.7.1.L Embedded Figures Task 
Children groups ~ Group means of correct solutions and average times taken to track 
the hidden figures are shown in Table 3.4. Two separate one-way ANOVAs yielded 
significant main effects on number of conect solutions (F (2,32) = 6.98, p = .003) 
and perfoimance speed, {F (2, 32) = 6.94,/? = .003). Pairwise comparisons showed 
that both the young ASD group and the typical children offered a significantly higher
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Table 3.3. Participant characteristics of Experiment 2: age and IQ data
Group N Age VMA* PIQ FIQ
4#hildrenqroups'  ^ ‘
ASD children 
(9 Aut, 3AS)
12 12.5 6.8 93.5 81.5
Learning
Difficulties
8 13,9 6.9 69.2 66.0
Typical
Children
14 8.4 - -
‘Old’ children 6 9.4 - - -
‘young’ children 8 6.7 - - -
Adultgroups'J C  A -  . .  ^ '
ASD adults 
(1 Aut, 7 AS)
8 22.5 89.1 104.2 99.0
Adult control'* 12 23.8. - - -
^combined from WISC prorating + BPVS 
 ^ including one adult with learning difficulties
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number of correct solutions than the learning difficulties group, and also traced the 
embedded figures at higher speed (Tukey’s p < .05 for each pairwise comparison). 
However, pairwise comparisons between the young ASD and the typical children 
gi'oups on the number of conect solutions and performance speed did not yield any 
significant differences (Tukey’s p > .05, for each pairwise comparison).
As the young ASD group had a slightly lower estimated VMA than the 
children, aged 6 to 10, taken together (see Table 3.2.), their performance was also 
compared with that of the 6 to 7 year olds only. The children with ASD exceeded the 
typical 6 to 7 year olds in performance speed, (independent t- test approached 
significance, t (18) = -1.85, p = .06.) By contrast, the two groups did not differ from 
one another in teims of the number of correct solutions (t (18) = 1.37, p > .05).
Adult groups -  The adults with ASD correctly traced on average 11.5 of the 12 
hidden figures, the adult contiol group 11.8 (see Table 3.4.) Whilst it took the ASD 
adults on average 15.3 seconds to trace the hidden shape, the adult contiol group 
needed on average 13.5 seconds. Independent t-tests yielded no group differences in 
terms of number of con ect solutions (t (18) = -1.85, p > .05), or performance speed,
(t (18) = -.50,/? >.05).
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Table 3.4, Results of the children and adults’ versions of the Embedded Figures Task 
(Mean, standard deviations and ranges in brackets)
Groups N Means of correct 
solutions (max = 25)
M SD Range





12 23.61 1.44 (20-25) 12.09 6.77 (4.44-26.33)
Autism 9 23.60 1.52 (20-25) 11.49 6.33 (4.44-26.33)
Asperger
Syndrome
3 23.66 1.74 (22-25) 14.07 9.3 (8.32-24.82)
Learning Difficulties 8 18.5 6.45 (8-25) 27.59 16.84 (9.30-53.62)
Children 14 23.42 1.74 (20-25) 14.12 6.16 (5.39-27.99)
6-7 year olds 8 22.37 1.59 (20-24) 17.91 5.18 (12.13-27.99)
9-10 year olds 6 24.83 .40 (24-25) 9.06 2.71 (5.39-12.06)
\ » '■^ ?
Groups N Means of correct 
solutions (max =11)
M SD Range




8 11.5 .53 (11-12) 15.3 9.0 (6.11-30.4)
Adult control group 12 11.8 .40 (11-12) 13.66 5.10 (8.09-23.63)
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3.7. L 2. Block Design Task
Children groups- Group means are shown in Table 3.5. The young ASD 
group obtained on average 23.6 points, the LD group 18.5 points and the typical 
children 23.4 points. Based on previous findings (e.g. Shah & Frith, 1993) the young 
ASD group was expected to perform better than the LD group and possibly also 
better than the typical children. However, a one-way ANOVA showed that there 
were no significant differences between the performances of these three groups, {F 
(2, 30) = 2.54,^ = .095). A significant effect of group on scaled scores (which 
account for chronological age) {F (2, 30) = 10.24, = .000) was attiibutable to the 
better perfoimance of the normal children as compared to both the learning 
difficulties group and the young ASD group (Tukey’s p < .01 for each pairwise 
comparison). Since the young ASD group had a lower estimated verbal mental age 
than the 6 to 10 year old children, considered as one group, we also compared the 
young ASD group with the 6 to 7 year old typical children of comparable mental 
age. It was now found that the ASD childien outperfoimed the VMA matched 
typical children (t (17) == -2.11, /? = .03).
Adults groups - As shown in Table 3.12, whilst the adult Autism Spectrum group 
achieved a group mean of 23.25 on the raw score of the Block Design task, the adult 
control group scored on average 36.45. An independent t-test showed that the better 
performance of the adult controls as compared to the ASD adult group was 
statistically significant {t (23) = 6.51,/r =.021).
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Table 3.5. Results of the children and adults’ versions of the Block Design task











12 23.58 16.20 (2-48) 7.33 4.46 (1-14)
Autism
9 22.88 16.13 (2-48) 6.88 3.91 (1-12)
Asperger
Syndrome
3 25.66 19.85 (4-43) 8.66 6.80 (1-14)
Learning Difficulties 9 12.22 4.49 (0-42) 4.22 4.52 (1-13)
Children 12 28.0 16.29 (5-60) 12.16 3.18 (7-19)
6-7 year olds 6 13.40 8.20 (5-25) 10.40 2.88 (7-14)
9-10 year olds 6 38.42 11.71 (26-60) 13.42 2.93 (10-19)





9.34 (10- 8.37 3.66 (5-16)
Adult Control 12 36.45 12.23 (4-49) 11.72 3.13 (4-16)
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3.7,1.3. Sentence Completion Task
Children groups - The children groups did not differ fi*om each other in terms 
of correctly completed control items (F (2, 32) = 1.61 y p > .05). However, one-way 
analyses of variance, followed by pahivise comparisons, showed that the young ASD 
group obtained an overall higher Sentence Completion score than both other gr oups 
(F (2, 32) = 9.6, p < .001; Tukey’s /? < .01 for each pairwise comparison). Closer 
inspection of the character of completions showed that interestingly, the young ASD 
group made specifically more local completions (F (2, 32) = 6,4, p < .05) than both 
control groups (Tukey’s < .05 for each pairwise comparison). The typical children 
completed the sentence stems significantly more often in a global fashion than the 
ASD children but not the learning difficulties group (F (2, 32) = 7.32, p = .002, 
(Tukey’s p for pairwise comparison between ASD and typical childr en < .05). At the 
same time, the number of otherwise inappropriate completions did not differ between 
the three groups (F (2, 32) = 1.96, p > .05).
Adults groups -The two adults groups did not differ from each other in terms 
of the total Sentence Completion score obtained, (t (18) = 1.81, p > .05) or the 
number of inappropriate local completions (t (18) = .615, p >.05).
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(Max = 10) (Max = 10) (Max = 20)
ASD
TOTAL




12 2.16 3.41 8.25
Learning
Difficulties
8 2.75 1.5 5.75
Typical
Children
15 .76 1.15 3.0
8-10 years 6 1 0 .75
6-7 years 9 .66 1.66 4.0
Adult groups
ASD Adults 9 .88 .44 1.55
Adult
Control
15 .20 .20 .60
 ^ high scores represent high number of inappropriate (but not specifically local) 
completions.
 ^high scores represents high number of local completions 




3.7.1.4. Summary ofbetween-group analyses
On the Embedded Figures Task, the findings obtained firom the autism 
spectrum children and adult groups mirrored each other and suggested that 
performance on the EFT represented a snared or nreserved skill. However, contiary 
to previous findings, we could not find support for the claim that the individuals with 
an autism spectrum disorder, taken as a group, or the individuals with autism or with 
Asperger’s Syndrome viewed separately, performed superior to the normal 
population (see, for example, Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997). However, it is 
interesting to note that the speed of some individual children with autism far 
exceeded the group means obtained by even the normal 9-10 year olds. Notable was 
the performance of S.E., who was one of the lowest fiinctioning children with ASD 
in the present sample. He was the fastest of all children, achieving a remarkable 
average speed of 4.44 seconds.
On the Block Design Test, the young autism spectrum group perfoimed at a 
level of tlieir estimated verbal mental age, but below the level of their chronological 
age. The failure of finding the predicted gi'oup difference to gioup with learning 
difficulties might be attributable to the small sample sizes. Considering this, one 
might be willing to consider the p-value of .095 as a very weak tiend.
However, the results for the ASD adult group were more surprising, as the 
adults with ASD performed significantly worse than the typical adults. The full 
reasons for this unexpected finding are unclear, as our procedure did not differ fiom 
that used by other groups. Likewise, when performance speed - rather than raw 
scores as reported beforehand - was considered (as by Shah & Frith, 1993), the
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significant difference remained. Given the high mean scores of the contr ol group (36 
out of 51) one possibility could be that the adult control sample (comprised of 
students) performed better than normal, rather than the present ASD gr oup worse 
than previous samples.
Likewise, on the sentence completion task, predictions made by Centr al 
Coherence Theory were only supported for the children ASD group, but not for the 
adults with ASD.
3.7.2. Results of correlation analyses between the three Central Coherence 
Tasks.
To examine links between the three Centr al Coherence measures, a series of 
correlation analyses were conducted. For the two clinical groups, partial correlations 
were used that accounted for age and verbal IQ (see Jarxold et al., 2000). For the 
typically developing children, only age was partialled out. The results of the thr ee 
children groups are shown in Table 3.6, those of the two adults groups in Table 3.7.
Children autism spectrum group.
As predicted by Central Coherence Theory, performance on the Block Design 
Task related significantly to both the number of corxect solutions (r (12) = .67, p < 
.01) and performance speed on the Embedded Figures Task (r (12) = -.80, p < .01).
Centr al Coherence Theory also predicts that good performance in the vrsuo- 
spatial area (manifested as high numbers of correct solutions, fast performance speed
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and high numbers of successfully assembled blocks) would go at the expense of 
impaired performance in the conceptual-semantic area -  the Sentence Completion 
Task (represented in high numbers of local completions and high sentence 
completion total score). As shown in Table 3.7., contrary to this prediction, neither 
of the two visuo-spatial measures related to performance on the Sentence 
Completion Task. However, there was a trend for a negative relation between Theory 
of Mind score and the Sentence Completion score (r (12) = -.50, p = .07)
Typically developing children
Although Central Coherence Theory was specifically developed as a theory 
accoimting for cognitive abnormalities in autism, it was based on the assumption that 
within the normal population, a force to process information globally would equally 
affect the visuo-spatial and semantic domains. Hence, a strong tendency for Central 
Coherence should be manifest in relatively “bad” performance on the Embedded 
Figures and Block Design Tasks, and relatively good performance on the Sentence 
Completion Task.
As expected, there was a trend for the negative relation between performance 
speed on the Embedded Figures Task and the number of correctly assembled blocks 
(r (12) = -,57,.p = .08). However, the link between performance on the visuo-spatial 
and semantic tasks went into the opposite direction as predicted: children who 
swiftly tracked the hidden figures made at the same time fewer errors on the 
Sentence Completion task, (r (12) = - .65,/? < .05). It is important to note that there 
was, however no relation between good performance on the EFT or BD and the
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specific pattern of local completions. Fmthermore, there was no relation between 
any of the Central Coherence measures and Theory of Mind competence.
Learning difficulties group
In this group, a strong relation between the tliree Central Coherence measures 
and between each of them to Theory of Mind competence was found. Someone who 
needed less time in tracking the hidden shape was also better at assembling the 
blocks (r (9) = -57, p = .07). Individuals who gave more inappropriate completions 
also took longer to find the hidden shapes (r (9) = .84, p < .05) and tended to have 
difficulties assembling the blocks (r (9) = -71,/? = .08). Individuals with second 
order Theory of Mind competence were also faster at tr acing the embedded figures (r 
(9) = -.98, p< .01), showed better performance on the Block Design Task (r (9) = .75, 
p  = .07) and made fewer inappropriate completions {r (9) = -.85, p < .05).
Adults Autism spectrum.
For the adults with ASD, contr ary to expectations, no relation between 
performance on the Embedded Figures and Block Design tasks were found (r (8) = 
.03, p = n.s.). Moreover, contrary to predictions derived fiom Central Coherence 
theory adults with ASD who were fast on the Embedded Figures Task were also less 
likely to make local errors on the sentence completion task (r (8) = .-.77, p = .063). 
As summarised in Table 3.8., Theory of Mind scores, which ranged from first order 





As predicted, adults who were swift in tracing the hidden figures were also 
good at assembling the blocks (r (12) = -.10.p < .01). However, Table 3.8 shows that 
contr ary to expectations, neither of the visuo-spatial Centr al Coherence measures 
correlated with performance on the Sentence Completion task.
Correlations between task performance and IQ
To shed more light on the unexpected correlations, and lack of conelations, a 
further set of Pearson’s correlation analyses were performed that investigated the 
link between performance on each of the Centr al Coherence Tasks and the 
intelligence measures. For the ASD children, performance on the Block Design Task 
correlated with Full IQ, (Pearson’s r (9) = .72,/? < .05,2-tailed), and with 
performance IQ, {r (9) = .85,/? < .05), but there was no correlation with verbal 
mental age (r (9) = .40, p = .28). Neither performance on the Embedded Figures Task 
nor performance on the Sentence Completion Task correlated with any of the 
intelligence measures. For the adults with ASD, performance on the Block Design 
task correlated with performance IQ (r (7) = .84,/? < .05, two-tailed), and a 
correlation with full IQ approached significance (r (7) = .79, p = .061). Surprisingly, 
performance on the Block Design Task also correlated with verbal IQ (r (7) = .80,/?
< .05). There were no correlations between the number of local completions on the 
Sentence Completion Task and any of the IQ measures (VIQ: r (7) = -44., p = .31); 
PIQ: r (7) = -.44, p = .37); FIQ: r (7) = -.41, p = .41).
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Table 3.7. Partial correlations between the three Central Coherence measures for the 
children groups (continued overleaf)
a) Young ASD group, accounting for age and VIQ
Young Autism Spectrum group 











CEFT correct -.80** .67** -.02 .06 -.004
CEFT Time - -.65* .03 -.30 -.01
BD - .25 .36 -.36
80 Local - .56* -.28
80 total - -.50*
Theory of -
Mind score
b) Typical children, accounting for age
Typical children (aged 6-10 years)
OEFT OEFT BD raw 80 Local 80 Total Theory
Correct Time score errors score of Mind
groups
OEFT correct - -.91** .35 -.54 -.65* .08
OEFT Time - -.57* .44 .55 -23
BD - .13 .14 .54
80 Local - .44 -.43

















CEFT correct - -.98** -.69 -.56 -.89* .97**
CEFT Time -.75* .56 .84* -.98**
BD - -36 -71= .75*
SC Local - .56 -.44
SC total - -.85*
Theory of -
Mind score
^ascending: high number of tracked figures represents good performance, 
‘’descending: shorter performance speed represents good performance, 
^ascending: high scores represent good performance.
'^descending: high scores represent a high number of local completion errors, 
^ascending: high scores represent increasingly worse performance (number of 
local completions and otherwise inappropriate sentence completions combined), 
‘ ascending: high scores represent advanced Theory of Mind
‘ significant at the <.05 level (two-tailed)
“ significant at the < .01 level (two-tailed)
1 trend: p=.07
2 trend, p =.08
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Table 3.8: Partial correlations between the three Central Coherence Measures for the 
adult groups
a) Adults with ASD, accounting for age and VIQ














EFT correct -.42 .03 .79* .73* .39
EFT Time - -.15 -77= -.79* .58
BD raw score - .33 .27 .89
SC Local - .98** .06
Total score - -.16Theory of -
Mind score
b) Adult control group, accounting for age










EFT correct -.35 .03 .10 No correl.
EFT Time - -.70** -.35 With Theory 
of Mind




*= significant at the < .05 level 
** = significant at the < .01 level 
* tr e n d ,/?  =  078  
 ^trend, p=  .063
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For the children with learning difficulties, performance on the Block Design 
Task highly coiTelated with PIQ (r (8) = .97,/? < .01), with Full IQ (r (8) = .94,/? < 
01) as well as with verbal mental age (r (8) = .77,/? < .05). Likewise, performance on 
the Embedded Figures Task highly conelated with PIQ; (r (8) =-.81, p < .001), Full 
IQ (r (8)= -.87, p < .007) and verbal mental age (r (8)= -.88,/? < .01). And the total 
sentence completion score coiTelated significantly with verbal and full IQ estimates, 
as well as with age (VIQ (r (8) = -.87,/?< .05); PIQ (r (8) = -.64,/? = .08); FIQ (r (9) 
= -.93,/? < .01).
For the typically developing children, as expected, age correlated with 
perfoimance on all three tasks; Sentence Completion Task (r (15) = -.78,/? <.01); 
Block Design Task (r (12) = .75, p <.01); Embedded Figures Task ( r (13) = .-83,/? 
<.05).
For the adult control gi'oup, age did not coiTelate with perfoimance on any of 
the Central Coherence measures (EFT: r (11) = -1.9, p = .57, BD (r(l 1) = .18, p =
.58, SC r(ll) = .09,p = .80).
3.7.2.1. Summary o f correlation analyses
The results of the conelation analyses were interesting in many respects. 
Based on Cential Coherence Theory, two predictions were made: firstly, that 
performance on the two visuo-spatial tasks, the Embedded Figures and the Block
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Design Tasks should coiTelate positively. Secondly, perfonuances on both tasks were 
expected to correlate negatively with performance on the Sentence Completion Task. 
As expected, for all three children gi'oups, i.e. the young ASD gi'oup, the learning 
difficulties gioup and the typical children, high correlations between performance on 
the EFT and BD was found (although this was weaker for the typical children). 
Likewise, the adult control group displayed this predicted pattern. However, 
for the adults with ASD, this predicted correlation was lacking.
When the relation between performance on the visuo-spatial and semantic 
tasks was inspected, it was found that the different gioups behaved very differently. 
Only for the adults with ASD, the expected link between swift performance on the 
EFT and local completion eiTors was found. For the children with ASD, coiTelations 
were altogether lacking. What is more, for the control gioups, relations went into the 
opposite direction as predicted. Inspection of the learning difficulties group suggests 
that their performance on all three tasks was to a large extent determined by both the 
verbal and perfoimance parts of their general level of intellect.
3,7,3. Central Coherence Groups
For our main puipose of assessing the impact of Central Coherence upon 
perfoimances on the ‘cultural knowledge’ tasks of the next chapters, it was essential 
for us to be able to characterise participants in teims of this cognitive style. Although 
the pattern of con elations - and lack of conelations - found in the previous section 
invites to caution, we still followed the initial plan of calculating a ‘Total Central
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Coherence score’ -in analogy to a Total Theory of Mind score as discussed in section
3.3.1. In doing so, it was firstly required to transform the raw inteiwal scale data of 
all three tasks into categorical groups, which would allow us to directly compare 
perfoimances on the three tasks and the children and adult versions.
Different ways of collapsing the continuous raw data into two or more groups 
would in principle be possible. One obvious way, for example, could be to use 
central tendencies as a cut-off point. This would, however, result in only two groups; 
‘weak’ versus ‘strong’ Cential Coherence. More importantly, based on inspections of 
distiibutions (see Figures 3.3 -3.5) we felt that such a division would be misleading, 
as participants who clustered around the mean or median and hence showed similar 
perfoimance, would be grouped into two separate categories. At the same time, 
within any one category, participants would be grouped together whose performance 
seemed to be of rather different character. This impression was supported using 
conelation analyses between the raw results and the new gioups, divided up on the 
basis of group means or medians. On the adult version of the Block Design task, for 
example, gioup assignment into a Weak versus Strong Central Coherence gioup, 
using the overall group mean as a cutting point, did not yield any significant 
correlation with the raw results (r (20) = .42, p  = 105). Therefore, the cutoff criteria 
that were employed are specified below.
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3.7.3.1. Block Design Task groups
For the Block Design Task, distributions of the perfoimance on the children 
and adults’ versions were considered separately. Each scale was divided up into three 
equal slices. For the children’s version, raw scores ranged from 0 - 6 2  with higher 
scores representing better perfoimance. Scores obtained between 0- 20.6 represented 
BDsccs between 20.7 and 41.2 B D mcc and between 41.3 and 62 BDwcc* For the 
adult version, raw scores ranged from 0-51, A division into three equal groups 
resulted in scores obtained between 0-17 representing BDscc» between 18-34 
B D mcc, and between 35-51 BDwcc- Figures 3.3. a 4-b show the histograms for the 
children and adult gioups.
In order to validate whether the new categories are associated with the raw 
scores, Spearman’s rank coiTelations were computed for the relation between the 
Block Design raw scores and the new Block Design gioups. High correlations were 
found for both the children gioups (r (32) = .91, p  <.001.(two-tailed), and the adult 
groups combined, ( r (20) ~ .91, p  = ,002).
3.7.3.2. Embedded Figures Task
For the two versions of the Embedded Figures Task, the performance speed 
measure was used. As most participants found the target figures well below the time 
limit, the criteria employed for the Block Design task, that is to divide the scale into 
three equal slices, would potentially be misleading. Figure 3.4. shows that for the 
childien’s version, 85% of the total sample would fall into the Weak Central 
Coherence Group, We therefore decided to use for both versions the perfoimance of
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the typical comparison groups as a baseline. When the typical children were divided 
up into three groups of equal sizes, the cutting points of the fastest gioup were at 11. 
Participants who perfoimed in the range of 1-11 were
assigned to the EFTwcc group, children who perfoimed between 12 and 16 to the 
EFTmcc group and those who needed 17 seconds or above were assigned to the 
EFTscc gi'oup.
The same criteria were applied for the adult version of the EFT. Dividing the 
data of the adult control gioup into three groups of equal sizes resulted in assigning 
participants to a gioup of EFTwcc if they had tr aced the shape within 10 seconds, a 
EFTmcc group ranged from 11-16 seconds, and if a participant needed 17 seconds or 
longer s/lie was assigned to the EFTscc gi'oup.
Speaiman’s rank correlation showed for the children gioups combined and 
the adults gioups combined, the new EFT Central Coherence Groups highly 
coiTelated with the raw data (children: (r (32) = -.92, p  < .01); adults: (r (20) = -.94, p  
<  .01).
3.7.3.3. Sentence Completion Task Score
The same criteria as described for the Embedded Figures task were applied to 
establish CC group scores for the Sentence Completion Task. The score for the 
number of local completions was used, as this was seen to be most diagnostic for the 
assessment of a Weak Central Coherence cognitive style (as opposed to the Total 
Score which also included other types of inappropriate completions). The 
performance of the noimal group, comprising both childi en and adults on the
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Figure 3,3. Histogram showing individual performances on the children or adults’ 
version of the Block Design Task
a) Children groups
learn ing  difficulties
normal children
1Ü
child block d e s ig n  raw  sc o re
b) Adult groups
odult autism  spoctrum
S to 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
adult block design raw score adult block design raw score
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adult control children ASD
sentence completion Inappropriate local completions
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measure of number of local completions, were used as the baseline. As can be seen 
in Figure 3.5., the majority of normal control participants did not make any local 
completions. Hence, a score of 0 represented SCscc- For the remaining participants, 
50% made either 1-2 local completions or 3-4 local completions. SC mcc was thus 
defined as scoring between 1-2, and SCwcc by three or more local completion 
erTors. Spearman’s rank correlation, computed for all participants comprising the 
sample, showed a high corTelation between the raw data and the categorical gr oups, 
(r(52) = .98,j!7<.01).
3.7.3.4, Total Central Coherence Categories
Finally, for each individual a ‘Total Cerrtral Coherence score was computed 
by combining the scores obtained on each of the three tasks. If on any one task, we 
denote a tendency for Str ong Centr al Coherence with 1 point. Medium Central 
Coherence with 2 points, and Weak Central Coherence with 3 points, criteria for the 
total Central Coherence Score were as follows:
WCC total score (8-9 points) - A person was given a WCC total score if s/he had 
obtained a WCC score on at least two out of the three tasks, and performed at 
medium level on the third task.
s e e  total score (3-4 points) - Likewise, participants were assigned to the SCC group 
if they had obtained a SCC score on at least two out of the three tasks, and performed 
at medium level on the third task.
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MCC total score (5-6points) - A medium CC total score was given for participants 
who had obtained a score of 2 on at least two out of the three tasks. The third score 
could either reflect str ong or weak central coherence.
Mixed style(5-7 points) - A mixed style score was introduced to account for the 
pattern found particularly amongst participants in the typical control gr oups. For 
example, some adults performed very well across all three tasks, hence obtained 3 
points for the Embedded figures task, 3 points for the Block Design task, and 1 point 
for the Sentence Completion Task. The opposite pattern of someone who performed 
badly across the board was also characterised as mixed. In addition, this group 
included individuals who truly showed ‘mixed’ performance, such as good 
performance on the Embedded Figures and Sentence Completion Tasks in 
conjunction with relatively bad performance on the Block Design Task.
The results of Central Coherence gr oup assignments and exact patterns of 
performances are shown in Table 3.9 and in Figure 3.6. The main findings were as 
follows:
1. Weak Central Coherence as a processing style specific to Autism Spectrum 
Disorders
With the exception of one typical adult, onlv people with an autism spectrum 
disorder fell into the weak central coherence group. (Assigning this typical adult to 
the WCC and not the mixed group was a rather conservative decision. She excelled 
on the Block Design and Embedded Figures Tasks, but also made 2 local 
completions on the Sentence Completion Task. (However, she immediately noticed
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Table 3.9. Number and percentage of participants in each Central Coherence group 
and exact pattern of performance. (The first number represents performance on 
Embedded Figures Task, the second number performance on Block Design Task and 
the third number performance on Sentence Completion Task.)






























































Normal children 28.6% (4) 28.6 % (4) 0 49 %(5)
2-1-1 
2x 1-1-2





9-10 yrs 0 16.7 %(1) 0 83.3 % (5)
2 X 3-3-1
3 X 3-2-1
6-8 yrs 57.1% (4)


















Figure 3.6. Distributions of Weak, Strong, Medium Central Coherence and mixed style 
for the different participant groups (continued overleaf)












6-8 years old children children 6-10 years
SlrongCC
the meaninglessness of these completions, and laughed, whilst people with ASD rarely 
recognised the meaninglessness of their sentence completions). This suggests that 
weakness in central coherence may be a processing style specific to people with an 
autism spectrum disorder. It can also appear in “normal” individuals but might be 
modulated by other cognitive processes.
2. Weak Central Coherence is not characteristic o f all people with ASD.
Secondly, implicit in Frith’s theory is the suggestion that weak central coherence 
is universal in people with an autistic condition. Contrasting with this suggestion, some 
people in the present autism spectrum sample did not show this processing style. In fact, 
when participants with ASD who fell into the SCC, MCC and mixed style groups were 
added together, 60% of our sample of people with an autism spectrum disorder did not 
have an overall weakness in central coherence. A comparison between the two autism 
spectrum subgroups suggested that more people with autism than with Asperger
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Syndrome showed weakness in cential coherence, but this difference was not 
statistically significance.
3. Central coherence might not characterise the processing style o f the typical 
population
Figure 3.7 shows that the majority of the 9-10 year old typically developing 
children and the adult controls fell into the ‘mixed style’ group. As can be specified 
fi'om inspecting Table 3.9, this was largely the result of good performance across all 
three tasks. Only one adult contiol participant showed a ‘mixed pattern’ in the true 
sense; she perfoimed relatively poorly on the EFT, well on the BD and also well on the 
Sentence Completion task. The reason that the typically developing 6 to 7 year olds fell 
into the Strong or Medium Central Coherence gioups appeared to be the result of their 
consistently poorer performance on all thiee tasks. It seemed that general development 
-  age- had a similar effect on performance on all three tasks
The majority of people with learning difficulties showed a tendency towards 
Strong Centr al Coherence —roughly the opposite pattern to the one obseiTed in people 
with ASD. However, for the learning difficulties and children groups, eri'ors on the 
Sentence Completion task did not seem to reflect a specifically piecemeal style, but the 
tendency to make other erTors on this task. This appeared to reflect their lower 
developmental level of intellectual abilities.
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Experiment 1 largely replicated the results of recent studies investigating Theory 
of Mind competence in individuals with autism and Asperger’s Syndrome. As reported, 
for example, by Bowler (1992) and Ozonoff et a/ (1991), individuals with Asperger’s 
Syndrome in the present sample, albeit most of them of adult age, had Theory of Mind 
competence at either the first or second order levels. The results of Experiment 1 also 
confirmed previous findings suggesting that verbal IQ was the best predictor for passing 
Theory of Mind tasks in people with autism and Asperger’s Syndrome (Tager-Flusberg, 
1997). However, in the present sample, age did not relate to Theory of Mind 
competence, possibly because the ASD gioup was composed of a large proportion of 
adolescents and adults and did not include children younger than eight years.
By asking three test questions on the False Belief Task, inconsistencies were 
noted in a small number of individuals with an autism specti um condition, though none 
in the other gi'oups. The fact that three individuals conectly responded to the ‘think’ 
question whilst they had previously failed the ‘look’- question might suggest that 
having more processing time could have helped these individuals to compute the 
character’s false belief. Moreover, inconsistencies between perfoimances on the False 
Belief and Strange Stories Tasks also point to the possibility that some individuals may 
function in a ‘borderline’ range. With this, we mean that they might have a dawning, yet 




Experiment 2 went beyond the attempt to replicate previous findings on 
relatively common tasks used to assess Cential Coherence. Novel contiibutions 
included firstly, the attempt to investigate how the two parts of the notion of Central 
Coherence -  a good eye for detail and impaiiments in processing infoitnation for 
meaning -  are linked within the same individual. Secondly, the present experiment also 
explored the possibility of individual differences in (Weak) Central Coherence amongst 
people with an autism spectrum disorder and without such a condition.
The main findings of Experiment 2 were that the notion of a Weak Cential 
Coherence processing style appears to be specific to people with an Autism Spectium 
Disorder, but such a tendency does not seem to be universal to all individuals with this 
condition. Moreover, this study failed to find preponderance towards either strong or 
weak centi al coherence in the majority of the present sample of typical individuals fiom 
around 9 to 10 years onwards. In addition, we failed to find a tendency for WCC across 
domains and even in the visuo-spatial domain, in the six to seven year old children. 
Their relatively worse perfoimance on the EF and BD tasks did, however, not entail a 
tendency to generate more local completions. The assumption of Central Coherence 
theory was that the ability of typical people to perceive stimuli globally somehow 
occurred at the expense of the ability to perceive and process information locally. What 
we have found here is, first, that older children and adults have the ability to flexibly 
change from one processing mode to another depending upon the task at hand; and 
secondly, that the possibility of using a Weak Cential Coherence processing style might 
be a relatively late acquisition in development.
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This finding stands in line with Witkin et al’s (1971) original suggestions of a 
developmental tiajectory of relative ‘field dependence’ to ‘field independence’. It also 
fits with the proposal made in another domain -  to be considered in later chapters -  that 
already fiom preschool age or before, young children are able to conceive of holistic, 
configurally organised knowledge structures (e.g. Nelson, 1986). On the other hand, the 
present finding does not fit Happé’s (1999) suggestion who related Takeuchi and 
Hulse’s (1993) finding that up to around 6 years, childien are generally able to acquire 
absolute pitch, with a featural processing mode. Given these open questions, studying 
the developmental trajectory of central coherence should be one of the priorities for 
future research exploring this constiuct.
We shall now discuss in turn possible factors that could have contiibuted to the 
finding that 1) more than half of the ASD population was characterised as not having 
WCC and 2) why we failed to find a relation between the two components of the CC 
construct, i.e. the expected co-occunence of good performance on the visuo-spatial 
tasks and poor performance on the conceptual-semantic task for most of the typically 
developing participants.
Why were more than half of the participants with ASD characterised as not 
having a tendency for Weak Central Coherence? The between-group analyses suggested 
that in tenns of perfoimance on the EFT and SCT, the present sample of individuals 
with ASD perfoimed similarly to what has been reported by other groups with other 
samples of people with autism or Asperger’s Syndrome using the same tasks (e.g. Shah 
& Frith, 1983; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997). Only the finding that the adults with
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ASD perfoimed worse than the contiol adults on the Block Design Task was 
unexpected in light of previous findings, for example by Shah & Frith, 1993. However, 
given that the adults with ASD obtained an average group score of 23.25 (of a 
maximum 51), which is right in the normal range as regarded by Wechsler (1981), their 
performance must nonetheless be considered as reflecting a relatively preserved ability. 
By considering the average scores obtained by the adult control group (36.45 out of 51), 
one possibility for the significantly worse performance of the ASD adult group as 
compared to the normal adult group could be that our adult control group, all recruited 
fi'om amongst a student population, performed exceptionally well even in comparison 
with the normal population at large.
Hence, overall the results of the three between-group analyses on the Embedded 
Figures, Block Design and Sentence Completion Tasks largely replicated the results 
found in previous studies. It seems therefore unlikely that the finding of the categorical 
transformation analysis that in the present sample, the majority of individuals with ASD 
were characterised as not having WCC, could be attributed to some spurious reasons for 
which participants in the present sample were very different to those tested in previous 
studies.
What then might have caused the unexpected findings of the con elation and 
total CC score analyses -  not only in the ASD adult population, but also in the contiol 
groups? For the adults with ASD, the lack of conelation between performance on the 
EFT and BDT seemed to have been due to the fact that only the BD, but not the EFT 
coiTelated with Full IQ estimates and surprisingly, even VIQ estimates. In this sense, 
the EFT seems to have been a ‘purer’ test of Cential Coherence.
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More surprising still was the finding that for the adults with ASD, as well as the 
9 to 10 year old typical children and the learning difficulties gioups, good perfoimance 
on the EFT coiTelated positively with good perfoimance on the Sentence completion 
task.
One possibility that could account for this finding is that we need to think of 
Cential Coherence not in terms of an amodal cognitive style, but one that is specifically 
related to the visuo-spatial domain (and perhaps the perceptual domain, which was not 
investigated in the present study). A good eye for detail and difficulties integrating 
infoimation in context might have independent origins, but the two tendencies could in 
some cases occur.
An alternative possibility could be that Central Coherence was indeed an amodal 
force, but that individuals with high verbal abilities are able to compensate for a 
piecemeal processing preference. This could however not explain the result of some of 
the younger individuals with ASD who had good verbal abilities but nonetheless made a 
relatively large number of local completion errors on the Sentence Completion Task.
Instead, inspection of individual performances on the Sentence Completion Task 
suggests that those in the present sample with the most verbal language difficulties did 
not make the most local completions, but gave otherwise inappropriate responses - just 
like those with the most profound learning difficulties in the present sample. However, 
those with ASD who had mild learning difficulties up to the normal range of 
intelligence were about equally likely to generate local completions. That for the 
children and adults with ASD there was no relation between the number of local
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completions and verbal IQ, might be indicative for the possibility that this particular 
pattern of performance -  the neglect of meaning -  is not associated to intelligence.
One explanation for the ‘mixed’ performance, of those who perfonned well 
across-the-board could be that the EFT and the BD tasks do not measure a spontaneous 
preference or tendency, as in fact it is onlv possible to successfully solve both tasks 
when adopting a piecemeal processing mode. In this sense, good performance on these 
tasks may not directly reflect a tendency to see the world in a more fragmented way, but 
might merely show a better ability to flexibly adopt such a processing style where 
requested, hr order to test this possibility, future work would be needed that employs a 
test that does not work in pass-fail terms and does not implicitly demand to adopt a 
piecemeal processing style, but compares that to a spontaneous preference.
Correlation analyses between performances on the Theory of Mind and 
Centr al Coherence tasks suggested that the two abilities were not related. This seemed 
at first to contrast the findings obtained by JaiTold et al (2000) who reported good 
performance on Theory of Mind Tasks to be negatively related to performance speed on 
the EFT in both typically developing children and children with autism. However, 
closer inspection of the individual data suggested that all individuals with ASD assigned 
to the no-ToM group also had Weak Central Coherence, whereas Weak Central 
Coherence seemed to be more pervasive as it was also found in three individuals with 
ToM abilities at the first or second order levels. This lends some support to a finding by 
Happé (1997) who reported that some individuals with ToM abilities continued to fail
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using the preceding sentence context on the homographs task. However, individuals 
with ASD with MCC, SCC or the mixed style showed to similar degrees Theory of 
Mind competencies at the first or second order levels.
In summary, Study 1 has been useful in allowing us to characterise the present 
participant population in tenns of their tendency towards Theory of mind and Centr al 
Coherence, The present participant population had in about equal proportions no ToM, 
first order ToM or advanced ToM competencies. We inteipret our findings as 
suggestive of individual differences in terms of Centr al Coherence both with regards to 
the ASD group and typically developing individuals. The study has raised a number of 
questions that may lead to future research needed to clarify the notion of Central 
Coherence. Within this thesis, they were not further explored, as indeed, the study was 
initially motivated by a different aim: to see whether degr ees of Central Coherence 
might affect the extent to which people with ASD may experience difficulties with 
cultural knowledge. Given that not all individuals with ASD showed this processing 
style, our predictions were revised, so that we only expected those with Weak Central 




S o c ia l  in f e r e n c e  t a s k
“What is it, then, I pressed her further, that goes on between nomial people, from which 
she feels herself excluded? It has to do, she has inferred, with an implicit knowledge of 
social conventions and codes, of cultural presuppositions of every sort. This implicit 
knowledge, which every normal person accumulates and generates throughout life on 
the basis of experiences and encounters with others. Temple seems to be largely devoid 
of. Lacking it, she has instead to ‘compute’ others’ intentions and states of mind, to try 
to make algorithmic, explicit, what for the rest of us is second nature. She herself, she 
infers, may never have had the normal social experience from which a normal social 
knowledge is constructed.”
Oliver Sacks, about Temple Grandin, a life-stock scientist with high-functioning autism,
in “An Anthropologist on Mars” (1995)
4.1. Introduction
A tendency to navigate through the social environment, as if “oblivious to social 
rules and norms” is a feature that already ICatmer (1943) noted as characteristic of many 
of his patients with autism. Anecdotes of situations in which people with ASD enter 
someone’s house for a first-time visit, stating they do not like the food spotted on the 
dinner table or commenting upon the host’s funny hair cut, are innumerable. By 
ignoring social norm pressures, people with ASD sometimes appear ‘brave’ or 
involuntarily funny at best, more often however, their behaviour tends to cause offence 
in their unsuspecting audience. This is often paired with a lacking understanding of 
‘how the world works’, for example, Twachtmann-Cullen noted how one of her 
participants stated that “for a 100 £ I can buy Me Donald’s, every book in the world and 
become older than my teacher” (Twachtmann-Cullen, 1998).
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Such apparent naïveté to real world knowledge and ‘blindness’ to social noims 
tends to stand out even more in able and older individuals with high-functioning autism 
or Asperger Syndrome, precisely because others do not see any mitigating factors such 
as an apparent limitation of the person’s intelligence.
Wliat could explain such inappropriate conduct? Perhaps people with autism are 
unaware of the effect, such as feelings of hurt or embanassment, they produce in others. 
Or else, they may genuinely lack knowledge of social norms and conventions, a mental 
guidebook that usually governs much of our behaviour. The Tlieory of Mind deficit 
hypothesis would endorse the first possibility. However, the second possibility —that 
people with an autistic condition may systematically lack knowledge of social noims— 
has received suiprisingly little attention.
In an ‘informal test of social Imow-hows and its uses’, Dewey (1991) presented 
seven young men with autism with a set of stories in which the protagonists displayed 
behaviours likely to be seen in people with autism. For example, in one stoiy, a young 
man was feeding pigeons in a park during his lunch break. He obseived how a baby in a 
carnage began to cry, unnoticed by its mother who was swinging an older child nearby. 
As he had leamt from his baby nephew that when he screamed, this sometimes meant 
that the diaper had opened, instead of bothering the mother, he quickly checked the 
baby’s clothing for an open pin.
Dewey asked her participants to rate the story characters’ behaviour on a scale 
ranging from ‘fairly nonnal behaviour in that situation’ through to ‘shocking 
behaviour’. She found that her respondents with autism often revealed a disregard for
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the social context or social convention. For example, they did not rate the behaviour of 
the man touching a strange baby as shocking as contiol participants without autism did. 
At the same time, the group with autism showed a tendency to judge conventional 
behaviours as eccentric or shocking — for example they commented upon the wasting 
of good food by throwing it on the ground for birds.
Dewey’s study was informative by illustrating how people with autism 
spontaneously judged a variety of naturalistic social situations and others’ behaviour. 
However, the study did not disentangle whether the responses by the participants with 
autism were the result of difficulties with mental states or with social noims, as the 
stories required both loiowledge of social noims and the drawing of mentalistic 
inferences to make judgements of the characters’ behaviours. '
Likewise, as discussed in Chapter 2, most recent studies that were aimed at 
approaching characteristics of naturalistic social situations have focused on the 
mentalistic component of social understanding (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; Happé, 1994; 
Heavey et al, 2000; Kaland et al., 2002). Hence, on the basis of perfoimance on these 
tasks it is difficult to tease out whether real life social impaiiments of people with ASD 
are solely the result of theory of mind deficits, of abnormalities in representing cultural 
knowledge of social norms and customs, or of both.
We designed a new ‘Social Inference Task’ that aimed, firstly, to test the extent 
to which people with ASD were able to predict and explain someone’s behaviour on the 
basis of real world knowledge of social norms and customs, but without requiring them 
to evoke mental state attiibutions. For example, to forecast that a 12-year old is more
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likely to have a drink of orange juice than a glass of beer, or that in the morning a man 
has an appointment with the dentist instead of going to the cinema, does not directly 
necessitate to refer to the agents’ mental states.
A second aim of this study was to investigate whether hypothesised deficits in 
social knowledge may be related to specific and known cognitive abnormalities 
associated with autism spectrum disorders: theory of mind deficits or a weakness in 
central coherence. Two alternative predictions were pitted against each other. If cultural 
Icnowledge of social norms and customs relied on general learning mechanisms or 
verbal language, then the ASD group would be expected to possess such cultural 
Icnowledge to a similar extent as control gioups without autism who function at a 
similar intellectual level. An alternative suggestion would be that distinct cognitive 
abilities might affect either the development or usage of these shared beliefs. As 
discussed earlier, a number of authors have suggested that the acquisition of cultural 
Icnowledge may indirectly rely on Theory of Mind or their developmental precursors 
(Tomasello, 1999; Bruner, 1986, 1993). If cultural understanding were indirectly 
dependent on Theory of Mind, then people with ASD who have profound deficits in this 
cognitive capacity should show gieater impairments than individuals without this 
condition who function at a similar intellectual level but have a representational 
understanding of the mind. What is more, a within-group difference would be expected, 
so that individuals with autism with profound metarepresentational deficits would be 
predicted to show greater impairments than individuals with an autistic condition with 
theory of mind competence at the first or second order levels.
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We had no concrete predictions as to whether or not Weak Central Coherence 
(WCC) would affect the acquisition or development of real world knowledge of noims 
and customs. However, as WCC is in part defined as the failure to integiate information 
in context, it could be expected that people with ASD with WCC apply their Icnowledge 
of social norms inappropriately by not relating it to the social context.
4.2. M ethod
4 .2 .1 . T ask  m ateria l
Ten stories were designed to test whether individuals with ASD were able to 
predict and explain a character’s likely behaviour or preference on the basis of social 
norms or real world knowledge (e.g. gender noims, age norms, common customs). For 
example, in one story vignette, “John has received an invitation to his best fiiend’s 
wedding. The wedding is going to take place in a beautiful chapel in the countryside. 
Eventually, the big day aiiives. John gets up early to get diessed for the wedding”. The 
participant is then asked: “What is John going to wear?”
To choose fiom the four options ‘wedding dress’, ‘suit’, ‘mountain jacket’ and 
‘uniform’, the participant does not need to impute a mental state to the character. 
However, it is necessary to extract and integrate two relevant pieces of story 
infoimation -  that the occasion is a wedding and that John is a man. If it was not for the 
wedding, going to the countryside may lend itself to wearing a mountain jacket. A 
wedding may be associated with a wedding dress, but this is only for the bride and not a 
guest, especially not when the guest is a man. Hence, a suit would be the most
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appropriate choice of these options. However, although somewhat less likely, from the 
given story infomiation, one could imagine a scenario in which a uniform may also be 
appropriate; for example, if John was a soldier.
Stories varied in teims of the number of relevant clues giveiK For example, in 
the story ‘after homework’, tlie only relevant information decisive for the character’s 
likely choice of di'ink was his age. By contrast, for the stoiy ‘paintings’, in order to 
establish that the character went to a museum, it was necessary to consider that this 
place had paintings and that he bought a ticket to enter. One does not need a ticket to go 
to the depaitment store or railway station (although one can buy tickets at the latter, 
too), and although one needs a ticket to go to the theatre, the pictures (should there be 
any on the wall) are irrelevant.
Each set of four pictures was used in two different story contexts. The con ect 
options were different across story pairs. This was to explore whether participants were 
able to use context information to justify their choices, as well as to ensure they did not 
choose items for other reasons, as for example, personal preference. The full set of 
stories, response choices and memory contiol questions, is given in Appendix 4.1.
4,2.2. Procedure
The Social Inference Task was computerised and presented on a PC notebook 
(Toshiba Tecra 8000, 13.3-inch screen). The main aim of presenting the task in this way 
was to make it as attractive as possible (many people with ASD have a fascination for 
computers) and to enable easy administration and scoring.
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To introduce the task, the experimenter told the participants that they were going 
to listen to some stories about different people. It was explained that after each story, 
the experimenter would ask one question about what the person in the story was likely 
going to do next. Then, they would look at four pictures on the computer, one after the 
other. For each picture, the participant was instructed to say whether it showed the right 
and likely answer, or the wrong and unlikely answer. This task introduction appeared on 
the screen and was read out aloud by the experimenter. Upon mouse-click, controlled in 
most cases by the experimenter, the first story appeared on the computer screen and was 
read out aloud by the experimenter. Some older and more able participants chose to read 
the stories out aloud themselves. After the story was read, the experimenter asked the 
participant if he or she had understood the story or wanted to listen to it again. If the 
participant signalled to be ready for the questions, the first prediction question was 
asked, for example “What is John going to wear?”. Upon mouse-click, the computer 
then presented four photographs, one after the other (e.g. ‘wedding dress’, ‘suit’, 
‘mountain jacket’, ‘unifonn’). For each photogiaph, the participant had the response 
choice between ‘yes, likely’ and ‘no, unlikely’. One click was needed per photograph, 
upon which the next photograph appeared (see for an example of item presentations. 
Figure 4.1).
If the participant gave at least one incoixect response, a memory control 
question, tailored onto the relevant infoimation in each stoiy, was asked (e.g. “Where 
did John go?”). After presentation of all four pictures, mouse-click made a justification 
question appear on the computer screen (e.g.“Why are the other [clothes] wrong or 
unlikely?”). The experimenter then verbally specified this question for the four items,
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by taking the participant’s responses on the prediction question (e.g. “Why is a wedding 
dress unlikely [likely]?” “Why is a suit likely [unlikely]?”) into account. Responses 
were tape-recorded and later tianscribed in full.
4,2.3. Coding system
4.2.3. L Responses on prediction questions
Participants’ responses were only included for stories for which he or she had 
passed the memory control questions. Responses on the prediction question were scored 
as either correct (1 point) or incorrect (0 points) for each story, which resulted in a 
maximum score of 10.
Baselines for correct responses - In stories 4 , 6, 7 and 9, on ly  one response  
com bination across the four item s w as considered as appropriate. For exam ple, in  the 
story ‘paintings’, a correct prediction involved  choosing the m useum  and rejecting the 
train station, the department store and the theati e. I f  the probability o f  answering each  
item  coiTectly b y  chance is 50%, then the probability o f  obtaining b y  chance a coiTect 
answer for the story in total is 50% x 50% x50% x 50% = 6.25%.
For the remaining stories (1,2, 3, 5, 8, and 10), more than one response 
combination on the four items was scored as conect. With this, we aimed to explore 
whether people with ASD were willing to consider that sometimes more than one type 
of drinlc or clothing can be possible in the same context. For the stories 1, 2, 5, 8 and 10, 
one item was unambiguously conect, and another one could be seen as an acceptable
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exception (e.g. the uniform at the wedding). On this story, one needs to reject the 
wedding dress and the hiking jacket, one can include the suit and reject the unifonn, or 
one can accept
both, but it was scored as inconect to include the unifonn but to reject the suit. Hence, 
the baseline probability for giving a conect response on these stories by chance was 
50% X 50% X (100- 25%) = 18.75%. Story 3 ‘football TV’ was exceptional in that only 
the item ‘beer’ (yes, likely) was relevant. Choosing beer on the basis of a situated 
gender stereotype and rejecting the other beverages was scored as conect, as well as 
choosing beer plus any of the other types of beverages. Rejecting the ‘beer’ and only 
choosing other types of drinks was scored as incorrect. This resulted in a chance 
baseline of 50%. (Appendix 4.2. gives the baselines for each story).
4.23.2. Coding system for explanations
A  second analysis was concerned with the quality of conect and inconect 
explanations. Clearly, someone who was able to appropriately justify his or her choice 
on the prediction question could be considered as having more in-depth cultural 
Icnowledge than someone has who could not justify his or her prediction, or gave an 
inappropriate explanation. Our coding scheme included three categories of appropriate 
explanations (social norm, relevant story infoimation, canonical Theory of Mind 
inferences) and five categories of inappropriate explanations (inappropriate Theory of 
Mind inferences, inappropriate inference unrelated to story information, associative 
function responses, personal attitude and a diverse responses category). A definition of 
each category and examples are given below.
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1. Appropriate social norm
For responses to be coded in this category, justifications were required to refer either 
explicitly or implicitly to social norms or generalised real world knowledge. An 
example of an explicit reference would be “it’s the kind of social norm”. An implicit 
reference to a norm could be evidenced by a deontic component of a more general 
explanation of what people, or types of people tend to do (for example “it’s not 
appropriate”, “it has to be 18”).
2. Relevant story information
This category included responses that refened to a relevant piece of information given 
in the story. For example, when asked to justify why a mountain jacket was the unlikely 
option in the wedding story, a participant replied: “well, there’s no one hiking at a 
wedding”.
5. Canonical theoiy o f mind inferences
‘Canonical states’ describe routine or conventional happenings (see Lucariello, 
1990). We introduce the tenu ‘canonical mental states’ to describe mental state 
inferences that bear on conventional expectations or stereotypes. An example for a 
canonical mental state explanation on the question “Why is Peter [12 years old] unlikely 
to have a cup of coffee?” was “most children don’t like the taste of coffee, they like 
orange juice or Ribena”. Hence, the inferred desire was based on a common stereotype 
of children in the situation of the story character.
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4, Inappropriate Theory of Mind inferences
Previous research (e.g. Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 1995) suggests that people 
with autism use on the whole fewer mental state tenns in their narratives than control 
groups. However, based on initial readings of the inteiview material, our impression 
was that at whilst at times, participants did use mental state terms, they did so in an 
inappropriate way, since the inference did neither bear on general real world knowledge 
(as in category 3) nor referred to some clue about a character’s likely mental state in the 
story. For example, one participant with autism justified his rejection of the ‘coffee’ 
option on the story ‘TV football’: “I think thev didn’t want coffee because I thought it 
was white. I like orange-iuice. I hate diluted taste, but I do like orange juice.”
This explanation involves an inference of the character’s mental state -  “they didn’t 
want coffee’- but the basis of this inference was rather idiosyncratic in nature. It was 
based on his veiy own preferences, likes and dislikes, which shows that he precisely 
failed to acknowledge that others can have differing desires, as well as that his own 
desires cannot influence the choices of a story character! Hence, the character of this 
type of ‘mental state inference’ is rather different to the one discussed in the above 
category ‘canonical mental state explanations’.
5. Inappropriate inference unrelated to story information
This category mirrors category 2 and included explanations that are based on 
(non-mentalistic) inferences that cannot be drawn on the basis of the available story 
infoimation. An example for this type is the response of a typical seven-year-old child
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in relation to the stoiy ‘Monday morning’: “Why did he not go to the dentist?” “He 
went to the dentist a week ago”.
6, Associative function disregarding story context
This category included explanations revealing that the participant associated the 
item with certain (social) functions, albeit without considering the story context. This 
categoiy included responses, such as “is for the coffee house”, “for tooth cleaning”, “to 
get his hair cut”.
7, Personal experience or attitude
In this category, explanations w ere based on too naiTOW personal experiences or 
attitudes, for exam ple “W hy is B ill [40 years] not having a glass o f  beers?” ” M v dad 
d oesn ’t drink beer”. T his category also included responses that m ay be phrased in  
social norm terms (eg. ‘should b e’, ‘is usual’ etc) but had largely an idiosyncratic 
content (“it’s not usual for m en to go to the department store”).
8, Diverse
The final category involved incorrect responses that did not fit into any o f  the 
categories described before, or responses that w ere too vague, such as “it has to be”, 
“because that’s w h y” and “don’t lo iow ” responses.
Following Happé’s (1994) scoring suggestions for the Strange Stories Task, 
where multiple answers were given for one item, the scoring procedure was facilitated 
by crediting the participant for his or her most appropriate answer. Ambiguous
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responses were discussed with a second rater until agreement was reached. In a few 
instances in which ambiguity could not be resolved, the explanation was excluded from 
the analysis.
4 .2 .4 . P articip an ts
For this study, all individuals who had failed the False Belief Task because they 
had failed the memory control questions (3 participants with ASD, two with learning 
difficulties), were excluded from the analysis. Participants who failed to understand the 
false belief or mentalistic components presumably because they had difficulties to 
understand or memorise the story plots (‘false belief + memory failer’, see Chapter 3) 
were excluded in order to investigate whether or not predicted group differences could 
be attributed to Theory of Mind. Fuitheiinore, one participant with autism and one with 
learning difficulties were excluded due to a lack of verbal responses on the justification 
question. This leaves 20 individuals on the autism spectrum (8 individuals with autism, 
12 individuals with Asperger Syndrome), 7 individuals with learning difficulties, 16 
noimal children and 10 adults. Age characteristics, and for the two clinical groups 
verbal IQ details, are shown in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1. Participant characteristics (grey shades denote matched groups)
Groups N CA Verbal IQ
ASD TOTAL 20 16.5 87.6
Autism 8 14.1 78.0'
Asperger’s Syndrome 12 18.0 94.12
Learning difficulties 
(4 first order ToM/ 3 
second order ToM)
7 14.3 74.6
Normal children 16 8.1 -
9-10 year old (second 
order ToM)
7 9.4 -




 ^from 7 individuals only 
^from 9 individuals only
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4.3 . R esu lts
The data were analysed in three different ways. First, possible differences 
between diagnostic groups were considered, i.e. the autism spectrum group, considered 
as one group, was compared to the learning difficulties and typical children groups. We 
then divided those with ASD into autism versus Asperger’s Syndrome and compared 
the autism subgroup with the verbal mental age matched learning difficulties group and 
the six to seven year old children. The Asperger’s Syndrome subgioup was compared to 
the typical 9 to 10 year old typical children and adults.
For a second analysis, participants were grouped according to their level of 
theory of mind competence. Finally, for a third analysis, participants were giouped 
according to their central coherence groups. For each analysis, since small cell sizes 
were a concern, first parametric one-way analyses of variance were performed, followed - 
by pairwise comparisons, using Tukey’s tests. Where significant group differences were 
found, the data was re-analysed using non-parametiic Mann-Whitney U tests.
4.3.1. Results for comparison between Autism Spectrum and control groups
4.3.1.1. Memory control questions
The autism spectrum group passed on average 8.9 out of 10 control questions, 
the learning difficulties group 9.0, the children 9.3 and the adults all 10. A one-way 
ANOVA showed that these differences were not statistically significant {F(2>^ 51) = 
.361, p  = .77). When the autism spectrum group was split into autism versus Asperger 
Syndi’ome subgroups, those with autism passed on average 8.5 control questions and
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those with Asperger Syndrome 9.1. The 6 to 7 years olds passed on average 9. Land the 
9 to 10 year old children 9.8 of the control question. Again, a one-way ANOVA did not 
reveal significant group differences (f(4, 50) = .67, p ~ .61).
4.3.1.2. Prediction question
The results of participant groups’ performances on the prediction questions are 
shown in Figure 4.2.
ASD versus Control Groups - The participants with an autism spectmm disorder 
did not differ from the learning difficulties and typical children control groups in ternis 
of the means of conect predictions (F(2,42) = 677, p  ~ ,51). Each of these gioups, 
however, made significantly fewer conect predictions than the normal adults {F (3,52) 
= 5.12, p  = 004, for each paiiwise comparison Tukey’sp  <.05).
Autism vs. Asperger Syndrome - Next, the ASD group was split into subgroups 
with a diagnosis of autism versus Asperger’s Syndrome, and each subgroup was 
compared to their respective contiol gioups. A one-way ANOVA showed that the 
autism subgroup did not differ from the individuals with learning difficulties or the 
VMA matched 6 to 7 year old ‘young’ children in terms of means of correct predictions 
(F(2,22) = 1.02, p = .37). However, significant group differences between the 
Asperger’s Syndrome, 8 to 9 year-old children and adult control gioups, were found 
(F(2, 29) = 4.43, p = .02). Mann Whitney’s U test specified that only those with
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Figure 4.2. Means of correct predictions (max = 10)
a) Autism Spectrum group versus control groups
I "I  so
B so
Autism spectrum disc typicst chid
learning dtfTtcultie normal adults




Asperger’s Syndrome made significantly fewer coiTect predictions than the adult 
conti'ol gi'oup (Z = -3.28, N = 22, p < .001). Furthermore, autism and Asperger’s 
Syndrome subgroups did not differ significantly from each other in terms of means of 
correct predictions {t (20) = -1.62, = .121.)
4.3.2. Results for Theory of Mind groups
To explore whether Theory of Mind competence influenced performance on the 
Social Inference Task, groups were split into no ToM, first order ToM, and second 
order ToM groups following the groupings established in Chapter 3. Participant 
characteristics in terms of Theory of Mind abilities are shown in Table 4.2. All 
participants in the contr ol groups included in this study had Theory of Mind 
competence on either the first or second order levels.
4.3,2.1. Memory control questions:
The ASD no-ToM group passed on average 7.8 memory question, the ASD first 
order ToM group 9.3, and the ASD second order ToM gi'oup all 10. In the control 
groups, those with learning difficulties passed on average 9, the first order ToM 
children 9.2 and the second order ToM children 9.5 control questions. A one-way 
ANOVA established that these differences were not statistically significant, F  (6,45) = 
.278, p = n.s.).
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Table 4,2. Participant characteristics, grouped according to Theory of Mind abilities
Groups n CA
Verbal 10/
VMA estimates in 
brackets
ASD No ToM* 6 12.6 69.33 (6.8)
(5 autism/1 AS) 
ASD first order ToM 7 17.7 84.0 (7.3)
(2 autism/ 5 AS)
ASD second order ToM 7 18.5
(1 autism/ 7 AS) 
Learning difficulties 7 14.21 74.60 (8.9)
(4 f'order ToM/ 3 2"  ^orderToM) 
Typical children (6-10 yrs) 16 8.1 -
2"'* order ToM children 7 9.4
(9-10 year olds)
1®' order ToM children 9 6.8
-
(6-7 year olds) 
Typical adults 10 24.3 -
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4.3.2.2. Results prediction question
The results were clear-cut and are illustrated in Figure 4.3. A one-way ANOVA 
showed that the ASD no ToM group alone performed significantly worse than all other 
gioups, (F (6,48) = 13.77,;? =.000, Tukey’sp  <.001 for each paiiwise comparison).
The relevant paiiwise comparisons showed that the ASD noToM group significantly 
more often failed to coiTect predict the character’s likely behaviours or choices than the 
ASD first order ToM gi'oup (Z = -2,05, N = 13,;? < .04), the typical first order ToM 
children (Z = -2.1,N = 15,;?< .02), and than the learning difficulties group group (Z = - 
2,2 N = 13,;? < .02). The performance of the ASD first order ToM group did not differ 
fi'om that of the Learning Difficulties and first order ToM typical children contr ol 
groups {F (2, 20) = 2.3, p =.12). Likewise, the ASD second order ToM group gave on 
average as many correct predictions as the second order ToM typical children and the 
adult control gioup {F (2,19) = .150,;? = .86).
However, the mean number of correct predictions did not allow us to distinguish 
between someone who specifically failed to predict a story character’s behaviour but 
had understood the story and someone who failed the memory contr ol question for that 
story. A concern could be that the significantly worse performance of the ASD no ToM 
group was the result of this group simply failing more memory contr ol questions than 
the other groups. To investigate this possibility, a second analysis was conducted using 
proportions. Proportions were calculated by dividing the number of conect predictions 
by the number of correct memory questions. Results are shown in Table 4.3 and are 
depicted in Figure 4.3.
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Table 4,3, Proportions of conect predictions
Groups N Total = 1 SO Range
ASD noToM 6 .41 .29 (0-.7)
ASD first order ToM 7 .75 .16 (.5-1)
ASD second order 7 .83 .1 (7-1)
ToM
Child first order ToM 9 .73 - (.6-.9)
Child second order 7 .83 (.7-9)ToM
Learning Difficulties 7 .80 .15 (.6-1)
Adult 10 .97 - (.9-1)
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A one-way ANOVA showed a significant effect of ToM group on the proportion 
of correct predictions {F (6, 45) =9.53, p  <.001). Tukey’s tests showed that the ASD no­
ToM group made significantly fewer conect predictions, even when viewed against the 
total number of correctly understood stories, than all other groups (/? < .01). This 
suggests that the worse performance of the ASD no-ToM group were not attributable to 
global difficulties with the story comprehension.
4,3.2.3. Types o f Explanations
Next, the quality of the explanations given by the participants was considered. 
Results are shown in Table 4.4. For this analysis, the total number of 40 items were 
considered, including those 9 items that were judged as conect either way, and 
inespective as to whether they were given after a conect or inconect prediction. 
However, responses on stories for which the participant had failed the memoiy control 
question, were excluded.
The relevant findings were that the ASD no ToM group refened significantly 
less often to social norms in their explanations than the typically developing first order 
ToM children (Z = -2.1, N = 15,p < .05), the learning difficulties group (Z = -3.01, N 
- \3 ,p <  .01), and the ASD first order ToM group ( Z = -2.5, N= 13,;? < .01). 
Furthermore, the ASD no ToM group gave significantly more ‘associative function’ 
responses that disregarded the stoiy context than the learning difficulties group (Z = - 
2.96, N = 13,/? < .01) and the typical children with first order ToM (Z = .-3.32, N = 15, 
/? =  001).
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Of all explanation categories, the ASD first order ToM group gave significantly 
more associative function responses than the typically developing 1®' order ToM 
children (Z = -1.93, N = 16,/? = .054  ^and than the ASD 2"^  order ToM group.
The explanations given by the ASD second order ToM gi'oup were comparable to those 
given by the typical second order ToM children and adult control groups, with 
exception of the ASD second order ToM gioup giving fewer annronriate ‘canonicaT 
ToM explanations than the typical second order ToM children (Z = -2.15, N =14,/? = 
.05) and than the adult control group (Z = -2.4, N = 17,/? = .035).
Analysis fo r story type
To investigate whether participants found the 2-relevant information stories 
more difficult than the 1-relevant infoimation, predictions for each type of story were 
inspected separately. Frequencies and percentages, given in Table 4.7., show that even 
the first and second order Theory of Mind groups did not perform at ceiling across all 
stories, and that all groups tended to find stories 7 and 10 most difficult.
4.3.3. Analysis for Central Coherence groups
The task required participants to extract relevant pieces of information from the 
story and to relate those to the photogr aphs. In this sense, one needed to use context 
information (e.g. morning, evening) to judge whether a character went to the dentist or 
the pub. This could be seen as comparable to, for example, the demands of using the 
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For this analysis, we lost four cases in the ASD group and two cases in the normal 
childi'en group, as no data on the cential coherence categories was available for these 
participants.
Correct predictions
Due to otheiwise small cell numbers, for statistical analyses, the four Central 
Coherence groups were compared across diagnoses. However, in Table 4.6, together 
with the means for all Central Coherence gioups irrespective of diagnosis, we also give 
the corresponding means of the ASD group only, characterised according to Central 
Coherence categories. Recall from Chapter 3 that with the exception of one typical 
adult, only individuals with ASD were characterised as having a Weak Central 
Coherence cognitive style. A one-way analysis of variance showed that the Central 
Coherence groups did not differ in terms of the number of correct predictions (F (3, 43) 
= 2.26,/? =n.s.).
Table 4.6. Number of conect predictions: all participants giouped in Cential Coherence 














SCO 10 6.5 3 5
MOO 11 7.4 5 7.2
WCC total 7 7 6 6.5




Of the different lands of explanations, we predicted that especially one type of 
inappropriate explanation might be rooted in a Weak Central Coherence cognitive style; 
the inappropriate associative function type. When all participants were gi ouped 
according to Centr al Coherence categories, significant group differences for the means 
of appropriate social noim explanations (F (3, 43) = 4.2, p == .01), inappropriate Theory 
of Mind explanations (F (3, 43) = 3.6. p = ,02), and inappropriate associative functions 
(F (3, 43) = 4.2,/? = .01) were found. However, post-hoc tests revealed that these 
significant gi oup differences always involved the better performance of the ‘mixed 
style’ gioup. This is less interesting, as the majority of the mixed-style gioup was 
composed of adult controls
4.4. Discussion
The study was aimed at exploring two questions: first, do people with an autistic 
condition have impaired cultural knowledge of noims and social customs that would 
affect their ability to predict and explain behaviour? Secondly, if there were such 
impaiiments, might these be related to deficits in either Theory of Mind or Weak 
Central Coherence?
In summary, the results were clear-cut: overall, individuals with autism or 
Asperger’s Syndrome did not show significantly gieater impaiiments in drawing 
inferences based on social norms or real world knowledge than their respective control 
groups. Neither did groupings into Central Coherence groups reveal statistically
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significant gi'oup differences. However, only individuals with an autism spectmm 
disorder and Theory of Mind impairments showed consistent deficits in predicting and 
explaining story characters’ behaviour with reference to social norms. The finding that 
the ASD no-ToM gioup made about twice as many wrong than coiTect predictions 
concerning a character’s norm-based actions suggests that for this subgroup, the 
unpredictability of others’ actions might go even beyond situations that directly require 
the (hawing of mentalistic inferences. And even where they did make coiTect 
predictions, probing questions for explanations suggested that about half of the times 
their understanding of the nonn was in fact only superficial and fiagile.
Another finding of this study was that participants amongst the typical 
population did not always give mentalistic explanations as the ‘default’ ones. As shown 
in Table 4.5, with increasing age, the typically developing children and adults gave 
increasingly higher proportions of social nonn explanations. This underscores the value 
of social real-world Icnowledge for everyday ‘sense-making’. In addition, at times 
canonical or stereotypical mental state inferences formed part of this social norm 
reasoning. The typically developing children elegantly combined their real world 
Icnowledge with relevant stoiy information to back up their mentalistic guesses (for 
example: “Men usually like beer, particularly when they watch a football match”, “he 
might be thirsty after the work and wants a cold drink”). What is more, the typical 
children seemed to be aware that their predictions involved a component of uncertainty, 




Unexpected was the finding that the ASD no-ToM group gave most 
‘inappropriate ToM’ explanations. On the basis of past research, suggesting that people 
with autism use fewer mental state terms in their narratives (e.g. Loveland et al, 1989, 
Loveland & Tunali, 1993; Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 1995), we expected the no-ToM 
group to use only few mental state terms in their explanations. One possibility 
accounting for this unexpected finding might be that their tendency to give ‘Theory of 
Mind’ explanations was directly related to their relative lack of social knowledge that 
other gioups used instead in this context. Where those were not available, they might 
have attempted to evoke mentalistic explanations but failed to do so appropriately 
precisely because of their representational Theory of Mind deficit. Lucariello (1990) has 
argued that as part of nairative activities, Theory of Mind activities maybe particularly 
stimulated where something out-of-the-ordinary, ‘anti-canonical’ in her words, happens. 
If cultural knowledge that normally structures the ‘ordinary’ lacks, then actions that for 
us are ordinary might also fall into this category. However, the ‘inappropriate’ character 
of the ‘Theory of Mind’ explanations offered by the ASD no ToM group suggests that 
this group might have deployed mental state teims more as a conversational device, an 
empty shell, and not as a useful cognitive tool in which mental states were related to 
some relevant content in order to predict or meaningfully explain other’s actions. In this 
sense, a good proportion of responses coded as ‘inappropriate ToM responses’, saying, 
‘because he wants to’ need actually to be translated into ‘I don’t know’.
A further interesting finding of the explanation measure was the high number of 
associative responses found in the subgroups of ASD with no ToM. This pattern was
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specifically predicted from WCC theory, but it was also found to be most prevalent in 
the ASD no ToM gioup. For example, one participant consistently disregarded context 
information, such as information about the time or the identity of the character, and 
claimed that both the 12-year old boy and the adult would not diink coffee because that 
is “for the coffee house or in the morning” and they would not diink beer because “that 
is for the pub” etc. One explanation for significant differences between Theoiy of Mind 
groups could have been that in fact, the result might have been contiibuted by Weak 
Central Coherence, since all individuals in the no ToM group also had Weak Central 
Coherence. Whilst more able individuals with WCC (with ToM competence at the first 
or second order levels) might have used their language abilities to give meaningful 
explanations, this might not have been possible for these less able individuals.
The present study did not provide evidence for a lack of real-world Icnowledge 
of social noims and customs in all people with ASD, but rather suggested that the 
acquisition of social norms and of Theory of Mind might develop in tandem. On the 
other hand, can we conclude firom this study that real world knowledge is relatively 
intact in people with ASD who function at the level of first or second order theory of 
mind competence? Closer inspection of the different stories showed that two of the 2- 
item stories -  the ‘painting’ and ‘in a rush* stories - were even difficult for many of the 
individuals with first or second order Theory of Mind competence, including those with 
and without an autism spectrum disorder. However, a closer comparison between these 
2-item stories and other 1-item stories suggests that the 2-item stories were not based on 
social norms proper, something that could be explicitly taught, but rather they relied on 
real-world knowledge in a broader sense (see Appendix 4.1.).
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The study had two limitations. The first limitation relates to the task material. 
Although coiTect responses and explanations on this task did not require the participant 
to make theory of mind inferences per se, some of the stories included mental state 
descriptions (e.g. story 9: ‘looking for something’). Although participants’ responses 
were only included if they had passed the relevant memory control questions, and 
although a full understanding of the characters’ mental states was not necessary to make 
predictions, this inadvertent mentalistic component in some story cases may have 
disadvantaged the ASD noToM group. It would therefore be useful to refine the task by 
still further minimising the Theory of Mind component.
As a second limitation we need to consider the participant characteristics and 
relatively small numbers comprising the present sample. On the one hand, this may 
pose problems to generalise the findings to the autism spectmm population at large. On 
the other hand, the problem of small sample sizes refers generally to the danger of 
precluding a statistically significant effect. In this way, having found statistical effects 
with small cell sizes suggests a relatively high homogeneity amongst the separate 
subgroups.
In summary, as an exploratoiy study, the findings suggest that for some people 
with an autistic condition, impairments in social understanding may stietch beyond 
what has been suggested by the ‘fine cuts’ method in which social situations were 
compared in terms of whether or not the ability to draw mental inferences were 
required. The study also poses a number of questions that may stimulate future research.
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This includes, as a first avenue, to extend this line of research to younger normally 
developing children. As all control participants included in the present study had ToM 
competence at either the 1®‘ or 2"^-order level, it would be necessary to further 
investigate whether typically developing preschoolers acquire social norms and real- 
world Icnowledge before, with or after they develop a representational understanding of 
the mind. Although most of the behaviours were not prescriptive in a strict sense it is 
possible that they involved a deontic component. Whether or not deontic and 
mentalistic reasoning are distinct or interwoven domains, is subject of cunent debate 
(see Cosmides and Tooby,1992; Jackendoff, 1996; Nunez & Haiiis, 1998; Bmner,
1993). Comparative research with normally developing children and people with an 
autism spectrum disorder may be helpful to investigate further whether separately, or in 
-conjunction, these two reasoning abilities participate in real world knowledge 
acquisition.
Another way of studying the possible role of Theory of Mind for noim-based 
inferences would be to explore the neural correlates of this kind of social reasoning. A 
study using functional imaging techniques in which people with autism and 
psychopaths were given the Dewey stories found that in psychopaths, but not in autism, 
brain pathways were activated that are associated with mentalising capacities (Blair, 
personal communication). It would be interesting to see whether noimally developing 
childi'en or adults may show an activation of similar regions when reading ‘social norm’ 
stories, which do not directly involve a Theory of Mind component.
Future work is needed that investigates in more detail the understanding of 
norms or real world Icnowledge specifically in the able ASD and 2"^  order ToM
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groups. Given that as a first study with exploratory character, the task was designed to 
be comprehensible for a relatively wide age range and people with moderate learning 
difficulties, it might have tapped on a level far below what could be expected fi-om these 
able adolescents or adults. Infoimally, it was noted that adult controls and some of the 
typically developing childien often evoked exceptional scenarios in order to 
accommodate the less likely items. For example, whilst they recognised that a dentist 
was not a conventional place to socialise in the evening (and rejected it on the 
prediction question), one participant speculated that the character could meet his friend 
at the dentist if the friend happened to be a dentist. In other words, people used their 
imagination to create less conventional but hypothetically possible scenarios. One 
possibility that could account for a potential discrepancy between relatively good task 
perfoimance of this able ASD 2"^  order ToM group and real life problems may be that 
they have ‘over’-learnt social noims in a stiict rule-type way. It may be informative to 
explore whether or not they may be able to use theory of mind as a vehicle for 
imagination, in order to account for unlikely exceptional circumstances, which could be 
contr asted with truly ‘impossible’ ones. Secondly, one may ask this able subgroup 
whether they may be ready to make more fine-giained distinctions between what is 
more or less likely. A third question that arises is how far abnormalities may extend to 
other social inference processes in autism or further aspects of cultural knowledge. In 
order to explore further the possible range of abnormalities in cultural knowledge, in the 
following study we turn to yet another fundamental facet of it: the representation of 
routine events.
155
Ev e n t  r epr e se n t a t io n  in  a u t ism
5.1. I n t r o d u c t i o n
The question that motivated the studies presented in this and the subsequent 
chapter was how individuals with an autistic condition represent common and routine 
events. Event Icnowledge, often referred to as ‘scripts’ (Schank & Abelson, 1977),
‘event schemas’ (Mandler, 1983) or ‘generalised event representations’ (Nelson & 
Ginndel, 1981) are an essential part of our cultural knowledge. As a cognitive frame, 
scripts tell us what could or should happen in individual experiences with routine 
events, such as when going to a restaurant or grocery shopping. As obseiwed differences 
in scripts between different cultures underscore, this content is learnt and shared only 
amongst members of a given social and cultural community that share the same kinds of 
experienced events. For example, both Westerners and Samoans have general 
expectations of what happens when a friend visits them, yet the content of their 
represented routines varies considerably (Shore, 1996).
The notion of ‘scripts’ was first coined by Schank and Abelson (1977). In the 
attempt to model complex processes such as text or language comprehension in 
artificial intelligence, Schanlc and Abelson faced the problem that people infer much 
more about a situation than what is literally said. Real world based scripts were their 
proposed solution, defined as a high-level schematically organised Icnowledge 
stiiictures. As schemas (Bartlett, 1932; Mandler, 1979; Rummelhardt, 1977) in general,
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scripts or event schemas are thought to stand midway between immediate perceptual 
experiences and paradigmatic abstractions, where in a set of expectations the whole 
(e.g. living room) implies certain components, but the components (e.g. tables, chairs) 
do not imply the whole. In addition, event scripts comprise a sequence of actions that 
are organised within a particular spatial-temporal context and around a goal. Basic 
characteristics of scripts include generality, sequentiality, and causality of actions and 
agreement on main and cential acts. Somewhat analogous to a theatre script, mental 
scripts not only specify the social roles of people who appropriately participate in an 
event, but also the presence (or absence) of requisites and material artefacts, often 
refeired to as ‘props’. For example, in a restaurant event, we expect to find waiters, 
cooks, and guests, as well as tables, chairs and cutleiy, but no shopping carts. We 
predict that the waiter will bring us the food after and not before we have ordered it 
(temporal sequence) and expect to pay because we have consumed food (causality).
Of specific relevance for the present proposal is the assumed hierarchical 
organisation of scripts, which includes at the highest level scenes, then slots and at the 
lowest level slotfillers. For example, in the classic restaurant event, major scenes are 
ordering, eating and paying. Developmental research introduced a further distinction 
between central and optional (also called peripheral) acts. This distinction refers to the 
importance and probability of actions or ‘props’ (i.e. requisites, objects) to occur in an 
event. For example, a central act would be ‘paying the bill’, and an optional act would 
be ‘having a pudding’. Both central and optional acts can be expressed either as 
generalised slots (say, having pudding) or specific slotfillers (chocolate sundae). Due to 
the cognitive interplay between central and optional acts and the accommodation of
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specific instances into more general slots, scripts have both a sti'ucturing function and 
allow for a great deal of flexibility across different experiences with a given event. 
Taken together, scripts are considered to be powerful cognitive constmcts that provide a 
fi-ame or cognitive context for the interpretation of ongoing experiences, comprehension 
of text and stories, and the organisation of experiences in memory.
A number of studies have lent empirical support to the basic tenets of the script 
model. In a landmark study by Bower, Black and Turner (1979), adults showed high 
agr eement in their temporal organisation and in their spontaneous listing of actions 
relevant to routine events, which were described at a relatively high level. For example, 
in describing a restaurant event in a study by Galambos and Ribs (1982), participants 
wrote ‘he ate his soup’, as opposed to ‘he picked up his spoon, dipped it into the cup of 
soup, lifted it out’ etc. Further evidence that scripts appear to be activated as a whole 
comes from memory tasks. Participants typically falsely recognise actions not stated in 
the original text but that are implied by the underlying script (Bower et al., 1979;
Walker &Yekovich, 1984). Over time, memory for atypical, and irrelevant actions 
decreases whereas memory for typical action increases (Graesser, Gordon & Sawyer, 
1979; Graesser, Woll, Kowalski, & Smith, 1980).
A research programme led by Nelson and her colleagues (reviewed in Nelson, 
1986) has extensively studied the acquisition of event knowledge in young typically 
developing children. This research suggests that already by around 35 months of age, 
typical pre-schoolers possess schematised Icnowledge of familiar and recunent events in 
a script format. One of the most common methods used to study young children’s event
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knowledge has been the event generation paradigm in which children are asked to 
produce naiTatives of routine events, such as a school lunch, a restaur ant visit, or a 
birthday party (Nelson and Gruendel, 1981, 1986). The yormg participants showed high 
agreements amongst each other in terms of the main and central acts of an event, and 
their descriptions typically conform to the script characteristics of generality, 
consistency over time, temporal-sequentiality and hierarchical organisation. Generality 
is linguistically expressed by speaking of you or they eat, rather than using /  or we 
forms and consistency over time is linguistically expressed by deploying the timeless 
present tense rather than the past tense of individual experiences. Understanding of the 
temporal-causal structure is shown by linguistic markers, such îls first, then, and 
hierarchical organisation by structuring their reports in relatively high-order slots. For 
example, the children mentioned that activities before lunch time involve playing, but, 
unless specifically probed, rarely specified whether this means riding a bike or playing 
with dolls. With increasing age and experience, the descriptions of scripts were found to 
become more elaborate (more main component activities are reported) and more 
probabilistic in that more conditional and optional activities were included as possible 
components of a scripts. In sum, scripts are hierarchically organised, flexible, present 
from very early in development and serve as a cognitive tool to structure individual 
experiences.
5.2. Event representation in autism
Little systematic research is available that has studied how people with ASD 
represent events although speculations that people with ASD may have a poorly
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acculturated view of the world (Loveland, 1991; Loveland & Tunali, 1991; Bruner & 
Feldman, 1993) include predictions of impaired script knowledge. This relative neglect 
might strike one as surprising, as the research discussed above points to the vital role of 
generalised event representation in modulating social interaction - a key impairment of 
the autism syndrome. As French (1985) noted, it is the “flexibility within parameters of 
certainty” that makes event schemas powerful cognitive constructs to guide 
comprehension and behaviour. “Neither someone with a very rigid representation of 
allowable components, nor someone with no representation of the central components 
could behave appropriately across a variety of restaurant experiences” (p. 183). What is 
more, in events, the social and object worlds, commonly separated by developmental 
psychologists, are tightly intei*woven, as from scripts we do not only generate 
expectations of people’s actions in social situations, but also of what kind of objects 
should, might or might not be present.
To our awareness, only two previous studies have investigated script Icnowledge 
in people with autism. Loveland and Tunali (1991) compared how individuals with 
autism and Down syndrome responded to social scripts in an acted out ‘tea paity’ 
situation during which an experimenter talked about an unhappy experience (his stolen 
wallet). The children with autism did not significantly differ fi'om the control group in 
their responses to the tea party situation, but a significant proportion did not 
spontaneously respond by comforting the experimenter for his distiessing experience. 
The authors concluded that whilst the autistic gioup was relatively unimpaired 
regarding the script that was more instr umental in emphasis (the tea party), they 
experienced problems with the superimposed script that was more interpersonal in
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emphasis (responding to another person’s distress). This study, however, poses several 
problems, for example, participants were required to shift attention between two 
contexts (i.e. the pretend world of the tea party scenario, and the ‘real world’ distr ess 
situation). Moreover, the status of the distress situation as a script situation remains 
somewhat ambiguous.
In a recent study, Volden and Johnston (1999) found that children and 
adolescents with autism were on average less competent than mental age matched peers 
in generating core elements defining a restaurant, a movie, and a grocery store event. 
Instead, they mentioned more script irrelevant acts. However, when they were given a 
more structured task with visual support (videotaped scenario) that required participants 
to predict the next core element, they performed comparable to the contr ol group. The 
authors concluded that whilst autistic participants had appropriate ‘content’ knowledge, 
they lacked ‘microlinguistic skills’ to produce a coherent narrative. However, they 
noted that the finding “that autistic people have even basic knowledge of everyday 
scripts is somewhat surprising given the inappropriate behaviour often displayed by 
people with autism in situations that would ordinarily be scripted” (p. 210). Their 
participants were relatively old and high functioning, and the scripts were relatively 
simple with only a few core elements, which might have led to ceiling effects.
What is more, neither of these two studies departed from clear theoretical 
predictions as to why and how people with autism might show script abnormalities.
This leaves the possibility that these studies have not looked at specific aspects of event 
representation that might be impaired in people with ASD.
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The present proposal is that in addition to general learning difficulties often 
accompanying ASD, specific cognitive abilities associated with this disorder - a 
wealcness in centr al coherence and/ or theory of mind deficits - might impair acquisition 
of event knowledge.
5.2.1. Could a Weakness in Central Coherence affect the acquisition of script 
Imowledge?
If the cognitive style of people with autism is characterised by a featural processing 
preference, then impairments could be expected for the acquisition of knowledge 
stmctures such as schemas or scripts that are defined by their configurai and holistic 
character. However, as the hierarchical organisation is only one facet of scripts, ft om a 
Central Coherence perspective, only certain aspects of autistic people’s event 
representation are expected to be abnormal, whilst others should remain relatively 
intact. Our predictions were as follows:
1. Centr al Coherence theory does not make any predictions as to whether or not 
people with ASD might have problems with the temporal-sequential organisation of 
events. Rather, knowledge of causal-temporal relationships would be expected to be 
mainly influenced by the individual’s general level of intellectual functioning, so that 
impairments may be found in lower-functioning individuals with autism, though no 
more severely than in persons with similar learning difficulties without autism.
2. In the present interpretation of Central Coherence Theory, specific problems 
with the hierarchical organisation of events are predicted. It would be expected that a
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piecemeal processing style might result in representing events more in temis of local, 
featural slotfillers than in terms of more global slots. However, as discussed before, the 
benefit of representing event actions in slots consists in creating flexibility as slots can 
accommodate different individual experiences that vaiy on the surface. If events were 
instead already represented at this lower level, then very minor changes might constitute 
a deviance from that script. For example, changes from ‘spaghetti’ to ‘flshflngers’ in a 
restaurant, might constitute as much a deviance from the scripted expectation for an 
individual on the autism spectrum as would for a typical child or adult a change within a 
whole slot (e.g. not ordering a meal).
3. Moreover, a representation of events in terms of surface details might also 
affect the understanding of optional acts as distinct from central ones, as judging 
whether or not an act is optional to an event requires relating the event parts to a holistic 
understanding of the meaning of the event as a whole. If one did not understand events 
in such a hierarchical fashion but rather perceived them as a linear chain of details, it 
would remain opaque why certain acts happen in one situation but not in another one.
Either due to their specificity or their peripheral status within the event as a 
whole, both slotfiller acts and optional acts might or might not happen in individual 
experiences. Taken together, arguments two and thiee both predict that piecemeal 
processing might affect the ability to distinguish between what could and what should 
occur, in the sense that both might be represented as should-be-occumng.
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5.2.2. The relation between Theory of Mind and the acquisition of scripts
On the basis of the existing literature, the potential role of theory of mind in 
script knowledge is less well specified, and might possibly be less direct. We are not 
aware of any study that has explicitly attempted to relate these two areas so far.
However, scripts may not only be acquired through personal experience, but also 
through vicarious experiences communicated to us by others. In a first sense, Theory of 
Mind might have a general and indirect influence on script acquisition through the link 
between Theory of Mind and communication impairments. More specific predictions, 
however, can be generated from Bruner’s account (1986,1990). Bruner suggested that 
narrative thinking may be a vehicle for both script knowledge and theory of mind 
development. He argued that in narratives, told to others or even in monologues to 
themselves, (Nelson, 1989; Feldman, 1989) young children ‘relive’ their experiences. In 
doing so, narratives are proposed to scaffold metacognition about intentions, and also to 
consolidate young children’s understanding of a script. This view would predict that in 
autism, script impairments and theory of mind impairments should occur at a 
coiTesponding level.
In their original formulation, Schank and Abelson (1977) implicitly discussed 
the role of Theory of Mind for event representation when they spoke of events as “giant 
causal chains”. The authors specified five types of causal connections: “action results in 
new state”, “states can enable actions”, “states disable actions”, “states or acts initiate 
mental states”, and “mental states lead to actions” (my italics). The last two types 
emphasise the organisation of scripts around goals and activities, as for example, in a 
restaurant, you want to order, want to eat etc. If the waitress fails to bring a menu, this
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prevents you from ordering, having to wait for the food might make you angry at the 
waitress which in turn may result in your giving her only a small tip.
Hence, Theory of Mind may affect representation of events in two ways. If one 
does not understand how expectations and intentions link different event actions, then 
these actions may stand as rather unconnected, and need to be learnt in a rote-type 
fashion. In other words. Theory of Mind might affect how different acts are 
meaningfully related. Secondly, one may need Theory of Mind to understand the 
‘culture-embodying meanings of events’, as the ultimate ‘goal’ of many events (Bruner 
& Feldman, 1993) may at least in part be of a mentalistic nature; people go to a 
restaurant because they want to ‘have a good time’, or ‘to relax’.
5.3. S tu d y  3: E v e n t n a r r a t i v e s
The study had three aims. As an exploratory study, we were firstly interested in 
studying the quality of scripts produced by people with autism and in investigating the 
extent to which people with an autism spectrum disorder showed abnoimalities in script 
knowledge as compared to control gioups. Secondly, we aimed to explore the role of 
Central Coherence and thirdly, that of Theory of Mind on event knowledge. To study 
this, the script generation paradigm was used.
The choice of deploying spontaneous narratives as a method to study individuals 
with a developmental condition that may involve language impairments, poses potential 
problems (see Volden & Johnson, 1999). People with autism have been found to display 
abnormalities in giammar, semantics, (Tager-Flusberg, 1995), and pragmatics (Bruner 
& Feldman, 1993), and tend to produce overall shorter nanutives (Loveland, McEvoy,
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Kelley, & Tunali, 1990). However, given that the study was exploratoiy in nature, the 
potential benefit of being able to capture a variety of specific abnormalities in autistic 
people’s scripts that would be harder to track in more structured tasks, prevailed. In 
addition to the expectation that people with autism might produce overall shorter or 
worse narratives, we expected to find specific structure and content related peculiarities 
in their scripts. These included:
1. a tendency to describe events in a piece-meal fashion, manifest in the usage of 
slotfillers in places in which a more general description is possible,
2. difficulties distinguishing between ‘optional’ and ‘central’ acts, and
3. related to Theory of Mind impairments, difficulties understanding the meaning of 
events and how event actions are related in an intentional, goal-directed way.
Two different events were chosen on the grounds that they were assumed to be 
familiar to each of the participant groups; ‘going-to-a-restaurant’ and ‘celebrating- 
Christmas’\
Participants were asked to tell a character who has never been to Scotland or Britain 
what generally happens when people go to restaurants etc. All naiTatives were tape- 
recorded and later transcribed in full. This provided the material for both a qualitative 
and a quantitative analysis.
‘ The study involved a third event: visiting a fnend. However, we lost a number of participants through a 
variety of practical and technical problems and as cell sizes were very small, this event was excluded 
from the present analysis.
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As our main predictions revolved around the notions of slots, slotfillers, central and 
optional acts, clear-cut, operational criteria for tliese terms were vital.
Unfortunately, we felt that previous studies often employed coding schemes too 
coarse for the present puiposes, and more generally, ambiguities in coding individual 
utterances were anticipated given that researchers’ definitions of the terms were often 
too vague for operationalisation. Therefore, working definitions of the relevant teims 
were fomiulated based upon a pilot study with six adults, drawn fi-om the St Andiews 
student population, who were asked to describe the restaurant and Christmas events to 
someone unfamiliar with them. These are described next.
Working definitions of terms
Central act. We consider a central act an act that occurs with a high probability 
and that adults denoted in their description with linguistic markers, such as ‘usually’, 
‘most of the time’, ‘most people’ etc.
Optional act An optional act is one that adults linguistically denoted as 
occumng ‘sometimes’, ‘maybe’, ‘perhaps’, ‘under some conditions’, ‘if-then’, or as 
being performed by ‘some people’.
Slotfiller. The definition of a slotfiller follows Nelson and Lucariello (1985) as 
an act or object that can be substituted by one or more alternatives at the same 
categorical level (e.g. salad, soup), or that can be expressed as a higher-level category 
(e.g. starter) without causing alteration of the meaning of the act.
Core slotfiller. This tenu was introduced based on an observation from the pilot 
data and refers to acts or objects that can be seen as a sub-category of cential slots. As
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foi* a central act, a core slotfiller is an act or object that occurs with a high probability, 
linguistically denoted by the same markers as central acts. However, the special feature 
is that a central slotfiller is expressed in very concrete, Tow-level’ terms, but crucially 
cannot be substituted by any higher-level description. An example for a core slotfiller 
would be “wilting Chiistmas cards”, “Santa Clause brings presents” or the “the waiter 
brings the menu”. In these examples, the particular objects are relevant to the act, and 
cannot be easily substituted without changing the meaning of the act.
Slotfiller example. Driven by the pilot data, we introduced this teim to account 
for descriptions that involve specific slotfillers but that were used within the context of 
a more general description.
5.4. M e th o d
5.4.1. Participants:
Participants included 21 individuals with an autism spectrum disorder (11 with 
autism, 10 with Asperger’s Syndrome), seven individuals with learning difficulties and 
11 typically developing children. Their characteristics in teims of Theoiy of Mind and 
Central Coherence are given in Table 5.1,
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ToM Scores ee scores
ASD A/=19 A/=16
N -  19 Autism: 10^ ' No-ToM: 5 wee: 8
Asperger's S: 9 1®‘ order ToM: 6 MCC: 3
2"'^  order ToM: 8 see: 2
Mixed: 3
Learning difficulties A/ = 6 /V=6
N = 6 No-ToM: - wec:-
1®* order: 3 MCe:1
2"  ^order: 3 see: 2
Mixed: 3
Children: A/= 11 N =  11
N =  11 No-ToM wec: 0
1®‘ order ToM: MCC: 3
2"  ^order ToM: see: 3
Mixed: 5
X noToM, 2 x1^  order, 2 x second order 




The experimenter showed the participant a black-and-white photograph of an 
approximately twelve year old boy with Asian features, dressed in a traditional 
Buddhist monk outfit, and said: “Look, this is a boy called Toku. Toku was bom and 
lives in a country far far away fi-om here, in East Asia. Toku has never been to Scotland, 
or Britain, or even to Europe. In the place where Toku lives, many things are very 
different to the way things are done here in Scotland. I would like you to explain to him 
what things are like here in Scotland: first, what happens generally when people go to a 
restaurant, and then what happens when people celebrate Cln-istmas.” After the general 
introduction, the interviewer said: “Let’s start with the [restaurant] first. Wlien people 
go to a restaurant, what happens noimally?”
Throughout the course of the inteiview, neutral and more specific prompting 
questions were asked to encourage the participant to continue with or elaborate on his or 
her event description. If the participant had paused, neutral prompts were given first, for 
example “anything else?”, “and then?”, or “Can you tell me more about..?”, “You said [ 
], and what happens after that?”. If the participant responded with “I don’t know” or 
“That’s it”, or had missed out one or more whole scenes, more specific prompts were 
given to elicit the next cential scene. For the restaurant event, specific prompts 
included, for example: “And how do people choose what they want to eat?” What 
could they eat in a restaurant?” “Before they leave, what do people do?” “Is there 
anything that people have to do before leaving the restaurant?”
Aiwa vs Questions. In our analysis we were going to distinguish between 
‘correct’ and ‘wiong’ descriptions of optional acts on the basis of the use of linguistic
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qualifiers. If a participant had not spontaneously qualified an optional act by saying it 
occurred ‘sometimes’, ‘if-then’, or was performed by ‘some people’, the experimenter 
probed for the status the participant assigned to that act, by asking ‘always questions’. 
For example: “Do people always [eat spaghetti] when they are in a restaurant?”
Whv-questions For each event, a why-question was included to explore whether 
the paiticipant had an understanding of the (cultural) meaning of the event: “Why do 
people go to a restaurant”, “Why do people celebrate Christmas?”. For the complete 
interview protocol, see Appendix 5.1.
The study involved both qualitative and quantitative analyses. The coding 
criteria were slightly different for the two types of analyses, with the criteria for the 
qualitative analysis being more complex. Therefore, coding system and results are 
discussed separately for each type of analysis. The qualitative analysis is presented first.
5.5, QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
5.5.1. Coding criteria for the qualitative analysis
For the qualitative analysis, participants’ event narratives were assessed against 
Nelson’s criteria of script competence (Nelson & Gruendel, 1981, 1986) which include 




1.Generality. Generality is expressed through linguistic markers, including the timeless 
present tense (as opposed to the past tense of specific experiences) and usage of the 
forms ‘you’ and ‘they’ (e.g. ‘you first wait to be seated’, ‘they order their meal’). Using 
the ‘I’ or ‘we’ foims and/or the past tense of specific experiences would show a lack of 
generality.
2.Temporal-sequential and causal order of acts. Comprehension of the temporal- 
sequential and causal order of acts would be manifested by describing the event in teims 
of the temporal and causal sequence in which it usually occurs, and by using linguistic 
markers, such as ‘first’, ‘then’, ‘after’ etc.
3. Hierarchical organisation: It was coded whether the participant mentioned a central 
or an optional act. We also coded whether each type of act was linguistically marked or 
not, and if so, whether it was done in an appropriate way. ‘Should’, ‘must’, ‘have to’, 
‘usually’ and ‘mostly’, were seen as markers for central acts, ‘maybe’ ‘perhaps’, 
‘sometimes’, conditionals and ‘if-then-phrases’ as markers for optional acts. 
Abnormalities in the understanding of the hierarchical organisation would be indicated 
by mixing these two kinds of acts up, and by describing events in terms of specific 
slotfillers without embedding them in a more general description.
5.5.2. Qualitative results
The main question was whether individuals on the autism spectrum showed 
abnormalities in terms of their structure and content of event narratives. Not 
surprisingly, it was found that both structure and content of nanatives differed between 
higher and lower functioning individuals with ASD of the present sample. Two distinct
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patterns of event nan atives were identified. Most of the lower functioning individuals 
did not provide evidence of basic script Icnowledge as their naiTatives displayed a 
lacking sense of generality, temporal sequentiality and/or hierarchical organisation. 
Instead, their narratives consisted of a string of associations with one or a few slotfillers. 
Moreover, the global event did not seem to serve as a cognitive frame to structuie 
associations; instead associations took an ‘idiosyncratic’ route, whereby often different 
event fiagments were mixed up.
By contrast, on the whole, the more able individuals with autism or Asperger’s 
Syndi'ome gave evidence of having basic script knowledge. They included a number of 
central and optional acts, mostly appropriately sequenced, in their narratives. However, 
many narratives given by these able individuals with ASD showed abnormalities in 
addition to, rather than instead o f a general understanding of what different events 
entail. The character of these abnoimalities varied between individuals with ASD and 
included the predicted piece-meal or microscopic descriptions. To convey a more global 
flavour of the different ‘styles’ of event narratives, first extracts of interviews with 
lower-functioning individuals with autism are given. They are then contrasted in a 
second section with those of higher-functioning individuals with ASD.
5.5.2.1. Lower level ASD: Events as a chain of associations
The following extract is taken fi-om the interview with C.M, 13.7 years at the 
time of the interview. C.M. had one of the lowest verbal language skills (4.4 years) in 
the present sample and was assigned to the no ToM group. No data on the Central 




E: Wliat I want you to do is to tell Toku what people are doing when they go to a 
restaurant, okay?
C.M.: Chips in restaurants.
E: okay, what happens first when people are going to a restaur ant?
C.M.: Fish an’ chips
E: Okay, and what happens first?
C.M. (They) had beans, and sausages..and pie..for dinner.
E: Okay, and when people go to the restaurant, when they arrive, what is the first thing? 
C.M.: To do a story.
E: So when they anive at the restaurant, what is the first thing they’re doing?
C.M.: They had fish and chips
E: So are people always having fish’n chips in a restaurant?
C.M.: Yeah, they do.
E: Okay, and what would happen if one day they went to a restaurant and didn’t have 
fish’n chips but something else, what would happen?
C.M.: Or on a Fridays [...]
E: Okay, and why do people go to a restaurant?
C.M.:.. in Struan House school.
[...]
C.M.: They go home.
E: .. .And is there anything that they do in between? (attempting to probe for ‘paying’) 
C.M.: Elmi, they.. .pack the bags, strip the beds and put a bit of washing on.
E: And what does a restaurant look like?
C.M.: There’s shows to be on. With singers.
The extract suggests that C.M’s understanding of what a restaurant visit entails 
was strongly determined by specific slotfillers. A tendency to recount specific slotfillers 
appears to be especially inappropriate right at the start of the narxative, because the 
listener lacks a frame that could accommodate the specific information about the ‘fish’n
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chips’. Of his entire restaurant nanative, only one utterance was coded -by adopting a 
generous stance - as a slot; “they go home”. C.M. did not attempt to relate the single 
items he listed causally or sequentially to one another. It is not obvious whether his 
present tense usage in some instances can be interpreted as a sign for generality, as this 
was interwoven with past tense usage.
Remarkable was also that at various points and notwithstanding the 
interviewer’s prompting questions, C.M. went altogether astray fiom the restaurant 
event. Instead, his responses seemed to follow an idiosyncratic chain of associations 
from ‘fish’n chips’ (which is still related to the restaurant event) over ‘Fridays’, and 
‘Struan House School’ (where he usually eats fish and chips on Fridays) to the episode 
about the bags (which is presumably still related to his going home on the weekend, 
since the special needs school he attended was a boarding school). In summary, C.M.’s 
account did not fulfil any of Nelson’s criteria for script understanding. Wliilst 
acknowledging his low verbal abilities, his narrative was qualitatively different and far 
below the script competence developmental researchers have reported for typically 
developing preschoolers even younger than 4 years (Nelson & Giundel, 1981; Nelson, 
1986).
Extract 5.2. illustrates how S.S., 14 years at the time of the inteiview, assigned 
to the no Theory of Mind and Weak Central Coherence groups and with a verbal mental 
age estimate of 5.1. years, evoked a chain of associations upon the question “What does 
a restaurant look like”? Whilst at first he listed some relevant props, associations soon 
drifted away from the actual question, and via a list of food stuff that can be eaten in a
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restaurant, he crossed the boundary from the global restaurant event to a shopping 
event. Paired with the finding that he only described two central acts, his nanative 
conveyed the impression that he had not activated a global scheme of a restaurant. 
Instead, single items were taken out of the restaurant context and were locally 
associated with one another.
Extract 5.2.
S.S.: to his.. .to spaghetti, looks like.. .it looks like mhmm, it looks like..a table., they 
have plates,..knives and forks.. .coffee.. .milk.. .spaghetti.. .potatoes...sausage 
rolls..beans..pasta..mashed potatoes.. .fish, rice.. .ice cream.. .lollipop .. .coca cola..diet 
coke...shopping...magazine....I Icnow, a sweet!
5.5.2.2. Event narratives o f high-functioning people with ASD: piece-meal 
descriptions
As the next extracts illustrate, abnormalities in the production of event 
nanatives were not only confined to the most severely affected individuals with ASD. A 
number of peculiarities were also found in intellectually high functioning participants 
with autism or Asperger Syndrome. A.C. attended the same school as the other children 
previously discussed and was of a similar age, 13.5 years. His perfoimance on the 
WISC/BPVS revealed that he had intelligence in the normal range (VIQ 83, PIQ 139, 
FIQ, 116; VMA on BPVS 8.04 years). A.C. was assigned to the no Theory of Mind and 
Weak Central Coherence groups.
A.C.’s description of what happens when people go to a restaurant already started in a 
detailed manner, with a more than necessary emphasis on the seat belt, and an error in
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the logical sequence of getting dressed and putting on the seat belts in the car.
Extract 5.3.
E: So, can you tell him, elim, what happens when people are going to a restaurant?
A.C. : Travel by car
E: okay, and what happens then?
A.C.: sit in the car, puttin’ on the seat belt, ALL the way to the restaurant, then will take 
the seat belt off, leave the car, and have to dress up APPROPRIATELY!
E: right, okay, what does it mean to be dressed up appropriately?
A.C.: appropriately, because you need to have the seat belts to the restaurant.
E: no no no, so what happens then? After people have dressed up nicely? What happens 
next?
A.C,: take off the seat belts, and will be into the door, and have to, have to wait until sit 
in some restaur ants, and have to sit and the seat is reserved, just in some restaurants.
E: okay, then you’re sitting down, and then what happens then?
A.C.: and as you sit down, you have to wait for the menu to come.
E: okay
A.C.: and as the menu is there, you got to look’n choose and have the choice, and the 
the lady go away with the menu and you have to sit and be patient and [...]
E: and what does a restaurant look like?
A.C.: carpet, and seats and nice tables 
E: aha, and what else?
A.C.: lights ( ) cases of fire, oh de-fr-nit-e-ly! I like it to be, a fire is obligatory  ^and the 
fire bell.
E: what else is obligatory? Is there anything else obligatory?
A.C.: lights, toilets, obli-gatory
A.C.: and once you finish ALL the food, you went home.
E: and is there anything that happens before that, before going home?
A.C.: they went to wash their hands, and for a weewee and then went home.
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E: what else do people HAVE to do when they go to a restaurant?
A.C,: need to dress appropriately, need heaters 
E: and what else do they need to do?
A.C.: fire practice there
E: okay, and what else? What else is really compulsory?
A.C.: clothes
E: clothes. And before Üiey leave, is there anything else they need to do, compulsory? 
A.C.: no
In total, A.C. demonstrated a considerable understanding of what a restaurant 
visit entails. It is noteworthy that he linguistically differentiated between optional acts, 
for example, "the seat is reserved, only in some restaurants” and central acts. These 
were almost too strongly marked by deontic verbs (e.g. “have to dress up 
appropriately”, “need to have the seatbelts, “have to sit”, “have to wait” “got to look’n 
choose”). This corresponds to his enquiries in everyday life as to whether or not things 
are ‘compulsory’. However, notwithstanding that he could list a number of central and 
option acts, even after massive prompting, A.C. did not mention the necessity to pay.
A.C.’s responses to the question “What does a restaurant look like?” showed 
that in addition to more conventional requisites of a restaurant scene, A.C. considered 
further items as essential that are not part of the restaur ant (e.g. the fire practice), or 
even more interestingly, items that can be found in restaurants but that are not defining 
features of them (e.g. the heaters, fire bell).
 ^A.C. had just learned the word ‘obligatory’ which seemed to replace his usual favourite [tilings to be]‘compulsory’
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Throughout his whole restaurant narrative, indeed, throughout the narr atives of 
three events, A.C. did not use a single mental state verb -  not oiily did he not refer to 
others’ mental states, likewise he neither referred to his own mental states.
In addition, and despite his own incessant questioning of others, as a thirteen year-old of 
intelligence above average, A.C. was nonplussed when asked why people go to a 
restaurant’ (“because.. .that is a little bit hard”). This contrasted with the responses of 
the typically developing children, as even the six to seven year olds could readily give 
explanations, such as “to have a meal”, “to celebrate something or just for their tea”.
A different demonstiation of a tendency to describe events in a microscopic, 
piece-meal style, was found in the account of K.C. K.C. was aged 10 years, 6 months at 
the time of the interview, had Asperger’s Syndrome and went to a mainstream primary 
school. On the BPVS, his receptive vocabulary level of 11.7 years was even above his 
chronological age. As shown in the below extract, he confused different ‘backs’
(Schank & Abelson, 1977) of a restaurant. Whereas he started off describing a ‘posh’ 
restaurant, in Extract 5.7. he switched to the description of a self-serving café which 
then blended into that of a shopping event.
Extract 5.4.
[...]
K.C. “Also you can get from the café bit, you can get food from there, they have 
choices...
E: what is the café bit?
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K.C. The café bit is where you take a tray, and you slide it along this bai*.. .and then you 
pick your food, it’s all in a glass cabinet, and you pick the food you want, and then at 
the end, you pay for it.
[...]
K.C. You look for the food in behind the glass cabinet in the café, and you pick the one, 
and then the person beliind it will take it and give it to you over the top of the glass 
cabinet. You will put it on the tray and go and pay for it.
[...]
E: And is that what happens always?
K.C. well no, for example, if it’s a shop area, and the shop you buy food, you would
get a basket and you would stick it on the counter which is the big ( ) rectangle, and 
you, then you go around the aisle that has the food in it, and then you take the food you 
want and put it in, check that you’ve got enough money, you go to the counter and put 
the basket on the table.
Peculiar and characteristic was the style of his narrative, as K.C. faithfully 
enumerated each individual act involved in this process. Recall from section 5.1. that 
Galambos and Rips (1982) noted how their adult participants precisely avoided to give 
such detailed descriptions. However, K.C.’s minute, piece-meal way of accounting for 
the event, did not result in inflexibility. Optional and variable acts were appropriately 
linguistically marked with qualifiers. Additionally, by using the ‘you’ form and the 
present tense he indicated an understanding of generality.
Later on, K.C.’s description of what a restaurant looks like was modelled onto a 
Chinese restaurant. His elaborated insistence on the presence of “Chinese lanterns” 
suggested that he did not treat them as a lower-level slotfiller for decoration. Instead, he 
seemed to assign them to a more central status, as he was only willing to compromise 
on the variability of the lightning as far as the intensity of the light was concerned.
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(E; “Do they always have Chinese lanterns in a restaurant?” K.C: “Not always, 
sometimes they have a brighter one, or maybe even just a coloured light bulb with a 
dragon on it,...”)
5.5.2.3, Other qualitative pecularities
Below are summarised a number of other qualitative pecularities that were not 
captured by the quantitative analysis.
a. Event narratives as heavily influenced by personal experiences and interests 
Although the representation of events develops on the basis of personal 
experiences (Slaclcman & Nelson, 1984), it also requires adopting an ‘objective’ point 
of view in order to accommodate the interplay of actions between different actors (and 
not only those of oneself). Instead, some of the narratives of the very high-functioning 
participants with ASD with first and even second order Theoiy of Mind mainly 
revolved around their own personal experiences with the event. C.L.’s (VIQ: 80, PIQ 
96, FIQ, 86, F* order ToM, MCC) Christmas nanative, for example, was in large parts 
concerned with his own feelings.
Extract 5.5
10 o’clock, can’t sleep, so excited. ( ) not going to sleep at all, a long time,.. .2
hours sleep/ too excited, all of my presents, some of them are in my house look at
them, can’t take them upstairs straight away  .........
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In a different way, the role of personal involvement was also indirectly apparent 
by the very neglect of certain slots or scenes that are defining for the event but do not 
directly concern the individual with ASD him or herself. As A.C., about two thirds of 
the participants with ASD ‘forgot’ to mention - even upon prompting - the most 
‘obligatory’ of the central acts in a restaurant event: to pay the bill at the end.
b. Social roles
A number of participants with ASD, including some of the more higher- 
functioning ones, struggled in their understanding of the different social roles. For 
example, it was suggested that Santa Clause puts up the Christmas tree, or that the 
waiter prepares the food. Whilst most participants (including most people with ASD) 
described the actors participating in the Christmas event as ‘fathers’ , ‘mothers’ ‘mum 
and dad’, ‘family’ etc., one participant described actors irrespective of their roles or 
situations consistently as ‘man or lady’.
c. Mislabelling of ‘canonical artefacts ’
Another type of error that appears significant in relation to the possible impact 
of Theory of Mind deficits on cultural understanding was found in the mis-labelling of 
artifacts as something different to their canonical function. M.J., a 28 year old adult 
with Asperger Syndrome (first order Theory of Mind, Medium Central Coherence, 
verbal IQ: 83) suggested that in a restaurant, a waiter had “maybe a handkerchief, 
usually holding with a tray”. Using the teim handkerchief, rather than napkin, might be 
significant, since although the two items share the same or similar forms and functions
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(one can use one for the other), they differ in terms of their intended canonical function 
(Bloom, 1999). Only by acknowledging this culturally defined and intended function, 
and iiTcspective of featural similarities, would we predict to find a napkin in a restaurant 
but not a handkerchief.
d. Discrepancy between event representation and acting upon general expectations.
A discrepancy between event representation and acting within a script has been 
found for P.O., a young man with Asperger’s Syndrome who was assigned to the 
second order Theory of Mind group. When discussing a third event, visiting a friend, 
here not analysed in full, he emphasised the importance of offering a cup of tea or 
coffee to a friend. He stated that he would feel upset if a friend did not return this 
gesture and even considered that “I’d think they don’t seem to be my friend anymore". 
The illuminating aspect of this episode was that at the same time the experimenter sat in 
his living room for about two hours, without ever being offered a cup of coffee or tea.
e. Why-questions
Finally, some people with ASD, and cmcially amongst them even several 
individuals with intelligence in the normal range, stmggled with the why-questions. 
Interestingly, participants could more readily explain why people celebrate Christmas, 
possibly because they could fall back on explanations that they were taught at school or 
by their parents and that were not available for the restaurant event. For example, R.S., 
an intelligent adolescent with Asperger’s Syndrome, (90 verbal IQ, 124 Performance 
IQ, first order Theory of Mind, Medium Central Coherence), explained that people go
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to restaurants for “paities”. When asked whether this was the only reason, he stated 
“No, no money for the supermarket”. In contrast, he had a ready made explanation for 
why people celebrate Christmas “it’s a time to remember the birth of baby Jesus” and 
stated that he “learnt in school that it’s not only about presents”. .
5,5.3. Summary
Using Nelson and Gruendel’s (1981, 1986) criteria of basic script Icnowledge, 
the qualitative analysis of the event narratives identified two main patterns. Some of the 
lower functioning individuals with ASD seemed to altogether lack script knowledge - 
even beyond impairments predicted by Central Coherence Theory or Theory of Mind 
deficits and below what could be expected at their verbal language level. Rather, their 
‘understanding of events’ appeared to consist of loose associations of specific 
‘slotfillers items’ which drifted to other events, or included associations with the ‘here- 
and-preserrt’, such as with the experimenter or the school. This pattern reminds one of a 
speculation by Nelson about the consequences of lacking script knowledge. “[...] an 
incapacity to interpret new information against a ‘baseline’ of routine knowledge of the 
event, a lacking frame or cognitive corrtext for new experiences. Instead, it would be 
necessary to create ‘some’ representation, using whatever features the situation offers” 
(Nelson, 1986).
By contrast, for many of the higher-functioning individuals with ASD, 
abnormalities found seemed to be additional to, rather than in place of a general 
understanding of what different events entail. These included the predicted frequent
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usage of ‘slotfillers’, the recounting of personal experiences or the description of 
irrelevant details (e.g. heaters, a fire bell), and a mixed-up understanding of roles. 
Notable were also apparent deficits in the understanding of the global meaning of the 
restaurant event and that participants with ASD fi equently neglected to mention central 
acts that did not directly involve them.
5.6. Q u a n t i ta t iv e  ANALYSIS
5.6.1. Coding system
For the quantitative analysis, participants’ interview ti'anscripts were coded 
according to the following eight categories: number of central slots, number of 
appropriate optional slots, number of inappropriate optional slots, number of 
spontaneous slotfillers, prompted slotfillers, slotfillers as examples, number of script 
inappropriate or irrelevant actions, and number of props. A definition of each of these 
categories is given in Table 5.2. In addition, responses to the why-questions were 
categorically coded as either ‘correct’ or ‘wrong’.
Following Nelson and Gruendel (1986), as an indicator of the length of the 
naiTatives we used the total number of items produced (rather than the overall word 
length of narratives). This was calculated by adding together the number of items in 
each of the eight categories.
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Coding category Definition Example
1. Number of centra! acts An act that pilot adults 
denoted as ‘usually’ 
occurring and that is 
expressed at the highest 
level of generality to 
describe its meaning.
you sit down/ and have a 
drink/ and sit and talk for a 
while/ you order what you 
would like to eat/ order 
drinks first/ you have to pay 
for that, pay money/ they 
look at the menu/ the 
cashier takes the list to the 
chef/ the chef cooks the 
food
2. Number of appropriate 
optional slots
An act that pilot adults 
described as may or may 
not occuring in a specific 
experience and that the 
participant denoted as such
they sometimes ask the 
waiter for desert'/ ‘miaht 
have coffee/ if it’s a 
Mexican restaurant
3. Number of inappropriate 
optional slots
As in (2) but the participant 
did not denote it as such.
People are always having 
starters in a restaurant 
indeed/ they go in a taxi. 
Always..? Yes/
4. Spontaneous slotfillers An act or object that occurs 
with a high propability, 
linguistically marked as 
central acts. The special 
feature is that a central 
slotfiller is expressed in 
very concrete low-level’ 
terms, but cannot be 
substituted by any higher- 
level description
afterwards they have coffee 
and scones’/ ‘ the..chicken 
curry!’
5. Prompted slotfillers Specific item after 
prompting, such as: what 
else do people eat in a 
restaurant?
Steak pie and chips,’n 
sometimes fish’n chips
6. Slotfiller examples A specific item embedded 
in a more general 
description
order their food, order like 
steak pie or pasta or 
anything’
7. Script inappropriate acts An act or item that is not 
part of the event or 
irrelevant.
They’re going on a bus/ 
they’re playing/ to do a 
story
8. Props and roles Objects associated with the 
event




5.6.2. Results of quantitative analysis
5.6.2.1. Group means for total number o f items
Table 5.3. shows that when individuals with an Autism Spectrum Disorder were 
considered together as one group, or when they were split into autism versus Asperger’s 
Syndrome, they produced in total a similar amount of items as the other groups.
A One-way ANOVA confinned that for both events means of total items produced did 
not statistically differ between the gioups (Restaurant, F  (4, 36) = 1.42, p = n.s.; 
Christmas F  (4,35) = .51, p = n.s.). Hence, possible group differences between the ASD 
and control groups on specific item categories cannot be attributed to altogether shorter 
narratives produced by the autism or Asperger’s Syndiome groups. Therefore, we 
subsequently compared group differences in the means of each item categoiy.
Three sets of analyses were perfonned: firstly, we compared the total autism 
spectrum group with the normally developing children and the learning difficulties 
groups. This represents a conservative comparison, since the ASD group considered 
together as one group was higher functioning than both control groups. Then, each 
subgroup was compared with their respective contiol gioup(s). Thirdly, performances 
between the different Central Coherence gioups were compared. Finally, the different 
Theory of Mind groups were compared. For each set of comparisons, first a set of one­
way ANOVAs was performed, followed by paiiwise comparisons using Tukey’s tests. 
As small cell sizes were a concern for the usage of parametiic statistics, where 
significant group differences were found, a second set of analyses was conducted using 
Mann-Whitney U tests as the non-parametric equivalent for pairwise comparisons.
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Table 5,3. Total number of items produced for the Restaurant and Christmas events.




Autism Spectrum 21 19.2 17 13.7
Autism 11 19.7 9 14.5
Asperger’s
Syndrome
10 18.7 8 12.8
Learning Difficulties 7 14.8 7 12.2
Typical children 11 17.81 11 10.3
Young children 5 14 5 7.3
Old Children 6 21 6 11.83
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5.6.2,2, Comparisons between diagnostic groups
a. ASD versus control gi'oups
Restaurant - First, the individuals on the autism spectmm were compared to the 
typical children and learning difficulties control groups. Mann-Whitney U tests showed 
that the ASD group produced more slotfillers (Z = -3.23, n= 30, p < .01), more 
irrelevant/ inappropriate acts (Z = -3.2, n= 30, p < .01), fewer central acts (Z= -2,1, 
n=30, p < .05) and fewer slotfillers after prompting (Z = -2.1, n == 30, p < ,05) than the 
typically developing children. Compared to the individuals with learning difficulties, 
the ASD group produced more irrelevant/ script inappropriate acts (Z = 1.0, n= 25, p = 
.056).
Christmas. -The only group difference found on the Christmas event was that 
the ASD group produced more irrelevant/ inappropriate acts than the typically 
developing children (Z = -2.6, n = 25, p < .05).
b. Autism vs Asperger Syndrome vs control groups
Next, we split the ASD group into individuals with autism versus Asperger’s 
Syndrome. The autism subgroup was compared to the learning difficulties group and 
the ‘young’ 6 to 7 year old children, the Asperger’s Syndrome group with the ‘old’ 9 to 
10 year old children.
Restaurant - The autism group produced significantly more spontaneous 
slotfillers than the 6 to 7 year old typical children (Z= -2.58, n =16, p < .01). Compared 
to the learning difficulties group, the autism subgroup produced significantly fewer 
central (Z= -2.3, n = 19, p < .01) and optional acts (Z = -2.1, n = 19, p < .01).
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For both central acts and optional acts, analyses of COVARIANCE, which partialled 
out verbal IQ, were performed. These revealed that VIQ had no independent influence 
(F (1, 19) = .6.4, p -  ns.) on the production of central acts, while the effect of diagnostic 
group still approached significance, (F (1, 19) = 3.0, p = ,078). However, whilst there 
was no independent effect of VIQ on optional acts, (F (1, 19) = .56,/? = n.s.) once it was 
accounted for, the initial gioup difference also became non-significant, (F (1,19) = 1.8, 
p  = n.s).
Christmas - On the Chiistmas event, a one-way ANOVA showed a trend for a 
group difference on the mean number of spontaneous slotfillers (F (4, 28) = 2.54, p = 
.065). Subsequent pairwise analyses using Mann-Whitney U tests, however, did not 
reveal differences between the autism and the control groups. The autism subgroup, 
however, repoited more inappropriate acts than those with learning difficulties (Z = - 
2.0, n = 15, p< .05). Compared to the 9 to 10 year old typical children, the Asperger’s 
Syndi'ome group only reported significantly more inappropriate acts (Z = -2.09, n =15, p 
< .05) and significantly fewer slotfillers after prompting (Z = 4.5., n = 15, p < .01).
5.6.23. Analyses for Central Coherence gi'oups
As can be obtained fifom inspecting the participant characteristics in Table 5.2, 3 
out of 7 participants with WCC had Theory of Mind on the first or second order levels. 
Although constrained by the small cell numbers, an independent effect of WCC would 
be shown if individuals with WCC and Theorv of Mind competencies displayed similar 
impaimients as those with WCC but no ToM. Predictions from Cential Coherence 
Theory were that those with WCC should represent event actions and props more often
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in terms of concrete slotfillers and that optional acts would be used more often in an 
inappropriate way.
Due to already small cell sizes, participants in the different CC gi'oups were 
compared across diagnoses, but it is important to bear in mind that only those with ASD 
had WCC.
Restaurant - Means suggested that the WCC group produced on average more 
spontaneous slotfillers than all other groups (WCC : M = 2.83; SCC: M = 1.67; MCC:
M = .83; mixed style: M = 1.5 ). In addition, a one-way analysis of variance revealed a 
trend for the predicted effect of Centi al Coherence groupings on the production of 
spontaneous slotfillers (F (3, 30) = 2.38, = .08). However, subsequent analyses using 
Mann-Whitney U tests did not further support this prediction. Instead, it was found that 
the WCC group produced significantly fewer central acts (Z = -2.2, n=l 1, p < .05) and 
significantly more irrelevant acts than the MCC group (Z = -2.3, n =11, p <.01). There 
were no significant differences between the WCC group and the other CC groups, or 
between the latter.
Christmas - No gi'oup differences were found for the Christmas event.
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Figure 5.2. Means of event items produced by Central Coherence groups for the 
restaurant event
strong central coherence group
kWevmM/inappmp
medium central coherence group
SF prompted






5.6.2.4. Analyses for Theory o f Mind groups
In order to explore the possible effect of Theory of Mind on script production, as 
in the previous study, participants with an autism spectrum disorder and the typically 
developing children were giouped according to ToM performance.
Restaurant - Significant group differences were found for the production of 
central acts (F(5, 33) = 3.31,/? = .016), inappropriate acts (F (5 ,33) = 3.71,/? = .008), 
and the number of spontaneous slotfillers (F (5,32)= 4.80, p -  .002). The relevant 
pail-wise comparisons using Mann-Wliitney U tests specified that the ASD no ToM 
gi'oup produced more spontaneous slotfillers (Z = 2.9, n = 12, p < .01) and iiTelevant 
acts (Z = -.2.6, n = 12, p <.01) than the typical 1®‘ order ToM children, and more 
spontaneous slotfillers ( Z = -2.95, n = 12, p < .05) and fewer central acts than the first 
order ASD ToM gioup (Z = -1.81, n = 12, p = .06). In addition, the ASD no ToM group 
produced fewer central acts (Z = -1.81, n =13, p = .06), more iiTelevant acts (Z = -2.3, n 
= 13, p <.01) and fewer slotfillers after prompting (Z = - 2.1, n = 13, p < .05) than the 
individuals with learning difficulties. There were no group differences between and 
2"^  order ToM ASD groups and the typically developing children with respective 
Theory of Mind competence, or between either of these gioups and the learning 
difficulties group.
Christmas — There were no significant differences on any of the response 
categories between the different Theory of Mind groups.
195
Chapter 5
















child 1-st order ToM child 2nd-orderToM
Responses to whv-questions
Restaurant - 6 out of 16 individuals in the ASD group failed to appropriately 
explain why people go to restaurants, whereas all individuals in the learning difficulties 
group were able to do so and only one out of eleven typically developing children gave 
an incorrect response, % -^analyses showed that this difference approached significance, 
(Z^(2) = 5.12,p = .07).
Christmas - This analysis was conducted despite very small cell sizes due to 
missing cases. 11 out of 15 individuals with ASD and all individuals with learning 
difficulties gave an appropriate explanation. Of the 8 eight typically developing 
children, only one child gave an incorrect explanation, % -^square analyses showed that 
the differences between the groups were non-significant, (2) = 1.3,/? = n.s.)
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5.7  Sum m ary AND DISCUSSION
In summary, the results of the quantitative analysis lent partial support to our 
predictions. Overall, individuals with an autism spectrum disorder showed impairments 
in their restaurant narratives, but few in their descriptions of Christmas. More 
specifically, people with an autism spectrum disorder reported more slotfillers and 
inappropriate acts and fewer central acts than the typically developing 6 to 10 year old 
children. At the same time, the ASD group did not show significantly more 
abnormalities than the individuals with learning who as a group had lower IQ.
When the ASD group was split into the two subgroups, it was found that the 
autism gioup produced fewer central and optional acts than the learning difficulties 
group. For the optional acts, this gioup difference vanished when VIQ was accounted 
for, whilst for the central acts it was found that the performance of the ASD group 
remained significantly worse even when VIQ was taken into account. This result is 
consistent with developmental research suggesting that with increasing age, children 
give more optional acts, whereas central events are available fi-om early on (Nelson & 
Gruendel, 1986). Moreover, the autism subgroup displayed a range of abnormalities 
compared to the naiTatives of the young childi en of similar mental age. The only 
peculiarity displayed by the Asperger’s Syndrome subgioup in comparison with the 9 to 
10 year olds consisted of their more fiequent report of inappropriate acts.
Two separate analyses for which participants were grouped either according to 
Theory of Mind competence or Centr al Coherence style were aimed at investigating if 
either of these cognitive abilities might affect event descriptions.
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When grouped according to Central Coherence scores, means suggested that the 
WCC gioup produced the largest amount of spontaneous slotfillers and a one-way 
ANOVA showed a hend for an effect of CC gioupings on spontaneous slotfiller 
production. However, subsequent Mann-Whitney U tests failed to lend further support 
to the prediction that slotfillers might be the result of a WCC cognitive style. To 
inteipret this negative finding, it is important to bear in mind that the present group 
sizes were very small, which could have precluded an effect that might be found using 
bigger sample sizes. Whilst on the one hand it is possible that slotfillers were partially 
related to verbal language (the learning difficulties group - of which no participant had 
WCC - also spontaneosuly produced a relatively high number of slotfillers) the finding 
that three individuals with WCC who had ToM competence and VIQ in the noimal 
range might be suggestive for an independent influence of WCC on this response 
pattern.
When giouped according to Theory of Mind competence, it was found that the 
ASD no ToM group showed a range of abnormalities compared to typically developing 
childien with ToM competence, people with ASD with ToM competence, and the 
learning difficulties gioup. However, the ASD no ToM group only reported more 
slotfillers than the typical 1st order ToM children and ASD gioups, but did not differ 
fi'om the learning difficulties group.
Thus, as abnormalities were found according to both groupings, and 
acloiowledging small cell numbers, as well as the overlap of individuals who fell into 
both the no ToM and WCC groups, the results do not permit us to clearly tease out
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which of these two cognitive abilities had a greater influence on abnormalities in the 
event narratives.
Taking the qualitative and the quantitative results together, this study suggests 
that people with an autism spectrum disorder displayed a range of abnormalities in their 
naiTatives of the restaurant event, but to a lesser extent in their narratives of the 
Christmas event. The results obtained from the restaurant event replicate Volden and 
Johnston’s (1999) finding that reported that their sample with autism produced fewer 
cential and more irrelevant acts than control groups. However, the present findings go 
beyond this as they also suggest that some people with ASD might display fiirther 
qualitative abnormalities, such as the associations with one or more slotfillers or the 
piecemeal staccato style.
What could have contributed to the discrepancy between the restaurant and 
Christmas naiTatives? A first possibility might be that individuals with ASD had simply 
fewer experiences in going to a restaurant. Although participants were asked whether 
they had been to a restaurant, and all participants in the ASD group confirmed this, no 
independent in depth infoimation was obtained with regards to the level of their 
experience with this event. Interestingly, one typically developing child stated that he 
had never been to a restaui ant. Nonetheless, he gave as good a description of the event 
as the other young children, and cmcially did not report acts in a slotfiller fashion. He 
gave a number of central acts, only one optional act and had slight difficulties 
producing slotfillers after prompting When asked how he knew about what happens in a 
restaurant, he replied that “people tell me”. Hence, whilst a lack of personal experience 
with the event might have influenced ‘negative’ impairments (the production of fewer
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core or optional acts), lacking experience seems less likely to account for the ‘positive’ 
abnoimalities: the higher means of spontaneous slotfillers produced by the participants 
with an autistic condition.
A second possibility could be that Christmas might be a more salient event in 
several respects: it is a special event, preparations are made for it beforehand etc. Three 
individuals with ASD confused the restaurant event with a shopping event, but apart 
from one participant who continued to describe New Years Eve, no participant confused 
it with other events. Wliat is more, as R.S. explained, Christmas, its significance, as 
well as the different aspects that the event entails, might be more explicitly discussed 
with parents or even at school than other more mundane events.
A third possibility could be that the sti-ucture of the Christmas event is different 
to that of the restaurant event. Remember that on the basis of the pilot study, we 
inti'oduced the teim ‘core slotfillers’. In the analysis, these were treated as ‘central acts’, 
but the difference is that despite their importance and high occui*rence at the event, they 
are described at a more specific lower level. For example, Santa Clause cannot be 
exchanged with any other real or ficticious character. Whilst with regards to the 
restaurant event, participants would only mention specific dishes as ‘slotfiller examples’ 
in the context of a more global description of eating, for the Christmas event they stated 
that people “usually have turkey”. Hence, this str ucture of the event might have been 




Future research is needed that investigates more systematically the relative impact of 
personal experience and event structure and hence a possible variability in impairments 
across different events or event types.
The study did not permit us to clearly distinguish between the relative influence 
of Central Coherence, Theory of Mind and verbal language. That the results might not 
solely be attributable to verbal language or pragmatic communication deficits, was 
indicative in the qualitative analysis. For example, S.S. and K.C. gradually switched 
from items belonging to a restaurant event to the description of acts and items that are 
part of a supermarket scenario; a finding that can only be accounted for in terms of 
content, but not in terms of pragmatics. Nonetheless, given that we employed narratives 
which pose a high language demand, future research needs to address more 
systematically the extent to which abnormalities in event narTatives reflect an input 
problem (i.e. abnormalities at the level of the immediate perception of event 
experiences), a processing problem (i.e. how the event structure is represented in the 
mind), or an output problem (i.e. a reflection of how events were retold rather than how 
they were experienced or represented).
To study abnormalities at the level of event perception and event representation, 
paradigms are required that keep the language demands to a minimum. In the study 
presented in the next chapter, we used a new Frequency Rating Task that posed less 
verbal production demands. Our suggestion from WCC was that this cognitive style 
might affect both event perception and event representation, whereas Theory of Mind 
impairments might be at work at all three levels.
202
Chapter 5
The present findings have a number of intenelated implications. If abnormalities 
found were not only the reflection of impaiiments in verbalisation but manifested a 
genuine abnormality in the understanding of what events entail and how they are 
organised, then some individuals with ASD seem to show impainnents in a second 
important facet of cultural knowledge - beyond the deficits in real-world knowledge of 
norms, discussed in the previous chapter. This in turn may have repercussions for social 
interaction. As French (1985) had speculated, neither someone within a very rigid 
representation of events, nor someone who lacked the understanding of central 
components, can behave appropriately across different common and routine situations. 
Moreover, impaired event knowledge might be directly linked to a prevalent but poorly 
understood feature of autism spectrum disorders: the adherence to invariant routines, 
which is paired with a stiong resistance to changes in them. We suggest that a tendency 
to treat what could occur as what should occur may undeipin this feature. Whilst 
unexpected core, relevant changes create anxiety and fiustiation in normal children and 
even adults; perhaps minor, tiivial changes are assigned to a similar status in the mind 
of a person with an autistic disorder.
An anecdote of Fling’s (2001) insightful biography of her son Jimmy who has 
Asperger’s Syndrome, shall illustrate this idea. Fling described how Jimmy -  as many 
children with ASD -  used to be obsessed with the Thomas the Tank Engine television 
series. In the earlier episodes, Ringo Starr lent his voice to ‘Mr Conductor’. However, 
from the day another actor took over that role, Jimmy stopped watching the show, 
angrily protesting that “this is not right anymore” (p. 73).
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From the perspective of an assumed piece-meal processing preference, it might 
not be surprising that Jimmy put a relatively large emphasis on the voice given to the 
engine by the first actor, or perhaps a way certain words were pronounced. Whilst in the 
context of an animated cartoon, the voice could be regarded as a substitutable detail, for 
Jimmy it apparently represented a central part of the engines world. If what ‘could be’ is 
perceived as what ‘should be’, then changes must have a rather profound impact -  as he 
said -  things are not right anymore.
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6 . 1. In trod uction
In the previous chapter it was argued that investigations into possible 
abnoimalities in event representation in autism spectrum disorders may be a fruitful 
avenue that could potentially link two fundamental areas of the clinical picture; social 
impairments and the insistence to adhere to strict and inflexible routines. In support of 
this argument, the ‘script generation paradigm’ employed in Study 3 proved to be useful 
in identifying a variety of script abnormalities in the event narratives of individuals with 
an Autism Spectmm Disorder across a range of intellectual abilities.
There were three aims for the study presented in this chapter. The first aim was 
to investigate specifically whether the hypothesised abnoimalities in representing 
scripts in the noimal ‘hierarchical’ fashion might result in difficulties distinguishing 
between acts or elements that are cential to an event, those that are optional or 
peripheral and thus could but need not be occuning, and acts violating scripts.
Secondly, we sought to explore whether people with autism use context information and 
knowledge about social roles in order to distinguish when an act would be appropriate 
or not. For example, in the consulting room, we would consider a doctor’s request for a 
patient to take off his shirt as part of the ‘ going-to-a-doctor-script’ and hence as 
perfectly noimal. The same request made by a shop assistant in the supermarket, or, 
more interestingly, by the doctor on a tiain, now acting in his identity as a passenger
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would be unthinkable. Thirdly, as in the previous studies, we sought to investigate 
whether predicted abnormalities might relate to a Weakness in Central Coherence 
and/or Theory of Mind impairments.
As discussed earlier, one possible criticism of the previous study was that the 
paradigm posed considerable productive language demands, which may have 
particularly disadvantaged individuals with poorer language abilities. In the present 
study, we therefore attempted to keep productive language requirements to a minimum. 
For this purpose, a new ‘Frequency Rating Task’ was designed. The rationale behind 
this task was based on Script Theory and the design drew from a paradigm used by 
Hudson (1988). Hudson was interested in whether young typically developing childien 
of pre-school age and above could distinguish between script actions, actions in’elevant 
to a script, and script disruptions and violations. In order to test this, she told children 
aged four to seven years stories about familiar events, such as about going to 
McDonalds or giocery shopping. She then asked them to make frequency judgements 
for each sentence. For example “How often do you stand in a check-out line when you 
go groceiy shopping?” Hudson reported that even the four to five year old preschoolers 
agreed amongst themselves that in such situation you always stand in line, sometimes 
buy orange juice and never put on your pyjamas. Based on her finding, we thus felt that 
a rating scale was a suitable instiument to investigate participants’ understanding of the 




The Frequency Rating Task involved stories about a day in the life of two 
characters; Dr Smith and the teacher Mrs Jones. Each protagonist was presented in three 
different situations: the doctor on a tiain going to work, at work in the surgery, and 
shopping at the supeimarket. The teacher was described at home having breakfast, then 
at school and finally at the cinema. Each event was described in ten sentences, and for 
each sentence, the participant was asked to rate the action or scene description on a five- 
point scale, ranging from ‘always’, over ‘most of the time’, ‘sometimes’, ‘rarely’ to 
‘never’. The sentences were composed of i) central event acts, ii) optional acts and 
slotfillers and iii) script-inappropriate items. For example, for the ‘doctor-in-the- 
consulting-room’ event, a central act was “In the consulting room, the doctor is 
examining the patient”. An optional act was “In the consulting room, the doctor is 
wearing glasses” and a script violating item was, for example, “While examining a 
patient, the doctor is eating a sandwich”.
Our predictions were that the groups without autism would rate central slots as 
‘always’ occumng and script violating items as ‘never’ occurring. The prediction for 
optional ‘slots’ and ‘specific’ slotfillers were that, either due to their specificity or 
because they were only peripheral to the event, they would be rated as occumng in any 
of the intermediate options ‘most of the time’, ‘sometimes’ or ‘rarely’.
For the autism spectrum gioup, predictions were motivated by their putative 
Weakness in Central Coherence. Recall fiom Chapter 5 that we argued that a piecemeal 
processing style might translate into a representation of events more in terms of specific 
and detailed surface features, rather than in terms of generalised slots. If scripts were 
stmctured in teims of slotfillers and not at the level of slots, changes in slotfiller
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occuiTences might be perceived as a deviance from the script (as would for us changes 
in a whole slot) as opposed to a possibility that might or might not occur in individual 
instances. For example, in a supermarket event, ’orange iuice in a shopping trolley’ 
would be assigned the same status as normally ‘items in a shopping trolley’. Dependent 
on the individual’s personal experience, orange juice would either become an integral 
part of that script, rated as ‘always’ occurring, or - if orange juice happened not to be 
anchored in personal experiences of shopping events - this would be rejected as 
occumng ‘never’. Likewise, optional acts might be perceived in a more black-and- 
white fashion, as should be but not as could be occurring. Hence, we predicted that in 
the autism spectium group, ratings of optional and slotfiller actions would swing to 
either extieme of the scale, as ‘always’ or ‘never’ occumng. By contrast, we predicted 
that ratings of cential acts should not be affected because although we expected to find 
an equal tendency towards ‘always’ ratings, on these items, such a judgement would be 
appropriate.
Finally, we wanted to explore whether people with ASD would recognise script- 
inappropriate actions. In our task, these items were script inappropriate because actions 
were perfoimed and props were placed in the wrong context (e.g. a doctor prescribing 
medicine to the shop assistant in the supermarket). If someone associated ‘a doctor’ 
with ‘prescribing medicine’ and disregarded context information, she might fail to 





First, a pilot study was conducted to check whether 10 normal adults -  drawn 
from the St Andrews student population - would rate the ‘central items’, ‘optional and 
slotfiller items’ and ‘script inappropriate’ items as intended and whether they would 
coiTespond with each other. Initially, we had expected ‘cential items’ to be rated as 
occumng ‘always’, optional/ slotfiller items as occumng ‘most of the time’,
‘sometimes’ or ‘rarely’, and ‘inappropriate items’ as occumng ‘never’. Unexpectedly, 
agieements were found to be lower than we had hoped. Closer inspection of the 
response patterns revealed that for the ‘central items’, this was mainly due to some 
adults’ reluctance in giving ‘always’ ratings. Instead, they preferred to opt for the ‘most 
of the time’ response as they evoked exceptional circumstances to explain why a central 
script action may in specific circumstances not happen. For example, for the item “On 
the tiain, the doctor has got a ticket for his tiain journey”, one student said, “Even 
doctors can be late in the morning. Perhaps he was in a rush and wanted to buy a ticket 
on the train”. A similar pattern was found for the inappropriate items; again participants 
thought of exceptional circumstances that could accommodate an inappropriate and 
unlikely event action, such as a teacher reading a newspaper at the cinema. Here a 
student reasoned that she could have done this before the lights went out or if it was a 
very long film, during a break. For the optional items, disagieements were usually 
between ‘rarely’ and ‘sometimes’ or between ‘sometimes’ and ‘most of the time’ 
ratings. It seemed to us, then, that it would be difficult to find items on which adults
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showed perfect agreement, simply because we could not stop them from elaborating on 
exceptional events however unlikely they seemed. Therefore, we chose to redefine our 
working definitions of items in the context of the present taskl.
We considered central items those that were rated as either occurring ‘always’ or 
‘most of the time’. Hence, a correct rating for a cential item excluded ‘sometimes’, 
‘rarely’ or ‘never’ judgements. Optional-slotfiller items were defined as being rated by 
the adult participants as occumng ‘most of the time’, ‘sometimes’ or ‘rarely’. The 
criterion therefore became that rating optional-slotfiller items as occurring either 
‘always’ or ‘never’ was incorrect. Finally, script inappropriate items were those rated as 
occuning ‘never’ or ‘rarely’. For this item category, ‘sometimes’, ‘most of the time’ 
and ‘always’ ratings were considered as inconect.
Five items that did not fit into these criteria (i.e., they evoked greater variability 
of response in our normal sample) were excluded fr om the final version of the task. 
Therefore, the final version comprised 11 cential items, 35 optional-slotfiller items and 
9 inappropriate items.
' In fact, the results coiTespond with adults’ usage of ‘cential acts’ during the pilot study of the event 
naiTatives. This infonnation, however, was not available at the time the FRT was designed.
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6.2.2. Main experiment: Procedure:
6.2.2.1. Pretest
In order to ensure that participants understood the meaning of the rating scale, 
participants in the two clinical groups and the young normally developing children were 
first shown cards depicting the visual rating scale .^ As shown in Figure 6.1., a full cup 
represented ‘always’, a cup about three quarters full ‘most of the time’, a half full cup 
corresponded to ‘sometimes’ and so forth. Below each cup, the labels ‘always’, ‘most 
of the time’, ‘sometimes’, ‘rarely’ and ‘never’ were given.





never rarely sometimes Most of always
the time
 ^Some high-functioning adults with autism or Asperger’s Syndrome were not shown the rating scale as it 
was assumed that they would understand the meaning of it. This was done because of the risk that they 
might find the task too childish, which could hinder motivation.
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The experimenter inti'oduced the rating scale as follows. “In a minute we are 
going to listen to stories about different people, and I will ask you to say how often 
people do different things. Look at this card, here you see five cups. Look at this cup 
(pointing to the full cup). This cup means ‘always’. ‘Always’ means every time the 
person is in this situation. Now look at this cup: This cup is almost full, it means ‘most 
of the time’. ‘Most of the time’ is the same as ‘very often”. Likewise, the experimenter 
explained the meaning of each label. For a full script of these insti-uctions, see Appendix
6.1. The experimenter then presented the participant with a second card, showing the 
same arrangement of the cups, except for the frequency labels, and said: “Can you point 
to the one that means ‘always’?” “Can you point to the one that means ‘rarely’?” and so 
forth for all five labels in random order. If the participant made at least one eiTor, the 
experimenter explained the meaning of the different labels once again. If a participant 
persisted to make eiTors on the second trial, he or she did not proceed to the main task, 
or where he or she insisted in doing so, responses were excluded from the analysis.
6.2.2.2. Main task:
The Frequency Rating Task was presented on a portable computer (Toshiba 
Tecra 8000, 13.3-inch screen). The choice of presenting the task on a computer was in 
part motivated by the attempt to make the task more attractive for participants 
(particularly individuals on the autistic specti-um who often delight in computer games) 
and as this presentation facilitated the scoring procedure.
Written instructions were given on the computer screen and were read out aloud 
by the experimenter: “This is a rating task about the way people behave during the day.
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There are some things that people always do when they go shopping or when they take 
a train. Other things, only some people do, but not everyone, or people only do them on 
some occasions. Now we will see what happens during the day in the life of Doctor 
Smith, and the teacher Mrs Jones. Surely, you have some idea of what doctors and 
teachers are generally like? Can you tell me if doctors and teachers noimally do what 
Dr Smith or the teacher Mrs Jones are doing?” Upon clicking a mouse button, mostly 
controlled by the experimenter, the introduction for the doctor story (shown in Figure
6.2.) appeared. Again, upon clicking the mouse button, the introduction for the tiain 
event appeared (see Figure 6.3). Each event was introduced in this way. For the test 
items, first the sentence appeared on the screen. Upon clicking the mouse, the 
conesponding question and the rating scale appeared. When the participant had made 
his or her choice, the experimenter clicked the ‘next’ button to proceed to the next story 
item.
6.2.3. Participants
Nineteen individuals with an autism spectrum disorder (9 individuals with 
autism, 10 individuals with Asperger Syndrome), six individuals with learning 
difficulties, sixteen normal childien and sixteen adults took part in this experiment. 
Participants’ distribution of ToM and CC scores is shown in Table 6.1.
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Figure 6.2. Introduction to the Doctor Story
A Day in the Life of a Doctor
This is the story about a day in the life of Doctor Smith. Step by step, we will see what Dr 
Smith is doing in different situations, for example, when he is taking a train to go to work. 
Some of the things that this doctor is doing, DOCTORS always do when they are in this 
situation. Some of the things Dr Smith is doing, doctors do most of the time or sometimes. 
But this doctor is also doing things that doctors never do, or that happen only rarely!
Figure 6.3. Introduction to the train event.
On th e  tra in
In the morning, the doctor takes a train to go to work.
Do doctors normally do what this doctor is doing when they take a train?
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Figure 6.4. Example of test item presentation
On the train.
The doctor is sitting by the window.
On a train, do doctors sit by the window?
n ev e r ra re ly
#
s o m e tim e s
fM
m o s t o f  
th e  tim e a lw ay s
Time 1 : Sentence appeared on the screen.
Time 2: Question appeared together with the rating scale
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ToM Scores CC scores
ASD A/= 19 A/= 16
A/= 19 No-ToM: 5 WCC:8
Autism: 9 1®^ order ToM: 6 MCC: 3
Asperger’s S: 10 2"^  order ToM: 8 SCC:2 
Mixed: 3
Learning difficulties A/ = 6 A/ = 6
A/=6 No-ToM: - WCC:-
1®* order: 3 MCC:1
2"^  order: 3 SCO: 2 
Mixed: 3
Children; N= 16 A/ = 14
A/= 16 No-ToM WCC:-
1®* order ToM: 9 MCC: 4 (1x9-10yr old)
2"  ^order ToM: 7 SCC: 4 (all 6-8 yrs) 




The data was analysed in two ways: first, for ‘central’, ‘optional’ and 
‘inappropriate’ items, group means of incoiTect responses were compared separately. 
Then we inspected in more detail the means of ‘always-to-never’ ratings for each item 
category.
6.2.4.1. Number o f incorrect responses for ‘central \ ‘optional-slotfiller ' and
‘inappropriate ' items
As explained before, for the ‘central-slot’ items, both ‘always’ and ‘most of the 
time’ ratings were scored as correct, whereas the options ‘sometimes’, ‘rarely’ and 
‘never’ were all scored as inconect. However, judging cential-slot behaviours, such as 
“The doctor pays at the check-out” as occuning ‘never’ is arguably more incorrect than 
judging it as occuning ‘sometimes’. Hence incorrect responses were scored in the 
following way: ‘sometimes’-ratings were given one point, ‘rarely’-ratings two points 
and ‘never’- ratings three points. Consequentially, the maximum score for incorrect 
responses on the eleven ‘central slot items’ was 33.
The same scaling was applied for the inappropriate items: again, we considered 
judging an inappropriate behaviour, such as “in the classroom, the teacher is prescribing 
medicine for a pupil” as occumng ‘always’ as more incorrect than if someone says it 
occurs ‘sometimes’. Hence, ‘always’ ratings were given 3 points, ‘most of the time’ 
ratings 2 points and ‘sometimes’ ratings 1 point. Hence, the maximum score for 
incoiTect responses on the nine ‘inappropriate items’ was 27.
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For the optional-slotfiller items, correct ratings ranged fiom ‘most of the time’ 
to ‘rarely’. ‘Always’- and ‘never’-ratings were considered as equally incorrect and each 
was scored with 1 point, since both ratings miss the character of the act just as much. 
This resulted in the maximum score of 35 for inconect responses on the optional items.
6.2.4.2. Number o f ‘always ' to ‘never' ratings for each item category
To investigate in more detail the quality of responses for each item category, we 
followed Hudson (1990) in comparing the extent to which the groups differed in giving 
‘always’ to ‘never’ ratings.
As in the previous studies, three separate sets of analyses were performed. The 
first set compared performance between the diagnostic groups, the second set used the 
central coherence score as the between-group variable and the third set considered 
Theory of Mind performance. The statistical analysis was conducted as follows. First a 
set of parametiic analyses was conducted using one-way analyses of variances. Wliere 
significant group differences were found, subsequent pairwise comparisons were made 
using Tukey’s tests and Mann-Whitney U tests as their non-parametiic equivalent.
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6.3. Re su l t s:
6.3.1. Comparisons between diagnostic groups
6.3.1.1. Number o f incoirect ratings
The results conceming the number of incoiTect responses on all three item 
categories, comparing the Autism spectrum group with the control gi'oups, can be seen 
in Figure 6.5,
Central items. As predicted, participants with an autism spectrum disorder rated 
central items comparable to the learning difficulties and children control gioups {F (3, 
53) = 6.57. = .002). As subsequent pairwise comparisons showed, the significant F- 
value was only due to the better performance of the adult control group compared to all 
other groups. Likewise, when the autism spectium group was split into the autism 
versus Asperger’s Syndrome subgroups, each subgroup performed comparable to their 
respective control groups.
Optional-slotfiller items. It was predicted that people with ASD might give more 
incorrect responses to optional or slotfiller acts, as they might perceive actions or 
elements that can sometimes occur as either essential to an event or as not part of it at 
all. It was found that the ASD gi'oup rated optional-slotfiller items more often 
incoiTectly than the typical adults (Z^-4.5, n = 35, p = .000) and children ( Z= -2.1 =
88, n = 35, p= .034), but their amount of mistakes was comparable to that made by the 
learning difficulties group (Z = -.57, n= 25, n.s.).
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Further group differences were found when the ASD group was split into autism 
and Asperger’s Syndrome. Pairwise comparisons showed that the autism group 
performed significantly worse than the Asperger Syndrome group (Z = -1.9, n= 19, p = 
.055) and the young children (Z = -1.95, n= 18, p= .05). However, the autism and 
learning difficulties gioups did not differ fi*om each other (Z = -1.6, n= 15, p= n.s.). 
Whilst the Asperger Syndrome group did not differ from the old children (Z- -1.3, n = 
17, p = .19), both groups gave significantly more incoirect ratings than the adult control 
gi'oup (typical children: Z = -2.73, n = 25, p = .006; Asperger Syndrome: Z = -3.7, n =
2 8 ,  p  < 0 0 1 ) .
Inappropriate items. A one-way analysis of variance showed that the mean 
numbers of incorrect ratings of inappropriate items were not significantly different 
across the different groups {F (5, 53) = 1.39, p = n.s). However, as Figure 6.7 shows, 
both the autism group and the young childi en rated about half of the inappropriate items 
incoiTectly.
6.3.1.2. Means o f ‘always’ to ‘never’ ratings for each item category
Next, for the relevant ‘optional-slotfiller’ category, the patterns of ratings were 
more closely inspected. Interestingly, this analysis now revealed a significant difference 
between the autism and learning difficulties group: the autism group rated optional- 
slotfiller items significantly more often as occumng ‘always’ than the learning 
difficulties group (Z = -1.9, n=15, p = .05). Compared to the young children, the autism 
group gave significantly more ‘always’ (Z = -2.9, n= 18, p = .002) and ‘rarely’ ratings
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Figure 6.7, Group means of incorrect ratings of inappropriate items (max = 9)
autism  'old' child learning difficultie




(Z = -2.2, n =18, p = .024) and significantly fewer ‘sometimes’ ratings. (Z = -2.8, p 
=.003). As can be seen in Figure 6.8, the autism sub-group rated the optional-slotfiller 
acts in about similar proportions as ‘always’ through to ‘never’ occumng. A concern 
could be that ratings were done merely at random. However, Figure 6.9. shows that the 
participants with autism rated about two-thirds of central acts as occurring ‘always’ and 
about two-thirds of inappropriate acts as occuning ‘never’. These patterns suggest that 
on these two item categories, ratings were given in a systematic way, which renders the 
possibility that ratings on the option-slotfiller category were solely the result of random 
responses, less likely.
The Asperger’s Syndrome group gave significantly more ‘always’ (Z = -2,0, N = 
2A,p = .003), ‘rarely’ (Z = -2.4, N = 24,p = .015) and ‘never’ ratings (Z = -3.4, N = 24, 
p -  .004) than the adult control group and significantly fewer ‘most of the time’ (Z = - 
2.0, N = 24,p = .033) and ‘sometimes’- ratings (Z = -2.9, N = 24, = .003). However, 
there were no differences between the ratings given by the Asperger’s Syndrome gi'oup 
and the 9 to 10 year old children.
6.3.2. Frequency Ratings according to Central Coherence groups
We reasoned those frequency misjudgements as discussed above might be the 
result of a piece-meal processing style. Given that in Chapter 3 it was found that Weak 
Central Coherence was not universal to all people with an autism spectrum disorder, 
next it was explored whether only ASD people with Weak Cential Coherence would
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Figure 6.8. Ratings of optional items by diagnostic groups
autism Asperger's Syndrome
6-8 years old children 9-10 years old children
learning difficulties adult control group
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Figure 6.9. Comparison between the autism group’s ratings of central acts, optional 
acts and inappropriate acts
autism ratings of central acts autism ratings of optional acts
autism ratings of inappropriate acts
225
Chapter 6
display this pattern. However, as small cell sizes for ASD with Medium and Strong 
Central Coherence did not permit us to perform inferential statistics; Central Coherence 
groups were investigated across all participant groups.
To be more stringent, the adult contr ol group was excluded from this analysis. 
For the interpretation of this analysis, it is important to bear in mind that only 
individuals with an autism spectr um disorder fell into the Weak Centr al Coherence 
group. Figure 6.10 shows the mean number of always to never ratings as given by the 
four Central Coherence groups.
6.3.2.1. Number o f errors
Mann-Whitney U tests revealed that the WCC gr oup made significantly more 
errors on the optional-slotfiller item category than the SCC group (Z= -2.21, n= 17, p = 
.02) and the ‘mixed-style’ group (Z = -3.2, n=22, p =.001).
6.3.2.2. Mean number o f ‘always to never’ ratings on ‘optional-slotfiller’ acts
given by Central Coherence groups
The WCC group rated optional-slotfiller acts significantly more often as 
occumng ‘always’ (Z = -2.8, N = 17, p = .002) and significantly less often as occurring 
‘sometimes’ (Z= -3.0, N = 17, p = .001) than the SCC group. Compared to the MCC 
group, the WCC group rated optional-slotfiller acts significantly less often as occurring 
‘sometimes’ (Z = -1.6, N = 18, p = .006). In comparison with the mixed style group, the 
WCC group gave significantly more ‘always’ (Z = -2.5, N = 18, p = .011) and 
significantly fewer ‘sometimes’ ratings (Z = -2.9, N = 18, p = .002).
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Figure 6.10. Frequency Ratings of optional-slotfiller acts given by Central Coherence 
groups.
strong central coherence group medium central coherence group
weak central coherence group mixed style group
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2nd-order ToM child learning difficulties
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Whilst the SCC and MCC groups did not differ from each other in their ratings, both 
groups rated optional-slotfiller acts significantly more often incorrectly as occumng 
‘never’ than the mixed style group. (MCC vs. mixed style: Z = -2.78, N = 21, p = .005; 
SCC vs. mixed style: Z = -2.1, N = 19, p = .035).
6.3.3. Frequency Ratings according to ToM groups
As a final analysis, it was investigated whether Theory of Mind abilities affected 
frequency judgements. Compared to the learning difficulties group, a tendency of the 
ASD no-ToM group to give fewer ‘ sometimes ’ -ratings approached significance ( Z = - 
1.6, p = .068). Moreover, the ASD no-ToM group gave significantly more ‘always’ 
ratings than the typical 1st order ToM children (Z = -2.15, n= 14, p = .029), but there 
were no differences between the ratings given by the ASD no-ToM and ASD first order 
ToM groups.
6.4. Summary and D iscussion :
The first aim of this study was to investigate whether people with ASD 
perceived optional-slotfiller acts in a different way than people without this condition.
In summary, the results suggested tentatively that a diagnosis of autism influenced 
ratings, as the autism subgroup gave overall more incorrect ratings than the verbal 
mental age matched ‘young’ children. The autism subgroup also gave significantly 
fewer ‘sometimes’ ratings than the matched group with learning difficulties. Arguably,
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appreciation of the optional character of those items, namely that something might or 
might not occur, is best captured by ‘sometimes’ ratings.
By contiast, those with Asperger’s Syndrome perfbimed comparable to 9 to 10 
year old typically developing children, but the ratings given by both groups were less 
relativistic than those of the adults. The second question was whether a tendency 
towards Weak Central Coherence affected frequency ratings of optional-slotfiller acts 
whilst judgements of cential acts were not expected to be influenced. The results lent 
preliminary support to these predictions. Firstly, the WCC group (solely individuals in 
the ASD group) made in total more eiTors on the optional item category than the SCC 
and mixed style gioups. More specifically, separate analyses of the response options 
‘always’ to ‘never’ showed that compared to the SCC and mixed style gioups, 
individuals with WCC tended to avoid ‘sometimes’ ratings, and gave more ‘always’ 
ratings.
Was the effect of Weak Cential Coherence genuine? A similar pattern was 
found when participants were giouped according to their Theory of Mind competence. 
Here, we need to take into account that the ASD no ToM gioup also had slightly, 
though not significantly, more verbal language difficulties than the comparison gioups 
(individuals with learning difficulties, typical children and the ASD ToM groups). This 
leaves the possibility that either ToM competence, modulated by verbal abilities, or 
verbal abilities in themselves, might have contributed to the result.
However, informative was the inspection of tliree individuals with WCC who 
had Theory of Mind at either the first or second order levels. With verbal IQs in the 
noimal range, each of these three participants (two boys with autism and one boy with
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Asperger’s Syndrome) had considerably higher verbal abilities than the ASD ‘WCC and 
ToM failers’ (E.G . VIQ: 116; SS: VIQ: 97; K.C.’s verbal mental age estimate of 11.07 
years was higher than his chronological age of 10.04 years). The mean numbers of 
incoiTect ratings on the optional-slotfiller item category for the ASD no-ToM plus WCC 
group was 16.2 (of 35), whereas the MCC gi’oup (across diagnostic groups) gave on 
average 10.7, the SCC group 8.5 and the mixed style gi'Oup 3.3 incoiTect ratings. In 
comparison, E.G. (second order ToM) gave 17 incorrect ratings, S.So (second order 
ToM) 16, and K.C. (first order ToM) 5 incoiTect ratings. Although the participant 
numbers are too small to draw any firm conclusions, the performance of these three 
individuals suggests that neither ToM perfoiTnance nor verbal intelligence influenced 
their ratings. Of these three individuals, two boys gave as many incoiTect ratings as the 
other lower functioning individuals with ASD in the WCC group. This suggests that for 
these individuals, a WCC cognitive style might have had a genuine influence on the 
ratings of the ‘optional-slotfiller’ acts.
We did not find support for the hypothesis that people with ASD, or specifically 
people with ASD with WCC, might misjudge the occurrences of actions that are 
inappropriate because of being performed in the wrong context. Although group means 
(see Figure 6.7.) showed that individuals with ASD gave inconect ratings of about half 
of the inappropriate acts, no significant gi'oup differences were found as suiprisingly, 
the young childien made almost as many mistakes. It is unclear why the young typically 
developing children made as many inconect judgements of the inappropriate items on 
this task, since Hudson (1988) reported that pre-schoolers even younger than the
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children in the present sample readily spotted inappropriate behaviours. One possibility 
might be that the present ‘inappropriate’ acts were not as blatantly inappropriate as the 
ones Hudson gave children to rate. Alternatively, perhaps the young typical children, 
too, were relatively context insensitive and found it hard to appreciate that the same 
behaviour can be appropriate or inappropriate in different contexts or when perfonned 
by different people.
Finally, we need to address potential criticisms concerning the task itself. One 
potential problem relates to whether success on the pretest can be inteipreted as 
reflecting a full understanding of the semantic meaning of the fr equency terms. Wlien 
designing the task and the pretest, inquiries were made in order to find an appropriate 
visual aid that could help participants to understand the meaning of these ternis. 
However, interestingly, none of the visual communication systems commonly used in 
special needs schools (e.g. Makaton, Boardmaker) contained symbols for these 
frequency terms. The pretest employed in the present study cannot fully exclude that 
individuals with ASD might have passed it by using a visuo-spatial strategy that 
allowed them to relate the cups to the labels.
Another weakness of the task constitutes the lack of a tme control condition.
One possible way of approximating such a control condition could be to use parallel 
items, as fr equently included in questionnaire designs (Breakwell, Hammond, Fife- 
Shaw, 1995). Two actors, say Tom and Henry could be poitrayed in the same event, 
perfonning the same action (e.g. in the supermarket, both of them taking a shopping
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cart). We would expect someone who genuinely understands the meaning of terms and 
their relation to the actions to show consistency across ratings of these parallel items.
Although the present version included ‘non-social’ descriptions of scenes and 
objects, these items were not balanced with items describing social actions. Hence, we 
did not analyse whether paiticipants showed more eiTors in rating the occunences of 
social actions versus non-social objects. This might be relevant to consider in future 
work, especially since we suggested a possible link between a tendency to perceive 
‘things’ (acts and objects) that could occur as ‘should occmiing’ and the insistence on 
the adherence to non-flexible routines and ‘sameness’.
Despite the limitations discussed above, taken together, the present results lent 
preliminary support to the hypothesis that some people with ASD have difficulties 
understanding the occurrences of optional-slotfiller event acts. It is possible that 
different factors have influenced such disturbed event representation. Especially 
individuals with ASD whose cognitive profile included a combination of Weak Central 
Coherence, Theory of Mind impaiiments and conespondingly, verbal language 
impairments were at risk of failing to recognise that certain acts might or might not 
occur. Moreover, this tendency seems to stretch even to higher-functioning individuals 




D is c u s s io n  of Pa r t  I: A u t is m  a n d  Cu l t u r a l  K n o w l e d g e
7.1. Sum m ary  of Studies 1 to 4
A new theoretical perspective, which aimed to integrate the cultural and 
cognitive levels, motivated the empirical research that comprised the first part of this 
thesis. The central question was whether cultural knowledge might be impaired in 
people with an autism spectrum disorder. Our argument involved two pai'ts; the first 
part related to the developmental level, the second part related to the perfoimance level.
The argument refeixing to the developmental level was that the acquisition of 
different facets of cultural knowledge might rely on distinct cognitive abilities, which 
were assumed to be abnormal in ASD. With reference to independent proposals put 
forward by Bruner (1990), Tomasello (1999) and Sperber (1996), it was suggested that 
the acquisition of real-world knowledge of social norms and customs might rely on 
Theory of Mind (metarepresentational capacities or their precursors). If that view was 
correct, then impaiiments in the understanding of social noims might only be restricted 
to the subgroup of individuals with ASD who have profound Theory of Mind deficits. 
Moreover, we reasoned that a second facet of cultuial knowledge, the appreciation of 
the holistic-hierarchical structure of event scripts, requires a sense of Central 
Coherence. Based on the initial assumption that Weak Central Coherence might be
234
Chapter 7
universal to individuals with this disorder, abnormalities in generalised representations 
of routine events were predicted to stretch across ability levels.
On the performance level, it was argued that if individuals with ASD had 
abnormalities in cultural knowledge, they might experience even further difficulties in 
making sense of canonical social behaviour than hitherto assumed. In addition to the 
impaiiments in explaining and predicting behaviour on the basis of mental states, ASD 
with representational ToM deficits might also have difficulties understanding social 
norm based behaviours. At the same time, abnormalities in event knowledge might even 
impair individuals with ASD with representational Theory of Mind abilities to deploy 
this device on-line.
We will first discuss the extent to which the present studies lent support to these 
arguments. Secondly, the limitations of the cuirent studies are considered. Thirdly, 
implications of this research are discussed and suggestions are made for future reseai ch 
investigating how cultural knowledge may relate to the cognitive and behavioural 
phenotype of Autism Spectrum Disorders,
The relation between Theory of Mind deficits and the understanding of social 
norms was investigated in Study 2, by using a new Social Inference Task that required 
generating predictions and explanations based on noim based behaviours. However, 
previous resear ch suggests that language abilities and Theory of Mind development 
(e.g. Tager-Flusberg, 1997; Yiimiya et al., 1996) may be closely related in ASD, so that 
people with Theory of Mind competencies usually also have better verbal abilities than 
those without Theory of Mind. Hence, evidence for the specific role of Theory of Mind
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would be provided if people with ASD without ToM had greater difficulties than 
individuals with learning difficulties with Theory of Mind but with an equivalent level 
of verbal language abilities. If, by contrast, the understanding of social norms and real 
world knowledge relied on general learning mechanisms, perhaps even Theory of Mind 
failers might- depending upon their degree of accompanying learning difficulties - have 
some scaffold to fall back on in order to make sense of theii* social environment. The 
main finding of Study 2, the Social Inference Task, was that the ASD no ToM group 
showed significantly more difficulties in predicting and explaining norm based actions 
than individuals with learning difficulties and typically developing children of a similar 
verbal mental age. This suggests that at least one subgroup of people with an autism 
spectrum disorder might experience yet more difficulties and confusion in 
understanding social behaviour than the traditional Theoiy of Mind hypothesis 
suggested. In this sense, if we are ‘thinking through cultures’, as Shweder suggested, 
then this subgi oup of people with autism might metaphorically lack those spectacles 
through which we perceive the world and that help us to make sense of our social 
environment.
While Study 1 lent support to the notion that WCC could be specific to 
autism spectrum disorders (Frith, 1989), it challenged the assumption that such a 
cognitive style is universal to all people with an autism spectrum condition. Only about 
one-third of our paiticipants were characterised as having Weak Central Coherence, 
about two-thirds of the present participant population seemed to be better characterised 
as having Medium or even Strong Central coherence, or as showing a ‘mixed style’.
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Although these findings are interesting in themselves, with implications for future 
resear ch discussed in Chapter 3, they rendered the present task -  to tease out the 
possible influence of WCC on cultural knowledge -  more difficult. Firstly, we needed 
to revise our initial hypothesis. If the hierarchical organisation of event representation 
was dependent on Central Coherence, only a subgroup of individuals with an autism 
spectrum disorder, namely those with Weak Central Coherence, should show 
impaiiments in that. Secondly, whilst overall degrees of Central Coherence and Theory 
of Mind did not correlate, closer inspection revealed that all individuals in the no ToM 
group also had WCC. And although Weak Central Coherence seems to be more 
prevalent than Theoiy of Mind deficits in ASD, stretching to higher-functioning 
individuals with Theory of Mind competencies, in the present sample these were 
effectively only three individuals.
Studies 3 and 4 lent support to the suggestion that the representation of routine 
events might be to varying degrees impaired in people with ASD. Especially individuals 
with Theoiy of Mind impaiiments and Weak Central Coherence showed little 
understanding of the main components comprising the structure of event knowledge, 
such as generality, hierar chical organisation, and even the temporal order.
Abnormalities in the hierarchical event organisation were further evidenced by 
specifically poor ratings of the optional-slotfiller acts on the Frequency Rating Task,
However, given the overlap of individuals who showed both cognitive 
abnormalities, and since the compar ison gioups were slightly different for the two types 
of analysis, the results did not permit us to unambiguously tease out which of the two 
cognitive abilities had the gr eater impact. The finding that the level of Theoiy of Mind
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abilities distinguished well between perfoimances on the Frequency Rating Task was 
surprising since only Cential Coherence Theory made specific predictions concerning 
abnormalities in the ratings of optional -  slotfiller items. However, that Theory of Mind 
(impairments) and (abnoimalities in) event knowledge might be affected at a similar 
level is at least implicit in Bruner’s account that argued that both competencies develop 
from the same narrative mode of thinking. By telling stories to others (and even to 
oneself, as in Emmy’s bedtime monologues, see Nelson, 1989) young children seem to 
try and make sense of their experiences. Going through them, this ‘sense-making- 
process’ is thought to foster their Theory of Mind development (because they need to 
explain why things happened), as well as to consolidate theii* general understanding of 
what different events entail. Still, this account remains vague with regards to the 
dissociation between ‘specific’ difficulties in the understanding of the quality of 
optional-slotfiller acts and relative intact ratings of central acts, which is what was 
found here. Therefore, the possibility that Weak Central Coherence had a genuine 
impact may be supported by the main finding that the Weak Central Coherence group 
across ability ranges showed these impairments, and although roughly one third of 
individuals in this group had Theory of Mind competence at the first or second order 
levels.
However, it is possible that in general, results were also influenced by the 
individual’s general level of intellectual functioning, pai ticularly his or her verbal 
abilities. Possibly, good verbal abilities might have helped people with high-functioning 
autism or Asperger’s Syndrome to complete sentences in a meaningful way, as shown 
in Study 1, to give relatively appropriate explanations on the Social Inference Task
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(Study 2), and to produce relatively coherent event nanatives (Study 3). Nonetheless, 
almost in eveiy individual, more subtle difficulties were found, especially on the event 
naiTatives.
7.2. L im ita tio n s  o f  S tu d ie s  1-4
The studies involved a number of limitations of which a first set relates to the 
characteristics of the participant sample. The present sample comprised a relatively 
heterogeneous group of individuals with an autism spectrum disorder, ranging fiom 
individuals with autism with moderate lear ning difficulties to - in some cases - very 
intelligent adults with Asperger’s Syndrome. The decision of targeting such a relatively 
heterogeneous group was mainly motivated by previous insights of characteristics of 
people with ASD who fail versus pass standard Theory of Mind tests, which was crucial 
for exploring the possible effect of ToM on cultural knowledge.
1. Repercussions of this decision were that when divided into autism versus Asperger’s 
Syndrome, we had to work with small case numbers in each subgroup. Having small 
sample sizes does not only raise the question whether results can be generalised to the 
ASD population at large, they also render the possibility of detecting existing effects 
more difficult. This could have contributed to negative findings, for example, the failure 
to find significant differences between Central Coherence groups on the spontaneous 
production of slotfillers in Study 5.
2. Given the practical difficulties in recruiting individuals with a relatively rare disorder, 
such as ASD, most of the adults were recruited via support groups for adolescents or
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adults with Asperger’s Syndrome. Hence, the individuals with Asperger’s Syndrome 
were overall not only higher functioning, but also older than those with autism. 
Therefore, although in several analyses the two subgioups were compar ed, group 
differences must not be attributed to details of diagnoses of autism versus Asperger’s 
Syndrome. In other words, in the present studies we could not directly explore whether 
individuals with autism/ high-functioning autism differ from those with Asperger’s 
Syndrome in their cognitive profile or understanding of cultural knowledge.
3. In designing the new tasks, we had to consider possible comprehension problems of 
the lower functioning individuals in our sample. Therefore, the tasks might have been 
too easy for the intelligent adults with Asperger’s Syndrome, so that their relatively 
good performance cannot be seen as evidence that theii* understanding of cultural 
knowledge is fully intact.
4. As discussed above, the ‘overlap’ of individuals who had Theoiy of Mind 
impairments and Weak Central Coherence rendered the interpretation of the results 
more difficult. The results do not permit us to draw firm conclusions as to which 
cognitive abnormality had a greater influence on generalised event representation.
Hence, given the above limitations and that with exception of Study 1, the work 
presented here had exploratory character; the findings need to be seen as preliminary 
and in need of replication, ideally with bigger samples. However, they suggest that in a 
subgroup of individuals with an Autism Spectmm Disorder, notably those with Theory 
of Mind impairments and Weak Central Coherence, the understanding of cultural
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knowledge was to a greater extent impaired than in individuals who function at a similar 
intellectual or developmental level.
And more generally, these findings suggest that the notion of cultural knowledge 
may provide a fruitful avenue to further investigate the relation between behavioural 
and cognitive abnormalities in ASD. It should be noted that the present approach avoids 
the danger of circularity pointed out by Leekam (2002) (tiying to explain on the 
cognitive level behaviour s that are in themselves part of the diagnostic criteria), as from 
cognitive abnormalities we have generated predictions offurther impairments in ASD 
that are outside the diagnostic criteria.
7.2. IMPLICATIONS OF THIS RESEARCH AND OUTLOOK TO THE FUTURE
Event representation in people with autism and Asperger’s Syndrome at dijferent ability 
levels.
To explore the idea of cultural knowledge impairments in ASD further, a more 
systematic research programme is needed that firstly, accounts for different abilitv 
levels in ASD by using a variety of tasks that are appropriate for the mental age level of 
the participants. For the younger and more severely affected individuals, it will be 
necessary to assess the full depths of possible impairments using yet simpler tasks. With 
regards to the high-functioning individuals with ASD, the next question will be whether 




Exploring the relation between the perceptual and representational levels
This relation might not only be uni-directional or ‘bottom-up’ in the sense that 
event obsei*vations or cultural knowledge affect the drawing of on-line mentalistic 
inferences. The other interesting possibility would be to investigate the extent to which 
immediate event perceptions might be theory driven in ASD. It would be predicted that 
ordinary people selectively draw their attention to aspects of events that violate 
generalised expectations or representations. Furthermore, event perceptions might also 
be contributed by initial mentalistic inferences of actors’ intentions. For example, if I 
know that someone intends to bur gle a house, when obser*ving the scene I might draw 
my attention selectively to those aspects of the environment that ar e relevant for the 
accomplishment of the act. (E.g. I might notice the alarm system outside the house and 
the police station across the road). However, when I am told that the person is about to 
make a friendly visit and obseiwe the very same scenario, I might now notice the 
biscuits on the table but not the alarm system. Future resear ch may investigate whether 
in people with ASD, immediate event perceptions ar e to the same extent guided by 
representational knowledge.
The role o f  event knowledge for cognitive development: memory and language
Resear chers studying the development of generalised event representations in 
young typically developing children have argued that event knowledge acts as ‘basic 
building blocks’ for the development of other cognitive competencies, such as memory 
and acquisition of linguistic markers of modalities (Nelson, 1986). Extending this line 
of resear ch to people with ASD, one interesting question would be to explore the degree
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to which script abnormalities might affect those cognitive abilities or ar e related to their 
development. For example, previous research with typical children and adults has found 
that over time, people tend to ‘fuse’ different experiences with routine events in their 
memory (what you had for breakfast last week on Monday versus Tuesday). This was 
indicated by their false recognition of individual items that belong to a script but 
happened not to be present in a specific incident (Hudson, 1988; Bower et ah, 1979).
By contrast, if people with ASD tended to represent events more in terms of individual 
details, then recall or recognition might be more accurate and to a lesser extent 
contaminated by generalised expectations. This suggestion would fit with anecdotal 
accounts of sometimes astounding memory of details of ordinary events (e.g. Park, 
1982).
Relating the event representation approach to the behaviour phenotype o f  ASD
The relevance of all these proposals is that we ar gue that cultural knowledge 
impairments might be involved in the underpinnings of two central features of autism 
spectrum disorders: social abnormalities and a resistance to altered routines. Particularly 
the latter aspect of the autism syndrome is currently not well understood. It is 
sometimes seen as a by-product of the attempt to establish some order in an inherently 
confusing and unpredictable world (e.g. Joliffe, 1992; Baron-Cohen, 1995). This view 
would predict that with gradual Theory of Mind competence, such obsessions might 
become less intense. Although this is to our' knowledge an open question, anecdotes of 
high-functioning people with autism or Asperger’s Syndrome who are likely to have
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some ToM competence but are nevertheless keen on the order of then daily routines, 
suggests that these two features might not always correlate.
A second suggestion is that these symptoms stem fi'om executive functions (e.g. 
Turner, 1997). A potential problem with this view is that obsessions with routines are 
assigned to a similar status as lower-level repetitive actions - and are only seen as 
dysfunctional. In oui* view, the str ength of the present proposal is that it may offer a 
different account for the obsessions with routines that -  in the sphit of Central 
Coherence Theory -  emphasises ‘differences’ over strict ‘deficits’. If people with 
autism genuinely understand acts (and by using a similar* rationale also ‘props’, material 
artefacts, objects, ‘things’) that cowM happen in individual experiences as should 
happen, it may be subjectively meaningful for a person with autism or Asperger 
Syndrome to insist on the adherence of surface patterns. In order to explore the validity 
of this proposal, it will be necessary to compar e the degree to which abnormalities in 
cultural knowledge obser*ved in experimental situations relate to the natur e and extent of 
social impairments and a resistance to changes in routines in real life.
Autism as an indirect route to empirically investigate the nature and development o f  
cultural Imowledge.
Finally, the cultural knowledge approach to autism may have yet another 
benefit. Previous resear ch studying cognitive abnormalities in autism (Theory of Mind, 
central executive functions) has been useful for theory and research about the typical 
development. In a similar* vein, the implications of this approach are that - via the 
indirect route - autism can tell us something about the cognitive underpinnings of the
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‘normal’ acquisition and understanding of cultural knowledge. For example, it suggests 
that Theory of Mind and a sense of coherence play a role in this learning process, which 
previously other authors have theorised but not empirically investigated.
7.3. Conclusion
In summary, the research presented in the first part of this thesis lends support to 
the suggestion that by evoking the cultur al level, we may attain a better understanding 
of the way two central facets of the autism syndrome ar e related; the depth of social 
impairments and the obsession with routines. Moreover, the notion of cultural 
knowledge has been useful for the generation of predictions regarding the interplay 
between different cognitive abilities.
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8
T h e o r y  o f  M in d , p o w e r  a n d  D is c r im in a t io n
8.1. Introduction TO The PHENOMENON AT Issue: Intergroup 
D iscrimintion
In the preface to Fanon’s The Wretched o f the Earth (1965), Sartie described the 
mechanisms and function of dehumanisation in the colonies with passion and fury:
“Our soldiers overseas, rejecting the universalism of the mother country, apply 
the ‘numems clausus’ to the human race: since none may enslave, rob or kill his fellow 
man without committing a crime, they lay down the principle that the native is not one 
of our fellow-men. Our striking power has been given the mission of changing this 
abstr act certainty into reality: the order is given to reduce the inhabitants of the annexed 
country to the level of superior monkeys in order to justify the settler’s treatment of 
them as beasts of burden. Violence in the colonies does not only have for its aim the 
keeping of these enslaved men at arm’s length; it seeks to dehumanise them” (p. 12).
When considering situations in which intergroup discrimination presents its 
most extreme expressions in dehumanisation and genocide, as well when looking at less 
extreme forms, a challenging question is: what is going on in the minds of those who 
commit these acts that enables them to do so? Recall from Chapter 1 Staub’s 
supposition that the SS commandant Amos Goeth did not consider the thoughts and
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feelings of his victims. In a similar vein, Kieman (1996), in his analysis of European 
attitudes to other cultures in the imperial age, attributed to the colonisers 
incomprehension of the differing mental perspectives of the colonised: “That black 
people had only second-rate souls, and that they were better off as slaves (...) was a 
conviction that faded very slowly from the European minds. He [Albert Smith] fell back 
on the comforting stereotype of Africans as happy, carefree creatures, shackled in body 
but spared the heavy load of thought and doubt” (pp 211-212).
8.1.1. The roots of a hypothesis:
The images pressed upon us from these accounts are very different from the 
pictures painted by developmental psychologists about the ‘competent mindreader’. 
Notwithstanding many differences between the situations described by Sartre, Kieman 
and Staub, one common aspect amongst them is extieme power differentials between 
members of different social groups. These accounts provided the starting point for the 
following question: could it be that alongside with the denial of the ‘others” basic 
human rights, the oppressors denied the oppressed another central feature of humanity, 
their own independent mental perspective?
The suggestion based on this impression is that social contextual variables 
determining the relation between self and other may affect theory of mind usage. But 
does this suggest that unawareness, or more extieme, the denial of others’ mental 




“Oui* victims know us by their scars and by their chains, and it is this that makes their 
evidence iiTefutable. It is enough that they show us what we made of them for us to 
realise what we made of ourselves” (1965, p. 12).
Another example that emphasises a discrepancy between the extent, to which 
oppressors and the suppressed are aware of the mental states of one another, can be 
found again in Kieman’s (1996) analysis.
“He (Oyono) can easily be believed when he says that the colonisers knew their 
subjects far less than they were known by them. ‘The eyes that live in the native 
location stiip the whites naked. The whites on the other hand go about blind’”, (p. 218)
The issues of intergroup behaviour, conflict and oppression are today as acute as 
they have been in the past. With the present work, we hoped to contribute to an 
understanding of this phenomenon by approaching it from a Theory of Mind 
perspective. Based on the above accounts, we developed the hypothesis that power 
differentials may lead to an asymmetiy in the understanding of others’ minds. On the 
one hand, those who are in power, might for various reasons not be motivated to 
understand the mental perspective of their victims, how they interpret reality which 
includes their interpretations of the oppressors’ actions. On the other hand, the 
suppressed might have a clearer understanding of the states of mind of their oppressors, 
which we argue would be strategically beneficial for them.
Hence, our concem in this second part of the thesis is to explore the questions of 
whether and how power affects differential theory of mind usage, and how the denial or
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adoption of others’ independent mental perspective may serve strategic functions for 
those who commit or experience discrimination.
8.1.2. Power
If the terms racism and prejudice are often used interchangeably, there is one 
important social factor that distinguishes between the two: power. As Reicher (2001) 
has argued, prejudice and ethnocentrism (the preference of the ingroup over other 
groups) only translates into racism when the ingroup is capable of exerting power over 
the outgi'oup.
Russell (1938) considered power as “the fundamental concept in social science 
in the same sense in which energy is the fundamental concept in physics” (p. 10). For 
Dahrendorf (1968), a core feature of society is the unequal partition of power between 
its members. Nietzsche (1888/ 1968) saw ‘the will to power’ as a fundamental human 
drive, and Hobbes argued that only through the foimation of societies was it possible to 
limit the exploitative consequences of unequal power division.
Even if power is one of the most important factors that define social relations, a 
number of commentators have lamented that on the whole, power differentials remain a 
neglected issue in modem social psychology in general, as well as in studies of 
intergroup phenomena in particular (e.g. Ng, 1980; Fiske & Dépret, 1996; Haslam, 
2001; Reicher, 2001). However, more recently, researchers have converged on a 
working definition of power that includes a notion of the degi ee of contiol that a person 
or group has over their own outcomes and over those of others (see Jones, 1972; Dépret
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& Fiske, 1996; Rodriguez-Bailon, Moya & Yzerbyt, 2000; Haslam, 2001). In other 
words, those who are in a position of power are not only in control over their own 
outcomes, but also in control of the outcomes of those they dominate. Conversely, those 
who are in the dominated position lack control over their own outcomes, as those are 
largely deteimined by powerful others. The advantage of such a definition of power is 
that it allows one to contrast power with other constrocts. For example, in contrast to 
manifestations of social influence, it is implied that the power user is in a position to 
impose his will against the wishes of those he attempts to control. Moreover, such a 
definition of power contrasts with status, as one may be of higher status but without 
control over the other’s outcomes. The royal family may be of high status but without 
real governmental power, whereas a low status governmental employee may in actual 
fact have substantial control over the outcome of others.
8.1.3 Outline of part II of this thesis
To give more substance to the proposal that power, or social contextual 
variables more generally, may affect how Theory of Mind is used in practice, in the first 
part of this chapter, we discuss a number of research stiands within social psychology 
that are concerned with different facets of the issue at hand. First, as an exception from 
the lacuna of power research, an active progiamme of research that continues with the 
mainstieam social cognition tradition will be reviewed. In the second part, several 
problems of this direction as identified by a second influential research strand, the 
Social Identity approach will be discussed. These include the critique on an
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individualistic and static concept of social groups, and the assumption that ‘faults’ in 
cognitive processes are the consequences of limited cognitive resources. By contrast, 
we will see that Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1978, 1979) proposes a multi-levelled 
concept of the self and a process-oriented approach to intergroup behaviour. However, 
with only a few exceptions (Ng, 1980, Reicher, 2001), research within the Social 
Identity approach has not systematically considered the role of power for intergi oup 
processes, although the theoiy implies that power differentials between groups are 
flexible depending upon the social context. Moreover, its cuiTcnt limitations include a 
neglect of cognitive processes in their account of intergroup behaviour. In the third part, 
we present our proposal, which consists of a synthesis between these two lines of 
research by importing a Theory of Mind perspective to the study of intergi oup 
phenomena. The final part of this chapter gives an oveiview and the rationale of the 
empirical research presented in subsequent chapters.
8.2. S o c ia l  P s y c h o lo g ic a l  A c c o u n ts  o f  P o w er a n d  In te rg ro u p  
D isc rim in a tio n
8.2.1. Individualistic accounts
In the afteimath of the honors of World War II, Adorno et al (1950) developed 
an influential theory positing that the Nazis’ success in recruiting large parts of the 
Geiman population for their ethnocentric and discriminatory cause was grounded in a 
stable personality trait common to many Germans: authoritarianism. In other words, 
individual difference factors, anchored in German parental style, were argued to
251
Chapter 8
predispose Gemians to prejudice. Those tiaits, as established on the basis of a range of 
psychometiic tests, included, for example, rigidity, over-generalisation, intolerance of 
ambiguity, and a predisposition to an egocentric perspective. However, as 
commentators have pointed out, locating extreme racism in the psychological 
characteristics of individuals may be more informative in situations where racist 
attitudes and ideologies are in the minority (Billig, 1976). In these circumstances, it may 
well be a certain type of person who joins extremist groups. By contrast, where those 
views and attitudes become part of the dominant ideology, individualistic accounts may 
lose a great deal of their explanatory power (Billig, 1976). Billig also pointed to a 
second problem of individualistic accounts. This relates to the prediction of relatively 
stable and unchangeable intergroup relations, which contradicts sudden rises and falls in 
prejudice as witnessed throughout history.
Nonetheless, individualistic accounts have dominated the mainstream American 
social psychological scene, notably the social cognition tradition. Insights derived from 
them are reviewed first.
8.2.1.1. The effect ofpower on impression formation and stereotyping
In keeping with Allport’s (1924) individualist social psychology, social 
cognition research has since been driven by an individualistic orientation, as it searches 
within the cognitive processes of individuals for the causes of behaviour (see for a 
critique, Augoustinos & Walker, 1995). Fiske and Taylor (1984) originally porfrayed 
perceivers as ‘cognitive misers’ who are motivated to economise their limited cognitive 
resources (Fiske & Taylor, 1984). More recently, this metaphor has given way to the
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portrayal of perceivers as ‘motivated tacticians’ (Fiske & Taylor, 1991) who ‘invest’ in 
forming detailed, individuated impressions of others in situations in which the 
achievement of own goals is highly (inter-) dependent on others. Otherwise, he or she 
will be inclined to go for the easier option: to fall back on handy stereotypes (see, for 
example, Fiske & Neuberg, 1989; Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Erber & Fiske, 1984). As a 
further elaboration, this argument has been specifically tailored onto the relation 
between power and stereotyping. The ‘ Power-as-Control ’ model (Fiske, 1993; Fiske & 
Dépret, 1996) predicts an asymmetry in impression formation between those who are 
powerful and those who are powerless. The model is composed of two parts: the first 
part suggests that power holders are more likely to stereotype their subordinates since 
they pay less attention to individuating information, because they do not need to, are 
not able to and do not want to do so. In other words, powerful people stereotype both 
by default (not being able to do otherwise) and by design (not wanting to do otherwise). 
As the second part of the model, Fiske and Dépret (1996) have argued that people in 
subordinate positions are motivated to acquire diagnostic individualistic information 
about their superiors and are consequentially less prone to stereotyping. The model is 
based on the assumption that individualistic, stereotype-inconsistent information is the 
most diagnostic kind, as from such information inferences about the person’s 
dispositions and in turn, about his or her behaviour, can be made. “They [the powerless] 
in effect constr uct personality profiles of the person on whom they depend, perhaps in 
an attempt to see the other person (and therefore their own fate) as predictable. If they 
know the other person’s individual personality, they think they know what the other 
person will do and can infer how it will affect themselves” (Fiske, 1993: 625).
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Fiske and Dépret (1996) tested the first part of the model using two paradigms.
In the ‘Springfield Evaluation Paradigm’, participants were either assigned to a high 
power or low power group. In the high power group, participants believed that their 
evaluations of a number of student profiles had real consequences as to whether or not a 
student candidate was hired for an internship programme. The student’s identity was 
either clearly Anglo-American or Latino-American, Half of the descriptions fulfilled a 
Latino stereotype, half of them an Anglo-American stereotype. A think-aloud procedure 
served as the dependent variable. It was found that only in the high-power condition, 
participants paid less attention to information that disconfirmed the stereotype. This was 
interpreted such that “[...] the powerful people’s attention by default potentially 
reinforced their stereotypes” (Fiske & Dépret, 1996). Moreover, attention to stereotype- 
confirming information increased, which, as the authors suggested, confirmed the 
stereotype by design prediction.
In the workgroup paradigm, participants believed that they were participating in 
a study of task allocation in work groups. Participants were either assigned to a group of 
powerful ‘allocators’ or powerless ‘executors’. They were first given self-descriptive 
information about other ‘allocators’, ‘executors’, or neutral ‘observers’ whom they 
expected to meet in the final phase of the experiment. The time spent reading this 
information on a computer screen provided the attention measure. It was found that 
relative to the high-power ‘allocators’, both the low-power executors and the neutral 
observers paid more attention to stereotype-disconfrrming information. However, in the 
condition in which the perceiver was a high power ‘allocator’ and the target a low 
power executor, most attention was paid to stereotype-confirming information. This
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research has shown that power differentials affect cognitive processes, i.e. the amount 
of attention paid to different types of infoimation.
However, on a meta-theoretical level, this theory retains the assumption that 
individualistic information is intrinsically better than group information. Arguably, for a 
Jew in a concentration camp, it may not be most diagnostic to obtain individuating 
information about the KZ commandant, if his actions may primarily be determined by 
the group norms associated to his SS identity. Strategically, it would be more relevant to 
know what he as a commandant thinks about himself, as a Jewish prisoner (for a similar 
argument, see also Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1990). The next section gives a brief 
review of Social Identity Theory, which at its core challenges the very assumption that 
people are only characterised on the basis of personal characteristics.
8.2.2. Social Identity Theory
In a seminal series of experiments, Tajfel and his colleagues (Tajfel, 1972;
Tajfel & Turner, 1979) set out to systematically investigate the ‘minimal’ conditions for 
intergroup discrimination. The robust finding of these studies, now famously referred to 
as the ‘minimal group studies’, was that boys who were on a random basis assigned to 
two gr oups and asked to allocate points to anonymous members of their own group 
(ingr oup) and of the other gr oup (outgroup) - but critically never themselves - 
consistently favoured the ingroup member. This finding implied that mere group 
division, however empty or trivial those groups were, was a sufficient condition for
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intergioup differentiation. To provide a theoretical account for this finding Tajfel (1972) 
argued that adopting a group identity was the only way to impute meaning to this 
otherwise meaningless situation. It was suggested that the differentiation effect in this 
minimal intergroup scenario reflected a competition for a positive social identity. 
Through social identification with the randomly imposed groups, these categories 
contributed to the participants’ self-concept. Their desire to obtain a positive social 
identity motivated them to achieve a favourable social comparison between the ingroup 
and outgroup.
Most relevant for the present purposes are two key concepts of Social Identity Theory. 
Firstly, Social Identity Theory re-conceptualised the relationship between the individual 
and the group, and offered a new theory of how intergr oup behaviour can emerge fr om 
individual cognition. Central to this theory is the cognitive definition of a social group 
or category. Whereas previously, such as in the social cognition tradition just discussed, 
gr oups were regarded as an aggregate of individuals and individuals were defined in 
terms of their ‘unitary’ personal attributes, Tajfel suggested that people construe 
themselves on different levels. On the ‘subordinate’ personal level, people define 
themselves in terms of personal attributes (e.g. as intelligent, pretty), on the 
intermediate level in terms of their membership of social categories (e.g. as white, 
middle-class, male) or on the superordinate level as a human being. The part of one’s 
self-definition, which is derived fiom the membership of a particular social group, was 
called ‘social identity’. In his own words, Social Identity is “[...] the part of the 
individual’s self concept which derives fiom his or her knowledge of his or her 
membership of a social group (or gr oups) together with the value and emotional
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significance attached to that membership’ (Tajfel, 1978: p.63). From this flows a second 
key concept, specified by the subsequently developed Self Categorisation Theory 
(Turner, Hoggs, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Identity is not seen as a stable 
factor, but as highly flexible depending on the social situation or context. For example, I 
may perceive myself as a professional capacity in one situation, act in accordance with 
the gr oup norms associated with this social identity, and expect to be perceived and 
treated as such by others. However, in another situation, another Social Identity, say, 
gender, or Manchester United supporter becomes relevant which may then influence my 
behaviour. An important implication of the concept of Social Identity, not only for our 
understanding of group processes, but also for our understanding of the self, is that 
groups cannot be divorced from, or reduced to individuals.
8.2.2.1. A Social Identity Theory perspective on power
As noted earlier, the Social Identity approach has -  despite its centr al status in 
the study of intergroup behaviour - largely failed to consider power. This neglect was 
first recognised by Ng (1980, 1982) who addressed the role of power for the instigation 
of discrimination. He pointed out that for gr oup members to overtly express their 
ingroup favouritism in action, they must be in a position to do so independent of 
possible objections of others. This necessitates taking the power relation between the 
two groups into account. For the powerful group it is possible to translate ethnocentric 
tendencies into action without having to fear resistance or subsequent retaliation. For 
the powerless, on the other hand, the overt expression of discrimination may not be
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possible, however str ongly they may hold negatives views of the outgroup, because for 
them, subsequent retaliation by a more powerfirl outgroup poses a serious threat.
Sachdev & Bourhis (1985) investigated the effect of power on overt expression 
of group differentiation using the classic minimal group paradigm. Whilst the original 
design could be regarded as implicitly involving equal bilateral power relations, in this 
study, levels of power (from 0%, over 30%, 50%, 70% to 100%) and levels of gr oup 
membership salience were systematically manipulated. The authors reported that 
dominant group members used more discriminatory strategies on the Tajfel allocation 
matrices than subordinate group members, and dominant group members also felt more 
comfortable than subordinates. This result suggests that power constitute an important 
condition for group discrimination, as without power, social categorisation does not 
lead to this differentiation effect.
How do people attain more or less power than others? Although often left 
implicit, Social Identity Theory predicts that relative group power may be flexible, 
varying as a function of the comparative context. It entails a view of power as a social 
phenomenon that is located in the relation between different groups and group 
members. One can think of the relation between different social gi'oups within a larger 
context (e.g. society) as being akin to the positioning within a co-ordinate system in 
which social groups are in the process of social comparison. Power differentials (or 
else, power equality) emerge from social comparison between, say, group A and B at a 
particular moment in time. If, for example, social comparison established that gi'oup A 
is more powerful than gr oup B, then to the extent to which group membership to groups
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A or B are ‘salient’ in a particular social context, any member of group A (irrespective 
of his or her personal attributes, or memberships to other groups) will be more powerful 
than any member of group B. However, this does not imply that the power of gr oup A is 
absolute. Let us compare gr oup A with another gr oup C on the same or any other 
relevant social dimension. At the same moment in history, group C may now emerge as 
more powerful. In this situation, then, any member of group C will be more powerful 
than any member of group A.
This view implies that someone’s self-perception as either powerful or 
powerless cannot be totally absolute and general, but it must be relative and relates to 
specific and direct comparisons with some other agent. It furlher implies that power is 
not stable and intra-psychic, but located in the relation between people or groups of 
people and it is to some degree flexible. More specifically, someone’s degree of power 
should be flexible in as much as he or she either defines him or herself in terms of his or 
her personal identity or in terms of any of the social identities (SIi, SI2, SI3... .Six} that 
form part of his or her self, crossed with the number of possible comparison groups.
In real life, this flexibility, however, will be constrained by parameters of the 
social structure that renders some social groups simply more often ‘salient’ than others. 
Let us illustrate what was said before with an admittedly somewhat stereotypical 
example. Up until the mid 1920s, a male Jewish banker in Germany may have held 
considerable power over others in various different ways. In his identity as a banker, he 
would have had control over his employees, clients or applicants for a credit. In that 
time, as a man, father and husband, he may have had some power over his wife and 
children. He could have been a member of different societies, which may or may not
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have given him power in particular situations. However, when the Nazis came to power, 
many of these social gr oups that formed part of his identity became less relevant. What 
started to count as the only relevant social category, what became ‘salient’ within the 
social context of the Third Reich, was his identity as a Jew. Even if we attributed to him 
‘a need of power’ or an ‘authoritarian personality’, such an individualistic striving for 
power could not counteract his poweriessness derived from his group membership.
A concept of power derived from social identity theory therefore implies that power 
differentials are at the same time rooted in socio-structural differences between groups 
and present in specific interactions between individuals.
In this way, the Social Identity account of power is more one of situational 
power and does not accommodate dispositional dominance orientation (i.e. power 
associated with personal characteristics). Even if such a conceptualisation of power may 
be incomplete, it is a suitable tool to address questions of intergroup relations. In this 
context, group power may be the critical source of power differentials. As Haslam 
(2001) pointed out, the difference between personal and group power is that power on 
the personal level caimot work for anybody else than this person. On the group level, 
however, power can act in the service of the interest of peers, and is thus more likely to 
affect social change. Moreover, power differentials are seen as dynamic processes, 
which contrasts the static view of power posited by the social cognition paradigm or 
other individualistic accounts.
Taking the argument that power enables enactment of discrimination further, 
Reicher and Levine (1994, 1998) pointed out that for one group to impose its views on 
another group depends upon the ability to identify and hence make accountable
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outgi’oup members who oppose ingroup views. The authors predicted that when faced 
with a more powerful outgroup to whom they are visible and individually identifiable, 
ingi'oup members should decrease their expression of behaviours that express ingroup 
identity but are unacceptable for outgroup members. By contrast, identifiability amongst 
ingroup members should have a rather different impact, since it will empower them by 
increasing the possibility of mutual support. It will therefore facilitate full expression of 
ingroup norms. In one study (Reicher & Levine, 1994) that investigated these 
predictions, science students were recruited to participate in a study allegedly aimed at 
exploring their attitudes to work and leisiue. Either their group identity as ‘students’ or 
as ‘scientists’ were stressed. This was crossed with a ‘visibility’ manipulation; so that 
each half of the ‘students’ and ‘scientists’ were made identifiable to a powerful 
outgroup (members of staff) whilst the other half knew that their individual names 
could not be tr aced. Before an alleged group discussion, participants were asked to 
complete a questionnaire that comprised ‘punishable’ items (assessing their academic 
commitment) and ‘unpunishable’ (their views on the controversial topic of animal 
experimentation) items.
Whilst it was assumed that the scientist norm values high academic commitment 
and the benefit of experimentation, a student norm implies a more ‘laid back’ attitude 
towards transgressions, such as copying essays, as well as humane values. As predicted, 
to the extent that participants in the ‘student’ condition were anonymous to the powerful 
staff, they admitted more freely to transgressions on the ‘punishable items’ than when 
they believed themselves to be ‘visible’, and hence identifiable, to staff. The scientists’ 
responses, on the other hand, varied little over the visibility conditions, as their ingroup
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norni was already close to that of the outgroup and hence did not need adjustment in 
expression in the face of possible accountability.
As most research within the social identity ti'adition, the study did not explicitly 
investigate the cognitive processes underlying participants’ responses.
However, implicitly, the results of the study were also indicative for the psychological 
processes underlying their strategy to either express or suppress ingioup norms. Firstly, 
the powerless students must have had some ‘cultural knowledge’ of the differing group 
norms and values towards ‘work ethics’. This involves contrasting ‘our beliefs’ (e.g. 
“It’s okay to copy a friend’s responses in an exam”) from ‘their beliefs’ (e.g “They 
think it is unacceptable to cheat during an exam”). Furthermore, students may have 
reasoned that “if they, i.e. the powerful outgioup, believe [cheating] is negative and if 
they know that I do [cheat], they will punish me for this”. The students in the visibility 
condition must therefore have been aware of the likely mental attitude of powerful 
outgi'oup members. Not expressing their ingroup beliefs seiwed as a strategy to avoid 
possible punishment.
8.2.3. Current research: towards a reconciliation between a social identity 
approach and consideration of cognitive processes
Recently, a number of researchers have begun to work towards reconciliation 
between the North American Social Cognition tradition and the European Social 
Identity/ Self Categorisation approaches. As outlined in the previous section, on a meta- 
theoretical level, the Social Identity account criticises the assumption of a unitaiy self.
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solely defined on the basis of individualistic characteristics. Instead, at the heart of 
Social Identity Theory is the proposal of a multi-levelled concept of the self. This 
challenges two assumptions of the social cognition paradigm with respect to the relation 
between power and social cognition.
1. Only under the assumption of a unitary self does it make sense to argue that 
individualistic, stereotype-inconsistent information is in all circumstances most 
diagnostic in understanding the powerful/ powerless other and in predicting his or her 
actions.
2. Remember that the ‘power-as-control’ model proposed that the powerful stereotype 
their subordinates both by default and by design. Researchers within the Social Identity 
tradition have criticised the stereotype by default argument, i.e. the suggestion that 
selective attention to categorical information were primarily in the service of saving 
limited attention resources (e.g. Oakes & Haslam, 2001; Spears, Haslam & Jansen,
1999; Spears & Haslam, 1997). Instead, and corresponding with Fiske’s stereotype by 
design argument^ it has been argued that the driving force behind social stereotyping 
and prejudice may consist of the attempt to perpetuate and justify existing power 
positions.
For example, Fiske (1993) reported the case of Ann Hopkins, a successful 
manager at Price Waterhouse, to illustrate how the powerful and busy top management 
did not need to, did not want to, and could not attend to individuating characteristics of 
their relatively powerless female employee. Mrs Hopkins went to court, because despite 
her impressive performance, she was denied partnership on the grounds of being ‘not 
feminine enough’. In Fiske’s view, the outcome was the result of the busy managers’
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cognitive overload. Challenging this inteipretation, Oakes et al (1994, cf. Haslam,
2001) argued that this outcome may have been the result of rather different processes. 
Rather than reflecting that the managers ‘could not care less’, their discrimination might 
have instead been the result that they ‘couldn’t care more’; an intergroup strategy which 
served the purpose of maintaining women’s low status in the company.
In response to these criticisms, more recent work by Fiske and others (e.g. Fiske, 
1998, Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2001; Georgesen & Harris, 2000) has placed 
more emphasis on the argument that the powerful stereotype by design, in other words, 
as a motivational strategy. For example, Rodiiguez-Bailon, Moya and Yzerbyt (2000) 
argued that if the powerful seek to maintain and justify their position, they should pay 
particular attention to negative stereotype-consistent information about their 
subordinates as this served the justification of one’s own position (independent of how 
legitimate or illegitimate this may be). Ellemers, van Rijswijk, Bruins, and De Gilder 
(1998) investigated how subordinates explained their superiors’ power usage in a stock- 
tiading task. It was found that fr equent power usage by an outgi'oup member was more 
often attiibuted to the superior’s group membership, whilst frequent power use of an 
ingroup member was ‘explained away’ by external circumstances. As a consequence of 
these discrepant attiibutions, the authors reported decreased co-operation on the part of 
the subordinates in the outgroup-condition, whereas subordinates remained committed 
to the ingroup superior. As far as we are aware, this research is exceptional in 
considering how group constellations affected cognitive attribution processes that
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influenced subsequent social interaction -  the willingness to further co-operate with 
powerful others versus attempts to challenge such power usage.
However, taken together, the work presented so far did not actually investigate 
Theory of Mind deployment as such. The work concentiated on impression fonnation, 
as it was argued that by forming a detailed impression about the other, one can 
anticipate others’ future actions and make plans accordingly (Fiske & Depret, 1996; 
Rodiiguez-Bailon et al., 2000). But is a general impression of the other person 
sufficient? For example, if you find yourself in a dark alleyway, and see a figure 
stretching out his hands, more crucial than having a general impression about the other 
may be to have an understanding of his specific intentions towards you. Is he in need, 
asking you for help, or is he pretending to be in need and really seeks to maliciously rob 
or attack you?
Isolated studies coming from different backgrounds in social psychology, whilst 
not explicitly fl amed within the Theory of Mind tradition, have investigated related 
phenomena. Snodgrass (1985,1992) studied the separate and combined effect(s) of 
gender and subordinate role on ‘inteipersonal sensitivity’. She defined high 
interpersonal sensitivity as occumng when two interacting people are accurately tuned 
to one another’s feelings and thoughts. In her original study (Snodgrass, 1985), two 
hypotheses were pitted against each other. A common stereotype suggests that women 
have greater interpersonal sensitivity than men. On the other hand, Snodgrass .reasoned 
that this female advantage might be related to women’s historically subordinate role in 
society, which is often perpetuated in the hierarchy of organisations. Her argument was:
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“This sensitivity is quite variable. An individual experiences inteipersonal sensitivity 
more at times than at others and more in some contexts than others. What causes us to 
be more or less sensitive to other persons? If it were primarily a personal trait or skill, 
there would be more consistency in this ability. However, because there seems to be 
great variability, even within individuals, this ability must be affected by the social 
context" (Snodgrass, 1985: p. 146). Snodgrass also recognised the necessity to 
acknowledge the interactional character of social perception. She randomly assigned 
one member of an interacting dyad to a teacher (leader) and the other one to the student 
(subordinate) role and engaged them in a series of tasks. Between each task, both 
members were asked to fill in questionnaires, which involved ratings of how they felt 
about themselves (e.g. “I was a good teacher”), and how they thought the partner felt 
about himself and the participant (e.g. “She felt V she was the dominant one”). 
Snodgrass (1985) reported that -  contrary to the common stereotype -  women were no 
more intuitive to the thoughts and feelings of their partners than men. By contrast, her 
results lent strong support for the subordinate role explanation for the female advantage 
as those in a subordinate role, regardless of their gender, were more sensitive to the 
feelings of the dominant dyad member.
Whereas the impression formation research discussed beforehand was only 
concerned with perceptions of the kind of “I think the powerful or powerless is [x]”, the 
advantage of Snodgrass’ argument is that she considers more complex and recursive 
mental state inferences, such as:“I think the powerful or powerless thinks s/he is” and “I 
think the powerful/ less thinks I am”. Whereas Snodgrass required her participants to
266
Chapter 8
make Theory of Mind inferences, the social perceptions measured in the impression 
formation research did not. Knowing whether a powerful person is reflectively aware of 
his or her position, and knowing what he or she thinks about oneself, may be more 
diagnostic than simply forming one’s own impression about the other.
A further research avenue that implicitly studied Theory of Mind usage can be traced in 
the notion of ‘stereotype threat’, coined by Steele and his colleagues (1999, 1992). 
‘Stereotype threat’ describes “the threat of being viewed through the lens of a negative 
stereotype, or the fear of doing something that would inadvertently confirm that 
stereotype” (Steele, 1999: p. 3). This requires one to take the mental perspective of an 
outgroup member. In other words, the threat does not emerge because of a certain 
performance (how negative it may be) per se, but because of the inference of how own 
actions may be perceived by -arguably more powerful -  white others. To support their 
claim that a ‘sociological’ construct, such as stereotype threat, may indeed influence 
something as ‘individualistic’ as intelligence, Steele and Aronson (1995) conducted a 
series of experiments. One experiment involved black and white Stanford 
Undergraduates to complete a highly advanced verbal test. Although the gioups were 
statistically matched in tenns of their level of abilities, the black students performed 
dramatically worse than the white students. In order to rule out the possibility that some 
other factor, such as motivation, may have hampered the black students’ perfoimance, a 
second condition was added. Here, the task was explicitly presented as measuring ‘how 
certain problems are generally solved’, and it was stressed that intellectual ability was 
not at issue. Now the black students performed just as well as the white students. The
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authors suggested that in the first condition, the poorer performance of the black 
students might have been the result of the difficult test triggering awareness of a 
negative ingioup stereotype, i.e. as to be likely seen by others as having limited 
intellectual ability. The black students seemed to have succumbed under the weight of a 
negative outgi'oup view of oneself. As an infoi'mant stated in Maya Angelou’s television 
progiamme ‘Race in Britain’: “I am black, because people see me as black and nothing 
else”. In another study in which preferences in sport and music were assessed just prior 
to the difficult test, black students reported less interest in things commonly viewed as 
African-American (e.g. jazz, hip hop, basketball), whilst when the test was supposedly 
umelated to intellectual ability, they strongly manifested typical African-American 
interests. It appeared, that at the brink of taking a difficult test, the black students were 
stiategic in their attempt to impute in powerful others the belief that they differed 
individually from a negative ingioup stereotype.
The theoretical framework and empirical approach we put forward in the next 
section were derived from marrying the process perspective of the Social Identity/ Self 
Categorisation Theory traditions that account for contextualised variability of social 
positions with considerations of mentalistic inferencing processes. This provides an 
alternative, and as we argue, more complete account of intergroup processes than the 
one suggested by the social cognition tradition.
In summary, different research avenues in social psychology lent support to our 
intuitive impression from real-life anecdotes that social-contextual variables may
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influence cognitive processes that are part of or related to Theory of Mind processes. 
These different accounts addressed part of the phenomenon that interest us. In the next 
section we put forward a theoretical framework that was derived from marrying the 
process perspective of the Social Identity/ Self Categorisation traditions with 
considerations of mental inferencing processes to study how Theory of Mind is used in 
practice in different social conditions.
8.3. Power and intergroup behaviour from  a  contextualised
PERSPECTIVE o n  THEORY OF MIND IN PRACTICE
Our proposal shall be specified as we address three questions. Firstly, who is the 
mindreader? Secondly, why might instigation of Theory of Mind depend on the social 
context? And thirdly, how are differences in Theory of Mind usage manifested?
8.3.1. Who is the mindreader?
Following the Social identity Theory approach, the mindreader is seen as 
someone whose self is multi-dimensional, composed of a personal and several social 
identities. His or her power is at least paitially derived from and related to the social 
group(s) he or she belongs to. The extent to which the mindreader is relatively powerful 
or powerless is considered to be variable as a function of the social context, so that one 
and the same person can be powerful in one situation, vis-à-vis person A, but powerless 
in another situation, vis-à-vis another person B.
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8.3.2. Why should theory of mind usage be affected by social conditions?
A matter o f relevance?
Our first argument is that Theory of Mind deployment may be dependent upon 
the degree to which the other is perceived as relevant to oneself. Two different types of 
relevance (which in real life can be combined in varying degiees) come to mind:
Relevance in the first sense refers to the genuine desire to understand the other, 
or, as it is often expressed colloquially: a concern with ‘what is going on in someone’s 
mind’. This may be typical for all sorts of close interpersonal relations.
However, in addition, we consider relevance in the second sense: when one is not 
necessarily directly concerned with others’ thoughts and feelings, but with the 
behaviour that results from these mental states. By coining the notion of ‘Machiavellian 
Intelligence’, the primatologists Byrne and Whiten (1988) emphasized the strategic 
benefit of having (or using) a Theory of Mind: the ability to forecast and manipulate 
other’s behaviour, and in anticipation of others’ action, to adjust one’s own behaviour.
We have seen that in a relation to others, the degree to which one person can act 
upon his or her own desires is consti ained by the degi ee of power and resulting 
dependence versus independence fi’om the other. The actions of the powerless are not 
only governed by their own wishes, but also directed by the wishes of the powerful. 
Knowing what the powerful think, want or do not want would provide a strategic 
benefit, as such knowledge can be used instrumentally for the adjustment of one’s own 
actions and thus ultimately for the avoidance of punishment. It was suggested that the 
participants’ in Reicher and Levine’s (1995) study, as well as the black students in
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Steele and Aronson’s studies might have used Theory of Mind for such strategic 
purposes.
By contrast, the powerful can act upon their own will (and based upon their 
own, often hegemonic belief system) and can also make the powerless act upon their 
will (even where this might oppose the will, beliefs or belief system of the other). From 
the vantage point of the powerful, understanding the mind of the powerless is less 
relevant, because what they think or feel can by definition not constrain the 
achievement of their own goals. This idea is implicit in Essed’s (1991) comment: 
“Whitecentrism prevents whites, in everyday life, from being systematically confronted 
with the way blacks perceive reality, with what they feel, and with what their purposes 
in life are” (p. 194).
By considering some of the intrinsic properties of mental states, two further 
reasons for the powerful not to deploy Theory of Mind more than necessary are 
suggested.
Self-reflexivity leads to the acknowledgement o f own beliefs (belief systems) as only a 
representation of reality (but not reality as such).
Not taking the mental perspective of the powerless allows the powerful to 
maintain their own beliefs, especially beliefs that are part of a (hegemonic) belief 
system. On the other hand, taking the other’s mental perspective may necessitate^ 
dominant group members acknowledging that their own beliefs of reality may only be a 
representation of reality, and not reality as such. As was discussed in Chapter 1, beliefs 
-  in contrast to transparent states - have the properly of ‘referential opacity’. For
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example, if I believe ‘Bill Clinton is the ciment president of the United states’, my 
belief can be tine even if it does not match reality (George W. Bush is the cuiTent 
president of the United states) and you do not share it. To acknowledge this property of 
‘my belief requires self-reflexivity (I believe that ‘I believe’ [x]). Perhaps people in a 
powerful position may not wish to confront this property of their beliefs and thus do not 
engage in such reflective awareness. This may be the case particularly where cultural 
beliefs are concerned that do not only have epistemic but also normative character (see 
Bruner, 1993). In other words, cultural beliefs do not only describe states in the world, 
but also prescribe how they should be. If powerful people hold a hegemonic belief 
system, they may not be interested in alternatives that may provoke social change.
We do not make any predictions as to whether or not people in a powerless 
position may be more intrinsically motivated to acknowledge alternative beliefs. 
However, the notion o f‘double consciousness’ (Solomos, 1989) suggests that the 
powerless may be forced to view the world through two different lenses: through their 
own eyes and through the eyes of the powerful.
Taking the mental perspective o f the other influences the view o f oneself and own 
behaviour towards them.
An additional reason for the powerful may not to take the mental perspective of 
the powerless may be that they wish to maintain a ‘positive distinctiveness’ that Social 
Identity Theoiy suggests to be the cential force behind differentiation (including 
discrimination) processes. Taking the independent mental perspective of the powerless 
may lead one to modify the view of oneself. Inferences of how someone sees you also
272
Chapter 8
tells you also something about who you are, and the impact you have on (the life of) 
others. In other words, seeing the world fr om the perspective of others could force you 
to reconsider your own actions and justifications for those. It may affect changes of 
what you believe and want to do. The inverse of the same argument is suggested by 
Kieman (1996):“By thinking the worst of their subjects they [the colonisers] avoided 
having to think badly of themselves” (p. 36). Hence, it is suggested that the powerful 
may not be motivated to aclcnowledge alternative perspectives of reality because by 
doing so, they may undermine the legitimacy of their own goals and actions (which 
often have negative consequences for the powerless) and could possibly force them to 
reconsider their own actions.
It is important to keep in mind that we do not expect the powerful (notably 
where power is derived fr om gi'oup membership) to show an across-the-board 
unawareness of others’ mental states, as would a global deficit or personality style 
suggest. As Snodrass (1985) has pointed out and anecdotes remind us, it is important to 
account for considerable variability to which people are sensitive or insensitive to 
others’ states of the mind. The reported phenomenon that several SS commandants, as 
ruthlessly and brutally they may have behaved during their day’s work, yet returned to 




8.3.3. How is differential theory of mind usage manifested?
We shall postpone concrete predictions until the end of Chapter 9, when we will 
have presented a taxonomy of differential Theory of Mind usage, which considers the 
components of mental state inferences. For now, it shall suffice to speculate about two 
broad foims of how differential Theory of Mind usage could be manifested.
1. The powerful may not use Theory of Mind in order to account for the behaviour of 
the powerless.
This most strong prediction, although perhaps involved in those extr eme situations, 
were the other was dehumanised, seems to be unlikely to apply to less severe situations. 
However, a relative lack of Theory of Mind usage could be expressed in terms of a 
deontic assessment than mentalistic interpretations of behavioui*. Explaining someone’s 
actions in tenns of what s/he should or should not have done does not necessarily entail 
mental perspective taking, since such an inteipretation can be made from one’s own 
mental perspective.
2. Inaccuracies in Theory of Mind.
a. A first form of inaccuracies could consist of misperceiving different mental attitudes, 
such as mistaking an embarrassed smile for genuine agreement.
b. Another variant could consist of explaining others’ behaviour formally by imputing 
mental states but nonetheless retaining one’s own mental perspective. This may include 
ignoring that others have a different mental perspective because of different information 
access or different (cultural) value systems, or to focus on the outcome of an event and 
not the processes leading up to it.
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8,4. Ov e r v ie w  of stu d y  5
The framework sketched out above has motivated two studies, which are 
presented in the remainder of this thesis. Study 5 was an exploratory ethnographic 
interview study that studied how ordinary adults use Theory of Mind in the account of 
different social experiences and across different social relations. In Study 6 we sought 
to investigate the effect of power on theory of mind usage experimentally. In doing so, 
we imported an existing theory of mind paradigm, the ‘Reading the Mind in the Eyes 
Task’ (Baron-Cohen et al. 2001) to a work group scenario in which ordinary students 
were assigned to either the role of powerful supervisors or powerless workers. The 
remainder of this chapter, however, concentrates on an oveiview of Study 5, with full 
details about the development of a new methodology presented in Chapters 9 and the 
results of the analysis in Chapter 10.
Although we started off with a consideration of extreme expressions of 
discrimination, the argument, as outlined in the previous section, is of more general 
nature so that we would expect less extieme power differentials also to modulate 
Theory of Mind usage. One area in which we expected to find ‘natural’ power 
differentials in contemporary Britain are race relations. The social actions in which 
power is instigated are foims of racism and discrimination.
In civil rights law, discrimination is defined as the unfavourable or unfair 
treatment of a person or class of persons in comparison to others who are not members 
of the protected class because of, for example, race, gender, religion, age, or physical or
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mental handicap (The Office of Equal Employment Opportunity, 2002). Racism or 
racial discrimination presents the situation in which people are tieated differently than 
others because they are members of a specific race.
There is substantial evidence that in contemporary Britain, members of ethnic 
minority groups still experience racism and discrimination in their every-day life (e.g. 
Solomos, 1989), although fomis, and hence definitions of racism, have undergone 
substantial change. Whereas traditional definitions (e.g. Jones, 1972) stressed 
essentialist beliefs in the superiority of one’s own race over another one, contemporary 
racism may be less about beliefs in the biological inferiority of particular groups and 
more about certain groups’ transgression from beliefs about cultural values 
(Augustinous & Reynolds, 2001).
However, despite a substantial amount of research on stereotypes, prejudice, and 
attitudes on ethnic minority groups, studies that look at race relations fr om the 
perspective of the subordinate groups concerned are in fact relatively rare. One 
exception is a comparative study by Essed (1991), which consisted of in-depth 
inteiviews with black women in the Netherlands and North America. Essed has 
emphasised the need to recognise how racism is transmitted in apparently ‘noimal’ 
routine practices that she called ‘everyday racism’. Her study suggested that racial 
conflict is maintained through three central processes. The first is marginalisation, a 
form of oppression that includes whitecentrism (i.e. Whites are seen as the normative 
group), cognitive detachment and obstacles impeding equal participation. The second 
major process is containment, which includes practices such as the denial of racism, the 
overemphasis on difference, pationising behaviour, denial of dignity, and intimidation.
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The third process is problematisation that works by legitimising repression, and which 
includes cultural denigi ation and denigration of personality through pathologising non­
white group members.
The main aim of Study 5 was to explore the hypothesised effect of power 
differentials on Theory of Mind usage in naturalistic situations. Arguing from a Social 
Identity perspective on power, as discussed in earlier sections, not only inter-individual 
differences between people in Theory of Mind usage, but moreover intra-individual 
differences across accounts of different relations, were expected. Categories were not 
predefined in the sense that it was not assumed that somebody of say, Nigerian or 
Pakistani background would inevitably be powerless. By contrast, depending upon 
participants’ own constmction of the relationship between self and others across 
different encounters, we expected that race or ethnic origin would not be at issue in all 
encounters and that race would not mean in all social contexts that those who are white 
are powerful and those who are of African or Asian origin would be powerless. Rather, 
it was expected that where race was at issue, this could in some circumstances play a 
role in the definition of power differentials.
8.5. M ethods
8.5.1. Participant recruitment
The study targeted both white British people and people of Affican-Caribbean 
and Asian ethnic backgi'ounds. The project was adveitised in a leaflet which asked:
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“What is it like to live in a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural community?” It was subtitled as 
“a project studying day-to-day experiences in London”. The leaflet explained that we 
aimed to explore the reality behind the notion of a ‘multiculturaT, ‘multi-ethnic’ society 
by gathering and comparing the kind of experiences English people and people from 
other ethnic backgrounds made in their day-to-day lives (see Appendix 8.1.). We were 
interested, for example, in what areas of their daily life (personal, professional) 
informants got in contact with members of their own and other ethnic groups, and in the 
kinds of experiences that participants perceived as emiching, problematic or otherwise. 
It was sketched out that paiticipation would involve going through a number of 
experiences -  mundane encounters as well as encounters subjectively perceived as 
significant. Thus, we hoped to capture a variety of different kinds of experiences, and 
hence possibly different kinds of Theory of Mind usage. Deliberately, no direct 
allusions to issues such as discrimination, racism or eurothocentiism were made.
Leaflets were distributed in various places in London, for instance, cafes, 
bookshops and the Lambeth Council office in Brixton, South London; an area with a 
relatively large Jamaican population. Leaflets were also slipped through letterboxes in 
various areas in London (Brixton, Clapham). In addition, the study was advertised at the 
Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees centre. University College London, Goldsmith 
College, and at the Stephen Lawrence Conference (2000). Using the ‘snowballing- 
technique’, over the course of the study, a number of participants were helpful in 




Each participant was interviewed alone; according to his or her own preference 
either at their homes, in a café or at their work place. All participants gave their consent 
to record the inteiview on audiotape. The inteiwiews were semi-structured, open-ended 
and in large parts non-directive, simulating a natural conversation. The advantage of 
this approach was that it allowed participants to reveal their own priorities.
Diarv form Participants were first asked to fill in a diary form, describing for the past 
three days prior to the interview the person(s) the participant had met, the situation in 
which the encounter took place and what had happened. These notes were intended to 
provide a starting point for the inteiwiew by eliciting accounts of interactions that 
participants may otheiwise have felt were too mundane. However, it became apparent 
that some participants did not take part in the study in a ‘neutral way’. Rather, they 
perceived the interview as a platform for voicing views and experiences that were very 
much at the heart of their own concern. In this light, we felt it would be more 
informative to adapt a relatively non-directional stance, rather than pressing participants 
to go through each encounter of the 3-day diary for the sake of comparability.
Apart from the diary, the inteiview schedule consisted of a list of topics that 
provided a facilitating context for informants to talk about mundane and significant 
experiences. These included, for example: “In what sort of situations do you meet 
English people?” “In what sort of situations do you meet people from different ethnic 
backgrounds?” “Can you think, for example, of your professional [private] life?”
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The interviewer was particularly interested in eliciting narratives about specific 
events, rather than general descriptions and summaries. In order to prompt the 
participant to talk about more concrete experiences, open-ended questions were asked, 
for example: “Can you tell me what happened?” “Would you like to tell me about your 
experience with...?” “What happened to you?” “Can you give me an example?” In 
order to probe for Theory of Mind, ‘Why-questions’ were asked, such as “Why do you 
think did that happen?”, “why did he do/ say that?”, (see for the full interview schedule, 
Appendix 8.2.)
In describing the purpose of the study, as well as throughout the interview, it 
was emphasised that the main interest of the study was to compare and contrast 
informants’ subjective experiences. Taking explicitly a non-judgemental stance, the 
interviewer sought to create an atmosphere in which participants felt their point of 
views to be fully respected. This included conveying the feeling that participants’ 
experiences and accounts were not judged or criticised, that accounts of racism were 
taken seriously rather than questioned and that the interviewer also showed genuine 
interest in apparently mundane or ordinary events (see Essed, 1991). With this attitude 
it was hoped to prevent interviewees from reacting defensively, which could influence 
the way accounts were presented. Interviews lasted between one and three hours.
8.5.3. Participants
Thirteen interviews comprise the material of the present analyses. Interviewees 
came from a variety of different ethnic backgrounds. Eight interviewees were of black
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or Asian ethnicity, five interviewees were white. More specifically, three interviewees 
were African, two Jamaican, one Indo-Caribbean, one Chinese, one Vietnamese, one 
Italian, three English, and one Welsh. Of the black and Asian gr oup, four participants 
(PB4, PB7, PB9, PB 16) were bom and raised in Br itain. At the time of the interview, 
four interviewees were students at University while the others were professionals. Only 
one interviewee did not go through further education. All interviews were transcribed in 
full. (Symbols employed in the interview transcripts are summarised in Appendix 8.3.)
8.5,4. Overview of analysis
The analysis of this interview material will be presented over Chapters 9 and 10. 
The distinct analytical steps comprising the methodology used in this study are 
schematised in Table 8.1. A qualitative and quantitative analyses of the interview 
material comprised four steps.
Step 1: Identification o f narrative themes, narrative episodes and general talk
For each interview transcript, each ‘narrative theme’, ‘episode’, ‘example’, as 
well as ‘general talk’ is chronologically marked. A definition of these terms is given 
below. Each episode, example or general talk was treated as one analytical unit.
Narrative theme - We regard a narTative theme as a statement or utterance that 
expresses a gist or central topic. Following Labov’s paradigmatic structural approach 
(Labov, 1972; Labov & Waletzky, 1967), in our usage a narxative theme can contain
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Table 8.1. Overview of method used to study Theoiy of Mind in narratives
1. Hypotheses Chapter 8
2. Developing a methodology
a. how to track ToM in naturalistic talk?
b. a taxonomy to categorise ToM on the local level




-Dividing interviews into analytical units 
-Reconstr ucting the character of each analytical unit: 
racism or not? Power differentials: self as powerful, 
powerless or ‘neutral’
-Investigating ToM talk for each analytical unit
Chapter 10
4. Results
a. Qualitative results: Comparing ToM usage in 
everyday-situations and ToM usage in accounts 
of experiences with discrimination
b. Quantitative Results:




elements of his ‘coda‘, in that with a theme the perspective can be turned to the present, 
(e.g. T have experienced discrimination all my life’). It may also share similarities to 
Labov’s ‘abstract* as a naixative theme may not be foimulated in one sentence or 
utterance, but in fonn of a short summary of a participant’s experiences, views or 
concerns. As stated before, in some cases, participants approached the interview with 
very specific concerns; for example, they read the question “What are your experiences 
in relation to the notion of a ‘multi-cultiu'al society?” as a platform to communicate 
their experiences with racism, or to describe experiences with a different culture 
through a relationship with someone from a different cultuie. This may have then 
constituted the central naixative theme throughout large parts of the inteiview. Other 
participants approached the interview with a less concrete idea of what to expect. In 
those cases, the interview comprised usually a string of naixative themes. For example, 
the narrative themes of the inteiview with FB7 can be summarised as: ‘my professional 
career*, ‘daily routines: I do live in a multiracial environment*, ‘family background, 
cultural traditions*, ‘there are differences between a white society and black 
experiences*, ‘own maniage ideals*, ‘how religion influences my perception*, 
‘discrimination*.
Narrative episode - Freely following Burke’s (1969) classic method of analysing 
dramatism (see Lucariello, 1990), a naixative episode shall be defined on the basis of 
the elements comprising his famous pentad: an act, scene, agent, agency, and purpose.
In other words, in order to be coded as a naixative episode, the participants will have 
said something about what was done, when or where it was done, who did it, how it was
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done and why. Following Essed (1991), an episode includes not only events the 
participant had personally experienced or witnessed, but also vicarious and reported 
events.
Example - We call ‘example’ incidents in which the participant talked about a 
specific event, albeit in a more summarised way, leaving out infoimation about the time 
or place of the encounter.
General talk - General talk shall be seen as an umbrella term for instances in 
which participants talked, for example, about topics, such as their personal details and 
history, personal habits, cultural practices, preferences, or voiced their opinions about 
different issues. Apart from descriptions, general discussions of issues also involved 
mental state talk. However, in these instances, it is not always possible to tiace back the 
relation between what happened, the explanation and the outcome. Examples also 
include hypothetical scenarios. #
Step 2: Re-constructing the relationship between participant and other(s) and the 
character o f the encounter
A second step consisted of reconstructing the character of each episode, example 
and general talk. We coded the nature of the power relation between participant 
(speaker, S) and others and whether or not the encounter involved an incident of 
discrimination. In the language of quantitative research, this would represent the 
‘independent variable’. By using episodes and not inteiviews as the analytical unit, we
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aimed to explore both inter-individual (between different participants) and intia- 
individual (variances from one account to the next) differences.
Step 3: Tracking theory o f mind usage in each narrative episode and categorisation of 
such theory o f mind usage
In the process of tackling these phenomena, we encountered a number of 
problems: firstly, how can we track Theory of Mind usage in everyday language? And 
secondly, how can we systematically categorise and classify Theory of Mind usage?
It became apparent that neither the developmental Theory of Mind literature nor the 
diverse stiands in social psychology reviewed before could provide adequate answers. 
It was therefore required to develop a method that would allow us to track Theory of 
Mind usage in everyday language and to establish a taxonomy that differentiates 
between different ‘types’ of Theory of Mind usage and distinguishes mentalistic from 
other kinds of ‘non-mentalistic’ explanations.
Step 4: assessing differential Theory o f Mind usage
As the ‘dependent variable’, we were interested in how people explained and 
inteipreted their experiences in each episode. A forth step consists of a qualitative 
analysis in which we sought to relate different forms of situated Theoiy of Mind usage 
to different Idnds of experiences -  those that involved discrimination or dealt with the 




Step 5: comparing frequencies o f different types of Theory of Mind usage.
Based on the qualitative analysis of distinct patterns of Theory of Mind usage, in 
a final step we were then in a position to address questions of fiequencies. How often 
did participants infer others’ independent mental perspective, or infened that others 
took an independent mental perspective of either, recursively, the participant him or 
herself or other third parties? How often and in what conditions were participants 
unaware of others’ independent mental perspective or infened that others were unaware 
or denied oneself (or a third party) an independent mental perspective?
In the next chapter, we will be concerned with step 3, and present a method that 
enables us to tiack and categorise Theory of Mind usage in naturalistic language.
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A  M eth o d  F o r  Tr a c k in g  a n d  Ca t e g o r isin g  t h e o r y  of 
M in d  in  N a t u r a l ist ic  La n g u a g e
9.1. Introduction
Studying Theory of Mind deployment in narratives poses different challenges 
than studying Theory of Mind in direct behavioui". In order to investigate whether and 
how Theory of Mind deployment might vary as a function of social relationships, we 
saw ourselves faced with an immediate problem. How can we track Theory of Mind 
usage in everyday language and how can we categorise and quantify different ‘types’ of 
Theory of Mind usage and contrast those from other kinds of inteipretations?
This enteiprise involved three steps. As a first step, we propose a method that 
enables us to frack Theory Mind usage in naiTative language. The second step consists 
of a taxonomy that allows us to categorise different types of mentalistic and non- 
mentalistic explanations on the local level; or in other words, within the context of 
individual utterances. Since our main interest was to compare differential Theory of 
Mind usage across different kinds of experiences, we then add a third step in which we 
take together and analyse all explanations found in the account of one experience, or 
narrative episode, as we call it.
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9.2. H ow  TO TRACK THEORY OF MIND USAGE IN EVERYDAY TALK?
Mental representations and mentalistic inferences are covert and need to be 
inferred. When we talk about our encounters and experiences, they become public in the 
process of explaining, interpreting and justifying what happened. Before going ahead, it 
is therefore necessary to first discuss what characteristic naiTatives, or any kind of 
everyday talk for that matter, present. Let us first consider the ‘simpler’ case of reading 
the mind of others in direct interactions. In this situation we have two parties that 
Whiten and Pemer (1991) termed the mindreader and the target individual (see Figure 
9.1a).
In contiast to direct interactions, naiTatives require one to deal with two 
landscapes: the one ‘inside’ the story in which the mindreader is the narrator (speaker, 
self) and related to one or several other agents. This landscape inside the story is of 
primaiy interest to us. How and to what extent did the narrator use Theory of Mind in 
order to explain and interpret others’ and his own actions across separate encounters? 
However, superimposed is a second landscape, the present one, in which the nanator 
(self) is communicating with the interviewer (see Figure 9.1.b).
As noted in Chapter 1, studies of pragmatic verbal (as well as non-verbal) 
communication suggest that an essential feature of human communication is the 
expression and recognition of intentions (Grice, 1957; 1969; Sperber & Wilson, 1986,
2002). In other words, communication is seen as a collaborative effort in which speaker
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Figure 9.1. The dyadic relation between mindreader and target in behaviour, versus the 
tiiadic relations between mindreader, target and interlocutor/ intemewer in 
communication
a) Behaviour
Mindreader ► Target individual(s)
b) Communication
Target or agent(s) Interlocutor(s)
(inside the story, in the past tense) (e.g. inteiwiewer, analyst.





and listener(s) share certain assumptions, such as the maxims of truthfulness and 
relevance. The benefit is great and includes the fact that the speaker does not need to 
spell out every minute detail, which would otheiwise lead to lengthy repetitions. For 
example, having introduced a chair once, the speaker can confidently assume that the 
listener will understand what he means when refening to ‘it’. Something similar can be 
expected for speakers’ mentalistic inferences and explanations; i.e. that they are not 
always explicitly spelled out, but remain at times implicit and need to be infeiTed fiom 
the listener.
For analysts, having to account for this second landscape and this characteristic 
feature of communication is more than unwelcome, as it renders the task of tracking of 
Theory of Mind in language more difficult. In fact, it is due to this feature of 
communication that we have to introduce a method of tracldng ToM in language, rather 
than being able to just ‘pick up’ mentalistic inferences fiom the text. Developmental 
research studying Theory of Mind in language has typically used mental state terms as 
an indicator for an emerging understanding of mental states, such as ‘want’, ‘think’, 
‘laiow’, ‘hope’ and so forth (Bartsch & Wellman, 1988; Dunn & Brown, 1993; Shatz, 
1994; Tager-Flusber, 1992). This research has found, for example, that children tend to 
use volitional mental state terms (desire, wanting) a little earlier in their language than 
they use epistemic mental state teims (believing, knowing). However, as will be shown 
in more detail below, using mental state terms as markers bears a number of problems if 
one wants to capture true Theory of Mind usage. On the one hand, there is a danger of 
including instances in which mental state teims are used but do not denote that the 
speaker truly deployed representational Theory of Mind. Moreoever, because of the
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nature of the communication landscape, Theory of Mind usage can be hidden in the text 
without being denoted by a mental state teiin. If mental state terms were used as the 
sole criterion for tracking theory of mind usage, such instances of implicit Theory of 
Mind would be missed. How then, can we decide whether or not a specific utterance 
involves true Theory of Mind usage? On the basis of the argument just discussed, we 
foimulated the following test rule:
A test rule
Any utterance will be counted as reflecting deployment of a representational 
Theory of Mind if and only if
1) it explicitly involves a mental state teim related to a second or third person referent 
or can be foimally transformed as to reflect the recursive attribution of a mental 
state to self or other and if
2) without the inference that the speaker attributed a mental state to another person the 
utterance can not be understood as meaningful.
By the same token, any utterance that does involve a mental state term but in which this 
mental state teim does not add to the meaningful understanding of the utterance will not 
be counted as Theory of Mind.
We have systematically applied this test lule to a part of the interview material. 
This process, in conjunction with considerations of previous arguments, resulted in the 
elaboration of distinct categories of implicit Theory of Mind usage, as well as in a list of 
non-mentalistic types of explanations or interpretations. Table 9.1 summarises different
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Table 9.1, Instances in which speakers’ usage of mental state terms does note evidence 
representational ToM, explicit mental and public representations and implicit ToM 
usage
No-ToM/ ToM Category Example
Instances in 
which speakers’ 
usage of mental 




First order intentionality "1 want to go to the 
cinema”




“He knows some people 




Mental representations using 
second or third person mental 
state verbs
“The girl thought she saw 
the pink frog”




ToM in pragmatic 
language
Mentalistic traits and stereotypes “He is narrow-minded”
Non-literal speech: jokes, lies 
and irony
“It was just a joke." 
“She said 1 was lying"
Mental states implied in verbs, 
adjectives and expressions
“He shoved her”
“He treats me as if...” 
“Taking serious “
Mental state inferences indicated 
in ‘pronoun reversal’
“You can’t do that 
because you’re black.” (= 
they think 1 can’t do that 
because I’m black)
Mental state inferences indicated 
in grammatical sentence 
constructions
“So that” -> intention 
“In order to” -> intention 
“As if’-> pretence
Implicatures in the local the 
sentence context
“People are good at 
hiding [their true thoughts 
and feelings]”
Implicatures in the global context 
of a narrative episode
“‘it’s a strange thing 
here." (= they think it’s a 
strange thing here)
Descriptions of behaviour as acts 
of ostensive-inferential 
communication
....and he (teacher) 
slapped him (brother) in 
the face.
(= Teacher did not 
understand why brother 
was still in the corridor)
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types of instances in which a mental state teim is used but does not denote usage of 
Theory of Mind, as well as the opposite case of implicit Theory of Mind -  where we as 
readers can infer that the speaker used Theory of Mind even without deploying a mental 
state term. In subsequent sections these categories are explained in more detail.
9.2.1. Speakers’ usage of mental state terms without deployment of ToM
9.2. LL First order intentionality
As the philosopher Dennett (1987) has convincingly argued (see Table 9.2.), 
there is a fundamental difference between own beliefs and infeiTed beliefs of others. 
Own beliefs (or by the same token own desires or any other mental states) can be 
computed on the level of first order intentionality. In utterances, they are expressed, for 
example as: “I believe it is cold outside”, “I don’t want to go out”, “I hope you come to 
visit me this evening” etc. These expressions manifest intentionality or ‘aboutness’, my 
mental attitude(s) about something or someone. However, crucially, they do not require 
representational Theory of Mind. By contrast, infeiTed beliefs of others (my belief 
embedding someone else’s belief) do. Consider the sentences (la) and (lb) in Example
9.1. which - on the surface - look very similar.
Example 9.1.
(la) “ I believe it is raining.”
(lb) “He believes it is raining.”
(Ic) “I believe he believes it is raining.”
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Table 9.2. Relation between ‘levels of intentionality’ and Theory of Mind.
Levels of intentionality 
(Dennett, 1987)
Levels of Theory of Mind Example
1®* order intentionality 
2"  ^order intentionality 
3'"'^  order intentionality
x-order intentionality
0-order Theory of mind 
order Theory of mind 
2"^  order Theory of mind
(x-1 ) order theory of mind
1 believe [...]
1 believe he believes [...] 
1 believe he thinks she 
thinks [..,]
Computationally, however, they are of quite different complexity. The first 
sentence merely describes my own mental attitude towards something, whereas the 
second one, which can be formally tiansfbrmed into (Ic), describes my attitude about 
someone else’s attitude about something, in other words, a belief that is recursively 
embedded in another belief. Hence, by applying our test rule we find that only sentences 
lb and Ic, but not the one in la, involve Theory of Mind. Therefore, participants’ 
utterances about their own mental states, which although they involve a linguistic 
mental state marker can be understood without assuming that s/he made a mental state 
inference, are excluded as a first class of ‘false positives’.
The exceptions are, of course, utterances revealing a reflective awareness of 
own beliefs (my belief about my belief or desire) either in the present or the past. 
Examples for such self-reflective utterances are “I thought there were Smaities in the 
box but now I know there’s just a pencil inside”, or “I want to think that I can take a day 
off’. Application of the test rule shows that these utterances can only be understood by 




9.2.2. Speakers’ explicit representational Theory of Mind: mental and public 
representations
Every utterance that uses a mental state teim in relation to a second or third 
person target is counted (he thinks, wants, believes, doubts etc.). We decided to include 
mental as well as public representations, a choice that shall be explained in more detail 
below. Whether or not language rtuthfully represents internal thought is an old 
philosophical problem, and still object of vivid debate, notably in the discursive 
literature (e.g. Edwards & Potter, 1992) that cannot be discussed here. However, 
amongst philosophers of mind, there is more agi eement that in teims of their sti'ucture, 
mental and public representations are both representations that are insulated fiom other 
representations (Recanati, 1997). As such, they share some fundamental properties, as 
for example, the non-entailment of truth. In other words, I can believe that the girl either 
said or thought that she saw a pink fiog, without believing the proposition (i.e. that 
indeed she saw a pink fiog) myself.
For either sentence to be true, it is immaterial whether or not the girl really saw a 
pink fiog, so that the truth-value of the proposition (she saw a pink fiog) does not affect 
the truth-value of the sentence as a whole. Moreover, Example 9.4., taken fiom the 
interview material, shows that participants often used mental and public representations 
interchangeably. Note that in sentence a) in contrast to the transparent ‘seeing 
something’, ‘seeing something or someone as something or someone else’ implies 




A  second class o f ‘false positives’ includes conversational phrases, such as those 
starting or ending a sentence with “you know”.
Example 9.2.
“And you hear people shouting accusations at other people. ‘All, you’re just one o f  
these people who moved in’, on the back o f the Fridge bar, the Dock Star, and you 
know, all these kind o f white ti endies. But I want to tiy and distance m yself from that, 
because I’m not, you know.” (PW12)
Applying our test rule, we find that the ‘affix’ ‘you know’, does not add to the 
interpretation of the meaning of the sentence, as we cannot assume that starting or 
ending a sentence with ‘you know’ implies that the speaker made any inference about 
‘my’ (i.e. the listener’s) state of mind.
9.1.2.3 Non-epistemic ‘knowingsomeone’
The term knowing can also be employed in a different way which does not have 
epistemic character, but as a synonym for “being familiar with”, “being acquainted 
with”.
Example 9.3.
[ ...]” the kind o f people they know .. . .”
Application of the test rule suggests that the sentence can be understood without 




(a) “She sees me as a problem.”
(b) “ She said I was a problem. And that would have been it.”
(PB9)
9.2.3. Speakers’ implicit representational Theory of Mind in pragmatic language
As indicated earlier, inferences about someone’s prepositional attitudes can be 
expressed or hidden in language without using mental state teims. Below are listed five 
classes of phenomena that could be called ‘implicit Theory of Mind usage in pragmatic 
language’ (but it should be pointed out that this list may by no means be exhaustive!). 
Following our test rule, what defines them as implying Theory of Mind is that a foimal 
analysis of the utterances would allow us to add a mental state term in such a way that 
without such an addition it would not be possible to interpret the utterance as 
meaningful.
9.2.3.1. Mentalistic traits and stereotypes
Most mentalistic inferences discussed in the developmental literature were of 
transient nature. Sally transfers the marble fiom basket to box; hence the child infers 
that Sally now believes the marble is in the box. But beliefs and desires can be more or 
less stable over time, as for example John’s belief in god or Sarah’s like of chocolates. 
Wellman (1990) suggested that traits and dispositions are beliefs and desires 
tiansfbnned into stable properties of a person rather than transient mental states. A 
curious class of what could be termed apparent mentalistic attributions are, in our 




(a) “I f in d . . .m a n y  p e o p le  are q u ite  n a iT o w -m in d (ed ).” (PW17)
(b) “The English are reseived.” (PW17)
(c) “The Chinese are hard-working.” (PA8)
However, as Example 9.5.C shows, this claim does not hold for all traits and 
stereotypes, and needs to be restricted to a subset of those only (a + b). Whilst 
descriptions, such as narrow-minded, reseived, refer to a state of mind, some traits, such 
as ‘hard-working’, ‘lazy’, or ‘punctual’ describe behaviours. Others, such as 
‘disciplined’ seem to be at the border between the description of a mental state or 
behaviour. What the speaker intended by using this term may become disambiguated 
through the context in which it is used. Hence, ‘mentalistic traits or stereotypes’ require 
the listener to appreciate that the speaker made an inference about an agent’s state of 
mind.
Malle, Knobe, O’Laughlin, Pearce and Nelson (2000) suggested to treat 
mentalistic traits or stereotypes differently to belief-desire attiibutions. For them, a tiait 
or stereotype explanation is part of a ‘causal histoiy of reason’ (CHR) explanation, 
whilst belief-desire attiibutions are part of ‘causal reason’ (CR) explanations. The 
authors pointed out that the difference between these two types of explanations is that 
CHR explanations operate outside a character’s subjective awareness whereas CR 
explanations require an agent’s subjective awareness. This can be seen by comparing 
sentences a) and b) in Example 9.6. The idea of being good-natured may have been 
outside JaiTon’s awareness and might not have motivated his behaviour, whereas the
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agents’ belief that they were out of rice has motivated the agents’ behaviour in the 
second example.
Example 9.6.
a)‘‘Jarron gave in because he is good-natured.”
b) “We went to the store because he thought they were out o f rice.”
(from Malle et al., 2000)
9.2.3.2. Non-literal speech: jokes, lies and irony
As was discussed in Chapter 2, previous research on pragmatics has shown that 
for the comprehension of the communicative intention underlying lies, jokes, sarcasm 
etc. it is necessary to infer first or second order mental states, (see Sullivan et ah, 1995, 
Winner & Leekam, 1991; Winner et al, 1998).
Example 9.7.
“She said I was lying.” (PB9)
If we assume that speakers use ternis such as lying, cheating, joking etc. 
competently, then for the listener to understand the communicative intention behind the 
utterance, it is required to translate this sentence into “Speaker believes that an agent 




9.2.33. Mental states implied in verbs, adjectives and expressions 
Conversation analysts have pointed out how intentions can be descriptively 
produced (Sacks, 1992). Consider the following extract from one of Sack’s early 
lectures, in which a man had called a telephone help-line (reprinted by Edwards, 1997).
Example 9.8.
B; .. .Well, she (wife of B) stepped between me and the child, I got up to walk out o f  
the door. Wlien she stepped between me and the cliild, I went to move her out o f the 
way. And then about that time her sister had called the police. I don’t know how  
she.. .what she..
A: Didn’t you smack her one?
B: No
A: You’re not telling me the story, Mr B.
B: Well, when you say smack you mean hit.
A: Yeah, you shoved her. Is that it?
B: I shoved her.
(From Sacks, 1992: vol. 1, own italics)
The extract did not involve a mental state teims. However, as both parties’ 
attempts to clarify or ‘repair’ the conversation shows, the description of the episode as 
move away/ hit/ smack/ shove was essential to attribute B’s intention behind the act. 
Hence, calling something a shove as opposed to ‘move away’ goes a long way from a 
mere behavioural description, as it implies an agent’s underlying intention.
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9.23,4. Mental state inferences indicated in ‘pronoun reversal’
Initial readings of the text revealed that participants sometimes talked from the 
perspective of someone else.
Example 9.9.
“Only now, when I became a mature woman, it’s the more qualification I’ve acquired 
in my life ,. .1 can see the barriers put up and say ‘vou can’t do that, because you’re 
black’.” fPB16)
As a listener, we will read this utterance as “the speaker thinks that white people 
think that she is incompetent or not in a position to pursue certain ambitions because 
she is black.”
Example 9.10.
“Straight away, straight away I understood what what tliis.. .cause I’ve seen that kind 
o f behaviour before when you know .. .talk down to you, be very offhand with you, and 
you let accept it, you can talk to the young (.) young black person like that (.) because 
you don’t need to interact with them day to day, and you have whatever perception you 
have o f them ...” (PB7)
In the first part of Example 9.10, the speaker talks of himself as ‘you’, which 
then changes in the phrase ‘you can talk to the young black person like that’. In this 
part, ‘you’ refers to ‘they’ or more specifically ‘white people’. To attain a coherent 
understanding of these utterances, the listener must be translate them into “the speaker 




9.2.3.5. Mental state inferences indicated in grammatical sentence constructions
Malle et al (1999) noted that desire inferences can be marked within sentences 
through characteristic grammatical foims. The authors pointed to the role of the 
puiposive infinitive (“then I went to the beach, just to be away”) and the purposive so 
that or so statement (e.g. “I’m going to stay away from Ariel so I  can spend some time 
with my friends ”) (p. 311). Applying our test rule to these examples shows that so that 
phrases can only be meaningfully understood if the listener invokes a desire or intention 
state to the speaker. Of course, as with explicit mental state markers, ‘so that’ phrases 
will only be coded as implicit ToM inferences, if they are related to somebody other 
than the speaker him or herself. In addition, from the interview material, two further 
grammatical markers were identified.
Example 9.11
“Youth are like that, causing trouble for fun.” (PA8)
Doing something ‘for’ something denotes a purpose. The sentence can thus be 
tiansfbrmed into the speaker believes that youth cause trouble with the intent to have 
fun.
Example 9.12
“She now smiles at me as if  nothing had happened.” (PB7)
As discussed in the developmental literatme, ‘as if-phrases mark the inference 
of pretence. Hence, the sentence must be understood as “she now smiles at me 
pretending that nothing had happened”.
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9.2.3.6. Implicatures in the local sentence context
Following Sperber and Wilson (1986), we understand an implicature to be “[...] 
a contextual assumption or implication which a speaker, intending her utterance to be 
manifestly relevant, manifestly intended to make manifest to the hearer” (pp. 194/95). 
The next set of examples represent sentences that can only be meaningfully understood 
if the listener adds a mental state inference to them. The sentences given in Example 
9.13 were taken from Malle et al (2000).
Example 9.13.
(a) Jeremy greeted his uncle emphatically because his uncle looked depressed
(b) Carey watered the plants because the leaves were wilting.
Sentence a) must be understood as “Jeremy greeted his uncle emphatically 
because he thought his uncle looked depressed”, just as sentence b) needs to be read as 
“Carey watered the plants because she thought/ felt the leaves were wilting. If only the 
speaker believed that the uncle looked depressed, then this would not provide the 
speaker with a plausible explanation for the agent’s, Jeremy’s, behaviour (empathie 
greeting). To further illuminate the character of this category, next is given an extract 
fr om the inteiwiew material in which a Nigerian woman recounted her experiences with 




The tiling is . . .people are very good at hiding, especially when you are in front o f them,
talking to them.
The utterance was made as part of the participant’s description of a job 
interview. She accused the interviewers of discrimination as the true motive for not 
offering her the job. In this context it is obvious that the speaker’s informative intention 
was not to convey the impression that people, or, more specifically, the inteiwiewers, 
were literally good at hiding. Rather, within the context of the utterance it is 
unambiguous that PB 16 intended to express that people were being very good at hiding 
their ‘time motives’, or their ‘time thoughts and feelings’.
9.2.3.7. Implicatures in the global context o f an episode or narrative theme.
This category describes instances in which an utterance can only be understood 
as meaningful if it is read within the more global context of the wider episode or of a 
particular narrative theme made explicit elsewhere in the text.
Example 9.15 was taken from the same interview as the previously discussed 
example. Here, the participant talked about a Nigerian greeting custom. The utterances 
were embedded in the nanative theme “white people don’t understand my background 
and our tiaditions”. She explains how in the morning, she usually gi'eets her mother in 




PB 16: yeah, when I wake up in the morning..when I see my mother, I don’t say ‘hello’ 
or ‘good morning’, I would say it in my language. I would say [Nigerian language] 
and.. .sometimes in the morning I have to kneel. It’s a strange thing here, but that’s the 
way we’ve been brought up. It was something that to do, that’s to do with our way of 
life. And somehow (we want to ) express it in our language, and I know it’s something 
very meaningful, so I would think, I wouldn’t treat it as a ioke.”
The comment “it’s a strange thing here’ would stand out as meaningless, a 
possible though unlikely contradiction to her preceding description of the kneeling 
tradition. However, the utterance becomes meaningful if the listener replaces the “it’s” 
with “they see it as a stiange thing here” or “they think it is strange”, which implies 
Theory of Mind. Likewise, her further addition I wouldn’t treat it as a joke”, would 
violate the maxim of relevance if one does not read it as implying that other people 
would treat it as a joke. Treating something as something has to be regarded as a 
shorthand for the underlying inference of mentalistic perception “I would not see it as 
[strange, a joke], or I would not think of it as a joke. Hence the explicit ti'ansfoimation 
would be that the speaker infers that “they perceive the kneeling tradition as a joke”.
9.2.3,8. Descriptions o f behaviour as acts o f ostensive-inferential 
cormnunication
The final category includes descriptions of behaviour that require from the 
listener to trace the speaker’s inference about the agent’s’ mental states in order to infer 
the speaker’s ostensive-communicative intention. Theorists have previously argued how 
actions (e.g. leaning backwards on the park bench so that you, who are sitting next to
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me, can now see your son being engaged in some obnoxious behaviour, Sperber & 
Wilson, 1986) and speech acts ( you saying ‘gosh’ and look at me while pointing at the 
snake crawling along the garden, Gomez, 1998) can have the puipose of ostensive (i.e. 
showing that someone wants to show something) communicative acts. In a similar vein, 
it appears that behavioural descriptions without an explicit or implicit inteipretation 
offered by the speaker can in themselves denote such an ostensive component, inviting 
the listener to infer the meaning of the act himself. As long as we, the listeners, cannot 
understand the meaning of the speaker’s description without attiibuting to him/ her 
mental state inferences of the agent(s) these instances shall also be coded as ‘implicit 
theoiy of mind’. The next example shall illustiate this argument. To support her claim 
that ‘my mum has experienced racism all her life’ (425), one of our inteiviewees 
offered the example of her parents being turned down on the basis of their colour when 
applying for rental accommodation.
Example 9.16.
[. . . ]  “the racism she and my father experienced when they came to England, that’s why 
they bought this house because she said when they originally arrived in Brixton there 
was no room, and my father used to (call up), and yeah, ‘come over the room is there’ 
and as they turned up and suddenly they saw they were black, the room was gone.”
The speaker did not offer an inteipretation of the episode herself. How can we as 
the listeners understand the sudden unavailability of the room as an example for an act 
of racism? If, meanwhile, the rooms had truly gone, the episode could hardly be called
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for as evidence of racism, but perhaps more an incident of bad luck. To understand this 
experience as an incident of racism, we (the listeners) have to infer that the speaker 
intended to say that the white landlords pretended the room was gone, because they did 
not want to let it to a black person.
9.2.4. Summary
In the application to the text material, our test rule has proved to be a useful tool 
in tiacking speakers’ inferences of others’ mental states. In support of our initial 
argument, the analysis showed that it is necessary to go beyond the linguistic surface of 
mental state teim deployment in order to distinguish between instances in which 
participants made mentalistic inferences and those in which they explained their own 
and others’ actions merely by taking an ‘intentional stance’. Moreover, by importing 
insights from previous research, a number of categories of implicit Theory of Mind 
usage in language, were identified. Although these categories are by no means seen to 
be exhaustive, it is hoped that their usage may be of use to others concerned with 
Theory of Mind usage in naturalistic talk. It was shown that in certain instances it is 
necessary for the listener or analyst not only to consider the ‘local’ context of a sentence 
or utterance, but beyond this, the more global context of a whole episode in order to 
trace the speaker’s intended meaning. The analysis therefore also lends support to 
previous suggestions put foiward by theorists of pragmatic communication (Grice,
1957; Sperber & W ilson, 1986) that in naiTatives a collaborative effort is  required from  
the listener in in fe iiin g  the speaker’s com m unicative intentions.
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9.3. A  T axon om y o f th e o ry  o f m ind  t a lk
As we are now able to track Theory of Mind usage in the text, the next question 
is how can we organise different kinds of mentalistic inferences? In principle, there are, 
of course, numerous ways of categorising Theory of Mind talk. As analysts, we had to 
make a choice as to how coarse or fine-grained a system of coding categories would 
best seiwe our purposes. The simplest way to distinguish between different explanations 
would be to only differentiate ‘true’ Theory of Mind explanations from other kinds of 
explanations, of which some types were previously discussed as ‘false positives’. 
However, by only attending to this one dimension, we might miss other potentially 
interesting patterns of Theory of Mind usage. The other extreme would be to minutely 
code for each possible kind and combination of Theory of Mind inference. For example, 
one could draw a fine-grained distinction between different types of ‘intentional states’, 
such as ‘knowing’, ‘remembering’, ‘meaning to’, ‘forgetting ‘, and other psychological 
states that are more overtly expressed, such as emotions and feelings (see Dunn, 1991). 
Whilst this may allow us to account for the frill diversity and richness of Theory of 
Mind talk, paradoxically, a highly fine tuned approach may equally risk to lead us to 
miss patterns of interest. The taxonomy presented below can be seen as reflecting an 
intermediate stance, one that was guided by our main research questions. In this section, 
we first turn to the consideration of speakers’ individual mental state inference tracked 
in the text. The taxonomy was built on a consideration of the major components of 
mental state inferences; speaker, mental attitude, agent, referent, and prepositional 
content. Together, they can be seen as constituting the grammar of theory of mind 
inferences. In order to delineate different utterances, we notate them in fomial ternis.
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For abbreviations of the individual components needed for the grammar of Theory of 
Mind inferences see Table 9.3.
In Chapter 8, we also argued for a distinction between Theory of Mind and 
mental perspective taking. Having specified different forms that each component can 
take, we will then ‘reassemble’ those components on the zero-order, first order and 
second order levels.
9.3.1. The grammar of theory of mind inferences
9.3.1.1. Speaker (S)
The speaker (S) is the only constant within mentalistic inferences, taking the 
first person form ‘I’.
9.3.1.2. Mental attitudes (epistemic and volitional, ‘positive’ and ‘negative’) 
Mental attitudes include epistemic and volitional states, together forming the
class of intentional states, which are complemented by a set of ‘psychological or 
emotional states’. Moreover, inferences of others’ mental states can be either asserted or 
negated. Examples of assertions are attributions, such as he believes x, he wants x.
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Table 9.3, Abbreviations of components comprising the gi ammar of mental state 
inferences
S = Speaker
( ) = brackets denote a mental attitude, for example 
(bel) = belief or other epistemic state,
(perc as) = perceive as 
(des) = desire, e.g. 'want'
(int) = intention 
(exp) = expectation
(pubrep) = public representation, e.g. ‘saying’
A = Agent,
if more than 1 other agent, then {Ai, Ag, ....AJ. if not further denoted, A stands 
for one individual other 
Agenerai = Agent In general, e.g. ‘people’
Aougroup = Agent being an outgroup member, e.g. ‘white people’ if participant is black
Ail
denotes ‘we





= propositional content, including, for example, an external object or 
event (without subject), agents’ behaviour, trait 
= mental attitude towards something or someone 
= Implies
= corresponds to in this particular situation, is equivalent to, 
e.g. surprise is equivalent to a negative expectation 
= as something, symbolic meaning
= representation of someone as something or someone else in symbolic terms, 




foimally expressed as S (bel) > A (bel) -> [x]. Negation of mental attitudes are, “I think 
he would not seejt as a problem”, formally expressed as S (bel) > A (neg. bel) -> [it= 
A’s behaviour {problem}].
For reasons of simplifications, expressions, such as “I don’t think he would see 
it as a problem” will also be coded as ‘negative ToM’, they can be transformed into 
“I think he would not see it as a problem”.
In instances in which mental states are positively asserted, as for example, in 
utterances, such as ‘he believes x’, he wants x’, he intends x’, the reader cannot infer 
from the local utterance context whether the speaker and the agent hold the same mental 
perspective. However, using a negation -  he doesn’t want/ believe x - seems to imply 
the speaker’s awareness of different mental perspectives towards that same thing or 
event.
9.3.1.3. Agent(s) whose mental states are inferred
The agent is the person or persons whose mental states are infened. In 
conversations and direct interactions, the agent can include ‘you’ (e.g. I think you 
think). However, in most narratives and in particular in the intemew situation, in which 
a speaker tells a listener about some encounter in the past, the agent can only refer to he, 
she, we, or they. In instances of reflexive awareness, the agent is recursively the speaker 
(e.g.’ I think I want’ or ‘I think he thinks I think... ’). Of specific interest to us is the 
identity of the agent or agents in relation to the speaker, notably whether the agent is
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Table 9,4. Characteristics of mental attitudes
valence Epistemic mental 
states







Don’t/ doesn’t Don’t/ doesn’t want Surprised = doesn’t
believe Don’t doesn’t intend expect
Don’t/ doesn't think






dominant or subordinate, someone who commits or experiences discrimination. As 
unspecified generalised others, ‘they’ and ‘we’ can refer to either ingroup or outgroup 
members. We will be particularly interested in mentalistic inferences dubbed here 
‘second-person-second-order ToM’ inference. This describes the situation in which a 
speaker reflects upon what an agent thinks, wants, feels etc about the speaker him or 
herself. Note that this kind of inference can not only be made on the inter-personal level 
(“he thinks about me as an individual person”) but also on the intergi'oup level, such as 
“they think about us.
9.3.1.4. The propositional content []  -  what mental attitudes are about
Mental states are always about something. Philosophers of mind refer to this 
content as the ‘prepositional content’. In other words, the propositional content is that 
which is explained. For our purposes, a rough distinction between three types of 
‘prepositional content’ is made: 1) about [x], an external object or event, 2) about an 
individual agent or a gi'oup of agents [e.g. Al, Amgroup, Aoutgmup, etc.) or 3) recursively, 
about [S], the speaker.
A peculiar feature of intentional states or mentalistic inferences found in the 
internew material is ‘thick description’: representations of something or someone as 
standing for, meaning or signifying something or someone else. Since, to our 
awareness, this property has received little attention in the literatme, it shall be 
illustiated with an example fi*om the inteiwiew material. PB4 recounted how his parents 
first came fi'om Jamaica on “a sort of promise” that England, the mother country 




“When they first arrived, they saw a lot of chimney smoke, on the chimneys, and they 
went ‘wow’, they thought all the chinmeys were factories, they didn’t realise that 
everyone (..) who owned a home in England, or had chimneys, they thought all these 
chimneys were factories.” (PB4)
The account implies that PB4 attiibuted a ‘false belief to his parents. In contrast 
to the Sally-Ann scenario, this mistaken belief did not concern the whereabouts of 
something, but it concerned the meaning of something -  the chimneys. Based on a lack 
of cultural knowledge, the parents thought of chimneys as indicators for factories (and 
hence prospective work) and not as a sign for houses in general.
9.3.3. Putting the components together within levels of Theory of Mind
A summary of different types of intentional and mentalistic explanations, their 
composition and emerging character is given in Table 9.5. The table does not list all 
possible combinations, but it includes those that were theoretically perceived as most 
relevant. Let us start with those kinds of explanations that do not strictly reflect usage of 
a representational Theory of Mind on behalf of the speaker. With reference to previous 




9.3.3.1. 'Zero-order Theory o f Mind explanations
As was discussed in the first section of this chapter, explanations of behaviour 
do not necessitate Theory of Mind, as they can rest on the level of first order 
intentionality (although these may include mental state terms).
In general teims, this kind of explanation involves a speaker (S), and his or her own 
mental attitude (MentAtt) about something, the propositional content. This can be 
foimally expressed as: S (MentAtt) -> [propcont]
As shown in the last column of Table 9.5, three classes of zero order Theory of 
Mind explanations were identified.
1. Speaker’s attitudes about an object or external event (e.g,”[I think] London is a very 
difficult city”).
2. Speaker’s inferences of an agent’s non-mentalistic trait, or where there is more than 
one agent (i.e gioups), non-mentalistic stereotypes, for example (“that’s how they are”)
3. Speaker’s (deontic) explanations relying on his or her norms (e.g. “he should have 
been less noisy”).
9.3.3.2 First-order theory o f mind
When investigating the development of Theory of Mind competence, 
researchers have primarily focused on the level of mentalistic interpretations. Formally, 
they can be expressed as:
S (mental attitude) > A (mental attitude) > [Propositional content]
For example, (I think) Sally thinks [the marble is in the basket].
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In other words, on the first order level, a person makes an inference about another 
person’s mental state about something or someone.
As can be seen in Table 9,5, from the combination of the four components speaker, 
mental attitude (positive, negative), agent, and propositional content, different 
characters of mental inferences emerged.
1. Mentalistic trait or stereotypes - The class of ‘mentalistic traits’ was already 
discussed in the first part of this chapter. As can be seen fi om our taxonomy, a 
speaker’s attiibution of these kinds of inferences (e.g. ‘the English are reserved’) falls 
into the category of the first-order Theory of Mind inferences.
2. Self reflexivity
a. Speaker’s recursive inference of his/ her mental state(s):
“I believe I want” , formally expressed as S (bel) -> S (des, bel) [x], for example, “My 
attitude definitely changes.. .how I inteipret, or want to represent myself’ (PWl 1).
b. Reflexivity of how others view my behaviour or me.
I believe he thinks I am/1 do, formally expressed as S (bel) -> A (bel) -> S [behaviour], 
“I think he might perceive my behaviour as threatening” (ficticious example).
These can be denied:
c. “I believe he does not understand...”, formally expressed as S (bel) -> (neg bel) > S , 
or S [ behaviour], for example, “He does not understand me”.
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3. Seeing me/him/her/ them as...-This class describes inferences of others’ ‘thick’
or stereotypic representation of self (speaker) or a third agent: I think he sees me as 
something or someone else, foimally expressed as S (bel) > A (perc as)-> S {as X}.
For example: “My father has a certain view that he sees me as someone at this level of 
intelligence.(PW l 1), or “ they see me as a teacher type of person, and they don’t 
have good experience with education...” (PW6).
9.3.3.3. Second-order mentalistic inferences 
On the second-order level, we have the inference of the mental state of an agent A2 
embedded in the inference of agent Ai (first order level). Therefore, the number of 
different combinations becomes exponentially gieater. Second order mental state 
inferences can be foimally expressed as: S (bel) -> A% (mental attitude) -> A% (mental 
attitude) -> [propositional content]. For our analysis, not only the relation between 
speaker and agents, but also between the agent on the first order level and the agent on 
the second order level will be of interest - for example, a speaker’s inference of whether 
or not the outgroup appreciates the mental perspective of the ingroup. Of the various 
different possible combinations between speaker, mental attitudes, agents, and 
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1. Inferences o f agent(s) ’ attribution(s) o f mentalistic traits or stereotypes
This includes a speaker’s inference that an agent 1 attiibutes a trait or stereotype 
to an agent 2 (as an individual or group). Where the agent at the second order level 
refers recursively back to the speaker, this can be described as a mentalistic meta­
stereotype (see, for example, Vorauer et al, 2000, for the concept of meta-stereotypes). 
This can be foimally expressed as S (bel) -> Aoutgioup (bel, perceive as) > Singroup 
(mental state}. This inference implies that the speaker infers that the agent views 
himself at the gi'oup or categorical level, hence S (bel) > A (perc as) -> S (group). An 
example for such a meta-stereotype is “They think we [black people] are unreliable.
2. Attributing to another agent 1 awareness o f agent 2 ’s mental perspective
This category consists of a speaker’s inference of agent I ’s awareness of a 
second agent 2’s mental perspective, formally expressed as S (bel) > A (aware) -> S/ 
A2 (mental state) -> [ ]. An example for such an inference would be: “They know that 
she thinks it was unfair of them not to give her the job”.
5. Attributing to unawareness o f other’s mental perspective -
This involves essentially the same structure as in (2), but with a negative mental 
state inference at the first order level, formally expressed as S (bel) -> A (neg aware) -> 
S/ A2 (mental state) -> [ ], for example “She is not aware of what he thought when he 
was not allowed to enter the staff room.”
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4. Higher-order theory o f mind inferences
In principle, infinite recursive mentalistic inferences are possible. However, 
since in the text we rarely found Theory of Mind inferences at a higher-order than the 
second-order level, they are not explicitly discussed here. However, the same 
organisation as illustrated for the first- and second-order levels can be applied to these 
more complex higher-order mentalistic inferences.
9.4. P la c in g  ty p e s  o f  ToM  t a l k  (a n d  o t h e r  k in d s o f  e x p la n a tio n s )  in
THE CONTEXT OF NARRATIVE EPISODES
So far, we have considered the different characters of mentalistic (and other) 
explanations on the local level tracked in the text. However, our main research question 
was whether people used Theoiy Mind differently depending upon social contextual 
variables. In order to address this question, our main interest was to compare Theory of 
Mind usage across different kinds of experiences and across different social relations. 
As outlined in Chapter 8, to study this, we used experiences - nanative episodes and 
examples - as analytic units.
Through the taxonomy we are now able to specify our predictions. Recall that 
our main hypothesis comprised two parts. The first part predicted that those in power 
might be relatively unaware of the mental perspective of the powerless. The second part 
predicted that by contrast, those who are powerless should be aware of the mental 
perspective of the powerful, and that they would use this awareness instiumentally to
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adjust their own actions. The predictions remained when applied to experiences of 
racial discrimination, which involved the victim’s situated powerlessness.
9.4.1. Predictions of differential Theory of Mind usage in different power relations
By considering the different types of Theory of Mind, as well as ‘non- 
mentalistic’ explanations, our predictions were as follows: If the speaker was in power 
or the one who was discriminating, he or she would explain or inteipret the encounter 
more on the 0-order level, in terms of 1) his or her own attitudes or 2) group norms or 3) 
attributions to the victim of non-mentalistic and mentalistic traits or stereotypes. 
Moreover, we predicted those in power to show little reflective awareness (on the first 
and particularly second order ToM level) of how their own actions were perceived by 
the powerless.
By contrast, we predicted that speakers in a powerless position (i.e. victims of 
discrimination) would show high degi ees of awareness of how the powerful perceived 
them, which includes the class ‘thick’, or ‘stereotypical’ ‘seeing-me-as’ inferences. 
Moreover, indirect evidence of the first part of the hypothesis would also be given if the 
powerless infeiTed that the powerful does not take their (i.e. the powerless) mental 
perspective. Attributing to the peipetrator ‘negative mental attitudes towards self or the 
ingroup’ would manifest this.
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9.5. S um m ary
With the taxonomy outlined in this chapter we have generated a methodological 
tool that enables us to adequately address the questions that interest us. Firstly, the 
method suits the exploratory character of the study, as it allows us to capture the quality 
and richness of mentalistic explanations and how they are related to different kinds of 
experiences. Secondly, the method can also be objected to a quantitative analysis as it 
allows one to compare frequencies of distinct types of ToM talk. As such, 
methodologically, it represents an endeavour to overcome the qualitative-quantitative 
divide, which is often observed in social psychological research. The taxonomy has 
several advantages over previous coding schemes employed in social psychology. For 
example, compared to the mainstr eam person-situation dichotomy used within the 
Attribution Theory framework, it discriminates in a much more fine-grained way 
between different types of interpretations and explanations. It also enables us to 
distinguish between ‘true’ and ‘false’ Theory of Mind usage; a distinction that was 
often binned in the coding schemes of developmental psychologists who studied young 
childr en’s ToM competencies in narratives. However, a more detailed assessment of the 
usefulness of this taxonomy shall be postponed until the discussion of the results of the 
interview study, to which we shall now turn.
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Th e o r y  of M in d  U sa g e  in  A c c o u n t s  of D isc r im in a tio n
10.1. Introduction
In this chapter, the results of a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the 
interview material are presented. It will be recalled from Chapter 8 that our initial 
hypothesis comprised two parts: the first part predicted that those in power might be 
relatively unaware of the mental states of the powerless. The second part predicted that 
those who are powerless may be more aware of the mental states of the powerful as 
knowledge of their states of mind might be strategically used for the adjustment of their 
own behaviour. However, as shown in Table 10.1, a fundamental constraint of the 
present data was that in the accounts of their experiences participants -  inespective of 
their ethnicity - tended to position themselves as powerless. Consequentially, for the 
intended comparison between powerful and powerless’ individuals’ explanations of 
others’ mental states we lacked examples of people who subjectively perceived 
themselves as powerful. However, a large proportion of episodes dealt with experiences 
of discrimination. Paradoxically, this led us right back to our initial starting point, the 
anecdotes of extr eme situations in which one group discriminated against members of 
another group. We could therefore explore a related issue; namely whether or not 
Theory of Mind usage differs between explanations of different kinds of social actions. 
Our working assumption was that discrimination entailed situated power usage  ^so that
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those who are discriminated against are in this context positioned as relatively 
powerless, whereas those who enact discrimination are in a temporal state of power.
The questions that emerged were to what extent were the victims aware of the states of 
mind of the agents of discrimination? And did they make any inferences as to whether 
or not the agent appreciated their own mental perspective?
Moreover, the material permitted us to investigate the argument underlying the 
first part of our initial power hypothesis, namely the extent to which participants who 
positioned themselves as powerless related inferences of the mental states of those in 
power to their own subsequent actions.
10.2. Analysis
10.2.1. Coding system
In total, 150 analytical units were identified, of which 115 were coded as 
episodes or examples^ and 35 as general talk. For further analyses, only episodes and 
examples were considered. For each episode, participants’ subjective constr uction of the 
character of the relationship and of the encounter were assessed on the basis of the four 
following dimensions.
L Interpersonal versus intergroup level -  For each episode it was coded 
whether the participant construed the relationship between self and other(s) on the 
interpersonal or intergroup level.
2. Power relation - We distinguished between self as powerful -other as 
powerless and self as powerless -other as powerful. Incidents, in which participants did
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not comment upon the perceived power relation, or in which power did not seem to be 
an issue, were coded as ‘neutiaT.
3. Emotional valence o f experiences - Indices of the emotional valence of 
episodes were, for example, questions from the interview schedule that were asked to 
elicit accounts of ‘positive-enriching’ or ‘negative-problematic’ experiences. More 
often, however, participants spontaneously mentioned how they felt about a particular 
experience. For example, in one episode PWl6 described that after an unsuccessful job 
interview in Brighton, youths were shouting racist abuse at the train station. She stated 
having felt ‘awful’ after this experience and only wanted to head back to London. 
Episodes which could not be unambiguously coded as either positive or negative, or that 
truly reflected an experience low in terms of emotional emphasis, were coded as 
neutral.
4. Discrimination - A categorical code was used to define whether or not an 
episode explicitly dealt with discrimination. We did not distinguish between different 
kinds of discrimination (i.e. racial discrimination, gender discrimination etc.). It was, 
however, distinguished between three different types of accounts dealing with 
discrimination: (1) the participant’s experience as a victim or target of discrimination, 
which included accounts of vicarious experiences, directed against someone else,
(2) accounts, in which the participant was the actor who committed an act of racism or 
discrimination, and (3) accounts in which the issue of racism/ discrimination were 
discussed in general. Numbers and percentages of episodes characterised in terms of 
these four categories are shown in Table 10.1.
327
Chapter 10
Table 10.1, Numbers and percentages of episodes defined in terms of interpersonal 
versus intergroup relation, power relation, valence of experience and discrimination
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10.3. R e s u lts
The results are organised in two sections. The first section is concerned with the 
nature of ToM inferences participants made when accounting for an experience with 
discrimination. Two main and distinct patterns of Theory of Mind inferences were 
identified. Firstly, participants inferred that the agent perceived the victim (self or a 
third person) solely in racial terms to the exclusion of the appreciation of any other 
social or personal identity. Secondly, the content of the accusation of racism involved 
the inference that the other was unaware of or even denied the victim his or her own 
independent mental perspective. To illustrate the character of these findings, first a 
qualitative analysis is presented. This is followed by a quantitative analysis that shows 
the extent to which the patterns were representative for the total interview material.
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Results presented in the second section were concerned with one aspect of our 
initial power hypothesis; how for those in a position of situated powerlessness. Theory 
of Mind usage was related to subsequent social actions.
10.3.1. Theory of Mind inferences in accounts of the accusations of racism
10.3. L I . Qualitative results I: stereotypical ‘seeing me as’ ToM inferences as a 
precondition for the definition o f a social act as an act of racism 
With exception of incidents in which someone shouted racist abuse, in most 
episodes that dealt with discrimination, racism was ‘covert’ rather than ‘overt’. What 
distinguishes the experience of racism from other kinds of ‘negative’ or ‘bad’ 
experiences? The following extract illustrates how a participant’s particular type of 
Theory of Mind inference constituted the precondition for the interpretation of an 
experience as an act of discrimination.
PB9 was a woman in her mid-thirties who had been brought up in Britain by 
parerrts of Jamaican origins. The thematic thread throughout large parts of the interview 
was that “I have experienced racism all my life”. The following extract was taken fr om 
amongst a string of episodes that illustrated this claim. Hence, the episode was 
subjectively construed as an experience with racism, hr extract 10.1, PB9 recounted an 
episode in which “ we [PB9 and a black friend] went to a white lady’s house to view it”. 
At issue was the landlady’s behaviour in the moment PB9 turned up at her door. “I said, 




Extract 10.1 ‘you had better come in then'
PB9: [...] so my friend and I went to view a house , and a nice house, and elmi, 
detached four bedroom house, and it costs about (...) it costs two nine nine fifty 
actually, (.) two hundred ninety thousand it cost, elim I don’t flunk she expected black 
women to turn up at her door. Yeah, elmi, I think she was suiprised seeing black 
women ..coming to view the house [...]
PB9: Yeah, I did think she expected us to come, right, that’s what it was, cause people 
have a perception of a black community, and a perception of us as not being able to 
afford certain types of things, (.) elmi, not having the money, you know what I mean?
At issue was the landlady’s communicative act, her phrasing “you’d better come 
in then”. PB9’s chain of inferences is summarised in Box 10.1. below. In this situation, 
racism was not directly ‘overt’, but PB9 was faced with the need to explain or inteipret 
the landlady’s unexpected, script deviant behaviour. How can we, as the listeners, 
understand PB9’s utterance that the landlady did not expect black women to turn up at 
her door as evidence of racism on the part of the landlady? Firstly, this utterance only 
becomes a meaningful explanation if we draw the inference that the participant 
attributed to the agent a ‘thick’ or ‘stereotypic’ representation of herself as a black 
woman. To emphasise that her colour was at issue, she further elaborated, “I did think 
she expected us to come”. As shown in steps 2a -  2c in the analysis box, in order to 
understand this utterance as not contradicting her previous statement, the listener needs 
to add the implicature that with ‘us’ she meant ‘us as potential buyers’. Further implied 
is that whilst PB9 in this particular situation represented herself as a potential buyer, she 
inferred that the agent did not acknowledge her in that identity. This was justified by
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drawing on meta-stereotypical knowledge (see step 3 in the analysis box) that involved 
a first order Theory of Mind inference.
Box 10.1.
Example Formal notation Emergent character
1. "1 don’t think she 
expected black women to 
turn up at her door.”;
"1 think she was surprised 
seeing black women...”
S ( bel) -> A (neg exp « 
surp) > S [{black women} 
behaviour: to turn up at her 
door]
Negative 1st order ToM 
2nd person expectation
1a. Implicature:
She perceived us as black 
women
S(bel) > A (perc as) > S 
[black]
Implicature 
Inference of agent’s 
stereotypic representation 
of self (1st order ToM)
2. She expected us to 
come
S (bel) A (exp) S 
[behaviour]
Positive 1st order ToM 
expectation, apparent 
contradiction to (1)?
2a. Implicature: She 
expected potential buyers 
to come
S (bel) > AI (exp) > 
[buyer]
Implicature
1st order ToM inference
2b. Implicature see myself 
as a potential buyers
S (perc as) > {S as buyer} 0 order ToM symbolic 
represenation of self
2c. implicature; She did not 
perceive us as viewers
5. S (bel) > A (neg perc 
as) > S {as viewers}
Implicature
1st order neg ToM
inference
3. (Explanation)'People 
have a perception of the 
black community...not 
being able to afford..."
S(bel) > Aoutgroup (perc 
as) > Singroup{ as not 
being able to afford...}
Metastereotype 
(1st order ToM)
For PB9, it was not so much a problem that the landlady perceived her as a 
black woman per se, but what was at issue was the inference that she saw her ‘only’ as 
black in a context in which she expected to be appreciated as a potential buyer. This 
inference also changed her construction of the character of the situation. From her own 
anticipated buyer-seller relation it became instantly a matter of race relations.
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Interestingly, the account was also informative about the underlying 
mindreading process. Based on the wording of the landlady’s initial statement “oh, I 
suppose you had better come in then”, PB9 compared her own cultural expectations of a 
‘viewing-someone’s-house’ script with the landlady’s deviation from an expected role 
behaviour. The outcome of the encounter was that PB9, although she liked the house, 
did not consider buying it from her.
The episode points to an important process underlying the accusation of racism. 
An act is not perceived as racist because “he or she did something bad”, but the 
accusation seems to necessitate the inference that “s/he did something bad because s/he 
perceived me as black”. In other words, it appeared that a necessary precondition for the 
attribution of an experience as racially motivated was this type of inference of the 
other’s stereotypic ‘thick’ representation of oneself as a member of a particular social 
gi'oup. This means that the experience of covert discrimination requires the victim’s co- 
consti'uction of social reality and of the meaning of social actions. Hegel (1807) 
suggested in his famous master-slave dialectic that the powerful needs the powerless for 
the acknowledgement and validation of his own position of power. In a similar vein, it 
seems that for a victim to accuse a perpetrator of a racist action, his or her 
acknowledgement of the mental perspective of the one who discriminates is required.
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10.3.1.2. Quantitative results I: Comparison between frequencies o f stereotypical 
‘seeing me as ’ ToM inferences in accusations of racism and episodes not dealing with 
discrimination
In order to investigate whether this type of stereotypical second person 
mentalistic inference was characteristic for experiences with racism, in a first step we 
compared their occurrences in episodes that were and were not concerned with an 
accusation of racism. Table 10.2 shows that in 80.4% of participants’ accusations of 
racism, this particular type of inference was made either explicitly, or could be tiacked 
implicitly (as in example 10.1), compared to only 20.5% of incidents that did not deal 
with racism. However, as pointed out by Whiten (2003, personal communication), using 
episodes as analytic units carries the risk of committing a pseudo-replication enor (e.g. 
Hurlbuil, 1984). For a statistical analysis, we therefore calculated for each participant 
the proportions to which s/he made ‘seeing-me-as-[social category]’ inferences in 
accounts of episodes dealing with discrimination and non-discriminatory events. For 
example, PB9’s interview involved seventeen nari'ative episodes, nine were coded as 
dealing with experiences with discrimination and eight as not dealing with 
discrimination. In this interview, the issue of discrimination was not discussed in 
general terms, nor did PB9 discuss any incident in which she herself acted in the role of 
the perpetrator of discrimination. These two latter categories were therefore coded as 
missing cases. Out of nine episodes that dealt with experiences with discrimination, in 8 
cases it could be tracked explicitly or implicitly that she attributed to the perpetrator a 
perception of herself in racial terms. Therefore, we calculated the proportion of
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Table 10,2. Number and percentage of stereotypical ‘seeing as’ inferences in episodes 
characterised as involving an accusation of discrimination, episodes in which 
discrimination was not at issue, episodes in which the participant acted in a 
discriminatory fashion or discrimination was discussed in general teims.
Character of 
account
Explicit or implicit 
Inference 
S(bel)"> A1 (perc. 
as) S/A2 {race}
No such inference Total
S accusing A of 
racism
33 (80.4%) 8(19.5%) 41
No direct reference 
to discrimination
3(49.1%) 58 (95.1%) 61




7 (70%) 3 (30%) 10
Total 43 72 115
Table 10.3. Proportions of inferences of stereotypic ‘seeing-as’ inferences in accounts 
of accusations of discrimination and in experiences not dealing with discrimination, 
means, standard deviations and ranges in brackets
N Mean SD Range
Proportion of 
stereotypical ‘seeing me 
as’ inferences in 
accusations of 
discrimination
I f .84 .20 ( .3 3 -1 .0 )
Proportion of 
stereotypical seeing me 
as inferences in episodes 
not dealing with 
discrimination
I f .12 .29 (0 -1 .0)
one missing case due to an interviewee not reporting an episode in which s/he made an 
accusation of discrimination.
^one missing case due to an inteiwiewee not reporting an episode in which s/he did not 
make an accusation of discrimination.
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stereotypical ‘seeing me as’ inferences in accounts of discrimination (8/9 = 0.88). In 
none of the incidents that did not deal with discrimination was such an inference traced 
(0/8 = 0).
Since across participants, cell sizes of the categories ‘episodes about 
discrimination in general’ and ‘self as discriminator’ were small, these were excluded 
from the subsequent analysis. Proportions of stereotypical ‘seeing me as’ inferences in 
accusations of discrimination and in non-discriminatory episodes are shown in Table
10.3. When the data was subjected to a Wilcoxon signed rank test, a significant 
difference was found (Z = -2.71, N = 11,/? = .007, two-tailed). This suggested that in 
the context of episodes in which participants made an accusation of discrimination, they 
made significantly more often stereotypical ‘seeing me as’ inferences than when they 
talked about episodes that did not relate to an experience with discrimination.
However, as can be obtained from Tables 10.2 and 10.3, results showed that 
attributions of this type were found in accounts that did not explicitly deal with 
accusations of racism (‘false positives’). Moreover, we found instances of accusations 
of racism that did not involve this type of inference (‘false negatives’). Closer 
inspection of the three cases of ‘false positives’ shows that these episodes were not 
counted as racism since the inferred stereotypical perception of self did not translate 
into any action. For example, although one of PB4’s main naiTative themes was that he 
did not experience racism in London, he recounted an experience in a pub in Sti'atford. 
Together with his mother and daughter he entered the pub because their car had broken 
down whilst they were travelling through the town. He recounted how ‘nothing
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happened’, but “everything stopped, the way they looked at us... like aliens”. Later he 
speculated that the situation might have been different if instead he had gone to that 
same pub in the company of his brothers. As a group of black men they might have 
been perceived as a threat. PA5 infeiTed that people in Scotland saw them -  
“Vietnamese boat people - as Eskimos, so strange”, but he considered the Scots’ 
curiosity upon this ‘strangeness’, and the treatment they received, as a positive 
experience.
Potentially more concerning for the claim that the accusation of racism involves 
the inference that the agent who commits a discriminatory act perceives oneself in racial 
terms were the false negatives; instances in which such an accusation was made but in 
which this particular type of inference was not found. Why these instances nonetheless 
represented experiences with racism shall be illustrated in the next section in which a 
second, more profound pattern of Theory of Mind inference will be discussed.
10.3.1.3. Qualitative results II: Second order ToM inferences o f others 
unawareness or denial o f own perspective as the essential content o f an 
accusation o f racism
P assive  racism
The first extract is an example of ‘passive racism’, which refers to an action 
which was committed without the agent’s intention to be racist but which effectively is 
racist. The episode, as told by PWl 5, was embedded in his global narxative theme, how 
through his wife and her family from the Punjab he had become involved with different
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aspects of Indian culture and also more sensitive to racial issues. PW15 talked about his 
initial concerned about his parents’ reaction to his relationship. He described his parents 
as the “typical Daily Mail reader, middle Englander, middle consei*vative, slightly racist 
personality”, “not terribly liberal minded, they hold some views that I think a lot of 
English people hold”. Through this description the relation between the agents was 
coded as on the intergroup rather than the interpersonal level. As a first example, he 
described how his parents would “[...] use words like Paki, not with the intention to 
offend, but because that seems the word that people use to describe Asian people, or 
that white people use to describe Asian people.” The following episode related to an 
incident that occuned while he made preparations for the wedding banquet.
Extract 10.2.Steak at the Hindu wedding
PW15:1 sort of rang them up and asked “what would you like? If you had the choice, 
whatever you like, what would you like?” And they said “steak”; which is obviously 
deeply offensive to Hindus, because of the position of the cow.
[...] I think they would have liked to have a steak and they didn’t think past that [...] 
No, I think when it was pointed out to them, they sort of clicked, they understood, why 
that couldn’t happen, h\xt I  don H think they thought past what they wanted. What that 
actually meant to people from another culture.
The crucial inference was that ingroup members (white British people) lacked 
reflexive awareness of the way their own action would be perceived by outgroup 
members (his wife’s Indian family). However, when it was brought to their attention, 




Sentence Formal notation Emergent character
1. “they said ‘steak’ which 
is obviously deeply 
offensive to Hindus”
8 (bel) > AHindu (perceive 
as) -  > A2outgroup(offensive)
[behaviour]
8 shows awareness of how 
a third agent’s behaviour is 
perceived by another group
2. "1 think they would have 
liked a steak, and they 
didn’t think past that.”
8 (bel) > Aingroup (des) 
[steak] and
Aingroup ("eg bel) [ past A’s 
desire]
2nd order negative ToM 
inference: attribution of 
ingroup’s unawareness of 
outgroup’s state of mind.
3. "they understood...what 
that actually meant to 
people from another 
culture."
8 (bel) -> Aingroup
(understood) -> Aoutgroup 
perc as [{meaning}ingroup 
behaviour]
Resolution: 2nd order 
inference of ingroup’s 
appreciation of how 
outgroup perceives ingroup 
behaviour
episode constitutes one of the few exceptions in which the participant did not make the 
inference that the agent of discrimination saw the targets in racial terms. However, the 
content of the accusation related precisely to the ‘Daily Mail readers’ ’ neglect of taking 
into consideration the Indians’ different cultural backgiound. Consequentially, they 
ignored that the meaning of their own behaviour could be perceived differently from a 
different mental perspective.
Denial of different experiences
Commentators (e.g. Essed, 1991) have frequently highlighted that the emphasis 
or exaggeration of difference (e.g. cultural practices, cultural values) between the own 
white-Westem group and non-white ethnic outgroups constitutes an important feature of 
racism. The next extract shows that the opposite -  the denial of different experiences -  
may be an equally central feature of racism. It can be subsumed under the category 
‘denial of racism’ (Essed, 1991). As will be shown with the next extiuct, this involves 
the denial or failure to recognise that different kinds of experiences emanate from
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different mental perspectives, and that different experiences form different mental 
perspectives. The episode was told by PB7, a young Indo-Caribbean playwiight who 
was bom and brought up in North London. The naiTative theme was that interacting 
between Black and Asian communities and white communities has shaped his 
experiences. His point was that “[..] they [white people] want to tieat you (..) as if there 
were no differences, and I think there are a lot more differences than they realise or 
want to realise, or want to tieating you as if there are no differences [...] between a kind 
of white society and a black experience.” The following episode was given amongst a 
string of encounters as “another example for not recognising culture” and was 
concerned with PB7’s confrontation with an Artistic Play Director. At issue was that 
PB7 had explicitly put black and Asian images into the stage directions, which he 
believed to be crucial for the understanding of the play as a black and Asian experience. 
Although this was pointed out to the director, these images were not seen. He described 
the director as “in the sense he had the power”, “he had the power to do that,” which 
subsequently led to a frustrating outcome for PB7 “I never had.., so he he got it his way, 
he got it his way”.
Extract 10.3. The Artistic Director: “This is not an Asian play”
PB7: [but he is still saying it’s NOT an Asian play, it’s not a black play, it’s just a play. 
I think by (.) the mere fact of not recogiising that this is a play about the experience of 
kind of black British people 
I: mlim 
[...]
PB7: the script is so heavily about (.) ehm black and Asian experience, (.) yet he is not 
directing it in that way, he’s not seeing it in that way [....]
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PB7:Yeah, not acknowledging my perspective, and a lack of cultural understanding, a 
lack of of of not understanding my perception and seeing black British people as the 
same as white British people and not saying that the experiences are different, and so 
the images we are showing back on ourselves.
Critical to his account was the artistic director’s comment “this is not an Asian 
play, it’s not a black play, it’s just a play” which reflected his behaviour, i.e. he ignored 
the relevant stage recommendations. As can be seen in the analysis box, PB7’s 
interpretation included both a negative second order ToM inference (2) and the 
inference that the agent perceived him as a black person (3). The participant 
subjectively felt that his choice of self definition and the definition of his experiences, 
were denied. This represents a sub-category of the denial of agency, which Reicher 
(2001) has highlighted as a central component of racism.
Box 10.3.
Sentence Formal notation Emergent character
1. “the mere fact of not 
recognising that this play is 
about the experience of 
kind of black British people
S (bel) — Apowerful 
white" (not
recognising) -  8 
(int/meaning) [a  
play about the 
experience of kind 
of black British 
people]
2nd order ToM 
negative Inference 
S’ inference of A’s lack 
of acknowledgement of 
S’s intention
2. “not acknowledging my 
perspective, a lack of 
cultural understanding, a 
lack of not understanding 
my perception.."
8 (bel) — Apowerful white
-(no t
acknowledging) -  S 
(my perspective)
2nd order ToM 
negative inference. S’s 
inference of A’s lack of 
acknowledgement of 
S’s independent mental 
perspective 
2nd order ToM
3. "...seeing black British 
people as the same as 
white British people..."
8 (bel) > A (seeing 
as) > Singroup (as the 
same as outgroup}





Different to the previous extracts was that here, the agent’s mental perspective 
was directly challenged in a confrontation. Hence, the ‘strength’ of the claim involving 
negative second order Theory of Mind inferences became more intense: “not being 
aware” turned into “not recognising” and then “not acknowledging my perspective”.
Jo k e s  and ridicule
The next extract describes a common practice of intimidation: racist jokes and 
ridicule. In this example, this practice was paired with the attribution that the agent did 
not reflect upon the way his own actions might be perceived by the victim. The episode 
was told by PB7 who we intioduced in the previous episode. Here, he described how as 
a schoolboy, he felt intimidated by a white supply teacher.
Extract 10.4 “Sit down Sing, Shah, Patel, whatever your name Is”
PB7 [...] my experiences with a white teacher is , there’s a white teacher when I was at 
school, I was at the back of the class, standing up, mavbe been a bit noisy, he said “sit 
down Sing Shah Petel, whatever your name is”. He’s a supply teacher, he doesn’t know 
me. He said “sit down Sing Shah Patel” which is an experience [...]
So that is about my interaction with white people, but he’s at the front of the classroom, 
and I was shocked. I was only about..kind of eleven, twelve, maybe, (.) and I was 
shocked, and 11 didn’t react, and I haven’t reacted up until now, he’s probably still 
teaching somewhere, hope not, but maybe he is.
I: Why would you think he just did that?
PB7: Elim..I haven’t ...why did he say that? I (..) he he found it quite funny, saying “sit 
down Sing, Shah, Petel” and he had a little smile on his face, right, this was a funny 
thing to say so he didn’t see it as being ...although it was racist and offensive, he didn’t 
see it as that.
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The analysis shows the contrast between the participant’s own interpretation of 
the teacher’s behaviour and his inference of how the agent perceived this same 
behaviour. PB7 inferred that the teacher intended to be funny or thought of his 
behaviour as being funny, unaware that others, specifically PB7 himself, could perceive 
his remark in a different way. Implicit in the remark “he didn’t see it as offensive” was 
the inference that the teacher lacked reflexive awareness of his own behaviour, and the 
effect he produced on his pupil (being shocked).
Box 10.4.
Sentence Formal notation Emergent character
1. “1 was shocked” 1. S- (shocked) 
[A’behaviour], and
8’ mental state about A’s
behaviour
0-ToM
2. “it was racist and
offensive..”
implicature
“1 found his behaviour racist 
and offensive"
S-> A’s behaviour {as 
offensive}
Attribution of a mentalistic 
trait, 1®* order ToM
3. "He found it quite 
funny.."
S-> A (think/ intend) -> A 
(funny)
order ToM: 8’s inference 
of A’s mental perspective 
about A’s behaviour
4. “He didn’t see it as 
[offensive]...”
8 -> A (didn’t see it as) -> 
{offensive}
2"^  order negative ToM 
inference: S’s inference 
that A did not perceive A’s 
behaviour from 8’s 
perspective
Denial of an ou tg roup’s  “privileged inform ation” a s  a trustw orthy  so u rce  
of know ledge”
In the following episode, PB9, the informant already introduced in extract 10.1., 
recounted two related experiences she made as a school girl. The episode was
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introduced as her first realisation of discrimination. Of interest is that PB9 minutely 
detailed the origins of her own mental perspective about the two matters of dispute -  
her family’s housing situation in Jamaica in the first incident and the history of 
colonisation in the second one. Borrowing the term from the classic false belief 
scenario, her perspective was based on ‘privileged information’, that is information 
unshared by other agents. She explicitly detailed the source of her privileged 
information, which also seiwed the purpose of rhetorically validating her account. This 
consisted of a recent personal trip to Jamaica with her mother. There, relevant 
information was communicated to her through an eyewitness, her gr eat-grandmother 
who was born at the end of slavery but had still experienced life in bondage. PB9 
declared the information she had as unshared by her comment that they “only ever learn 
British history here”. Against this background, she recounted how upon return from her 
holidays, a classmate provoked her with the comment “did you swing in the trees and 
live in mud huts?” When probed, PB9 suggested two parallel reasons for the girl’s 
comment, both of which involved first order ToM inferences: “as a joke to everybody”, 
and “because she really believed it”. PB9’s response that “the housing is much nicer 
than here” was dismissed as a lie, crucially not only by the schoolgirl but subsequently 
also by her class teacher. PB9’s cential claim was that the value of her description, 
which challenged white people’s stereotypic perception of Jamaicans, was denied.
The character of the episode contrasts with previous ones in that here, it was not 
the agent’s behaviour that was at issue but the speaker’s behaviour, hi a second related 
experience, PB9 recounted how she, as a child, stood up in school and directly 
challenged her teacher’s hegemonic beliefs about black people.
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Extract 10.5. She said 1 was lying
PB9: [...] well, she [the teacher] said that White people were the first people who 
(were) on the Westindian Islands, and prior to that there were savages. And ehm, she 
said in Africa, there were savages, and ehm, in Asia, there were savages 
[••.]
I said in a child way I said to her ‘oh no, they had factories before. We knew they had 
factories before and eh (.) the British people went over there and stopped them fr om 
having the factories, and the one thing is there were Indian people living there, and 
Christopher Columbus wiped them out, I think that’s wrong (all in a fairly emotional 
loud voice).’ (Then, in a low voice) I got suspended from school.
[ • • • ]
PB9: She said I was lying, she told me to get up, I never forget it, she GRABBED me 
out of my seat, and said “how dare you to be so rude, [name of participant]”, and eh, 
she marched me to the headmaster, ( ) and eh (.), he asked me what happened, 
and he told me he couldn’t have that kind of behaviour in school.
[...] I said T was not lying, but I told him about my grandmother, and her mum, told 
him my great-grandmother was an African and my grandfather, my Great-grandfather, 
my grandfather was an Afr ican, my Great-grandfather was an elim a plantation-owner, 
and. .he said I was lying, anyway, they suspended me (..) and sent me home.
As in the previous part of the episodes, PB9 was consistently and by multiple 
parties, all of which were in a position of power over her, accused of lying. A lie 
involves the inference that a speaker intended to make someone else believe something 
to be X while at the same time s/he knows x not to be true (Winner & Leekam, 1991 ; 
Sullivan et al, 1995). Whilst in previous episodes, participants accusations of racism 
related to a negative second order ToM inference with the agent’s behaviour as the 
prepositional content, as shown in Box 10.5, here we find a negative second order ToM
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inference related to the speaker’s behaviour. In other words, PB9’s own independent 
representation of reality was categorically denied and dismissed as a lie. Another 
interesting feature of this episode was that it shows the consequences of an attempt by a 
powerless person to challenge the hegemonic belief system of the powerful. The 
teachers swiftly implemented their power by suspending the black child from school. 
That the power relation was not only one between pupil and teacher, but between black 
and white was implied in the final part of the narrative episode in which her mother 
attempted to come to her defence. “[...] And he [the head teacher] told her to remove all 
her children from the school.”
Box 10.5.
Sentence Formal notation Emergent character
1. “She said that white 
people..before that there 
were savages."
8 (bel) > Aoutgroup > (pub 
rep) -> A2.
8’s recounting of the 
Outgroup’s mental 
perspective (as public 
representation) about 3’  ^
agents (savages, White 
people). Contradicts!:
2. “1 said to her 'no....'" 8 (pubrep) > [negating A’s 
pubrep)
8’s (public representation) 
about 3"^  ^agents (savages, 
white people)
3. She said/ he said 1 was 
lying
8 (bel) -> Avvhite outgroup (say)- 
> 8 [lying], implies 
8 (bel) > A (neg. bel) > 8 
(bel X + 8 Int make bel_> A 
not x)
S’s inference of A’s 
dismissal of the truth value 
of her perspective, negative 




Essed (1991) argued diat problematization represents one of the main forces of 
racism. Locating the problem in the personal or cultural nature of the outgi oup provides 
fuel for the dominant group to rationalise and legitimise marginalisation and differential 
treatment. One notorious form of problematization is to pathologise black people. This 
can be reflected in ideas of cultural pathology or the attiibution to blacks of pathological 
personalities. By drawing on the idea that social deprivation causes black people to 
develop ‘damaged personalities’, reactions of Blacks to oppression and racism are often 
devaluated as ‘oversensitive’ or ‘overemotionaT.
In the next episode, PB9 recounted an experience at the Victoria and Albert museum. In 
the first part, she gave a detailed description of her enquiry about a particular post card 
in the museum shop, to which an employee gave her a series of rude responses. At issue 
was her inference that he behaved in such a rude manner because he did not want to 
serve her as a black woman. Her inference was explained as “this is a black woman’s 
experience all the time, isn’t it?”, but upon probing she was more specific. She related 
her obseiwation that she was the only black person in the queue with the impression that 
he was “being accommodating and polite to everyone else”, until it came to her. When 
she confronted the employee with her inteipretation of his behaviour, he denied having 
acted in a racist way: “He said ‘I don’t like you as a customer’”. Most relevant is the 
second part of the episode in which PB9 recounted how she approached the manager, 
and asked her to call the employee and to get him to apologise to her, but the manager 
firmly refused to do so. The encounter took an unexpected turn through the intervention
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o f  another customer, a “w hite very m iddle class w om an” w ho had overheard the dispute 
and defended P B 9 ’s position.
Extrac t 10.6. Experience a t the  m useum : “sh e  sa id  I w as a problem ”
PB9: [imitating a white customer speaking to the manager] I THINK YOU’RE 
BEHAVIOUR IS UNACCEPTABLE AS WELL! I THINK YOU SHOULD CALL 
HIM! And she called him. And the only reason why she called that man was because a 
white woman batted in. ( ) She said I was a problem. And that would have been it. But 
in the minute that white woman batted in, because she was a white woman and she was 
very middle-class as well,..
I: right
PB9:..she had to take note that this was a problem. She had to take note that I wasn’t 
causing the problem in the store 
[...]
[...] what I thought was she objected (...) to a black woman speaking to her in that 
manner, and she objected to me being articulate and being able to articulate myself very 
well,
I: right
PB9 : 1 think that was one of her objections, I think what she thought was because the 
media had quite often a negative, and for years, they had a very negative view of the 
black community, they are expected to be lou:d, and ...lots of noise, and..into dmgs, and 
all that, with every conununity, cause it’s small..and so, because I was being articulate, 
because I wasn’t very raising my voice, because I was explaining in a very articulate 
way what had happened, I wasn’t accepting what she had said as a white woman, 
because a black woman ( ) actually accept, because I thought that as black people , we 
are the least listened to in the society, and black women especially, black men are not 
listened to, but black women are the least listened to in society, and I thought she 
thought that you know, but you ( ) I thought that she was totally dismissing me, my 




Sentence Formal notation Emergent character
1. “She said 1 was a 
problem."
S (bel) -> A1 (said) S [Is 
a problem]
Inference of other’s non- 
mentalistic explanation of 
8’s behaviour
2, "What I thought was 
she objected to a black 
woman speaking to her In 
that manner...”
8 (bel) -> A1 (object) -> 8 
[behaviour: speaking 
articulate] > A
S’s 2"'* order negafiveloM 
Inference: inference of A’s 
state of mind: objecting 8
2a. Implicature:
She saw me as a black 
woman
8 (bel) -> A1 (perc as) -> 8 
{as a black person}
=> 8’s Inference of A’s 
stereotypical representation 
of 8 as a black person
3. “They had a very 
negative view of the 
black community."
8 (bel) Aoutgroup(bel) S 
(neg view/ expectation) -> 
Afngroup = black people [sttrlbute. loud]
order ToM awareness of 
Meta-stereotype, 
perception of outgroup 
representation of Ingroup 
as
4. “1 think what she 
thought was because the 
media...”
8 (bel) -> A 1  (bel) -> Abiack
people
PB perceives A as an 
outgroup member
5. “A black woman 
actually accepts”
8  (bel)-> Aoutgroup (sxp) -  
Ingroup (accept) [the view 
of outgroup?]
2"'^  order ToM awareness 
of meta-stereotype which 
implies attribution of a state 
of mind
6. “1 thought she was 
totally dismissing me, my 
point of view and my 
views."
8 bel) -> A (dismissing) -> 
8, and 8 (point of view)
2"“ order ToM Inference of 
agent’s dismissal of own 
perspective
Central to this episode is the relation between PB9 and the manager. At issue 
was PB9’s attempt to complain about the shop assistant’s allegedly racist behaviour 
towards her. Here, she did not need to infer how the manager evaluated herself and her 
account, as this was made public: “[the manager] said I was a problem”. PB9 used 
meta-stereotypes to justify the inference that the agent dismissed her mental 
perspective. This infeiTed view, which pathologised PB9 provided the manager with a 
justification for “not responding”. If PB9 herself constituted the problem, then the 
intrinsically coherent conclusion was that there was no other issue to be confronted.
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And indeed, her account showed that her complaint in itself was to no avail. The 
acknowledgement of her perspective was only achieved through the unexpected support 
of a bystander, identified as a “white very middle class woman”. In this episode, the 
inferred denial of one’s own perspective was crucial for the participant’s subjective 
interpretation of why she was being pathologised.
Denial of racism
Some forms of pathologising that were previously discussed, such as alleged 
‘oversensitivity’ or ‘paranoia’ on the part of minority groups, often overlap with another 
insidious feature of racism: the denial of racism. Particularly relevant in societies that 
ostensibly reject racism, the denial of racism serves the peipetuation of suppression by 
obscuring the experience of racism in the lives of minority groups (Essed, 1991). The 
following episode is extracted from an interview with PA8. Contact with PA8 was made 
at the Stephen Lawrence Conference where he acted as a translator for a Chinese victim 
of institutional racism. The character of this interview differed fi-om the others in that 
the interviewee predominantly did not talk about personal experiences and instead about 
a wealth of experiences with racism accumulated over the past seventeen years as the 
Chinese communal worker. One of the narrative themes that incoiporated a large part of 
the interview was that “the police is not taking serious the complaints by the Chinese”, 
as the police claims that there is no racism against the Chinese. “They have family, 
mind their own business, they don’t cause riots, so they are good people”.
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PAS described that white people, particularly youth offenders, regard Chinese 
people as easy targets (“they see the Chinese as vulnerable”). In his account, white 
people’s actions were enabled by their knowledge of the ‘the system’, which includes 
an awareness of institutional racism within the police. This perpetuated the Chinese’ 
vulnerability, who were already vulnerable through language difficulties, lacking 
knowledge of the system, and relative social isolation. He suggested that white youths 
become increasingly aware of their power over the Chinese through repeated offences 
that do not result in real consequences for them, such as charges by the police. PAS 
suggested that the white youths reflect on the impact of their actions. However, in his 
account they do not consider the impact of their behaviour on the victims, the Chinese 
or Asian, but on the (more powerful) police.
In one episode, PAS described how white youths attacked a Chinese fish and 
chips shop in Peckenham on four subsequent days over the Christmas period. On the 
first day, about 20 youths came to the shop, tore apart the Christmas decoration, 
shouting racial abuse. The shop owner called the police; the police came while the 
youths were still there, spoke to the owner, but did not arrest anybody. Over the next 
three days, the attacks became increasingly more violent, and although the police came, 
the youths were not aiTested, as the Chinese could not identify them. PAS commented 
“they (the police) are aware of the pattern”. The worst incident occuiTed on New Year’s 
Eve. In anticipation of the youths’ return, the shop owners deliberately closed the shop 
earlier. Indeed, the youths came back, broke the window and the door, shouting racial 
abuse. PAS described that the owners “inside the shop, just stood there, just stood and
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cried”. They then phoned PA8, who subsequently infoimed the police about the pattern. 
He phoned them on four consecutive days in the new year, but “they didn’t even return 
my call”. Only when he then contacted the head of the race and crime office of 
Scotland Yard, was the attack being taken seriously. As PA8 put it: “the following day 
they installed a pen alaim and .. .within two weeks they arrested people.” Most pertinent 
to PA8 were the reactions of the police.
Extract 10.7. Racism from the attackers and the police
So when they [the police] know that people who know that system intervene they start 
to take it serious. So what it really means is that they have the power, they can do 
things, but they, the police decided not because they know that these people, a lot o f 
them don’t know the English, and they don’t know the system, they are likely to get 
into trouble
I: But who would be getting into trouble?
PA8: But I’m talking about the police. The police, the police you know, they don’t take 
action, right, first, they’re likely to get away with this as well. They have a duty to 
intervene and protect, but not carrying out their duty, it’s against the law. So I say 
racism is both from the attacker and from the police.
His inference was phrased in conditional terms. “When they know that people 
who know the system intervene they start to take it seriously.” The implication is made 
explicit subsequently. “[..] the police decided not [to take it serious] because they know 
that these people, a lot of them don’t know the English (...)”. Following the method 




Sentence Formal notation Description of character
1. “The police is not taking 
serious the complaints by 
the Chinese”.
=> transformation: take It 
serious Into ‘acknowledge’
S (bel) -> Aou tgroup (neg bel) 
> Aingroup [complaints]
Neg order ToM
2. “So when they know that 
people who know that 
system intervene they start 
to take it seriously.” 
Transformation: take it 
serious « acknowledge 
Implicature: when they 
know that there are no 
people who know the 
system, they do not take it 
serious
P  (bel) > IF Apoiice (know)->
A "som eone who knows the system"(know) > [attack], then 
A poiice (acknowledge) 
A (C hinese) O r  A ch in ese  ( m e n t a l
attitude).
Implicature
P  (bel) > / F  Apoiice (know)->
A som eone who knows the system (negknow) > [attack], then 
A poiice (neg acknowledge) 
A(C hinese) experience or 
A ch in ese  (mental attitude).
Conditional 2"'* or 3''“ order 
ToM Implies negative ToM
to take it seriously”, as readers we need to infer his informative intention, they start to 
take seriously their concerns, or their experiences. Hence, for the accusation of this 
form of racism we found once again that the most pertinent inference was a negative 
second order mentalistic inference.
The content of examples of accusations of racism discussed in this section 
consisted of the inference that the perpetrator denied the speaker or the victim his or her 
independent mental perspective. As for the first pattern identified, a quantitative 
analysis was performed in order investigate the fi equencies of this type of negative 
second order mental state inference in accusations of racism.
352
Chapter 10
10.3.1.4. Quantitative results II: comparison between frequencies o f second 
order ToM inferences o f others ‘ unawareness or denial o f own perspective in 
accusations o f racism and episodes not dealing with discrimination 
As shown in Table 10.4,, in 53.7% of accusations of racism, the participant 
infeiTcd that the agent was unaware of or denied the speaker (or a third person victim’s) 
his or her mental perspective, whereas this type of inference was only made in 13.1% 
cases that did not deal with discrimination. Following the procedure detailed in the 
previous quantitative analysis (see section 10.3.1.1.), for each participant proportions of 
negative ToM inferences were calculated separately for episodes in which an accusation 
of racism was made and other episodes in which discrimination was not at issue (see 
Table 10.5). A Wilcoxon signed rank test revealed that in the context of accusations of 
racism, participants inferred significantly more often that the peipetrator was unaware 
of or even denied them their independent mental perspective than when they accounted 
for experiences that did not deal with discrimination (Z= 2.38, N = 11,p  = .015, two- 
tailed).
A summary of those 19 cases of experiences with racism that did not involve 
this attribution, given in Table 10.6., shows that 11 of these cases were concerned with 
foims of ‘overt racism’; shouting racial abuse, or physical attacks combined with the 
shouting of racial abuse, as well as a half-serious threat in one case. In addition, eight 
cases of covert discrimination that did not involve the inference that the other denied the 
victim’s mental perspective all involved the inference that the ‘agent saw me as a black 




Table 10,4. Numbers and percentages of inferences that agent denied own/ third 




Explicit or Implicit 
inference 
S(bel)“> A1 (neg 
bel) S/A2 (bel) [x]
No such inference Total
S accusing A of 
racism
22 (53.7%) 19 (45.3%) 41
No direct reference 
to discrimination
8(13.1%) 53 (86.7%) 61
S discriminating 0 3(100%) 3
Discussion
discrimination
1 (10.0%) 9 (90.0%) 10
Total 31 84 115
Table 10,5, Proportions of participants’ negative first and second order ToM inferences 
in accounts of accusations of discrimination and in experiences not dealing with 
discrimination, means, standard deviations and ranges in brackets
N Mean SD Range
Proportion of negative 
ToM inferences in 
accusations of 
discrimination
I f .54 .41 (0 -1 .0 )
Proportion of negative 
ToM inferences in 
episodes not dealing with 
discrimination
11“ .15 .29 (0 -1.0)
® one missing case due to an interviewee not recounting an episode that dealt with an 
accusation of discrimination
 ^one missing case due to an inteiwiewee not recounting an episode that did not dealt 
with an accusation of discrimination
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Table 10.6. Quality of the 19 cases of accusations of racism in which the participant did 
not make the inference that the agent was unaware of! denied own or the victim’s 
mental perspective
Character of racism Frequencies
Overt discrimination 11
Shouting (racist) abuse 6
PW6: stranger shouting abuse on the street when realising that the
woman with whom she was walking along the street was her female
partner.
PW6: Witnessing a woman shouting racist abuse to a Turkish passenger 
on a bus
PW6: Racist comment made by a ‘friend’
PB9: driver shouting racist abuse to her from car 
PW11 : boy calling PW 11 as a boy ‘bloody Jew’
PB14: White students singing Hitler songs’ in pub in Oxford
Physical attack 4
PA8: physical attack on Chinese fish and chip show owner 1
PA8: physical attack on Chinese fish and chip shop owner 2 (episode
‘Identity parade’)
PA8: serious attack on Mr Wong, leading to him being permanently 
physically disabled
PA8: being personally attacked in the Underground in the 80s 
Other 1
PW17: Half-serious threat: we could give your job to an English person 
‘Covert discrimination’ 8
PB 16: job interview at Brighton
PB 16: job interview at Ammersham (and racist name calling by boys at 
train station)
PB 16: job interview at Hampshire
PB 16: parents trying to rent a flat in the 70s: ‘sorry, the flat is gone now’.
PB 9: viewing the white lady’s house
PB9: Curtain shop: you might want to look over there, there are the 
cheaper ones.
PB 14: excuse for racism in employment: “you’re too qualified ”.
PB14: being accused of stealing by the manager at the wine shop__________________
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In summary, this analysis suggests that with exception of overt forms of 
physical abuse, the accusation of racism implied either the inference that the perpetrator 
viewed the victim in racial categories (specifically in contexts in which another social 
or personal identity would be more appropriate) or involved negative second order 
Theory of Mind inferences. These involved on the first order level the inference that the 
outgioup member was unaware of, or more sti'ongly, denied the victim his or her own 
differing mental perspective.
10.3.2. Powerlessness and acting upon the perspective of the powerful
As stated earlier, the first part of our initial power hypothesis predicted the 
powerless to have relatively good and accurate insights into the mind of the powerful 
since it was argued that they might use such understanding of the powerful for the 
strategic purpose of adjusting their own behaviour. This shall be explored in the next 
section.
10.3.2.1. Qualitative analysis III: situated adjustment o f behaviour 
As a narrative theme, PA8 described the attitude of the Chinese community as 
“suffering in silence”, as feeling “powerless, helplessness, fear of retaliation”.
Extract 10.8. Identity parade
PA8:1 just had a case last Monday. Two white di’unken guys went into a fish and chip
shop, Chinese fish and chip shop, not buying anything, just shouting, throwing things,
“( ) Chinese, bum the shop down.”
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I: Bum the shop down?
PA8: were just shouting (...) the shop owner just sat there, did not answer a single 
word, just let them shout.
I: elim
PA8: (this usually their attitude), they just let them shout and after a while they go 
away. They they just go away, but after a while, they came back with a big stick ( ) 
the family, big stick, smashed everything in the shop.
I: really?
PA8: [hold the shop owner to the floor, and kicked him..on his bent..notliing. And the 
shop owner then rang me, told me what happened (and we) called the police. [He said] 
“And they asked me to do identity parade..what shall I do?” I say, "of course you go.” 
He says ‘if I do a parade, and they do a charge, they come back and beat me up.’ That’s 
the kind of vulnerability, of the isolation, fear of retaliation.
Box 10.8.
Sentence Formal notation Character
“He says ‘if 1 do a parade, 
and they do a charge, they 
come back and beat me 
up’.”
Transformation 
PA 8 thinks that the agent 
thinks that if he does the 
identity parade, he might 
cause the youth to get 
arrested which ultimately 
leads to their punishing 
him.
8 (bel) > A bel /7A 
behaviour x, then x cause 
y in A2
First order ToM attribution 
of agents reflective 
awareness of the impact of 
his own behaviour on 
perpetrators.
PA8 thinks that the agent 
thinks that one day the 
youth will want to retaliate
8 (bel) -> Aingroup (bel) -> 
Aoutgroup (dos) [retaliate
Aingroup]
2"'^  order ToM attribution of 




The episode did not involve any explicit mental state attribution of PA8. 
However, as discussed in section 9.2.3.8., the participant’s description of the shop 
owner’s behaviour, his refusal to do the parade, can be seen as indicative for his 
underlying Theory of Mind usage. Why did he refuse to do the parade, when the arrest 
of the peipeti'ators would apparently been in his own interest? From the perspective of 
the youths, the aixest would be a negative outcome. However, since they would not be 
imprisoned forever, the shop owner infened that they would want to retaliate, and he 
feared they might do so by beating him up. Even if the arrest in itself would be a 
desirable outcome for him, he already anticipated the attackers’ next step and adjusted 
his own behaviour accordingly.
The following extract illustrates the context dependence of power differentials. PW12 
was a white young professional male who described himself as “liberal middle class 
man. University education”. One of his narrative themes were his experiences as a 
minority member in Brixton (“I definitely feel like a minority down here”), an area in 
South London which has housed a high Jamaican population for the past thirty years. 
More specifically, he was aware of being accused by black people for ‘gentrifying the 
area’ (as Brixton has become an attractive area for ‘white tiendies’ which led to a 
sudden rise in house prices) and detailed how he wished to distance himself fiom that 
image. However, he assumed that for someone, who was driven out of the area because 
of mounting house prices, these subtle differences between himself and other white 
people would not have much meaning. The situated powerlessness that he discussed in 




Extract 10.9. ‘getting banged-into’ and ‘staring-each-other’ out scripts
.. .for instance if some white guy bash...passed me on the middle of a white area, I’d 
kind of feel, “what is your problem, what is that about?” whereas here, if a guy of 
another race did that, I’d just kind of., head down and walk off.
I: right.
PW12: And there’s a lot of that.
I: Aid why would you do that?
PW12: It’s fear.
[...] Oh, no no I would always be apologetic if I had done that, what I’m saying, if it 
happens to you, if someone bashes into you, and..some guy sort of go...(makes some 
gestures), oh sorry, you’d apologise straight away.
I: even if it was the other guy who..?
PW12: yeah, yeah, yeah. Always always. [..] yeah, because of a lot of the times, to 
avoid conflict.
[...]
Here, there’s a bit of a culture of oppression in young males, the whole kind of 
Jamaican thing about staring you out. Two men walking towards each other stiaight 
...who wants longest staling at the other, before looking away. That is a real kind of 
tradition thing, it’s a status thing, I mean, you know who glares the longest, who stares 
the longest, the first one who looks away has lost and you defer to the other, and he 
walks on and feels better then. Aid I can’t risk any involvement in that, and it’s 
pathetic.
[...] PW12: Well, first of all, that is a MASSIVE generalisation that I was making, but 
if we do isolate a particular moment, ( ) , and a strong possibility would be that he was 
doing it on purpose, whereas I know I definitely wasn’t doing it on purpose, and I 
would make every effort to get out of the way, whereas..I’m not so sure whether he 
would have done that..and given him the benefit of it now, but I also know that I’ve 
been through so many incidents like that on a daily basis, where I would just move out 
of the way for people, because you gonna get banged into..or whatever, and to even 
pretend that there would be a fifty-fifty element is nothing that these people would be 




Sentence Formal notation Character
1. “If some white 
guy... passed 
1a. A strong possibility 
would be that he was doing 
it on purpose”
If 8 (perc as)- [A{as white}] 
then X,
If 8 (per cas) -  [A{as of 
another race}] then y.
8 (bel) A (intention) [A’s 
behaviour towards 8]
0-order ToM, description of 
hypothetical scenarios;
1®* order ToM inference of 
outgroup member’s 
intention
1b. “To even pretend that 
there would be a 50/50 
element is nothing that 
these people would be 
interested in..." 
Transformation 
“they are not interested in 
only pretending that [...]”
8  (bel) Aoutgroup (neg. 
interest) ( pret) [x]
Awareness of outgroup’s 
state of mind: negative 
second order ToM
1c. 1 know 1 definitely 
wasn't doing it on purpose
8 (bel) 8 (neg intention) 
[8’s behaviour towards A]
1®* order reflexive 
awareness of own actions
Implicature
“1 know that he knows that 1 
know that he did it on 
purpose”
8 (bel)-> A (bel) -> 8 (bel)
A (intention) [A’s behaviour]
3rd order 2"'^  person ToM 
inference
The infoimant engaged in Geertz’s (1973) ‘thick description’. Just as Ryle’s 
hypothetical boys could differentiate between a blink and a burlesque wink, so PW12 
was aware of the cultural meaning associated with ‘ staring-each-other-out’, a symbol of 
dominance. In the related ‘banging into’ scenario he showed awareness of the “strong 
possibility” that this behaviour was intended to be a provocation on the part of a 
hypothetical and stereotypical Jamaican male. The subsequent apology of PW12 was 
hypocritical, as he knew that in fact it was the Jamaican who had shoved him and not 
vice versa and that if anything it would have been up to the other one to apologise. He 
knew that the other knew that too. Still, he apologised, signalling to the other that he
360
Chapter 10
ostensibly accepted his superiority at which he privately did not believe. In other words, 
he acted upon the infeiTed expectation of the other regarding his own behaviour.
10.3.2.2. Qualitative results IV: cultural assimilation as a strategy to avoid 
racial discrimination
The next extract shows that inferences of the states of mind of the powerful can 
affect own behaviour even to a more profound degree. The example involved PB9’s 
account of her mother’s not allowing PB9 and her siblings to speak their mother tongue.
Extract 10.10: Speaking English to assimiiate into the system
PB9: She she was aware [of the problem o f racism], but she wouldn’t think that we 
would encounter them, she thought because tliat black children, cause we spoke the 
language,
I: right




PB9:..because like although we weren’t allowed to speak our mother tongue at home, 
because she didn’t want us to, because she thought if  we learnt, i f  we spoke that way 
all the time, then we would be more discriminated against, like her [...]
It appeared that not allowing her children to speak their mother tongue was used 
as a measure intended to prevent them from becoming the target of white people’s 
racism that she herself had experienced. It seems that she made the inference that by 




Sentence Formal notation Emergent character
1. “she was aware of [the 
problem of racism]
1. S (bel) > mother 
(aware)-> [problem of 
discrimination] (1.239), and
S’s inference of mother’s 
awareness of external 
problem
2. If we spoke that way 
[mother tongue] all the 
time, then we would be 
more discriminated 
against, like her
2. S (bel) > mother (bel) - 
> [outgroup discriminate 
against her more because 
she did not speak English]
Conditional involves 
implicature: mother’s self 
reflexivity upon the 
reasons for which she was 
being discriminated 
against
3. She thought because 
we spoke the language we 
would assimilate
3. S (bel) > mother (neg 
bel) > [problem for 
children, because children 
speak the language] (1. 
239), and
S’s inference of mother’s 
desire to prevent that this 
problem affects her 
children
4. “If we learnt, if we spoke 
the languae all the time, 
we wouldn't be 
discriminated against, like 
her"
4. S (bel) > mother (bel) - 
>{if children speak mother 
tongue, then they’ll be 
more discriminated 
against, and if children 
speak English, then they’ll 
assimilate and experience 
less discrimination}, 
therefore
S’s Inference of mother 
entertaining alternatives
5. Implicature 5. S (bel) > mother (bel) - 
>{if children speak mother 
tongue, then they’ll be 
more discriminated 
against, and if children 
speak English, then they’ll 
assimilate and experience 
less discrimination}, 
therefore
1®' order inference of 
mother’s belief about 
hypothetical alternatives
speaking English as a first language, they would be perceived as ‘Black British’ and 
therefore more likely to be accepted. The example indicates that members of a 
powerless group act upon the perceived mental perspective of a more powerful
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outgi'oup, and that this awareness of the powerful’s mental perspective affects own 
behaviour at a persistent and profound level.
10.3.2.3. Quantitative analysis o f the relation between power relations, ToM
and social action
A quantitative analysis was conducted to explore the relation between power relations, 
participants’ Theory of Mind inferences and the outcomes of social interaction. For this 
analysis, we first coded for each nanative episode the power relation between self 
(participant) and other according to the criteria presented in section 10.1. In a second 
step, for each participant the numbers of episodes in which s/he was defined as 
powerful/ less or in a neutral relation with other(s) was noted. As the dependent 
variables, we noted the fiequencies to which participants acted upon own belief-desires, 
were obstructed in acting upon own belief-desires or acted upon the other(s) beliefs. A 
further category was reserved for episodes of which the outcome of an interaction was 
not discussed. To account for the varying numbers, to which participants were 
characterised in the three power relations across episodes comprising one inteiview, 
proportions were calculated. These are shown in Table 10.7. However, since only three 
participants talked in a total of six episodes about encounters in which they construed 
themselves as powerful, this category was excluded fi'om the subsequent analysis.
Using Wilcoxon signed rank tests, it was found that when being in a situation of 
powerlessness, the possibility to act upon one’s own mental perspective was 
significantly more often obstructed than when the relation between self and other was 
defined as neutral (Z = -2.20, N =11,/? = .027, two-tailed). Moreover, compared to
363
Chapter 10
Table 10.7. Proportions to which participants characterised as powerless, powerful or in 
neutral relations acted upon own belief-desires, were obsti’ucted in acting upon their 
own belief-desires, acted upon others’ belief desires or talked about experiences with 
undetermined outcomes.






















Self powerful 3 .50 (.50) 0 .17
(.29)
.25 (31)
participants in neutral relations, a trend was found for the predicted tendency of 
powerless participants to act upon the mental perspective of those in power (Z = -1.57, 
N = ll,/> = .07)\  However, unexpectedly, there were no differences in the extent to 
which under both conditions participants acted upon their own belief-desires (Z = -9.71. 
N =  11,/? = .33).
1 Since we predicted an effect of power on subsequent ‘actions as from the perspective of the other’, it 




With this study we set out to explore whether social contextual variables might 
affect Theory of Mind usage. Whilst our initial aim was to compare Theory of Mind 
usage in different power relations, the interview material allowed us to study mainly a 
related phenomenon: Theory of Mind usage in the accounts of discrimination.
To what extent could a Theory of Mind approach contiibute to our understanding of 
racism beyond what we had known before about this phenomenon? In summary, the 
study suggests that Theory of Mind usage constitutes a relevant cognitive process for 
participants’ subjective understanding of experiences of discrimination. Two specific 
patterns of Theory of Mind usage were related to the accusation of discrimination. 
Firstly, Theory of Mind seemed to play a major role in the process of subjectively 
establishing an act as racist. Secondly, the content of a large proportion of accusations 
of racism involved participants’ second order negative mentalistic inferences. This 
particular type of ToM inference involved an awareness of the perpetrator’s (differing) 
mental perspective in which was embedded the inference that s/he in turn was unaware 
of, did not understand, did not recognise, or actively denied the victim’s own mental 
perspective. This latter finding lent indirect support to the second part of our initial 
power hypothesis that predicted that those in power (the one who enacts discrimination) 
might have a diminished awareness of the mind of the powerless (his or her victim). It 
was shown that this same mechanism operated at different levels and across different 




We reasoned that not taking the victim’s mental perspective would be of 
stiategic use for the perpetrators, seiwing as a cognitive tool to rationalise existing 
inequalities and to justify own present and future actions. The qualitative analysis lent 
preliminary support to this suggestion. For example, problematizing PB9 seiwed the 
museum manager as a justification for not engaging in any action. The schoolteachers 
were able to sustain their hegemonic beliefs about the “savages” in the West Indies by 
calling the pupil who attempted to challenge this view a liar. On an institutional level, 
proclaiming that racism against certain ethnic groups does not exist perpetuated the 
Chinese’ vulnerability for racial attacks. The quantitative analysis showed that whilst in 
the context of accusations of racism, negative first and second order ToM attributions to 
the perpetrator were significantly more frequent than in the accounts of other kinds of 
experiences, they were only made in about half of all incidents. Does this challenge the 
suggestion that the inference of the other’s denial of one’s own perspective represents a 
substantial part of the expeiience of discrimination? A closer inspection of the character 
of these experiences revealed that all incidents in which such an inference was not 
found involved forms of overt racism (e.g. shouting racist abuse, or racially motivated 
physical abuse). By conti ast, of the interview material in total, most of the incidents of 
discrimination discussed were ‘covert’, as for example, when a customer fi.*om a 
minority group is treated with less respect than a white customer or when a white job 
applicant receives preferential treatment. This high proportion of ‘covert’ cases is not 
suiprising given that on the whole, Britain, like other European and American societies, 
has politically subscribed to ‘cultural pluralism’. The point is that when we distinguish 
between episodes dealing with accusations of ‘covert’ and ‘overt’ forms of racism, and
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only consider the ‘covert’ experiences, then the frequencies of negative second order 
ToM inferences augments to more than 75% of incidents. Possibly, when faced with a 
blatant physical attack, the action speaks for itself and requires little interpretative effort 
from the victim. True, episodes of covert discrimination also entail a negative, often 
unexpected outcome for the victim, yet the action per se does not seem to constitute the 
prime focus of the victim’s accusation. Rather, at the centre of the accusation appear to 
be considerations of the perpetrator’s states of mind that motivated his/ her actions.
Furtheimore, the study explored one facet of our initial power hypothesis that 
predicted the powerless not only to be motivated to take the mental perspective of those 
in power, but also to use this information to adjust their own actions (for example, in 
order to avoid the powerfuls’ punishment). The qualitative analysis showed that a 
number of participants used their understanding of those construed as powerful for such 
strategic purposes. For example, PW12’s account suggested that in the context of 
situated powerlessness, he used his insights into the mind of the Jamaicans strategically 
and acted according to other’s expectations from him. Further examples showed that 
people who were in broad areas of their lives members of a minority group employed 
this ‘strategic component’ at an even more profound level. For example, PB9’s mother 
insisted on her children speaking English in order to assimilate and avoid 
discrimination. PB 16 recounted that ageing, perceived from her personal and Nigerian 
cultural perspective as positive and associated with higher status, became a negative 




However, a subsequent quantitative analysis suggested that this strategic usage 
of the others’ mind was overall not very frequent. Instead, the most common outcome 
for the powerless was the obstruction of own beliefs. This was to be expected, as power 
differentials entail by definition (see Dépret & Fiske, 1996; Rodgiiguez-Bailon et al., 
2000 and Chapter 8) the extent to which one has conti’ol over the outcomes of the other. 
Moreover, we only found a trend for participants in powerless situations to act more 
often upon the mental perspective of those in power than when in ‘power-neutral’ 
conditions. Whilst this result does not lend support to our prediction, it cannot be seen 
as challenging it either. We simply lacked the relevant dimension of comparison, 
namely the extent to which those in power acted upon the mental perspective of the 
powerless. That also in ‘neutral’, mainly interpersonal relations, people are willing to 
take the other’s mental perspective and act from that, is consistent with the more global 
‘relevance’ hypothesis, as laid out in Chapter 8. This suggested that as soon as the other 
is perceived as relevant to oneself, he or she might be more inclined to attempt to 
understand the world through the other’s eyes. However, it is possible that participants 
in the ‘neutral’ relations acted from others’ perspectives for different reasons. The 
motivation might not have primarily been the strategic benefit, but rather a ‘true’ 
concern about the other.
Before turning to a discussion of implications of this study, it is necessary to 
note a number of limitations. Obviously, the material did not permit us to fully test our 
hypotheses -  we simply lacked the ‘powerful’. This might be partially related to the 
cover story and the context of the study. Initially, it was assumed that in the context of
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ethnic relations, white people might be more often relatively powerful in relation to 
African Caribbean and Asians. Perhaps the ‘cover story’ was not suitable for attiacting 
‘the powerful’. Firstly, the response of white English people was overall much poorer 
than the response fr om people of other ethnic backgiounds. Secondly, it appeared that 
we recruited only a certain type of white participant, namely those white English people 
who consti'ued themselves as liberal-minded and found the issue of exploring the notion 
of a multi-cultural society interesting enough in order to devote 1-2 hours of their spare 
time for it. Perhaps related to the second argument, we found that thirdly, white 
participants did not construe themselves significantly more often as powerful than black 
and Asian participants. They either talked about experiences in which power was not at 
issue or construed as about equal, or even in the context of ethnic gi'oup relations, also 
positioned themselves as powerless. While these characteristics rendered it impossible 
to fully explore our initial aim with the present interview material, especially the latter 
finding supports the notion of the power construct as situated and flexible. Moreover, 
despite efforts to recruit participants from diverse socio-economic backgrounds, with 
the exception of one participant, all were in higher education or professionals. On the 
one hand, this restricts the generality of the results. On the other hand, it suggests that 
experiences with racial discrimination cannot be reduced to class differences.
The limitations just discussed do not affect the extent to which this approach has 
been infoimative about how adults use Theory of Mind in practice. Although due to 
space limitation, this was not discussed in great detail, the extracts presented in earlier 
sections suggested that adults’ mentalistic inferences involved an appreciation of
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relevant cues given in the immediate environment, especially those picked up from 
others’ behaviour and prior knowledge. Participants were usually able to explain, 
paiticularly when being prompted, why they attributed to an agent a particular state of 
mind. ‘Mindreading indices’ included, for example, tone of voice (e.g. PB9 imitated the 
man’s “harsh tone of voice” when dealing with her at the museum) or body language 
(e.g. PB16 accounting for discrimination at a job interview: ‘she couldn’t see me in the 
eyes’). This suggests that in addition to the requirement of having a representational 
Theory of Mind, the adults also had to be ‘smart behaviour readers’ (Whiten, 1996), 
sensitive and quick in catching behavioural clues in an ongoing interaction in order to 
account for their experiences. Beyond this, in various instances participants also drew 
on their cultural knowledge to make mentalistic inferences. For example, PB9 argued 
that the landlady’s initial remark “you had better come in then” deviated from the 
canonical ‘visiting-a-house-script’, and PWl 1 could not have adjusted his behaviour, 
had he not had some knowledge of the ‘staring-each-other-out’ script. This supports the 
suggestion made in the first part of this thesis that cultural knowledge is necessary for 
appropriate Theory of Mind usage in practice.
In addition, the study suggested that ‘inside’ their naiTatives, participants rarely 
made ToM inferences computationally more complex than on the second order level. 
Instead, they often seemed to entertain different mentalistic inferences in parallel (e.g. 
PB9: “she said it as a joke and also because she believed it”). Furthermore, as shown 
notably in the categories ‘general talk’ and ‘examples’. Theory of Mind inferences were 
often embedded in hypothetical scenarios, including if-then constructions.
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In summary, the study was exploratoiy in character, and the interview material 
posed an immediate constiaint upon the initial aim of comparing Theory of Mind in 
different social relations. The initial question whether the powerful are really worse in 
taking and using the mental perspectives of the powerless than vice versa requires 
future research. Suggestions for possible ways to address this question and to overcome 
the limitations of the present study are postponed to Chapter 12, However, the interview 
material lent itself to study a related phenomenon, how Theory of Mind is used during 
the experience of social actions of discrimination. By deploying the method developed 
in Chapter 9, we could account for the richness of naturalistic talk and make 
comparisons of frequencies. The study showed that the quality and quantity of Theory 
of Mind talk differed when people consider episodes of situated powerlessness (that is, 
being discriminated against) from accounts of experiences in which they are equally 
powerful than the other. This suggests that Theory of Mind usage is flexible, depending 
upon the social relation between self and other. Moreover, mentalistic inferences seem 




D oes Po w er  A ffect  Th eo r y  of M in d  U sa g e ?
The  ‘Re a d in g  t h e  MiND in  th e  Ey e s  Ta s k
1.1. Introduction
The aim of the study presented in this chapter was to investigate directly and 
experimentally whether power differentials influence situated theory of mind 
deployment. Recall from Chapter 8 that we were specifically interested in the influence 
of group power, i.e one’s relative power derived from the membership of a discrete 
social gi'Oup in relation to members from a specific outgioup. As opposed to individual 
differences in power motivation, it was argued that group power might be most relevant 
to explore issues of collective action and social change (see Haslam, 2001). As detailed 
earlier, we did not expect powerless people to show an across-the-board superiority in 
understanding others’ mental states, but we expected those in a subordinate position to 
be specifically good at understanding the mental states of powerful others. In the same 
vein, those in power were expected to show only insensitivity in relation to the mental 
states of their subordinates.
The challenge for the operationalisation of this research question was to find a 
paradigm that required participants to infer mental states of others who were either more 
or less powerful than oneself. Within the Theory of Mind literature, most existing tasks 
were considered as unsuitable because they were either designed for testing Theory of 
Mind abilities at the level of preschoolers and/or used stories, in which the characters
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were unrelated to the participants. There was, however, one exception: the ‘Reading the 
Mind in the Eyes Task’ or, more briefly, the ‘Eyes Task’ (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; 
2001). This task was designed specifically with the aim of exploring more subtle 
cognitive dysfunctions in individuals at the very high-functioning end of the autism 
spectrum, as well as it has been used to measure subtle gender differences in Theory of 
Mind within the normal population. We felt that this task could be adapted for the 
present purposes.
11.1.1. The Reading the Mind in the Eyes task
By taking the metaphor of the eyes as a ‘windows to the mind’ seriously (Baron- 
Cohen, 1995), the Eyes Task consists of a series of photographs showing the eye region 
only. Participants are given four mental state terms amongst which they are required to 
make a forced choice (e.g. concerned, versus playful, serious, friendly).
Some authors (e.g. Jarrold et al., 2000) have remarked that this task does not measure 
representational Theory of Mind in the narrower sense, as it does not require one to 
make inferences about the content of mental states. However, the task taps into one 
aspect of Theory of Mind, namely to accurately identify and distinguish between 
different mental attitudes on the basis of cues given by the eye region only. It is seen as 
a ‘pure’ Theory of Mind task as other cognitive requirements, including the usual 
executive function component, are kept to a minimum. Moreover, although only tapping 
into the first order Theoiy of Mind level only, the Eyes Task is considered as measuring 
Theory of Mind at an advanced level. Firstly, the task requires one to have a lexicon of 
complex mental states and knowledge of the semantics of these teiTns. (In contiast to
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basic emotions, such as happy, sad, angry, complex mental states -  for example, 
surprise - involve attiibution of a cognitive state, such as a belief or intention to the 
person). Secondly, one needs to map the mental state terms onto fragments of facial 
expressions, and finally it is required to match the eyes in the picture to examples of 
expressions of eye-regions stored in memory and seen in the context of particular 
mental states.
The original version of the Eyes Task (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997) was validated 
against Happé’s (1994) ‘Strange Stories’ Task, then the only other available more 
‘advanced’ Theory of Mind task, pitched at the level of a normal 8-9 year old. However, 
several psychometric problems led the authors to revise the task (Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Hill, Raste & Plumb, 2001). The revised version of the test includes four 
modifications; (i) an increase in the number of test items, (ii) an increase in the number 
of forced-choice response options from two to four for each tiial, (iii) usage of complex 
mental states only, and (iv) in most of the trials, the target and three foil terms have the 
same emotional valence (e.g. serious vs. ashamed, alaxmed, bewildered). As reported by 
the authors, the new version has greater power, gives a broader range of scores, and 
decreases ceiling effects. Therefore, the test is assumed to be better able to distinguish 
between subtle ‘grey shades’ of mindreading differences.
11.1.2. Overview of study and predictions:
In this study we operationalised power by creating a simulated workplace 
environment (see also Rodriguez-Bailon et ah, 2000; Goodwin & Fiske, 1996, for 
similar paradigms) in which participants were allocated either to the position of
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supervisor or worker. Participants were made to believe that the photographs depicted 
either powerful supervisors or powerless workers with whom they were going to 
directly interact during the course of the experiment that allegedly studied ‘creativity in 
the work place’.
Our predictions were thus:
1. Powerless people will be better at reading the mental states of powerful outgioup 
members than of equally powerless ingi'oup members.
2. Powerful people will be better at reading the mental states of their ingioup members 
than of their powerless outgroup members.
3. There will be no difference between powerful and powerless people in identifying the 
mental states of their respective ingroup members of comparatively equal power.








+ = better performance 





Thirty-seven students (eight male, twenty-nine female) of the University of St 
Andrews took part in this study. Gender was balanced between supervisor and worker 
conditions. Ages ranged from 17 to 56 years (mean age: 21.24 years).
11.2.2. Task material
11.2.2.1. Eyes Task
Twenty-two photographs of Baron-Cohen et aTs (2001) revised version of the 
Eyes Task were used. On the basis of a pilot study with six students, fourteen eyes 
stimuli were excluded as especially the females either resembled models being 
professionally photographed for a magazine, or because students believed the 
photoglyphs to represent famous personalities.
Several modifications to the original procedure were introduced:
1. The eyes test was computerized.
2. Half of the photographs were labelled as supervisors, half of them were labelled as 
workers. Photogi'aphs of supeiwisor and worker eyes were presented in blocks. 
(Block 1 consisted of 11 supervisor stimuli, block 2 of 11 worker stimuli). The order 




3. Before each tiial, a mask appeared on the computer screen, saying “You will now 
see the eyes of one of your [the other] supervisors [workers]. The participant was 
verbally instiucted to press the space key for the photograph to appear.
4. Each photograph then appeared on the computer screen for 3 seconds only. In 
contiast to Baron-Cohen et aTs original procedure, the time limit was introduced to 
further minimise possible ceiling effects. Above and below each photograph, Baron- 
Cohen et al’s original target term and three foil terms were presented. An example 
of stimuli presentation is given in Figure 11.1.
5. Reaction time measure: The photograph then disappeared, leaving four buttons with 
one target and three foil terms. The paiticipant was free to take as much time as s/he 
wished to choose the teim that s/he thought best described the supervisor’s 
[worker’s] thoughts or feelings. The time that participants took to make their choice, 
however, was unobtrusively recorded by the computer, and provided a reaction time 
measure.
11.2.2.2. Attention measure
In order to explore whether potential group differences on the Eyes Task 
were related to attention processes, a separate attention measure was introduced. This 
consisted of self-descriptive questionnaires of supervisors and workers with whom 
participants were told to interact during the group session. Questionnaires were 
composed on the basis of a pilot study with 9 participants. Profiles included dominant, 
neutral and submissive person profiles, counterbalanced across supervisor and worker
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Figure 11.1. Example of Eyes Task stimuli
%
i n s i s t i n gcautious
The eyes picture was displayed in the middle of the screen and - together with the four 
mental state labels - was first presented for 3 seconds. The identity of the individual was 
clearly marked by the label ‘supervisor’ or ‘worker’, respectively. After 3 seconds, the 
photograph automatically disappeared, leaving the four labels only. Participants were 
instructed to click on the label that they felt best described the message displayed by the 
eyes of the target individual.
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identities. The time taken to examine each questionnaire was automatically collected by 
the computer and constituted the attention measure.
11.2.3. Procedure
11.2.2.1. Cover story: "Creativity at work”
The experiment was advertised (via sign-up sheets or intioduced at 
undergiaduate tutorial classes) as a study investigating the “effect of social dynamics on 
creativity at work”. Prospective participants were sent an initial e-mail in which they 
were told that the experiment involved two distinct parts: an ‘individual briefing 
session’ and the actual ‘group experiment’, comprising 6-8 gioup members. Students 
were told that the purpose of the individual briefing session was to explain in detail the 
procedure of the gi’oup experiment and his or her part in it, as well as to allow 
participants to exchange information about the other gioup members prior to the 
experiment. To this end, students were also asked to 1) complete a short self-descriptive 
questionnaire, and 2) to send the experimenters a photograph that ‘describes well who 
you are’. Both tasks served solely the puipose of enhancing the plausibility of the 
procedure as students received similar information about allegedly other group 
members at a later stage. The appointment for the group session was to be scheduled 
after the first part of the experiment. In reality, the whole experiment only consisted of 
the ‘individual briefing session’, with the present participant being the only person who 
took part in it.
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11.2.2.2. ‘Individual briefing session ’ - main experiment
Upon arrival in the laboratory, the participant was greeted and seated opposite to 
the experimenter. Several props were displayed in the laboratory (arrangement of chairs 
labelled either ‘supervisors’ or ‘workers’, pictures of students’ eyes and face parts hung 
up at the wall, tables of opaque gioup results, boxes with gear) to make participants 
believe that group experiments were actually taking place here.
The experimenter explained that the study aimed to look at whether social 
factors might impact on creativity in the workplace. To this end, it was sought to model 
a company in the laboratory. This company aimed to mimic two central features of real 
life organisations: firstly, it was pointed out that people hold different positions in 
companies (which referred to the power manipulation), secondly it was sti'essed that 
people at work know each other (which introduced the dependent measures).
Participants were told that each mock company would be divided into 3 ‘supervisors’ 
and 3 ‘workers’. Hereafter, the participant was given a sheet with his or her group 
identity as either a supervisor or worker. Instructions are summarised below and a full 
protocol is given in Appendix 11.1.
11.2.2.3. Power manipulation
Power was manipulated by telling participants in both groups that supervisors 
had the ability to control the workers’ outcomes in two ways. During the first part of the 
group experiment, supervisors as a panel would inteiview each worker for their ‘job 
aptitudes’. Supeivisors’ evaluations had real consequences for the assignment of 
workers to different types of tasks that varied in teims of their desirability and creative
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demands, A creative job involved, for example, inventing a slogan for a new product 
whilst an uncreative job required the worker to cross out every ‘t’ in a business letter. 
During the second part of the group experiment, workers were asked to caiTy out their 
respective tasks. The description highlighted that supervisors were in a position to enact 
their power by means of either rewarding a worker for particularly good performance or 
of penalising the worker for bad performance. At the end of these instructions, 
participants were encouraged to discuss any questions about the procedure of the gioup 
experiment.
11.2.2A. Dependent measures
To introduce the dependent measures, participants were told that in real 
organisations, people are to a certain degree familiar with their supervisors and 
subordinates. In order to make the study more realistic they would therefore now 
receive some information about the other supeivisors and workers. This information 
consisted of participants’ self-description as well as photographs. The participant was 
then led to a computer.
I" Eyes task
Participants were told that people often form their first impression about others 
by looking at them and that the eye region had been found to be most diagnostic. Taking 
up these insights, photographs of supervisors and workers were cropped, leaving the 
eye-region only. However, as social norms usually do not peimit us to stare at people 
endlessly, each photograph would be shown for three seconds. Participants were then
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told that above and below each picture, four words were given. They were asked to 
click on the word that the participant thought best described what the supeivisor or 
worker was thinking or feeling. A mask appeared before each stimulus that enhanced 
the salience of the identity of the target.
2- The attention measurement;
After completion of the Eyes task, participants were presented with the 
computerised questionnaires that they were told had been completed by other group 
members (three ingroup and three outgroup questionnaires). In addition to the reaction 
time measure, the attention measure was aimed to establish whether attention may serve 
as a ’co-cursor’ (Gomez, 2002) for mental inferencing. The questionnaires omitted 
names and other personal demographic infoimation, and only identified group members 
as worker 1,2,3 or supeivisor 1,3,4 (participants were always identified as worker no 4 
or supervisor no 2). Participants were only instructed to read thiough the six 
questionnaires in their own pace, and to click on a ‘next’ button once they had finished 
reading a questionnaire to go on to the next one.
3- Social identification and power manipulation checks
After completion of the two computerised tasks, participants were given a 
questionnaire assessing his or her social identification as a supervisor or worker. Three 
items were to be rated on 5-point Likert-type scales. The items were “How strongly do 
you identify yourself as a supeivisor [worker] in this experiment” (1= identify- 5=not
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identify), “I see myself as belonging to a group of supeivisors [workers]”, “I would 
rather not be a supervisor [worker]” (1= “sti’ongly agree -  5 = “strongly disagree”).
The following 5 items assessed the effect of the power manipulation.
“How much control do you feel you have over your own outcomes during the 
experiment?”; “How much control do you feel you have over the outcomes of the 
[other] supeivisors during the experiment?”; “How much control do you feel you have 
over the outcomes of the [other] workers during the experiment?”, “How much control 
do you feel the [other] supeivisors have over your outcomes in this experiment?”; and 
“How much control do you feel the [other] workers have over your outcomes in this 
experiment?” All items were to be rated on 7-point scales (ranging from 1= ‘strong 
conti'oT to 7 = ‘strong lack of control’).
4 - Check for suspicion
Upon completion of the questionnaires, the experimenter explained that -  as in 
many social psychological studies -  at the outset it was not possible to inform the 
participant in frill about all research aims. Participants were asked whether they had any 
idea about what else the study might be looking at, and whether anything had struck the 
participant so far. Hereafter, participants were given a debriefing sheet that fully 
summarised the real intent of the study and were encouraged to discuss any remaining 
questions (see Appendix 11.2). All participants expressed understanding about the 




The results are organised in two main sections. First, the results of the 
manipulation checks are discussed, i.e. whether participants suspected the real intent of 
the study, the degree to which they identified with the assigned supervisor versus 
worker identities, and the extent to which the power manipulation had worked for both 
groups. Then, the results of the Eyes Task and the Attention measure will be presented.
11.3.1. Suspicion
Four participants voiced suspicion as to whether the group experiment was 
going to take place, or spontaneously voiced doubts that they were going to meet the 
people whose photographs they had seen. One person had language difficulties and did 
not know some of the mental state teims. These participants were subsequently 
excluded from the data analysis, leaving 33 participants (16 supervisors and 17 
workers). Participants who only said in the final discussion, after having been informed 
about the real intent of the study, that they were unsure whether they would really meet 
the people in the photographs, were not excluded.
11.3.2. Social identification
To compute a total social identification score, the ratings on each of the three 
sub-scales were added up and divided by three. The third scale, which was negatively 
worded, was first reversed. If 1 represents strong identification and 5 strong 
disagieement with the assigned identity, group means show that the supeivisor gioup
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identified more strongly with their group (mean: 2.01) than the workers (mean: 2.67). 
An independent t-test revealed that this difference was statistically significant (t (31) = - 
2.69, p = .011).
11.3.3. Power manipulation
To check whether our intended power manipulation was successful, participants’ 
responses on the five scales were submitted to two separate analyses. Descriptive 
statistics are shown in Table 11.2.
11.3.3.1 Analysis of each offive sub-scales
a. Control over one *s own fate - We expected supervisors to feel highly in 
control over their own outcomes in this experiment, whilst workers should feel being 
controlled by the decisions of the supervisors. Although group means went into the 
predicted direction, workers still felt on average ‘slightly in control’ over their own 
outcomes, which precluded a significant gioup difference (^  (31)= -1.48,/? >.158).
b. Own control over others 'fate - As expected, workers felt that they had a 
slight lack of control over the fate of supervisors, whereas supervisors felt neutral to 
slightly in conti'ol over the outcomes of other supervisors. This difference was 
significant {t (31)= -3.90,/?< .001) Likewise, supervisors felt they had conti’ol over the 
outcomes of workers, whereas workers indicated that they were neutral to slightly 




c. Others ’ control over own fate - Contrary to expectations, the gi'oups did not 
differ in terms of the perceived degree of supervisors’ control over their own fate, {t 
(31) = 1.28, p  = n.s.). Inspection of the means showed that -  as intended- supervisors 
felt neutial about the level of control that other supervisors had over themselves, 
whereas workers felt to a slight extent being controlled by supervisors. It appears that 
the power manipulation was to some extent successful for the workers, but weaker than 
intended, which seems to have precluded a significant difference from the supervisors. 
As far as the perceived impact of workers’ control over one’s outcome was concerned, 
supeivisors perceived workers as slightly lacking conti'ol over themselves, whilst 
workers felt on average that the impact of fellow workers was neutral. Whilst this result 
is intuitively meaningful within the context of the experimental manipulations, the 
gi’oup differences remained once again non-significant (/ (31) = 1.5,/? = n.s).
11.3.3.2 Within-item comparisons
A second set of analyses, using repeated measures ANOVAs, compared the 
perceptions of the amount of control that supervisors versus workers had over the 
participant, and the amount of conti'ol the participant had over other supeivisors and 
workers in this experiment.
a. Supervisor vj. worker control over self - As expected, both groups felt that 
supeivisors had more conti'ol over oneself than workers, F (1, 31) =13.09, p <.001.
b. Self control over supervisor vs. worker - A significant main effect on target 
suggested that both groups felt that they had more conti'ol over other workers than other 
supervisors, F (1, 31) = 25.66, p < .001).
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Table 11,2. Means of supemsor and workers’ rating on the five power manipulation 



























As expected, no order-of-presentation effects were found. Although our sample 
was sti'ongly biased towards females, we also checked for possible gender differences. 
There were no group differences in teims of the number of coiTectly identified mental 
states of supervisors or workers.
11,3.4.1. Number o f correct stimuli
Of our main interest was whether supervisors and workers differed from one 
another in terms of the number of correctly identified mental state expressions of other 
supervisors and workers. Group means for conectly identified worker stimuli, 
supemsor stimuli, and the total number of stimuli are shown in Table 11.3.
First, a set of between-group analyses was conducted to see whether the workers 
and supervisors differed in terms of the number of coiTectly identified mental states of 
supeiwisors, workers or in terms of the total number of coiTect mental state 
identifications. As it will be recalled from Table 11.1, two main effects, on participant 
identify and on target identity, were predicted. Repeated measures ANOVAs showed a 
significant main effect on target identity (F (1, 31) = 3.89, p= .05). By contiast, there 
was no significant interaction effect (F (1, 31) = .80, p = .37). This suggests that overall; 
participants were better at identifying the mental states of the powerful supervisors than 
the relatively powerless workers.
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Table 11,3, Means of correctly identified supemsor, worker and total stimuli for the 









Supervisor 8.4 (1.6) 7.2 (1.6) 15.5 (2.7)
Worker 7.7 (1.7) 7.2 (1.5) 14.7 (2.9)
Total 8.0 (1.7) 7.2 (1.5) 15.3 (2.6)
Table 11,4, Reaction times (in seconds) for identifying supervisor stimuli, worker 
stimuli and in total for supervisor and worker groups (standard deviations in brackets)
— --.__Target 
Group identity""----^
RT Supervisor stimuli RT Worker stimuli RT Total
Supervisor 81.42 (36.96) 85.82 (39.17) 167.27 (67.57)
Worker 74.22 (22.67) 67.65 (20.11) 141.87 (39.22)
Total 77.92 (30.63) 77.0 (32.29) 154.92 (56.32)
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11.3.4.2. Reaction time on Eyes task
Reaction times are shown in Table 11.4. Repeated-measures ANOVAs showed 
that that supervisors took significantly longer than the workers to identify the worker 
stimuli (F (1, 31) = 6.5, p< .02). There was no effect of group identity on the time 
needed to identify the supervisor stimuli, {F (1,31) = .90, n.s.).
11.3.5. Attention measure
Inspection of the means shows that supervisors and workers virtually did not 
differ in terms of the time they spent attending to the self-descriptive profiles, neither in 
total nor when supervisor and worker profiles were considered separately.
Consequently, a repeated measure ANOVA with the within-subject factor ‘identity of 
attention stimuli’ yielded non-significant results for both main effect (F (1, 29) = .21, 
p -  .65) and interaction ( F (l, 29) = .931, = .344).
11.4. Discussion
The present study represents the first attempt to explore experimentally the 
possibility that social conditions might modulate Theory of Mind usage in practice. To 
summarise the results for the eyes task measure first: in line with our initial hypothesis, 
overall, participants were better at identifying the messages displayed by the eyes of 
supervisors than of workers. However, contrary to expectations, workers performed 




In the remaining part of this discussion we shall in turn discuss five factors that 
might have contributed to the results: 1) social identification (weaker for workers than 
for superivors) 2) experimental power manipulation (weaker for workers than for 
supeivisors), 3) potential problems associated to the procedure (i.e. artificiality, task 
presentation as detached from a real on-line interaction), 4) potential problems with the 
Eyes Task as a suitable ToM measurement, and 5) the need of further theoretical 
specification (i.e. the power constinct).
Social identification. The workers behaved contmry to two predictions. On the 
one hand, as a group they did not perform better than the supervisors, but in fact worse. 
On the other hand they were also only marginally better at identifying the supervisor 
than the worker targets. One factor that might have contributed to both results could 
have been that students assigned to the worker condition identified themselves less with 
the worker identity than students assigned to the supervisor condition. From the 
perspective of Social identity Theory, this is not surprising, as ‘workers’ may be 
perceived as a less desirable group to belong to than ‘supervisors’, and people usually 
seek to enhance their self-evaluation by association to positive or desirable groups. This 
weaker identification might have also been related to the fact that no justifications for 
group assignments were given (although a few participants voiced the guess that group 
assignment might have been based on the self-descriptive questionnaire they had filled 
in earlier). What is more, being a member of a less desirable group may have 
contributed to the workers diminished self-esteem in this experiment. Independently or 
paired with a weaker social identification, lowered self-esteem might have led the
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workers to lack motivation, which could be one interpretation for the faster reaction 
times on the eyes task and the slightly larger amount of mistakes made.
Power manipulation. Responses on the power manipulation check revealed that 
on average, the workers felt that their outcomes were only slightly controlled by the 
supervisors. Of the five components of the power construct that were measured, for our 
predictions, this component might have been most crucial (i.e. more relevant than the 
amount of control that workers felt they had over others’ fate). Hence, while overall, the 
power manipulation was somewhat successful for the workers; it might have been too 
weak to produce the intended effect.
Procedure. Although by and large, participants found the cover plausible, the 
actual eyes task was presented somewhat detached fiom the rest of the cover story. And 
although there was a mask in fiont of each photograph, aimed at enhancing the salience 
of the target’s identity, some participants verbally reported that they had not taken into 
consideration whether the person in the photograph was a supervisor or a worker. 
Therefore, there is a possibility that the study did not tap to the same extent into on-line 
usage as if participants were directly interacting with superior and subordinate others. In 
other words, the task material and its administr ation in the context of the cover story 
might have been too insensitive, which could have contributed to the negative findings. 
However, these criticisms seem unlikely to be able to account for the predicted results 
for the supervisors.
The Eyes task, hr their discussion, Baron-Cohen et al. (2001) acknowledged a 
possible critique of the revised version of the eyes task, namely that stimuli are static 
and not dynamic, as are real world interactions. The usage of these stimuli, however.
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seemed to be warranted in order to avoid especially the problem of controllability, 
which seems inevitable in ‘real’ interactions (and to some extent even in paradigms 
employing confederates). Moreover, even the revised version of the test might still 
contain some ambiguities. As the photogr aphs were initially taken from magazines, the 
authors might not have been able to trace back whether the mental state the person was 
holding at the time the photograph was taken ‘really’ corresponds with the target term 
they suggested. Indeed, in the present study, some participants spontaneously criticised 
that none of the terms adequately described what they felt the person was thinking or 
feeling.
The power construct. Theoretically, we argued that power might lead to 
insensitivity in identifying the mental states of powerless others, as it was assumed that 
by virtue of the means to control others’ fate, the powerful becomes more and the 
powerless less relevant. However, perhaps it might be necessary to differentiate 
between different forms of power. For example, in the present scenario, the supervisor 
identity might have led participants not only to adopt a sense of control over their 
workers, but also a sense of responsibility, for instance, as to make fair evaluations 
during the ‘interviews’. Alternatively, power in and of itself might not be sufficient to 
produce the hypothesised negative effects on theory of mind usage. Perhaps high power 
differentials need to be paired with a low evaluation of the powerless outgr oup, or must 




Concerning the attention measure, contrary to predictions, there were neither 
effects of target identity nor self-identity on the amount of attention paid to the self- 
descriptive questionnaires. These findings fail to replicate earlier results by Fiske and 
Dépret (1996), although the two studies are not directly comparable, as we did not 
distinguish between stereotype consistent and inconsistent information. Two of the 
factors already discussed in relation to the results of the Eyes Task, might have 
influenced this negative result. A first factor could have been the relative artificiality of 
the dependent measure as task presentation was abstracted from the actual power 
manipulation. Secondly, within the experimental context, participants might have 
interpreted the invitation to read the target profiles as a task proper that was to be 
completed in a faithful way. And finally, the task was presented in such a way that 
participants were not given room to do anything else but reading the profiles, whilst in 
real life, a lack of attention might be expressed in doing something else instead. Hence, 
further research is needed to determine whether attention might play a mediating role in 
accurate Theory of Mind inferences.
The results of this study need to be regarded as preliminary rather than 
conclusive. As discussed before, the study requires replication and for future research 
more sensitive and possibly ‘realistic’ instruments to test Theory of Mind performance 
in adults are needed. It will also be necessary to further specify the nature and valence 
of social factors. However, the results for the supervisors, who seemed to have been 
more engaged in the role play scenario than the workers, showing higher social 
identification with their assigned roles, suggests that power affected accuracy in Theory
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of Mind usage as predicted. Supervisors were worse at identifying the mental states of 
the less powerful workers than at identifying the mental states of equally powerful 
ingroup members. Therefore, albeit preliminary, the intriguing finding of this study was 
that Theory of Mind performance can be modulated by social relations.
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D isc u ssio n  Pa r t  II:
Th e o r y  of M in d  a n d  In t er g r o u p  Re l a t io n s
12.1. Sum m ary o f  S tu d ie s  5 a n d  6.
The research presented in the second part of this thesis was motivated by a new 
theoretical framework that imported a Theory of Mind approach to the domain of 
intergi'oup relations. We departed from the assumption made by Social Identity Theory 
that the self is multi-levelled that can be defined on both the interpersonal and 
intergroup levels. This entailed a process-oriented view on power, in which power 
differentials are construed as flexible and as emerging in the process of intergroup 
comparison. Our main hypothesis was that power might affect Theory of Mind in two 
ways. We reasoned that the powerless might be motivated to understand the mental 
perspective of the powerful -  even when the latter differed -  as this would enable them 
to strategically adjust their own behaviour. By contrast, for those in power it was 
predicted that they might show relative unawareness of the differing mental perspective 
of the powerless, as the understanding of what their subordinates think or want has no 
direct relevance for their own outcomes.
Based on the material obtained fr om an exploratory interview study, the first 
part of this hypothesis was investigated; how for the powerless Theory of Mind usage 
related to their adjustment of social actions. Furthermore, the material allowed us to
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explore the related issue of how Theory of Mind is used in the experience and 
accusation of social acts of racial discrimination.
In relation to this latter question, the main findings were that in accusations of 
acts of covert racism - that is, an act not overtly admitted by the perpetr ator to be 
racially motivated - two characteristic types of Theory of Mind inferences were 
involved. First, relevant for the definition of an experience as an act of racism were 
participants’ attributions that the agent viewed him or herself in terms of racial 
categories in a place in which they expected to be perceived and treated on the basis of 
another aspect of their identity. Such stereotypical ‘seeing me as’ ToM inferences 
provided the starting point of conflict development. Secondly, in a number of cases the 
content of an act of racism itself constituted the inference that the perpetrator was 
unaware of or even actively denied the victim’s (mostly the participant’s) independent 
mental perspective. This type of negative and 2"^  order ToM inferences was found to
be prevalent across different forms of racism, including the denial of racism, 
pathologizing behaviours, intimidation practices etc. Although we cannot make any 
claims about whether or not the participants’ inferences accurately reflected the mental 
states of these agents, this finding lent indirect support to the second part of our 
hypothesis, namely that those who are in a position of situated power neglect the 
independent mental perspective of their victims.
In addition, despite the lack of examples of participants positioned as powerful, 
the material permitted us to explore the first part of our initial hypothesis that predicted 
that people in a powerless situation deploy their inferences of the mental states of those 
in power strategically in order to adjust their own behaviour. A number of examples
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were found that suggested that on various occasions, participants who positioned 
themselves as powerless did use these insights, or reported of others that they used their 
inferences about the states of mind of more powerful others, to adjust their behaviour. 
However, this tendency to act from the perspective of another person was not confined 
to power relations; a quantitative analysis revealed that also in other situations, mostly 
coded as on the interpersonal level, participants acted ‘through the eyes of another 
person’. In summary, the approach of studying Theory of Mind usage in ordinary 
adults’ naturalistic language has been useful to explore patterns of differential Theory of 
Mind usage in the interpretation of real life experiences with particular types of social 
actions, such as racism and discrimination.
Study 6, presented in Chapter 11, investigated experimentally whether power 
relations affect Theory of Mind usage in typical adults. Contrary to predictions, the 
study did not reveal a difference in performance between participants believed to take 
the role of powerless workers and those assigned to the role of relatively powerful 
supervisors. However, participants across self-identity manipulations were worse at 
identifying the mental states of powerless as opposed to equally powerful others. Hence, 
the interesting finding of this study was that it gives first empirical support to the notion 
that Theory of Mind usage may vary as a function of different social relations.
Taken together, the results obtained from these two studies can be seen as 
promising for the proposed approach to adopt a Theory of Mind perspective to study 
intergroup relations. By acknowledging the novel character of this research, as well as
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the limitations of both studies, however, the findings must not be seen as conclusive. 
Rather, their main merit consists in mapping out questions that need to be addressed in 
future research. An outlook to this is given in the next section.
12.2. Outlook to the future
The present research raises notably two broad issues. To address these, a 
systematic research programme is required. First it is necessary to refine and further 
specify theoretical predictions regarding the nature of social conditions that might affect 
Theory of Mind usage. A second issue relates to how and where Theory of Mind might 
be affected within the wider ‘mindreading process’.
Let us first consider several aspects regarding the theoretical clarification of the 
power hypothesis. Study 6 pointed to the possibilities that the supeivisors perfoimed 
better and not worse than the workers because either power alone does not have the 
predicted deleterious effect on ToM usage, or because only some forms of power might 
lead to relative unawareness of others’ mental states. The latter possibility was also 
indicated by the inteiview study, in which only three participants acknowledged their 
position of power in specific situations. In one of these cases (PWll), power was 
derived fiom the participant’s position as an expert and University professor, and was 
related to master students coming from different cultures. In French and Raven’s (1959) 
typology of different foims of power, this could be subsumed under ‘expert power’. The 
participant showed awareness of the students’ different cultural ideas of exam traditions 
and related expectations, and used deliberately his stereotypical understanding of their 
different cultural perspectives in order to prevent them fr om possible disappointments.
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In this example, the participant — although aware of the control he had over the 
students’ outcomes - mainly emphasised a sense of responsibility to help the students in 
their achievement of a desired goal. Perhaps other forms of power, such as ‘coercive 
power’, might be more likely candidates for the predicted detrimental influence on 
Theory of Mind usage. Another possibility could be that the crucial variable might not 
be power per se^  but the actual instigation of power. If power is defined as the amount 
of contiol one has over the other’s outcomes, then unawareness, neglect or denial of the 
other’s desires might be most likely in conditions in which contiol is exerted against the 
will of the powerless. A third possibility could be that -  contraiy to our main 
hypotheses - the powerful are not unaware of the mental states of the powerless, but 
actively choose to ignore them in order to obtain their desired goals. Fourthly, power in 
itself may not be the sufficient factor. Possibly, for the predicted negative effect it needs 
to be paired with other factors, such as conflict, a history of hostility; factors that co­
occurred with extreme power differentials in the examples from which we started. 
Finally, the suggestion that social conditions and relations might modulate Theory of 
Mind leaves of course the possibility that ToM variability is not confined to power 
relations. Perhaps other factors defining ingroup -  outgioup relations without 
considerable power differentials or inteipersonal relations might affect the mutual 
understanding of other minds.
The second big task to attack in the future consists of the need to further clarify 
which facets of the mindreading process might be affected; the level of attending to or 
ignoring relevant contextual infomiation, or the actual computation of mental state 
inferences? Perhaps in situations as severe as the ones we departed from - instances in
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which the other was seen almost literally as an object -  his or her behaviour might be 
explained to a lesser extent in teims of intentional behaviour. In most other less severe 
situations, however, this strong claim seems untenable and subtler mindreading 
differences to be more likely. As argued earlier, it is possible to formally impute a 
mental state to another person but without actually acknowledging their different mental 
perspective. Other speculations could be generated from Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan’s 
(2000) suggestion of a componential model of Theoiy of Mind that was discussed in 
Chapter 2. In this model, dissociation between a conceptual and a perceptual-emotional 
component is proposed. One possibility might be that social conditions might affect the 
perceptual-emotional component more than the cognitive component. It is obvious and 
as such almost trivial to note that people do not feel the same extent of happiness, 
sadness or pain about events happening to people to whom they are related in different 
ways. For example, you may be more concerned when your child or a friend is ill than 
when dozens of people suffer from a severe illness in Hong Kong. A more precise 
understanding of which factors trigger people’s gr eater or lesser cognitive or emotional 
‘understanding’ of others’ feelings has important implications. From a cognitive 
perspective, exploring possible intra-individual differences in ordinary people’s 
sensitivity to other minds may provide a test case for studying hypothesised 
dissociations of different components of such a Theory of Mind system. From a social 
psychological perspective, a Theory of Mind approach provides a new angle not only to 
address the issue of conflict development, but also that of conflict resolution in 
interpersonal and intergr oup relations. Future research may explore these issues by 
adopting either an experimental or a naturalistic approach.
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In general teims, the approach developed in Chapter 9 can be applied to study 
different types of intergroup and inteipersonal relations. More concretely, this approach 
would be particularly suitable to compare accounts of different informants who 
participated in the same event. The question is, do we find that different parties interpret 
the same event differently? In the event that differences were found, this would allow us 
to further explore why people interpret the same event in a different way. What are the 
factors that let you interpret my behaviour in a different way than I do? On what kinds 
of information (behavioural cues, cultural knowledge) do people base their mentalistic 
inferences? Do people only consider the other’s action or to what extent do they open 
up their perspective to reflect upon how the others see their own behaviour? Although 
acknowledging practical constraints in can'ying out such research, in principle, this 
approach could be applied to compare eyewitness accounts of real life intergr oup 
conflicts, for example, the ongoing conflict in Ireland, the relation between Palestinians 
and Israelis, or the accounts of a demonstr ating crowd with those of the police etc.
The experimental approach, in contrast, has the benefit of studying Theory of 
Mind directly using as the dependent variable behavioural measures that could therefore 
account for or minimise potential ‘distortions’ in people’s verbal accounts. A challenge 
for the experimental approach consists in the necessity to find or develop adequate 
experimental paradigms. For example, such a paradigm requires us to directly relate 
perceivers and targets, ideally in an ongoing interaction, but to keep the relevant Theory 
of Mind component constant across different interactions. It would furthermore be 
desirable to create a scenario that enables us to test the relation between the extent to 
which participants understand the other’s mind and his or her subsequent social action.
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One possibility could be to add a Theory of Mind component to the classic minimal 
gr oup paradigm (see Chapter 8). This paradigm, which consists of different phases in 
which participants are required to allocate points to ingr oup and outgr oup members 
would have the additional benefit of investigating the relation between understanding of 
other minds and subsequent social action.
Another question that arose from the interview material and that could be 
studied using an experimental design relates to the episode in which the truth-value of 
PB9’s account was being denied by more powerful others. This finding might be 
relevant to how beliefs are distributed. As discussed in the first part of this thesis, 
Sperber suggested that one route of the ‘epidemiology’ of beliefs is through 
communication with others whom we trust. It might be interesting to explore the extent 
to which participants acknowledge or reject the possibility that outgroup (compared to 
ingroup) members have independent ‘privileged’ sources of knowledge which form the 
basis of their differing mental perspectives.
In summary, the work conducted in the second part of this thesis suggests that 
Theory of Mind processes play a relevant role in participants’ subjective construction of 
social relations and conflict development. At the same time, this work suggests that the 
social level in general, and intergroup relations in particular, provide a further route to 
attack -  complementary to the ongoing lines of enquiry fiom a developmental 
perspective, from developmental psychopathology, comparative studies with nonhuman 




Ge n e r a l  D isc u ssio n
The main proposal put foiward in this thesis was to think of Theory of Mind not 
only in tenus of a developing capacity, but beyond this, also in terms of how it is 
employed in practice. It is indisputable that having a representational Theory of Mind is 
a fundamental social tool, yet it is further necessary to know how to use it. From this 
perspective, it was argued that we need to place Theory of Mind in a social, cultural and 
cognitive context. We departed from a naiTow definition of Theory of Mind as 
essentially a cognitive ability to compute metarepresentations. Two real life phenomena 
- social dysfunctions in high-functioning individuals with ASD with putative 
metarepresentation abilities and apparent discrepancies in the extent to which ordinary 
adults consider the thoughts and feelings of others - have led to the foimulation of the 
two main hypotheses explored in this thesis. 1) In order to use Theory of Mind in 
practice, a cognitive metarepresentation capacity (ToMM mechanism) needs to be 
connected with input, which often consists of ‘cultural knowledge’. The acquisition of 
cultural knowledge might rely on distinct cognitive abilities, including the ability to 
foim metarepresentations or their developmental precursors. 2) Historical real-life 
phenomena seemed to suggest that Theory of Mind might not operate encapsulated 
fr om the mindreaders’ social environment, but that ToM deployment might be 
modulated by social contextual variables.
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These questions were built on insights obtained over twenty years of active 
research on Theory of Mind and should be seen as extending this research programme. 
The achievement of this work may consist of posing these novel questions, and in 
developing new methods (2 experimental paradigms, a new method to track ToM in 
language) to research them empirically. As a shadow side to such a new approach, 
however, it is necessary to bear in mind that the studies had exploratory character (e.g. 
we studied a relatively heterogeneous sample of individuals with ASD using the same 
tasks) and results must therefore be seen as preliminary.
A further merit of this work consists of the attempt to work towards cross- 
domain integration. The notion of a contextualised view of Theory of Mind in practice 
shall be seen in two related senses. In a first sense, the research tiied to build bridges 
across three disparate areas of psychology, namely: cognitive developmental 
psychopathology (explanations of cognitive abnormalities in Autism Spectrum 
Disorders), social psychology (theories of power and intergi oup relations) and cultural 
psychology (cultural knowledge as essential for the interpretation of the meaning of 
social experiences). In a second sense, the notion of ‘contextualisation* refers to the 
interplay between social, cultural and cognitive processes within the mindreading 
process.
This final discussion is mainly devoted to a consideration of the extent to which 
the two research sti'ands into autism and intergroup relations might inform each other 
and have contiibuted to further insights into how Theory of Mind works in practice.
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Whilst research has begun to build bridges between social cognition and Theory 
of Mind paradigms (e.g. Malle et al., 1999,2000, 2001; Ames et al., 2000; Klein & 
Hodges, 1998) the innovation suggested here was to extend a Theory of Mind approach 
to the study of intergroup relations. Obviously, the developmental Theory of Mind 
approach has influenced the research with adults. But does this influence only work in 
one direction? We suggest that the research with adults might also have implications for 
futui'e research with people with autism. The puzzle that motivated the research 
presented in the first part of this thesis was that some people with high-functioning 
autism or Asperger’s Syndrome appear to have difficulties in translating their Theory of 
Mind competencies into real life social adaptation. The work with adults required us to 
develop a new method to track and categorise Theory of Mind usage in narratives. This 
approach might be more sensitive to subtle ToM differences than experimental tests and 
could be used, for example, to study Theory of Mind usage in the accounts of personal 
experiences of high-functioning people with autism or Asperger’s Syndrome. 
Furthermore, the adult research suggested that inferences of how others view oneself 
contributed to the constiuction of social relationships. It would be interesting to explore 
this facet of self-consciousness, i.e. the extent to which people with autism or 
Asperger’s Syndrome are aware of, or reflect upon how they are perceived by others.
To what extent can the present research contribute to our understanding of how 
Theory of Mind works in practice? Previous research suggested that for Theory of Mind 
usage to ‘kick in’, individuals first distinguish between a stimulus as a self-propelled 
agent or as an object (see Premack & Premack, 1997). This has been argued to
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determine whether a movement is perceived in terms of goal-directed agency or 
physical causality. Within the notion of social contextualisation^ the present research 
suggests that beyond this, initial social-contextualised perceptions of ‘who’ someone is 
(and how this person is related to me) affect what I think this person thinks. The 
stereotypical perception of someone as someone of a particular social or ethnic identity 
might modulate whether one really takes the mental perspective of the other or retains 
an ‘intentional stance’ (Dennett, 1987). Moreover, ‘what’ someone thinks may be 
enabled by our cultuial knowledge -  we are thinking through culture(s), as Shweder 
(1984) put it. This brings us to the notion of cultural contextualisation. The work with 
adults suggested that participants drew on cultural knowledge in order to interpret the 
meaning of others’ actions. The identification of deviance from culturally shared 
canonical expectations contiibuted to their interpretation of social actions, especially the 
accusation of racism. Complementing this, work with people with an Autism Spectrum 
Disorder suggested that the more severely affected individuals with this condition had 
profound impaimients in their understanding of routine and canonical events, which 
might further impair them in their ability to make sense of others’ behaviour and events. 
Whilst the older and more able individuals with autism and especially Asperger’s 
Syndi'ome showed peculiarities but not global deficits in their judgements of events, it 
remains to be seen whether this high-functioning subgroup with ToM capacities is also 
able to effectively deploy such cultural knowledge in their interpretation of everyday 
experiences. Via the cultural level, we approached the question of cognitive 
contextualisation fiom a new and different angle. Given that scripts and schemas stand 
half-way between immediate perceptual experiences and conceptual, representational
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knowledge sfructures, this work points to the need of further studying the exciting 
interface between perceptual and cognitive processes, i.e. event perception, event 
knowledge, (Weak) Centr al Coherence and Theory of Mind usage in practice. How are 
perceptual and representational processes integrated in the mind? The direction between 
these three cognitive abilities may not be uni-directional (i.e. using perceptual 
information to make conceptual ToM inferences), but perhaps specific inferences of 
what one thinks or schematised expectations may also affect lower level perceptual and 
attentional processes. Further work is needed to study how perceptual processes 
(including cognitive styles, such as WCC affecting perception) are involved in the 
development of representational stmctuies (schemas, scripts), and vice versa, how 
representational structures guide immediate event perception. This is the way we 
construe the notion of cognitive contextualisation: how higher-level cognitive processes 
(schemas, scripts, Theory of Mind) are connected with lower-level perceptual 
processes.
To conclude, the maturity that the Theory of Mind approach as a research 
discipline has attained over the past twenty years, evidenced through the impressive 
bulk of replications and test refinements, must not lead us to forget that there are still 
further big and intiiguing questions. In tandem with research into the nature of the 
mind, how it develops, we may also need to obtain a more complete understanding of 
how Theory of Mind is modulated and enabled by social-cultural variables and how it 
operates in action in the seivice of making sense of our social experiences. This thesis 
has not been able to provide conclusive answers. But the value of the results of a set of
408
Chapter 13
exploratory studies may lie in the ability to point to a set of fresh questions for future 
research.
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A pp e n d ix  3.1. 
Fa l se  belief  t a s k  script
Story plot.
(Scene 1) Tony and Samantha behind a table. In front 
of them, boxes with open lids are 
displayed.
E: This is Tony, this is Samantha. Tony and 
Samantha have both received a present.
(Scene 2) E: Look, Tony has already eaten his 
chocolate. His box is empty.
(Scene 3) E: Let’s see what Samantha has got inside 
her box: Look, Samantha has got some 
yummy chocolates in her box.
(Scene 4) close-up on both boxes with both lids 
closed.
(Scene 5) Samantha leaving the room.
E: The telephone rings. Samantha goes 
next door to answer the phone.
(Scene 5a) Samantha at the phone.
(Scene 6) Tony behind the table with the two boxes.
E: Now, Tony is alone. Samantha is next 
door on the phone. She cannot see or hear 
what Tony is doing. Look carefully what 
he is doing now.
Photograph details
Photograph showing Tony, 
Samantha + both boxes in 
front of them.
1.Close up on Tony's box 
- empty
2.Tony + empty box -  
neutial facial expression
1. Close-up on Samantha's 
box: chocolate
2. Samantha + box with 
chocolates- neutral facial 
expression
Close-up on both boxes 
with both lids closed.
Photograph showing 
Samantha heading to the 
door.
Photograph showing Tony 
behind the table with the 
two boxes, lids closed.
(Scene 7) Tony opening Samantha's box, putting the Tony opening Samantha's
chocolate in his empty box.
E: Look, Tony opens Samantha's box. He 
is taking out the chocolate and putting it 
inside his own box!
box, reaching with his arm 
inside, holding the 
chocolate, (smiling)
Tony putting the chocolate 
in his own box.
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(Scene 8) Tony closing both boxes with lids. Tony IN THE MIDDLE 
between the two boxes 
with lids closed.
(Scene 9) E; Samantha has finished her phone call.
She comes back to the room.
Samantha at the door.
(Scene 10) E: Now she is having a bit o f chocolate. Samantha behind the table 
BETWEEN the two boxes. 
NOT looking at any of 
them!
TQl: Where will she look for her 
chocolates?
TQ2: Where does she think her chocolates 
are?
CQ: Where were the chocolates at the 
beginning?
CQ: Where are the chocolates now?
TQ3: Why does she think the chocolates 
are in the blue [red] box?
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A pp e n d ix  3.2. 
St r a n g e  stories  t a sk
Introduction:
E: “ You will listen to a couple of very short stories that I’ll play back to you on tape. 
Please listen carefully! If there is anything that you don’t understand, please tell me 
immediately, and we can listen to the story again. After you have listened to each story,
I will ask you two questions.
Let’s listen to the first story/ Let’s listen to the next story/ Let’s see what happens in this 
story ”
Story 1: (Irony)
Ann’s mother has spent a long time cooking Ann’s favourite meal; fish and chips. But 
when she brings it in to Ann, she is watching TV, and she doesn’t even look up, or say 
thank you. Ann’s mother is cross and says, “Well, that’s very nice, isn’t it! That’s what 
I call politeness!”
E: Is it true, what Ann’s mother says?
E; Why does Ann’s mother say this?
Story 2: (White lie)
Helen waited all year for Christmas because she knew at Christmas she could ask her 
parents for a rabbit. Helen wanted a rabbit more than anything in the world. At last 
Christmas Day arrived, and Helen ran to unwrap the big box her parents had given her. 
She felt sure it would contain a little rabbit in a cage. But when she opened it, with all 
the family standing round, she found her present was just a boring old set of 
encyclopaedias, which Helen did not want at all! Still, when Helen’s parents asked her 
how she liked her present, she said “It’s lovely, thank you. It’s just what I wanted.”
E: Is it tme what Helen said?
E: Why did she say that to her parents?
Story 3; (Lie)
One day, while she is playing in the house, Anna accidentally knocks over and breaks 
her mother’s favourite crystal vase. Oh dear, when mother finds out she will be very 
cross! So when Anna’s mother comes home and see the broken vase and asks Anna 
what happened, Anna says, “The dog knocked it over, it wasn’t my fault!”
E: Was it tiue, what Anna told her mother?
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E: Why did she say this?
Story 4; (Double Bluff)
During the war, the Red aiiny capture a member of the Blue aimy. They want him to 
tell them where his aimy’s tanks are; they know they are either by the sea or in the 
mountains. They know that the prisoner will not want to tell them, he will want to save 
his army, so he will certainly lie to them. The prisoner is very brave and very clever, he 
will not let them find his tanks. The tanks are really in the mountains. Now when the 
other side ask him where his tanks are, he says “they are in the mountains”.
E: Is it time what the prisoner said?
E: Where will the other army look for his tanks?
E: Why did the prisoner say what he said?
Story 5; (Persuasion)
Jane wanted to buy a kitten, so he went to see Mrs Smith, who had lots of kittens she 
didn’t want. Now Mrs. Smith loved the kittens, and she wouldn’t do anything to haim 
them, though she couldn’t keep them all herself. When Jane visited she wasn’t sure she 
wanted one of Mrs Smith’s kittens, since they were all males and she had wanted a 
female. But Mrs Smith said “If no one buys the kittens I’ll just have to drown them!”
E: Was it true, what Mrs Smith said?
E: Why did Mrs Smith say this to Jane?
Story 6: (Figure of Speech)
Emma has a cough. All through lunch she coughs and coughs and coughs. Father says, 
“Poor Emma, you must have a frog in your throat!”
E: Is it true, what Father says to Emma?
E: Why does he say that?
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A pp e n d ix  3,3.
S e n t e n c e  c o m p le t io n  t a s k  
LO C A L - G LO BA L C O N FLIC T TA SK
NAME ID: AGE: DATE:
INSTRUCTIONS:
“I’m going to read you some sentences and I want you to tell me something to finish off 
each sentence. First we’ll do one for practice:
He cleaned up the mess with a bmsh and ”
Each item to be read aloud by the experimenter. Record all responses and time to respond 
(begin timing from end o f sentence until response fi’om subject). Completions may be single 
words or a plirase. Try to prevent subject hom  repeating entire sentence. Tape recording o f  
entire task is recommended. Scoring is based on the subject’s first response.
1. I was given a pen and....*
2. The sea tastes of salt and ...
3. Hens lay eggs and ...
4. The woman took the cup and....*
5. You can get burnt by the sun and ...
6. You can feed a child bread and ... *
7. Little boys grow up to be men and...
8. In the sea there are fish and...
9. In a cave lived a bat and ...
10. You can go hunting with a knife 
and...
11. You can swallow apple ... *
12. The old shoe-maker mended the shoes 
and....
13. The fireman earned the bucket and ...
14. A vet cares for cats and ... *
15. The night was black and ...
TOTAL SCORE
* control items TOTAL NUMBER OF LOCAL 
COMPLETIONS (No. of 2’s)
Scoring System;
0 CoiTect global completion (not a local associate).
1 Repetition or local associate to another word in sentence.
2 Local completion to end of sentence.
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A p p e n d ix  4 .1 . So c ial  in fer en c e  t a sk
Instruction
Sometimes we can guess what people are going to do, even if we don’t know 
them. Now we are going to read short stories about different people.
For each story I will ask you one question.
Then you will see four pictures on the computer.
I would like you to judge for each picture whether it shows the right or likely answer or 
the wrong and unlikely answer. Sometimes, more than one picture can show a right or 
likely response!
Story 1 “Wedding”
1. John has received an invitation to his best friend’s wedding. The wedding ceremony 
is going to take place in a beautiful chapel in the countryside. Eventually, the big day 
arrives. John is excited and gets up early in the morning. After breakfast, he is getting 
dressed for the wedding.
Wlrat is John going to wear?
What is wrong with....?/ Why is [x] unlikely...?
Control question: Wliere did John go?
Response items: Hiking jacket, wedding dress, suit, (uniform)^
Story 2: “Friday evening”
It is Friday evening. After a long week of working, John is looking forward to go out 
to meet a fiiend. Chris arrives first. The place they are staying at closes at 11 pm.
Where did John go to?
What is wrong with....?/ Why is [x] unlikely...?
Control question: What time is it in the story? Is it morning, afternoon or evening?
' Items given in bold represent the coiTect response. Items in bold and in brackets are acceptable, but less 




Dentist, cinema, pub, hairdresser
Stoiy 3 “TV football”
Bill is forty-years o ld . He is married to his wife Jane, and together they have two 
children. After work and on the weekends, he enjoys watching television. Now he is 
sitting in front of the television, watching a football match. During the break he gets up 
and gets himself a drink.
What drink is he going to have?
What is wrong with....?/ Why is [x] unlikely...?
Contr ol question: How old is Bill? What is he doing?
Response items: glass of beer, (glass of red wine), (orange juice), (cup of coffee) 
Story 4: “Park”
Mary and James are in the park. They are feeding the pigeons and watching the ducks 
in the pond. As it is very warm and sunny, James suggests to sit down in the gr ass for a 
rest. But Mary feels hungry, so she tells him: “Well, I am getting really hungry now. I 
would like to get something to eat first, and then we can come back and eat it while 
sitting on the gr ass.”
What is Mary going to get?
What is wrong with....?/ Why is [x] unlikely...?
Control question: Where are Mary and James?
Response items: ham’n eggs, turkey with roast potatoes, hot dog, (her favourite Sushi 
Japanese food)
Story 5: “After homework”
Peter is 12 years old. When he comes home from school, he goes into the living room 
and switches on the television. His mother says: “Peter, you cannot watch the show 
now, you have to do your homework first”. Peter is a bit upset, because he will miss his 
favourite programme. He works hard, as he wants to watch the rest of the show. After
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half an hour he has finished all his homework. His mother is impressed, and when he 
comes back into the living room to switch on the TV, his mother says: “Well done, 
Peter. Now you can watch the rest of the show. What would you like to drink?”
What drink is he most likely to have?
What is wrong with....?/ Why is [x] unlikely...?
How old is Peter? Wliat is he doing?
Response items: Glass of beer, glass of red wine, orange Juice, (cup of coffee)
Story 6: “Mountains”
Every year, Sarah spends her summer holidays with her family in the mountains. They 
enjoy going on long hikes and swimming in the cool lakes.
Sarah and her parents are getting ready for a hike in the mountains.
What is she going to wear?
What is wrong with? Why is [x] unlikely....?
Control question: Where did Sarah go?
Response items:
Hiking jacket, wedding dress, suit, uniform
Story 7: “Paintings”
Paul had to cue for a long time in front of the ticket office, as many people were in 
fiont of him. Eventually, it was his turn. Paul bought a ticket and entered. 
Unfortunately, he didn’t like the paintings very much, so he left after only 30 minutes.
Where did Paul go?
What is wrong with....?/ Why is [x] unlikely...?
Control question: What did Paul not like?
Response items: Department store, museum, train station, theatre
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Story 8: “Christmas Day”
It is Christmas Day. In the morning, Lisa unwrapped many presents. Later on, all her 
family came round: Her grandparents, her auntie Caroline and her uncle Jack, and her 
cousins Sue and Martin. In the evening, they are having a big meal together that Mum 
had spent the whole day preparing.
What are they going to have?
What is wrong with....?/ Why is [x] unlikely...?
What day is it in the story?
Response items: Turkey with roast potatoes, ham and eggs, hot dogs, (her favourite 
Japanese Sushi)
Story 9: “in a rush”
As usual, Jackie is in a big rush. She enters the building and immediately heads for the 
third floor. She goes hastily from room to room but cannot find what she is looking 
for. So she leaves to try another place.
Where did Jackie go?
What is wrong with....?/ Why is [x] unlikely...?
Contr ol question: What did Jackie do?
Response items: Department store, museum, train station, theatre 
Story 10: Monday morning
It is a Monday morning. Before he goes to work, John has an appointment at 9 am. 
Where does John go?
What is wrong with....?/ Why is [x] unlikely...?
What time is it in the story? (Is it morning, afternoon or evening?)
Pub, dentist, hairdresser, cinema
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A p p e n d ix  4 .2 . B a se l in e s  fo r  st o r y  pr ed ic tio n s
Story (Story titles are 
working titles, participants 
were not given a story title)
Combinations of correct 
solutions
Baseline of correct 
response by chance
Story 1 : Wedding suit; (uniform) 18.75%
Story 2: Friday Evening Pub; (cinema) 18.75%
Story 3: TV football Beer; beer + 50%
Story 4: park Hot dog 6.25%
Story 5: after homework Orange juice; (coffee) 18.75%
Story 6: mountains Hiking jacket 6.25%
Story 7: paintings Museum 6.25 %
Story 8: Christmas dinner Turkey with roast 
potatoes; (sushi)
1875%
Story 9: in a rush Department store 6.25%
Story 10: Monday morning Dentist (hairdresser) 18.75%
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A pp e n d ix  5.1. Ev e n t  N a r r a t iv e s  script
Introduction:
I; Look, this is ToJcu. (Experimenter shows participant a photograph o f an about twelve 
year old boy with Asian features, dressed in a traditional Buddhist monk outfit) Tolai 
comes from a little village far far away from here, in East Asia.
Toku has never been to Scotland/ England, or even Europe.
In the place where Tolm ivaa' born and lives, many things are very different to the things 
here in Britain.
In order to help Toku to understand how things are here in this country, I  ask many 
people to tell him what they know about how things are in Scotland.
So I  would like to talk with you about things that people usuallv do in Britain. I  mean, 
not only what you are doing, but what most o f the people are usually doing.
Restaurant
I: Tolm has never been to a restaurant. Can you tell him what happens when people are 
going to a restaurant. Can you tell him what people are doing when they go to a 
restaurant?
When people are going to a restaurant, what happens first? What happens next?
Neutral prompts; Anything else? So you said [.....] what happens then? Is there 
anything else that happens when people go to a restaurant?
Prompted questions: What is the waiter doing? What are the guests doing? What else is 
the waiter doing? What are people eating in restaurants? What does a restaurant look 
like?
Probing questions:
‘ Alwavs-Questions ’ : Do people always [relating to what the participant spontaneously 
said] when they go to restaurants?
‘Whv-question’: Why are people going to a restaurant? (theory of mind)
Check for personal experience (at the end of the interview): Have you ever been to a 




I; In the place where Toku lives, people do not celebrate Christmas. Tolm has never 
been to a Christmas party, and he has not even heard about Christmas. Can you tell 
him what happens at Christmas?
Neutral prompts:
What happens when people celebrate Christmas? What else happens usually? What 
happens then? Anything else? I ’m sure you know much more about Christmas? What 
else do people do usually on Christmas?
Prompted questions:
I: How do people prepare for Christmas? What happens first on Christmas day? Who is 
preparing the meal? What are people having for Christmas supper? Who is giving the 
presents? Who is receiving the presents?
‘Always questions’: When people are celebrating Christmas, do they always [repeat 
what participant spontaneously said just before]?
‘Why- question’: Why are people celebrating Christmas?
Personal experience: Are you/ is your family celebrating Christmas?
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A pp e n d ix  6.1.
Fr e q u e n c y  Ra t in g  Ta s k  -  Ta s k  item s
Doctor script 
Introduction: A day in the life of a doctor
This is the story about a day in the life of Doctor Smith. Step by step, we will see what 
Dr Smith is doing in different situations, for example, when he is taking a train to go to 
work. Some of the things this doctor is doing, doctors always do when they are in this 
situation. Some of the things Dr Smith is doing, doctors do most of the time or 
sometimes. But this doctor is also doing things that doctors never do, or that happen 
only rarely!
On a train
In the morning, the doctor takes a train to go to work.
You will see different things that the doctor is doing when he is on a train.
Do doctors normally do what this doctor is doing?
1) The doctor has got a ticket for his train journey (central act)
2) The seats have a blue and green pattern on them, (slotfiller)
3) The doctor is cairying a bag. (optional act, not script defined)
4) The doctor is looking for his seat first (optional-slotfiller)
5) The doctor is sitting by the window, (slotfiller)
6) On the train, the doctor eats a sandwich, (optional act)
7) On the train, the doctor is reading a book, (optional act)
8) On the train, the doctor is reading a book about French history, (slotfiller)
9) The ticket inspector asks the doctor to show his ticket (central act)
10) The doctor asks a fellow passenger to take off her coat, (inappropriate act)
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At work in the surgery
Monday through to Fridays, the doctor is at work in the surgery.
1) Patients are waiting in a separate room, (central act)
2) Patients are waiting for 45 minutes before being called into the consulting room 
(slotfiller).
3) In the waiting room, magazines are displayed on little tables, (prop)
4) The doctor examines the patient, (central act)
5) In the consulting room, the doctor asks a patient to take off her shirt, (optional act)
7) In the consulting room, the doctor prescribes medicine for a patient (central act).
8) While he is examining a patient, the doctor is eating a sandwich, (inappropriate act)
9) The doctor is wearing glasses (optional act).
10) In the waiting room there are encyclopaedias (inappropriate prop).
Shopping at the supermarket
1) The doctor is paying at the check-out (central act)
2) At the entrance of the supermarket, there are shopping ti'olleys and baskets (prop).
4) The doctor is taking a shopping trolley (optional act).
5) The doctor is going to the fi'uit and vegetable section first (optional act).
6) The doctor is putting milk, chocolate and orangey nice in his shopping trolley 
(slotfiller).
8) The doctor prescribes medicine for a shop-assistant (inappropriate act).
9) The doctor has to pay more than £20 for his shopping (slotfiller).
Cross-over items:
Eating a sandwich: tiain, consulting room => inappropriate at work 
Prescribing medicine: work, supermarket => inappropriate at the supermarket 
Wearing a white coat: work, supermarket => inappropriate at the supermarket 




Introduction: A Day in the Life o f a Teacher
Now you will see what happens during the day of the teacher Mrs Jones. You will see 
what happens when the teacher is at breakfast, when she is at school, and when she is at 
the cinema in the evening.
Please rate for each sentence whether you think that this happens to a teacher in this 
situation always, almost always, most of the time, sometimes, rarely, almost never or 
never.
At breakfast
1) Before going to school, the teacher is having breakfast (cential act).
2) The teacher is wearing a dressing gown (optional act).
3) The teacher is preparing coffee (central act).
6) The teacher has got a white coffee mug with blue sti'ipes (slotfiller).
7) There is one fridge in the kitchen (central act)
9) The teacher is taking some medicine (optional act).
10) There are toys lying around in the kitchen (optional act).
At school
1) In the morning, pupils anive at the school (central act).
3) Pupils are coming on the school bus. (optional act)
5) The teacher is wearing a skirt and a white blouse (slotfiller)
6) In the French class, the teacher corrects the vocabulary of a pupil (central act).
7) In the classroom, there are chairs and desks (centi al act)
8) During the break, the teacher is conecting maths tests (optional act).
9) The pupils are using yellow pencils (slotfiller).




1) The teacher is watching a film, (central act)
2) The teacher is with a friend, (optional act)
3) The film starts at eight o’clock in the evening, (slotfiller)
4) There are chairs and tables in the cinema (inappropriate props)
5) At the cinema, the teacher is reading the newspaper, (inappropriate act)
6) The teacher is wearing glasses, (optional act)
7) The teacher con ects the vocabulary of a stranger sitting next to her. 
(inappropriate act)
8) The teacher is drinking a cup of coffee, (inappropriate act)
9) The teacher is buying popcorn, (optional act)
Script Cross-over items:
The teacher is reading the newspaper: breakfast, cinema 
The teacher conects a pupil/ a stranger: school, cinema.
Drinking/ preparing coffee: breakfast, cinema
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Appendix  8.2. In terv iew  Sch edule
Each interview is assumed to take a different course according to the interviewee’s 
response on a previous question. The set o f questions is therefore only meant to be a 
guideline for topics to be discussed during the interview.
In parts 1 and 2 the interviewer does not explicitly mention the issue or terms of 
"race”, "ethnicity” or even "multi-culture”. This allows the interviewee to construe 
categories freely, for example to speak about people in either personal or group terms.
1. Diary about everyday encounters
a. Prior to the interview, participants will be asked to complete a simple diary about 
their encounters during the past three days. The interviewer will begin discussing 
participant's entries in the diary
Interviewer: “Let’s go through your notes. Let’s start three days ago.( Don’t worry if 
some of these events or actions appear trivial to you. In fact, I am not only interested in 
some “sensational” experiences, but rather, for now, would like to get an idea of your 
everyday routines and life)”:
Can you tell me what you did on ....day in the morning?
Wlio did you meet?
What happened?
Why did he/ she do that?
And what did you do then?
How did you feel?
How (do you think) did s/he feel?
Let’s move on to the afternoon/ evening/ next day: Did something extraordinary/ special 
happen or was it a fairly typical day?
Let’s start again with the morning...
For each experience, the participant is asked to describe his or her relationship with 
the person s/he met (if this does not become obvious/can be inferred from participants ' 
spontaneous talk):
’^ o  was that person?
Did you know him/ her before?
How would you describe your relationship with him or her?
After discussion about the three days in participant’s life:
Were these typical days in your life? Or has something typical been left out?
What would be a more typical day for you then? Who would you meet? Can you recall 




Can you recall a particularly satisfying or enriching experience during, say the last year/ 
since you came to London?
What happened?
(Why did he/ she do that?)
Who were the person/ the people involved?
How did you feel?
Can you recall a particularly problematic or negative experience during the last year? 
What happened?
Who were the person/ the people involved?
Wliy did he/ she do that?
How did you feel?
3. Encounters with members from respective other ethnic groups:
(a) I f  the participant has not spontaneously talked about experiences with members of a 
different ethnic group (i.e. for English participants contacts with Asian/ Afro-Caribbean 
people, and for members o f ethnic minority groups contacts with English people) during 
part 1 or 2, the interviewer asiçs:
In what sort of situations do you come in touch with people from Asia, for example 
fr om India, Pakistan or China?
In what sort of situations do you come in touch with people from Africa or the 
Westindies?
In what sort of situations do you come in touch with English people?
Can you recall one situation and tell me what happened?
Prompt: What about, for example, at work or in your private life...?
I f  participants responds with a class o f situations ( e.g. on the market, at work, other 
parents in nursery/ school):
Can you give me an example? Do you recall a specific encounter and can you describe 
what happened?
(b) I f  a participant had previously talked about contact with a person/ people from a 
different ethnic background:
You said before you met X...Is it fairly rare for you to meet people from Y, or can you 
give me an example of other types of situations in which you get in touch with people 
from...?
How about your private life?




To what extent do you feel that living in a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, mixed 
community is or has been satisfying for you?
Can you give me an example?
To what extent do you feel that living in a multi-cultural community has aspects 
that have been or are problematic for you?
Can you give me an example?
Can you describe that situation? What happened?
I f  a participant does not spontaneously give an example, the interviewer may prompt: 
what about X (e.g. housing, schooling, jobs ? Do you think [that] only concerns other 
people, or does it affect you too?
5.Forms of practice :
a.) questions about culture and more global belief-systems for ethnic minority 
participants:
What aspects of your culture/ or the culture of your parents do you keep and practice in 
your day-to-day life? (prompt: for example food-wise, or in tenns of music, dressing, 
religion.
In what respects do you see differences between your (your parents’) culture and British I
culture? I
b) For English participants:
Do you, and if so, in what respects and to what extent do you feel being influenced by, 
say, Indian or African culture?
(e.g. foodwise, music,...)
In what respects do you see differences between their culture and British culture?
Probing questions (always asked after the participant’s spontaneous accounts):
Let’s go back to what you said about your experience with [....]
How do you think would he/ she explain what happened?
Do you think he/ she experienced the situation similar to the way you did?
How did you come to believe that his/ her behaviour was motivated by...?/ How did you 
come to believe that he/ she did [this] because...?
Why do you think that he/ she didn’t understand...?
Thank you for your time and for taking part in this project.
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A pp e n d ix  8.3.
P Participant




[...] missing sentence or paragraph
italics my emphasis, usually concerning ToM:
underscored participant’s emphasis in tone of voice
UPPER CASE participant’s emphasis in tone of voice: very loud
: e.g. lou:d participant’s intonation, stretching words
(.) pause
(...) longer pause
( ) missing word, sentence fragment or even paragraph due to unintelligible 
recording. The length of the blank indicates approximately the length of the missing 
part.
(maybe) words or phiases in brackets denote what the author understood the 
participant was likely to have said
= participant and interviewer speaking at the same time
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A ppen d ix  11.1. In st r u c t io n s  fo r  su per v iso r s  a n d  w orkers
__________________
BRIEFING FOR GROUP SESSIO N  -
Name: Participant title:
You were chosen to be a S U P E R V I S O R .
You will be working as a supervisor of a small group of workers. Together with 
two-three other supervisors, your task consists of directing and controlling 
whether or not the workers are doing a good job.
You will be in a position to decide for the workers what to do, and you will have 
to evaluate how they are doing it (in the best interest of the company). We 
believe that these processes also afford a particular facet of creativity, albeit 
perhaps not in the conventional sense.
1) Interview: At first, as a panel of supervisors, you will interview each worker 
about his job aptitudes.
2) Evaluation and a ss ig n m en t to  jobs: Together with the other supervisors, 
your task will then consist of evaluating each worker and of allocating different 
jobs to them. It will be up to you as supervisors to establish criteria against 
which to m easure their performance. On the basis of your evaluation, you will 
then assign different tasks to individual workers.
The tasks: As in real life companies, tasks differ greatly in creativity .
Creative I task: slogan task 
Creative II task: computer ‘design task’
Uncreative task: ‘crossing out “t’s” task 
Uncreative II task: administration sorting task
3) C ontinuous control of w orkers’ perform ance:
Throughout the remaining part of the experiment, your and the other 
supervisors’ job consists of further supervising the work. Workers’ good 
performance’ can be rewarded by
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i) entrusting the worker with a creative, responsible and enjoyable task
ii) give token points
Poor performance leads to negative consequences in which case you might 
have to give the worker
iii) less demanding uncreative tasks
iv) taking off points.
Note that as an experimenter I will not be in a position to influence your and the 
other supervisors decisions and evaluations.
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Q t h e  w ork er s
Name; Participant title:
BRIEFING FOR GROUP SESSIO N
You are chosen to be O  a w o r k e r  @1"^.
You will be working in a small group of four under the supervision of two-three 
supervisors. Together with the other workers, you will be asked to complete a 
number of different jobs that afford different degrees of creativity. These tasks 
will be allocated to you by the supervisors who will also be in a position of 
evaluating your performance (in the best interest of the company). Please note 
that these processes also afford creativity, albeit perhaps not in the most 
conventional sense.
1) Interview: At first, a panel of supervisors will interview you and the other 
workers’ about your job aptitudes.
2) Evaluation and assignment to jobs: The supervisors will then evaluate 
your and the other workers’ performance. As a panel, the supervisors will have 
established criteria against which to measure whether your performance is 
good or bad. On the basis of their evaluation, the supervisors will then allocate 
tasks to you and the other workers.
The tasks: As in real life companies, tasks differ greatly in creativity .
Creative I task: slogan task 
Creative II task: computer ‘design task’
Uncreative task: ‘crossing out “t’s” task 
Uncreative II task; administration sorting task
3) Continuous control of workers’ performance:
Throughout the remaining part of the experiment, you will be carrying out the 
tasks that you were assigned to under continuous supervision. If you perform 
well as a worker, supervisors may reward you by
i) entrusting you as a worker with a more creative, responsible and 
enjoyable task
ii) give token points
Poor performance may lead to negative consequences in which case 
supervisors may decide to
iii) assign you to less demanding, less creative tasks
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iv) take off points.




0 t h e  w or k e r s
B R IEFIN G  FOR IN D IV ID U A L  IN FO R M A TIO N  SESSION
Previous research suggests that people’s first impressions greatly influence the 
way they work together and may, as we believe, ultimately affect creativity at 
work.
In order to take this often neglected, yet important feature of work dynamics into 
consideration, the aim of this session is to provide group members with some 
preliminary information about each other.
The session involves two very short tasks:
1 ) We will show you photographs of the eye regions of the other group 
members.
2) We will exchange information that group members have provided about 
themselves, their likes and dislikes at work, in the brief questionnaire.
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A p p e n d ix  11.2.
Debriefing o f ‘creativity at work place’ experiment
As many psychological studies, this experiment involved what is called a ‘cover 
story’. In this case the cover story consisted of making you believe that we are looking 
at ‘creativity at the work place’.
In reality, the main aim of this study is to investigate the effect of different power 
relations on the way people read others’ minds. In psychological terms, the ability to 
represent mental states, such as beliefs, intentions, desires etc. and to interpret and 
explain others’ behaviour on this basis, is called a ‘theory of mind’. It is an important 
facet of social cognition (imagine you were blind to others mental states!) that in the 
past years has extensively been researched with regard to children’s development 
(when and how do children begin to understand that others have beliefs and desires) 
and a developmental disorder called autism.
Although as adults we are all principally able to understand that another person 
has a different mental perspective, anecdotes - for example from the relations between 
Nazi Germans and Jews in the Third Reich, ‘Black’ and ‘White’ people in South Africa 
or the US -  let us to reason that in some social conditions, people may be more or less 
likely to use this ability. In other words, it appeared to us that in conditions in which 
some people have , on the basis of their group identity, strong power over people 
belonging to another, powerless group, they may be less likely to appreciate what the 
other thinks, intends or feels. With this study we set out to look at this issue 
experimentally.
The photographs that you have seen on the computer are actually taken from a 
task developed by another researcher, designed to provide a sensitive measure of how 
well people read mental states of others from cues given by the eye region only (‘the 
eyes as a window to the mind’). These same pictures are given to ail student 
participants, hence nobody will ever rate your own photograph. The ‘group experiment’ 
that I was so keen to outline to you in detail will in fact never take place, and the 
experiment ends here.
We apologise for the deception that our cover story involved, but I hope you will 
be able to appreciate that it would not be possible to investigate our research question 
adequately if I had told you and the other students about the real purpose of the study 
from the outset -  as people would be likely to behave differently.
As the study will be run until end of January 2002, we would like to ask you for now not 
to discuss the experiment with friends and classmates who might perhaps take part in 
it as well.
Thank you very much for your participation!
438
R e f e r e n c e s
Adorno, T. W., E. Frenkel-Bmnswick, et al. (1950). The Authoritarian Personality. New 
York, Harper & Row.
Allport, F. H. (1924). Social Psychology. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company.
American Psychiatric Association (1994). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders. 4th edition. Washington, D.C., American Psychiatiic Association.
Ames, D. R., E. D. Knowles, et al. (2001). The social folk theorist: insights from social
and cultural psychology on the contents and contexts of folk theorizing. }
Intentions and Intentionalitv: Foundations of Social Cognition. B. F. Malle, C. J.
Moses and D. A. Baldwin. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
Asperger, H. (1944). “Die 'Autistischen Psychopathen' im Kindesalter.” Archiv fixer 
Psychiati'ie und Nervenkrankheiten 117: 76-136.
Asperger, H. (1991). Autistic psychopathy in childhood'. Autism and Asperger's 
Syndr ome. U. Frith. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Astington, J. W. (1990). NaiTative and the child's theory of mind. Narrative Thought and 
Narrative Language. B. K. Britton and A. D. Pellegrini. Hillsdale, N.J., Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates.
Astington, J. W., P. L. Harris, et al., Eds. (1988). Developing Theories of Mind.
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Astington, J. W. and A, Gopnik (1991). “Theoretical explanations of children's
understanding of the mind.” British Journal of Developmental Psvchologv 9:7- 
31.
Augoustinos, M. and K. J. Reynolds (2001). Understanding Prejudice. Racism, and 
Social Conflict. London, Sage.
Augoustinos, M. and I. Walker (1995). Social Cognition. An Integrated Introduction.
London, Sage.
Baron-Cohen, S. (1989a). “The autistic child's theory of mind: A case of specific
developmental delay.” Journal of Child Psvchologv and Psvchratrv 30: 285-297.
Baron-Cohen, S. (1989b). “Perceptual role taking and protodeclarative pointing in
autism.” British Journal of Developmental Psvchologv 7: 113-127.
439
References
Baron-Cohen, S. (1989c). “Are autistic children behaviourists? An examination of their 
mental-physical and appearance-reality distinctions.” Journal of Autism and 
Developmental Disorders 18: 379-402.
Baron-Cohen, S. (1993). “Are children with autism acultural?” Behavioural and Brain 
Sciences 16(3): 512-513.
Baron-Cohen, S. (1995). Mindblindness. An Essav on Theory of Mind and Autism. 
Cambridge, MA, Bradford Book, MIT Press.
Baron-Cohen, S. (2003) The Essential Difference. Men. Women and the extreme male 
brain. London, Penguin.
Baron-Cohen, S., T. Jolliffe, et al. (1997). “Another advanced test of theory of mind:
evidence from very high functioning adults with autism or Asperger syndrome.” 
Journal of Child Psychology and Psvchiati v 38: 813-822.
Baron-Cohen, S., A. Leslie, et al. (1985). “Does the autistic child have a "theoiy of 
mind"?” Cognition 21: 37-46.
Baron-Cohen, S., A. Leslie, et al. (1986). “Mechanical, behavioural and intentional 
understanding of picture stories in autistic childr en.” British Journal of 
Developmental Psvchologv 4(113-125).
Baron-Cohen, S., M. O'Riordan, et al. (1999). “Recognition of faux pas by normally 
developing children and children with Asperger Syndrome or high-functioning 
Autism.” Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders 29(5): 407-417.
Baron-Cohen, S., A. Spitz, et al. (1993a). “Can children with autism recognise surprise?” 
Cognition and Emotion 7: 507-16.
Baron-Cohen, S. and J. Swettenham (1997). Theory of mind in autism: its relationship to 
executive function and central coherence. Handbook of Autism and Pervasive 
Developemental Disorders. 2nd Edition. D. Cohen and F. Volkmar. New York, 
John Wiley and Sons: 880-893
Baron-Cohen, S., H. Tager-Flusberg, et al., Eds. (1993). Understanding Other Minds. 
Perspectives fr om autism. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Baron-Cohen, S., H. Tager-Flusberg, et al., Eds. (2000). Understanding Other Minds. 
Perspectives from Cognitive Neuroscience. Oxford, Blackwell.
Baron-Cohen, S., S. Wheelwright, et al. (1997). “Is there a "language of the eyes?"
Evidence fr om normal adults, and adults with autism or Asperger Syndrome.” 
Visual Cognition 4(3): 311-331.
440
References
Baron-Cohen, S., S. Wheelwright, et al. (2001). “The 'Reading the Mind in the Eyes' test 
revised version: A study with normal adults, and adults with Asperger Syndrome 
or high-functioning autism.” Journal of Child Psvchologv and Psvchiatrv 42(2): 
241-251.
Bartlett, F. C. (1932). Remembering. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Barisch, K. and H. M. Wellman (1989). “Young children's attribution of action to beliefs 
and desires.” Child Development 60: 946-964.
Barisch, K. and H. M. Wellman (1995). Children talk about the mind. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press.
Billig, M. (1976). Social Psvchologv and Intergroup Relations. London & New 
York, Academic Press.
Bloom, P. (2000). How children learn the meaning of words. Cambridge, MA, MIT 
Press.
Bower, G. H., J. B. Black, et al. (1979). “Scripts in memory and text.” Cognitive 
Psychology 11: 177-220.
Bowler, D. M. (1992). “"Theory of mind" in Asperger Syndrome.” Journal of Child 
Psychology and Psychiatry 33(5): 877-893.
Bowman, E. P. (1988). “Asperger's syndrome and autism: the case for a connection.” 
British Journal of Psvchiatrv 152: 377-82.
Brace, N., Kemp, R. & Snelgar, S. (2000) SPSS for Psychologists. A Guide to Data 
Analysis using SPSS for Windows. Palgrive, Hampshire & New York.
Brian, J. A. and S. E. Bryson (1996). “Disembedding performance and recognition
memory in autism/ PDD.” Journal of Child Psvchologv and Psvchiatrv 37: 865- 
872,
Burke, K. (1969). A Grammar of Motives. Berkely, University of California Press.
Breakwell, G. M., S. Hammond, et al. (1995). Research Methods in Psvchologv. London, 
Sage Publications.
Britton, B. K. and A. D. Pellegrini, Eds. (1990). Narrative Thought and Narrative 
Language. Hillsdale, NJ, Lawrence Erlbaum Ass.




Bruner, J. (1990). Acts of meaning. Cambridge, MA, Haiward University Press.
Bruner, J. (1993). “Do we "acquire" culture or vice versa?” Behavioural and Brain 
Sciences 16(3): 515-516.
Bruner, J. and C. F. Feldman (1993). Theories of mind and the problem of autism. 
Understanding Other Minds. Perspectives from Autism. S. Baron-Cohen, H. 
Tager-Flusberg and D. Cohen. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Byrne, R. and A. Whiten (1988). Machiavellian Intelligence: Social Expertise and the
Evolution of Intellect in Monkeys, Apes and Humans. Oxford, Oxford University 
Press.
Carruthers, P. and P. K. Smith, Eds. (1996). Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press.
Chaiman, T. and S. Baron-Cohen (1992). "Understanding drawings and beliefs: a further 
test of the metarepresentation theory of autism.” Journal of Child Psvchologv and 
Psvchiatrv 33: 1105-12.
Charman, T. and S. Baron-Cohen (1995). “Understanding photos, models, and beliefs: a 
test of the modularity thesis of theory of mind.” Child Development 69: 672-691.
Charman, T., S. Baron-Cohen, et al. (1997). “Infants with autism: An investigation of
empathy, pretend play, joint attention, and imitation.” Developmental Psvchologv 33(5):
781-789.
Chandler, M., M. Boyes, et al. (1990). “Relativism and stations of epistemic doubt.” 
Journal of Experimental Child Psvchologv 50: 370-395.
Chomsky, N. 1968. Language and mind. N. York: Harcourt Brace.
Cole, M. (1996). Cultural Psvchologv. A once and future discipline. Cambridge, MA, 
Harward University Press.
Corcoran, R. (2000). Theory of mind in other clinical conditions: is a selective 'theory of 
mind' deficit exclusive to autism. Understanding Other Minds: Evidence from 
Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience. S. Baron-Cohen, H. Tager-Flusberg and 
D. Cohen. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Cosmides, L. and J. Tooby (1992). Cognitive adaptations for social exchange. The
Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psvchologv and the Generation of Culture. J. Barkow, L.
Cosmides and J. Tooby. New York, Oxford University Press: 163-228.
442
References
Crawford, J. R., K. M. Allan, et al. (1992). “Short-foims of the UK WAIS-R: Regression 
equations and their predictive validity in a general population sample.” British 
Journal of Clinical Psvchologv 31: 191-202.
Dahrendorf, R. (1968). "Recent Changes in the Class Stnicture of European Societies". 
Reader in Political Sociology. F. Lindenfeld. New York, Funk & Wagnalls: 235- 
. 262.
D'Andrade, R. (1984). Cultural meaning systems. Culture Theory: Essays on Mind. Self 
and Emotion. R. A. Shweder and R. A. LeVine. New York, Cambridge University 
Press.
D'Andrade, R. (1987). A folk model of the mind. Cultural Models in Language and 
Thought. D. Holland and N. Quinn. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 
112-148.
Dahlgren, S. O. and A. Trillingsgaard (1996). "Theory of mind in non-retarded children 
with autism and Asperger's syndrome. A research note.” Journal of Child 
Psvchologv and Psvchiatrv 37: 759-763.
DeMyer, M. K., S. Barton, et al. (1974). “The measured intelligence of autistic childr en.” 
Journal of Autism and Childhood Schizophrenia 4(42-60).
Dennett, D. C. (1978). “Beliefs about beliefs.” Behavioural and Brain Sciences 4: 568-70,
Dennett, D. C. (1987). The Intentional Stance. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
Dewey, M. (1991). Living with Asperger's Syndrome. Autism and Asperger Syndrome. 
U. Frith. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 184-206.
Dunn, J., J. Brown, et al. (1991). “ Young children's understanding of other people's 
feelings and beliefs: Individual differences and their antecedents.” Child 
Development 62: 1352-1366.
Dunn, J. and C. Hughes (2001). “"I got some swords and you're dead!": Violent fantasy,
antisocial behavior, friendship, and moral sensibility in young children.” Child
Development 72(2): 491-505.
Dunn, L. M., L. M. Dunn, et al. (1997). The British Picture Vocabulary Scale. Second 
Edition. Windsor, UK., NFER-Nelson.
Edwards, D. (1997). Discourse and cognition. London, Sage.
Edwards, D. and J. Potter (1992). Discursive Psvchologv. London, Sage.
443
References
Ehlers, S. and C. Gillberg (1993). “The epidemiology of Asperger Syndrome. A total 
population study.” Journal of Child Psvchologv and Psvchiatrv 34: 1327-50.
Ellemers, N., W. Van Rijjswijk, et al. (1998). “Group commitment as a moderator of
attributional and behavioural responses to power use.” European Journal of Social 
Psychology 28: 555-573.
Erber, R. and S. T. Fiske (1984). “Outcome dependency and attention to inconsistent 
information.” Journal of Personality and Social Psvchologv 47(4): 709-726.
Essed, P. (1991). Understanding Everyday Racism. Newbury Park, Sage.
Fanon, F. (1961/ 1967). The Wretched of the Earth. London, Penguin.
Feldman, C. F. (1989). Monologues as problem solving narratives. Narratives from the 
crib. K. Nelson. Cambridge, MA, Haiward University Press.
Fischhoff, B. (1982). Debiasing. Judgements under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. P. 
S. Kahnemann and A. Tversky. New York, Cambridge University Press.
Fiske, S. T. (1993). “Conti'olling other people.” Amercian Psychologist 48(6): 621-628.
Fiske, S. T. (1998). Stereotyping, pqudice, and discrimination. Handbook of Social 
Psvchologv. 4th edition. D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske and G. Lindzey. Boston, 
McGraw-Hill. Vol 2: 357-411.
Fiske, S. T. (2000). “Stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination at the seam between the 
centuries: evolution, culture, mind, and brain.” European Journal of Social 
Psvchologv 30: 299-322.
Fiske, S. T. and E. Depret (1996). “Control, interdependence and power: understanding 
social cognition in its social context.” European Review of Social Psvchologv 7: 
31-61.
Fiske, S. T. and S. L. Neuberg (1989). Category-based and individuating processes as a 
function of information and motivation: Evidence from our laboratory. 
Stereotyping and Prejudice: Changing Conceptions. D. Bar-Tal, C. F. Graumann, 
A. W. Rruglanski and W. Stioebe. New York, Springer Verlag; 83-104.
Fiske, S. T. and Neuberg (1990). A continuum model of impression formation, fr om 
category-based to individuating processes: Influence of infomiation and 
motivation on attention and inteipretation. Advances in Experimental Social 
Psvchologv. M. P. Zanna. New York, Academic Press. 23; 1-74.
Fiske, S. T. and S. E. Taylor (1984). Social Cognition. New York, Random House.
444
References
Fiske, S. T. and S. E. Taylor (1991). Social Cognition. New York, McGraw-Hill.
Feldman, C. F. (1989). Monologues as problem solving natTatives. Namatives from the 
crib. K. Nelson. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.
Fivush, R., J. Kuebli, et al. (1992). “The structure of events and event representation: A 
developmental analysis.” Child Development 63: 188-201.
Flavell, J. H. (1988). The development of children's knowledge about the mind.
Developing Theories of Mind. J. W. Astington, P. L. Hanis and D. R. Olson. New 
York, Cambridge University Press; 244-267.
Flavell, J. H., E. R. Flavell, et al. (1983). “Development of the appearance-reality 
distinction.” Cognitive Psvchologv 15: 95-120.
Fling, E. (2000). Eating an Artichoke: A Mother's Perspective on Asperger's Svndrome. 
London and Philadelphia, Jessica Kingsley Publishers.
Fodor, J. (1983). The Modularity of Mind. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
Folstein, S. E. and Santangelo (2000). Does Asperger Syndrome aggregate in families? 
Asperger Svndrome. A. Klin, F. Volkmar and S. S. Spanow. New York, The 
Guilford Press : 159-171
Forguson, L. and A. Gopnik (1988). The ontogeny of common sense. Developing 
Theories of Mind. J. W. Astington, P. L. Harris and D. R. Olson. New York, 
Cambridge University Press; 226-243.
French, J. R. P. and B. Raven (1959). The bases of social power. Studies in Social Power.
D. Cartwright. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan, Institute for Social Research.
French, L. A. (1985). Real-world knowledge as the basis of social and cognitive
development. The Development of Social Cognition. J. B. Pryor and J. D. Day. 
New York, Springer Verlag; 179-209.
Frith, U. (1989). Autism. Explaining the Enigma. Oxford, Blackwell.
Frith, U. and F. G. E. Happe (1994). “Autism: beyond "theory of mind".” Cognition 50: 
115-132.
Frith, U. and M. Snowling (1983). “Reading for meaning and reading for sound in 
autistic and dyslexic children.” British Journal of Developmental Psvchologv 1: 329-342.
Galambos, J. A. and L. J. Rips (1982). “Memory for Routines.” Journal of Verbal 
Learning and Verbal Behaviour 21: 260-281.
445
References
Geertz, C. (1973). The Intemretation of Cultures. New York, Fontana Press.
Georgesen, J. C. and M. J. Hanis (2000). “The balance of power: interpersonal
consequences of differential power and expectancies.” Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin 261101: 1239-1257.
Gillberg, C. (1991). Clinical and neurobiological aspects of Asperger syndrome.
Autism and Asperger's Svndrome. U. Frith. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press; 122-146.
Gillberg, C. (1989). “Asperger's Syndrome in 23 Swedish children.” Developmental 
Medicine and Child Neurology 31: 520-31.
Gillberg, I. C. and C. Gillberg (1989). “Asperger Syndrome - some epidemiological 
considerations.” Journal of Child Psychology and Psvchiatrv 30: 631-638.
Goldman, A. (1989). “Interpretation psychologised.” Mind and Language 4: 161-85.
Gomez, J.C. (2002) Theory of Mind in Primates. Paper presented at the Workshop on 
Social Cognitive Neuroscience: Autism and Other Insights. Dundee, Scotland.
Gomez, J. C. (1998). Some thoughts about the evolution of LADS, with special reference 
to TOM and SAM. Language and Thought: Interdisciplinary Themes. P. 
CarTUthers and J. Boucher. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Gomez, J. C., E. Sania, et al. (1993). The comparative study of early communicationand 
theories of mind: ontogeny, phylogeny and pathology. Understanding other Minds: 
Perspectives from Autism. S. Baron-Cohen, H. Tager-Flusberg and D. Cohen. Oxford, 
Oxford University Press; 397-426.
Goodwin, S., A. Gubin, et al. (2001). “Power biases impression formation: Stereotyping 
subordinates by default, by design.” Group Processes and Intergroup Relations.
Gopnik, A. and J. W. Astington (1988). “Children's imderstanding of representational 
change and its relatio to the understanding of false belief and the appearance-reality 
distinction.” Child Development 59: 26-37.
Gopnik, A. and H. M. Wellman (1994). The theory theory. Mapping the mind: domain 
specificity in cognition and culture. L. A. Hirschfeld and S. A. Gelman. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; 275-293.
Gordon, R. M. (1986). “Folk psychology as simulation.” Mind and Language 1: 158-71.
Grice, H. P. (1957). “Meaning.” Philosophical Review 66: 377-388.
446
References
Grice, H. P. (1969). “Utterer’s meaning and intentions.” Philosophical Review 78: 147- 
177.
Graesser, A. C., S. E. Gordon, et al. (1979). “Recognition memory for typical and
atypical actions in scripted activités: Tests of a scripter pointer + tag hypothesis.” 
Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behaviour 18(349-332).
Graesser, A. C., S. B. Woll, et al. (1980), “Memory for typical and atypical actions in 
scripted activities.” Journal of Experimental Psvchologv: Human Learning and 
Memory 6: 503-515.
Happé, F. G. E. (1993). “Communicative competence and theory of mind in autism: A 
test of relevance theory.” Cognition 48: 101-119.
Happé, F. G. E. (1994a). Autism. An Introduction to Psychological Theory. London,
UCL Press.
Happé, F. G. E. (1994b). “An advanced test of theoiy of mind: Understanding of story 
characters' thoughts and feelings by able autistic, mentally handicapped, and 
normal children and adults.” Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders 
24(2): 129-154.
Happé, F. G. E. (1994c). “Wechsler IQ profile and theory of mind in autism: A resesarch 
note.” Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 35(8): 1461-1471.
Happé, F. G. E. (1995). “The role of age and verbal ability in the Theory of Mind task 
Performance of subjects with autism.” Child Development 66: 843-855.
Happé, F. G. E. (1996). “Studying weak central coherence at low levels: Children with 
autism do not succumb to visual illusions. A research note.” Journal of Child 
Psvchologv and Psvchiatrv 37(7): 873-877.
Happé, F. G. E. (1997). “Central coherence and theory of mind in autism: Reading
homographs in context.” British Journal of Developmental Psvchologv 15: 1-12.
Happé, F. (1999). “Autism: cognitive deficit or cognitive style?” Trends in Cognitive
Sciences 3: 216-222.
Happé, F (2000) Weak central coherence in autism: Global and local sentence
completions. Unpublished manuscript
Happé, F. (2001). Social and non-social development in autism: where are the links? The 
Development of Autism. Perspectives from Theory and Research. J. A. Burack, T. 




Happé, F., J. Briskman, et al. (2001). “Exploring the cognitive phenotype of autism:
Weak "Central Coherence" in parents and siblings of children with autism: I. 
Experimental Tests.” Journal of Child Psvchologv and Psvchiatrv 42(31: 299- 
307.
Happé, F., H. Brownell, et al. (1999). “Acquired 'theory of mind' impairments following 
str'oke.” Cognition 70(3): 211-240.
Happé, F. and U. Frith (1996a). “The neuropsychology of autism.” Brain 119: 1377-
1400.
Happé, F. and U. Fr ith (1996b). “Theory of mind and social impairment in children with
conduct disorder.” British Journal of Developmental Psvchologv 14: 385-398.
Harris, P. L. (1992). “From simulation to folk psychology: the case for development.” 
Mind and Language 7: 120-44.
Haslam, S. A. (2001). Psvchologv in Organizations. The Social Identity Approach. 
London, Sage.
Heavy, L., W. Phillips, et al. (2000). “The awkward moments test: A naturalistic measure 
of social understanding in autism.” Jouriral of Autism and Developmental 
Disorders 30(3): 225-236.
Hegel, G.W.F. (1807/ 1977). Die Phaenomenologie des Geistes (Bamberg and
Wuerzburg); trans A.V. Miller, The Phenomenology of Spirit, Oxford, Clarendon 
Press.
Heider, F. (1958). The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations. New York, Wiley.
Hermelin, B. and N. O'Connor (1967). “Remembering of words by psychotic and 
subnormal children.” British Journal of Psvchologv 58: 213-8.
Hillier, A. and L. Allinson (2002). “Understanding embanassment among those with
autism: Breaking down the complex emotion of embanussment among those with 
autism.” Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders 32(6): 583-592.
Hobbes, T. (1660/1968). Leviathan. Harmondsworth, Penguin.
Hudson, J. A. (1988). “Children's memory for atypical actions in script-based stories:
Evidence for a disruption effect.” Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 46: 
159-173.
Hughes, C. (2001). Executive dysfunctions in autism: its nature and implications
for everyday problems experienced by individuals with autism. The Development 
of Autism. Perspectives from Theory and Research. J. A. Burack, T. Charman, N. 
Yir-miya and P. R. Zelazo. Mahwah, NJ, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates; 237-254.
448
References
Hughes, C., J. Dunn, et al. (1998). “Trick or treat?; Uneven understanding of mind and
emotion and executive function in "hard-to-manage" preschoolers.” Journal of Child
Psvchologv and Psvchiatrv 39(7): 981-994.
Hughes, C. H. and J. Russell (1993). “Autistic children's difficulty with mental 
disengagement from an object: its implications for theories of autism.” 
Developmental Psvchologv 29: 498-510.
Hurlburt, S. H. 1984. Pseudoreplication and the design of ecological field experiments. 
Ecological Monogiunhs. 54:187-211.
Jackendoff, R. (1996). The natural logic of rights and obligations. Paper presented at the 
conference on the growing mind, Geneva.
JaiTold, C., D. W. Butler, et al. (2000). “Linking theory of mind and centr al coherence 
bias in autism and in the general population.” Developmental Psvchologv 36(1): 
126-138.
Jolliffe, T. and S. Baron-Cohen (1997). “Are people with autism and Asperger
syndr ome faster than normal on the embedded figures test?” Journal of Child 
Psvchologv and Psvchiatrv 38(5): 527-534.
Joliffe, T., R. Lansdown, et al. (1992). “Autism, a personal account.” Communication. 
Journal of the National Autistic Society 26: 12-19.
Jones, E. E. and K. E. Davis (1965). “From acts to dispositions. The attribution process in 
person perception.” Advances in Experimental Social Psvchologv. 2: 219-266.
Jones, J. M. (1972). Prejudice and racism. Reading, MA, Addision-Wesley.
Kahnemann, P. S. and A. Tversky, Eds. (1982). Judgment under uncerlaintv: Heuristics 
and biases. New York, Cambridge University Press.
Kaland, N., A. Moller-Nielsen, et al. (2002). “A new 'advanced' test of theory of mind: 
evidence from children and adolescents with Asperger syndrome.” Journal of 
Child Psvchologv and Psvchiatrv 43(41: 517-528.
Kalish, C. (1998). “Reasons and Causes: Children's Understanding of Conformity to
Social Rules and Physical Laws.” Child Development 69(3): 706-720.




Karniol, R., T. Eylon, et al. (1997). “Predicting your own and others' thoughts and 
feelings: More like a stranger than a friend.” European Journal of Social 
Psychology 27: 301-311.
Kieman, V. (1996). The Lords of Human Kind: European Attitudes to other Cultures in 
the Imperial Age. London, Serif.
Klein, K. J. K. and S. D. Hodges (2001). “Gender differences, motivation and empathie
accuracy. When it pays to understand.” Personalitv and Social Psvchologv Bulletin 27:
720-730.
Klin, A. (2000). “Attributing social meaning to ambiguous viusal stimuli in higher-
functioning autism and Asperger syndrome: The social attribution task.” Journal 
of Child Psvchologv and Psvchiatrv 41171: 831-846.
Klin, A., W. Jones, et al. (2002). “Visual fixation patterns during viewing of naturalistic 
social situations as predictors of social competence in individuals with autism.” 
Archives of General Psvchiatr v 59: 809-816.
Klin, A., W. Jones, et al. (2002). “Defining and quantifying the social phenotype of
autism.” American Journal of Psvchiatrv 159(6): 895-908.
Klin, A., S. S. SparTOW, et al., Eds. (2000). Asperger Svndrome. New York, The Guilford 
Press.
Klin, A., R. Schultz, et al. (2000). Theory of mind in action: developmental perspectives 
on social neuroscience. Understanding other Minds. Evidence from Cognitive 
Neuroscience. S. Baron-Cohen, H. Tager-Flusberg and D. Cohen. Oxford, 
Blackwell: 357-388.
Klin, A., F. R. Volkmar, et al. (1995). “Validity and neuropsychological characterization 
of Asperger Syndrome: Convergence with Nonverbal Learning and Disabilities 
Syndrome.” Journal of Child Psvchologv and Psvchiatrv 36: 1127-1140.
Koffka, K. (1935). Principles of Gestalt Psvchologv. New York, Harcourt.
Kohler, W. (1947). Gestalt Psvchologv. New York, Liveright Publishing Corporation.
Kohs, S. C. (1923). Intelligence measurement. New York, MacMillan.
Labov, W. (1972). The transformation of experience in narrative syntax. Language in the 
inner city: Studies in the Black English vernacular. W. Labov. Philadelphia, 
University of Pennsylvania Press: 354-396.
450
References
Labov, W. (1982). Speech actions and reactions in personal naiTative. Analyzing
discourse: Text and talk. D. Tannen. Washington, DC, Georgetown University 
Press: 219-247.
Labov, W. and J. Waletzky (1967). NaiTative analysis: Oral versions of personal
experience. Essays on the verbal and visual arts. J. Helm. Seattle, University of 
Washington Press: 12-44.
Langdon, R. and M. Coltheait (2001). “Visual perspective-taking and schizotypy: 
evidence for a simulation-based account of mentalising in normal adults.” 
Cognition 82: 1-26.
Leekam, S. (2002): From theory of mind to gaze perception.. .and beyond. Paper
presented at the workshop on Social Cognitive Neuroscience: Autism and Other 
Insights. Dundee, Scotland.
Leekam, S. and J. Pemer (1991). “Does the autistic child have a metarepresentational 
deficit?” Cognition 40: 203-18.
Leekam, S. R. and M. Prior (1994). “Can autistic childr en distinguish lies from jokes - a 
second look at second order belief attr ibution.” Journal of Child Psvchologv and 
Psychiatry 35(5): 901-915.
Leslie, A. M. (1987). “Pretense and Representation: The origins of "theory of mind".” 
Psychological Review 94: 412-26.
Leslie, A. M. (1991). The theory of mind impairment in autism: Evidence for a modular 
mechanism of development. Natural Theories of Mind. A. Whiten: 63-78.
Leslie, A. (1994a). “Pretending and believing: issues in the theory of TOMM.” Cognition 
50:211-38.
Leslie, A. (1994b). ToMM, ToBy, and agency: core architecture and domain specificity. 
Manning the Mind: Domain Specificity in Cognition and Culture. L. A.
Hirschfeld and S. A. Gelman. New York, Cambridge University Press: 119-48.
Leslie, A. and L. Thaiss (1992). “Domain specificity in conceptual development: 
evidence from autism.” Cognition: 43(225-51).
Lewis, V. and J. Boucher (1988). “Spontaneous, instructed and elicited play in relatively 
able autistic childr en.” British Jouriral of Developmental Psvchologv 6: 325-339.
Levi, P. (1986/89). The Drowned and the Saved. New York, Vintage International.
Lillard, A. (1998). “Ethnopsychologies: Cultural variations in theory of mind.” 
Psychological Bulletin 123(1): 3-32.
451
References
Lockyer, L. and M. Rutter (1970). “A five to fifteen year follow-up study of infantile
psychosis: IV. Patterns of cognitive ability.” British Journal of Social and Clinical 
Psychology 9: 152-169.
Loveland, K. A. (1991). “Social affordances and interaction II: Autism and the
affordances of the human environment.” Ecological Psvchologv 3(2): 99-119.
Loveland, K. A., R. E. McEvoy, et al. (1990a). “NaiTative story telling in autism and 
Down’s syndrome.” British Journal of Developmental Psychology 8: 9-23.
Loveland, K. A. and B. Tunali (1991). “Social scripts for conversational interactions in 
autism and Down's syndrome.” Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders 
21: 177-186.
Lucariello, J. (1995). “Mind, Culture, Person: Elements in a Cultural Psychology.”
Human Development 38: 2-18.
Lucariello, J. and K. Nelson (1985). “Slot-filler categories as memory organisers for 
young children.” Developmental Psvchologv 21(2): 272-282.
Lucariello, J. (1990). Canonicality and consciousness in child narrative. Narrative
Thought and Narrative Language. B. K. Britton and A. D. Pellegiini. Hillsdale, 
N.J., Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Malle, B. F. (1999). “How people explain behaviour: a new theoretical framework.” 
Personalitv and Social Psvchologv Review 3: 3-21.
Malle, B. F., J. Knobe, et al. (2000). “Conceptual stiucture and social functions of 
behavior explanations: Beyond person - situation attiibutions.” Journal of 
Personalitv and Social Psvchologv 79: 309-326.
Malle, B. F., L. J. Moses, et al., Eds. (2001). Intentions and Intentionalitv: Foundations of
Social Cognition. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
Mandler, J. M. (1979). Categorical and schematic organisation in memory. Memory 
organisation and structure. C. R. Ruff. New York, Academic Press.
Mandler, J. M. (1983). Representation. Manual of child psychology. P. Mussen. New 
York, Wiley.
Mandler, J. M. and N. S. Johnson (1977). “Remembrance of things parsed: Story 
structure and recall.” Cognitive Psvchologv 9: 111-151.
452
References
Meltzoff, A. N. and A. Gopnik (1993). The role of imitation in understanding persons
and developing a theory of mind. Understanding other minds: Perspectives from autism..
S. Baron-Cohen, H. Tager-Flusberg and D. Cohen: 335-366.
Meltzoff, A. N. and M. K. Moore (1983). “Newborn infants imitate adult facial gestures.” 
Child Development 54: 702-709.
Meltzoff, A. N. and M. K. Moore (1989). “Imitation in newborn infants: Exploring the 
range of gestures imitated and the underlying mechanisms.” Developmental 
Psvchologv 25(6): 954-962.
Memmi, A. (1990). The Colonizer and the Colonized. London, Earthscan.
Mitchell, P. and C. Lewis (1994). Children's Earlv Understanding of Mind. Hillsdale, NJ, 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Mitchell, P., E. J. Robinson, et al. (1996). “Contamination in reasoning about false belief: 
an instance of realist bias in adults but not children.” Cognition 59: 1-21.
Mitchell, P., M. Souglidou, et al. (in submission). “Do people believe what they see or 
what they are told? Judgments of credulity across different subcultures.”
Morton, J., U. Frith, et al. (1994). “The cognitive basis of a biological disorder: autism.” 
Trend in Neuroscience 14: 434-438.
Motti'on, L. and S. Belleville (1993). “A study of perceptual analysis in a high-level
autistic subject with exceptional giaphic abilities.” Brain and Cognition 23: 279- 
309.
Mottron, L. and S, Belleville (1995). “Perspective production in a savant-autistic 
draughtsman.” Psychological Medicine 25: 639-648.
Mottron, L., S. Belleville, et al. (1998). “Atypical memory perfonnance in an autistic 
savant.” Memory 6(6): 593-607.
Mottron, L., S. Belleville, et al. (1999). “Local bias in autistic subjects as evidenced by 
giaphic tasks: Perceptual hierarchization or working memory deficit?” Journal of 
Child Psvchologv and Psvchiatrv 40151: 743-755.
Motti'on, L., J. A. Burack, et al. (1999). “Perceptual processing among high-functioning
persons with autism.” Journal of Child Psvchologv and Psvchiatrv 40: 203-212.
Mundy, P., M. D. Sigman, et al. (1986). “Defining the social deficits of autism: the 
contiibution of non-verbal communication measures.” Journal of Child 
Psvchologv and Psychiatry 27(657-659).
453
References
Mundy, P., M. D. Sigman, et al. (1989). “The theoretical implications of joint-attention 
deficits in autism.” Development & Psychopathology 1(173-193).
Mundy, P., M. D. Sigman, et al. (1994). “Joint attention, developmental level, and
symptom presentation in autism.” Development and Psychopathology 6: 389-401.
Nelson, K. ri9861. Event knowledge. Stiucture and Function in Development. Hillsdale. 
NJ, Lawrence Erlbaum Ass.
Nelson, K. (1986). Event knowledge in cognitive development. Event Knowledge.
Structure and Function in Development. K. Nelson. Hillsdale, N.J., Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates.
Nelson, K., Ed. (1989). Narratives from the crib. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University 
Press.
Nelson, K., S. Engel, et al. (1985). “The Evolution of Meaning in Context.” Journal of 
Pragmatics 9: 453-474.
Nelson, K. and J. M. Gruendel (1981). Generalized event representation: Basic building 
blocks of cognitive development. Advances in Developmental Psvchologv, Vol.l.
E. Brown and M. Lamb. Hillsdale, NJ, Lawience Erlbaum Associates.
Nelson, K., Plea, P. D., et al. (1998). “Children's theory of mind: An experiential 
interpretation.” Human Development 41: 7-29.
Ng, S. H. (1980). The Social Psychology of Power. London, Academic Press.
Ng, S. H. (1982). Power and intergroup discrimination. Social Identity and Intergroup 
Relations. H. Tajfel. Cambridge and Paris, Cambridge University Press and 
Edition de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme.: 179-206.
Nietzsche, F. (1888/ 1968). The will to power. New York, Vintage Books.
Nunez, M. and P. L. Hams (1998). “Psychological and deontic concepts: Separate 
domains or intimate connection?” Mind and Language 13(2): 153-170.
Oakes, P. J., S. A. Haslam, et al. (1994). Stereotyping and social reality. Oxford, 
Blackwell.
Oakes, P. J. and J. C. Turner (1990). Is limited information processing the cause of social 
stereotyping? European Review of Social Psvchologv. W. Stioebe and M. 
Hewstone. Chichester, Wiley. Vol 1: 111-135.
Ozonoff, S. (1995). Executive functions in autism. Learning and Cognition in Autism. E. 
Schopler and G. B. Mesibov. New York, Plenum Press.
454
References
Ozonoff, S. and M. Griffith (2000). Neuropsychological function and external validity of 
Asperger Syndrome. Asperger Svndrome. A. Klin, F. Volkmar and S. S. SpaiTow. 
New York, The Guilford Press.
Ozonoff, S. and J. Jensen (1999). “Specific executive function profiles in three
neuro-developmental disorders.” Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders 
29(2): 171-177.
Ozonoff, S., S. J. Rogers, et al. (1991). “Asperger's syndrome: Evidence of and empirical 
distinction from high-functioning autism.” Journal of Child Psvchologv and 
Psvchiaüw 32171: 1107-1122.
Ozonoff, S., D. L. Stiayer, et al. (1994). “Executive function abilities in autism and 
Tourette Syndrome: An information processing approach.” Journal of Child 
Psvchologv and Psvchiatrv 32: 1015-1032.
Ozonoff, S. and D. L. Strayer (2001). “Further evidence of intact working memory in
autism.” Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders 31(3): 257-263.
Park, C. C. (1982). The Siege. The First Eight Years of an Autistic Child. With an 
Epilogue. Fifteen Years After. Boston, Backbay.
Pennington, B. F. and S. Ozonoff (1996). “Executive functions and developmental
psychopathology.” Journal of Child Psvchologv and Psvchiati v 37(37): 51-87.
Pemer, J. (1991). Understanding the Representational Mind. Cambridge, Mass., MIT 
Press.
Pemer, J. (1993). The theory of mind deficit in autism: rethinking the metarepresentation 
theory. Understanding Other Minds. Perspectives from Autism. S. Baron-Cohen, 
H. Tager-Flusberg and D. Cohen. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Pemer, J., U. Frith, et al. (1989). “Exploration of the atuistic child's theory of mind: 
knowledge, belief, and communication.” Child Development: 689-700.
Peterson, C. and M. Siegal (1995). "Deafness, conversation and theory of mind.” Joumal 
of Child Psvchologv and Psvchiatrv 36: 459-74.
Plaisted, K., M. O'Riordan, et al. (1998). “Enhanced discrimination of novel, highly
similar stimuli by adults with autism during a perceptual learning task.” Joumal of 
Child Psvchologv and Psvchiatrv 39: 765-775.
455
References
Pomeroy (1998). Subtyping peiwasive developmental disorder: Issues of validity and 
implication of child psychiatric diagnosis. Asperger svndrome and high 
functioning autism. E. Schopler, G. B. Mesibov and L. Kunce. New York, Plenum 
Press.
Pratt, C. and D. Bryant (1990). “Young children understand that looking leads to
knowing (so long as they are looking into a single barrel).” Child Development 
61: 973-82.
Premack, D. and A. J. Premack (1997). “Infants attiibute value +/- to the goal-directed 
actions of self-propelled objects.” Joumal of Cognitive Neuroscience 9(6): 848- 
856,
Premack, D. and G. Woodruff (1978). “Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?” 
Behavioural and Brain Sciences 4: 515-526.
Pring, L. and B. Heimelin (1993). “Bottle, tulip, and wineglass: Semantic and stmctural 
processing by savant artists.” Joumal of Child Psvchologv and Psvchiatrv 34: 
1365-1385.
Pring, L., B. Hermelin, et al. (1995). “Savants, segments, art and autism.” Joumal of
Child Psvchologv and Psvchiatrv 34: 1365-1385.
Prior, M. (1979). “Cognitive abilities and disabilities in infantile autism: a review.” 
Joumal of Abnormal Child Psvchologv 7: 357-380.
Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1978). “When is attiibution of beliefs justified?” The Behavioural and 
Brain Sciences 1: 592-3.
Quinn, N. and D. Holland (1987). Culture and Cognition. Cultural Models in Language 
and Thought. D, Holland and N. Quinn. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 
3-40.
Recanati, F. (1997). “Can we believe what we do not understand?” Mind and Language 
12(1): 84-100.
Reicher, S. D. (2001). Studying psychology studying racism. Understanding Prejudice. 
Racism, and Social Conflict. M. Augoustinos and K. J. Reynolds. London, Sage: 
273-298.
Reicher, S., M. Levine, et al. (1998). “More on deindividuation, power relations between 
groups and the expression of social identity: Three studies on the effects of 
visibility to the in-group.” British Journal of Social Psvchologv 37: 15-40.
456
References
Reicher, S. D. and M, Levine (1994). “Deindividuation, power relations between groups 
and the expression of social identity: The effects of visibility to the out-gi*oup.” 
British Joumal of Social Psvchologv 33: 145-163.
Rodriguez-Bailon, R., M. Moya, et al. (2000). “Why do superiors attend to negative
stereotypic infomition about their subordinates? Effects of power legitimacy on 
social perception.” European Joumal of Social Psvchologv 30: 651-671.
Rimland, B. and A. Hill (1984). Idiot savants. Mental retardation and developmental 
disabilities, Vol 13. J. Wortis. New York, Plenum Press.
Rinehart, N. J., S. Bradshaw, et al. (2000). “Atypical interference of local detail on global 
processing in high-functioning autism and Asperger's disorder.” Joumal of Child 
Psvchologv and Psvchiatiw 41161: 769-778.
Ropar, D. and P. Mitchell (1999). “Are individuals with autism and Asperger's Syndrome 
susceptible to visual illusions?” Joumal of Child Psvchologv and Psvchiatrv 40: 
1283-1293.
Ropar, D. and P. Mitchell (2001a). “Susceptibility to illusions and performance on
visuospatial tasks in individuals with autism.” Joumal of Child Psvchologv and 
Psvchiatrv 42(4): 539-549.
Ropar, D. and P. Mitchell (2001b). “Do individuals with autism and Asperger's syndrome 
utilise prior knowledge when pairing stimuli?” Developmental Science 4: 433- 
441.
Ropar, D. and P. Mitchell (2002). “Shape constancy in autism: the role of prior
knowledge and perspective cues.” Joumal of Child Psvchologv and Psvchiatrv 
43: 647-653.
Ross, L. D. (1977). The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings: Distortions in the 
attribution process. Advances in Experimental Social Psvchologv. L. Berkowitz. 
New York, Academic Press. Vol. 10.
Rummelhail, D. E. (1977). Understanding and summarizing brief stories. Basic processes 
in reading. D. Laberge and S. J. Samuels. Hillsdale, NJ, Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates.
Rumsey, J. M. and S. D. Hamburger (1988). “Neurophysiological findings in high- 
functioning men with infantile autism, residual state.” Journal of Clinical and 
Experimental Neumpsvchologv 10: 201-221.
Russell, B. A. W. (1938). Power: A New Social Analvsis. London and New York,
George Allan and Unwin; W.W. Norton.
457
References
Russell, J., Ed. (1997). Autism as an Executive Function Disorder. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press.
Rutter, M. (1978). "Diagnosis and definition of childhood autism.” Joumal of Autism and 
Childhood Schizophrenia 8: 139-61.
Sachdev, I. and R. Bourhis (1985). “Social categorization and power differentials in 
group relations.” European Journal of Social Psvchologv 15: 415-434.
Sacks, H. (1992). Lectures on Conversation. Oxford, Blackwell.
Sacks, O. (1995). An Anthropologist on Mars. London, Picador.
Sartre, J. P. (1961/1965). Preface to F.Fanon The Wretched of the Earth London, Penguin 
Books.
Scaife, M. and J. Bmner (1975). “The capacity of joint visual attention in the infant.” 
Nature 253: 265-6.
Schank, R. and R. Abelson (1977). Scripts. Plans. Goals and Understanding. Hillsdale, 
NJ, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Shah, A. and U. Frith (1983). “An islet of ability in autistic children: a research note.” 
Joumal of Child Psvchologv and Psvchiatrv 24: 613-20.
Shah, A. and U. Frith (1993). “Why do autistic individuals show superior perfoimance on 
the Block Design task?” Joumal of Child Psvchologv and Psvchiatrv 34: 1351- 
64.
Schleghoff, E. A. (1993). Conversation analysis and socially shared cognition.
Perspectives on Sociallv Shared Cognition. L. B. Resnick, J. M. Levine and S. D. 
Teasley. Washington, D.C., APA: 150-172.
Schütz, A. (1970). On Phenomenologv and Social Relations. Chicago, Chicago 
University Press.
Shatz, M. (1994). Theory of mind and the development of social-linguistic
intelligence in early childhood. Childrens' Understanding of the Mind: Origins 
and Development. C. Lewis and P. Mitchell. Hillsdale, NJ, Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates. 311-329.
Shore, B. (1996). Culture in Mind: Cognition. Culture, and the Problem of Meaning. 
Oxford, Oxford University Press.
458
References
Shweder, R. A. (1984). Cultural psychology: What is it? Cultural Psvchologv: Essays on 
Comparative Human Development. J. W. Stigler, R. A. Shweder and G. Herdt. 
New York, Cambridge University Press; 1-43.
Shweder, R. A. (1984). Anthropology's romantic rebellion against the enlightment, or 
there's more to thinking than reason and evidence. Culture Theory: Essays on 
Mind. Self and Emotion. R. A. Shweder and R. A. LeVine. Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press; 27-66.
Shweder, R. A. and R. A. LeVine, Eds. (1984). Culture Theory: Essays on Mind. Self and 
Emotion. New York, Cambridge University Press.
Shweder, R. A. (1991). Thinking through Cultures. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University 
Press.
Snodgrass, S. E. (1985). “Women's intuition: the effect of subordinate role on
inteipersonal sensitivity.” Journal of Personalitv and Social Psychology 49(1): 
146-155.
Snodgrass, S. E. (1992). “Further effects of role versus gender on interpersonal
sensitivity.” Joumal of Personalitv and Social Psychology 6211): 154-158.
Snowling, M. and U. Frith (1986). “Comprehension in 'hyperlexic' readers.” Joumal of 
Experimental Child Psvchologv 42: 392-415.
Sodian, B. and U. Frith (1992). “Deception and sabotage in autistic, retarded and noimal 
children.” Joumal of Child Psvchologv and Psvchiatrv 33: 591-605.
Solomos, J. (1989). Race and Racism in Contemporary Britain. London, Macmillan.
Spears, R., S. A. Haslam, et al. (1999). “The effect of cognitive load on social
categorization in the category confusion paradigm.” European Joumal of Social 
Psvchologv 29: 621-639.
Spears, R. and S. A. Haslam (1997). Stereotyping and the burden of cognitive load. The 
Social Psvchologv of Stereotyping and Group Life. R. Spears, P. J. Oakes, N. 
Ellemers and S. A. Haslam. Oxford, Blackwell; 170-204.
Sperber, D. (1985b). On Anthropological Knowledge. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press.
Sperber, D. fl996L Explaining Culture. A Naturalistic Approach. Oxford. Blackwell.
Sperber, D. (1997). “Intuitive and reflective beliefs.” Mind and Language 12(1): 67-83.
459
References
Sperber, D. (2000). Metarepresentation in an evolutionary perspective. Paper presented at 
the Millenium Mind and Language Conference. Oxford.
Sperber, D. and D. Wilson (1986). Relevance: Communication and Cognition. Oxford, 
Basil Blackwell.
Sperber, D. and D. Wilson (2002). “Pragmatics, modularity and mind-reading.” Mind and 
Language 17(1-2): 3-23.
Staub, E. (1989). The Roots of Evil. The Origins of Genocide and other Group Violence. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Steele, C. M. (1997). “A threat in the air - How stereotypes shape intellectual identity and 
performance.” American Psychologist 52(6): 613-629.
Steele, C. (1999). “Thin Ice: "Stereotype Threat" and black college students.” The 
Atlantic Monthly 284(2): 44-54.
Steele, C. and J. Aronson (1995). “Stereotype threat and the intellectual test perfoimance 
of African Americans.” Journal of Personalitv and Social Psychology 69: 797- 
811.
Stevens, L. and S. T. Fiske (2000). “Motivated impressions of a powerholder: Accuracy 
under task dependency and misperception under evaluation dependency.” 
Personalitv and Social Psychology Bulletin 26(8): 907-922.
Sullivan, K., E. Winner, et al. (1995). “How children tell a lie from a joke: The role of 
second-order mental state attributions.” British Joumal of Developmental 
Psvchologv 13(191-204).
Surian, L., S. Baron-Cohen, et al. (1996). “Are children with autism deaf to Gricean 
maxims?” Cognitive Neuropsvchiativ 35: 172-77.
Szatmari, P., G. Bartolucci, et al. (1989). “Asperger's syndrome and autism: Comparison 
of early history and outcome.” Developmental Medicine and Child Neurology 
31(6): 709-720.
Tager-Flusberg, H. (1981). “On the nature of linguistic functioning in early infantile 
autism.” Joumal of Autism and Developmental Disorders 11: 45-56.
Tager-Flusberg, H. (1992). “Autistic childi'en's talk about psychological states: deficits in 
the early acquisition of a theory of mind.” Child Development 63: 161-172.
Tager-Flusberg, H. (1993). What language reveals about the understanding of minds in 
children with autism. Understanding Other Minds: Perspectives from Autism. S. 
Baron-Cohen, H. Tager-Flusberg and D. Cohen. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
460
References
Tager-Flusberg, H. (1995). “'Once upon a ribbit': Stories nanated by autistic children.” 
British Joumal of Developmental Psychology 13: 45-59.
Tager-Flusberg, H. (1997). The role of theory of mind in language acquisition:
contributions from the study of autism. Research on communication and language 
disorders: contiibutions to theories of language development. L. Adamson and M. 
A. Romski. Baltimore, MD, Paul Brooks: 133-158.
Tager-Flusberg, H. (2000). Language and understanding minds: connections in autism. 
Understanding other minds: Perspectivees from cognitive neuroscience, second 
edition. S. Baron-Cohen, H. Tager-Flusberg and D. Cohen. Oxford, Blackwell.
Tager-Flusberg, H. and K. Sullivan (1995). “Attiibuting mental states to story characters 
- a comparison of narratives produced by autistic and mentally-retarded 
individuals.” Applied Psycholinguistics 16(3): 241-256.
Tager-Flusberg, H. and K. Sullivan (2000). “A componential view of theory of mind: 
evidence from Williams syndrome.” Cognition 76: 59-89.
Tajfel, H. (1972). Social Categorization. Introduction a la Psychology Sociale. S. 
Moscovici. Paris, Larousse: 272-302.
Tajfel, H. (1978). Social categorisation, social identity and social comparison.
Differentiation between Social Groups: Studies in the Social Psychology of 
Intergroup Relations. H. Tajfel. London, Academic Press: 61-76.
Tajfel, H. and J. C. Tumer (1979). An integrative theory of intergioup conflict. The 
Social Psvchologv of Intergi’oup Relations. W. G. Austin and S. Worchel. 
Monterey, CA, Brooks/ Cole Publishing Company.
Tajfel, H. and J. C. Tumer (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behaviour. 
Psvchologv of Intergioup Relations. S. Worchel and W. G. Austin. Chicago, IL, 
Nelson Hall: 7-24.
Takeuchi, A. H. and S. H. Hulse (1993). “Absolute Pitch.” Psvcholocial Bulletin 
113:345-361.
Tantam, D. (1988). “Annotation: Asperger's svndrome.” Joumal of Child Psvchologv and 
Psvchiativ 29(3): 245-255.
The Office of Equal Employment Opportunities (2002) 
http://www.niehs.nih.gov/oeeo/homepage.htm




Tomasello, M., A. C. Ki'uger, et al. (1993). “Cultural learning.” Behavioural and Brain 
Sciences 16(3); 495-511.
To whin, K. E. (1997). Pervasive Developmental Disorder Not Otherwise Specified.
Handbook of Autism and Peiwasive Developmental Disorders. D. Cohen and F. 
Volkmar. New York, Wiley.
Trevarthen, C. (1980). The foundations of intersubjectivity: development of interpersonal 
co-operative understanding in infants. The Social Foundations of Language and 
Thought. D. R. Olson. New York, Norton: 316-342.
Turner, M. (1997). Towards an executive dysfunction account of repetitive behaviours in 
autism. Autism as an Executive Disorder. J. Russell. Oxford, Oxford University 
Press.
Turner, J. C., M. A. Hogg, et al. (1987). Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self- 
Categorization Theorv. Oxford, Blackwell.
Turner, J. C. (1987). A self-categorization theory. Rediscovering the Social Group: A
Self-Categorization Theoiw. J. C. Turner, M. A. Hogg, P. J. Oakes, S. D. Reicher 
and M. Wetherell. Oxford, Blackwell: 42-67.
Twachtman-Cullen, D. (1998). Language and Communication in high-functioning 
autism and Asperger Syndrome. Asperger Svndrome or High-Functioning 
Autism. E. Schopler. New York, Plenum Press.
Venter, A., C. Lord, et al. (1992). “A follow-up study of high functioning autistic 
childien.” Journal of Child Psvchologv and Psvchiatiw 33(3): 489-507.
Vinden, P. G. and J. W. Astington (2000). Culture and understanding other minds. 
Understanding Other Minds: Perspectives from Cognitive Neuroscience. S. 
Baron-Cohen, H. Tager-Flusberg and D. Cohen. Oxford, Blackwell.
Volden, J. and J. Johnston (1999). “Cognitive scripts in autistic children and
adolescents.” Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders 29(3): 203-211.
Vorauer, J. D., A. D. Hunter, et al. (2000). “Meta-stereotype activation: evidence
fi'om indirect measures for specific evaluative concerns experienced by members 
of dominant gioups in intergioup interaction.” Journal of Personalitv and Social 
Psvchologv 78(4): 690-707
Vygotsky, L.(1978) Mind in Society: The Development of Higher Psvchological 
Processes. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.
462
References
Walker, C. and F. Yerkovich (1984). “Script-based inferences: Effects of text and
knowledge variables on recognition memoiy.” Journal of Verbal Learning and 
Verbal Behaviour 23: 357-370.
Wartofsky, M. (1973). Models. Dodrecht, D. Reidel.
Wechsler, D. (1974). Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children - Revised. New York, The 
Psychological Corporation.
Wechsler, D. (1981). Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale - Revised. New York, The 
Psychological Corporation.
Wellman, H. M. (1988). First steps in the child's theorizing about the mind. Developing
Theories of Mind. J. W. Astington, P. L. Hams and D. R, Olson. Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press.
Wellman, H. M. (1990). The Child's Theorv of Mind. Cambridge, MA, Bradford/MIT 
Press.
Whiten, A. and J. Pemer (1991). Fundamental issues in the multidisciplinaiy
study of mindieading. Natural Theories of Mind: Evolution. Development and 
Simulation of Evervdav Mindieading. A. Whiten. Oxford, Basil Blackwell: 1-17.
Whiten, A. (1996). When does smart behaviour reading become mind-reading?
Theories of Theories of Mind. P. CaiTuthers and P. K. Smith. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press: 277-292.
Wimmer, H., J. Hogrefe, et al. (1988). A second stage in children's conception of mental 
life: Understanding infoimational access as origins of knowledge and belief. 
Developing Theories of Mind. J. W. Astington, P. L. Harris and D. R. Olson: 173- 
193.
Wimmer, H. and J. Pemer (1983). “Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining 
function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception.” 
Cognition 13: 103-128.
Winner, E., H. Brownell, et al. (1998). “Distinguishing lies from jokes: theory of mind 
and discourse interpretation in right hemsiphere brain-damaged patients.” Brain 
and Language 62: 89-106.
Winner, E. and S. Leekam (1991). “Distinguishing irony from deception:
Understanding the speaker's second-order intention.” British Journal of 
Developmental Psvchologv 9: 257-270.




Wing, L. J. (1988), The continuum of autistic characteristics. Diagnosis and assessment 
in autism. E. Schopler and G. B. Mesibov. New York, Plenum Press; 91-110.
Wing, L. J. and J. Gould (1978). “Systematic recording of behaviour and skills of
retarded and psychotic children.” Journal of Autism and Childhood Schizophrenia 
8: 79-97.
Wing, L. J. and J. Gould (1979). “Severe impairments of social interaction and associated 
abnormalities in children: epidemiology and classification.” Journal of Autism 
and Developmental Disorders 9(11-29).
Witkin, H. A., P. K. Oltman, et al. (1971). A manual for the Embedded Figures Test. 
California, Consulting Psychologists Press.
World Health Organisation (1990). International Classification of Disease, 10th revision 
Chapter V. Mental and Behavioral Disorders (including disorders of 
psychological development). Diagnostic criteria for research. Geneva, WHO
Yirmiya, N., O. Erel, et al. (1998). “Meta-analyses comparing theory of mind abilities of 
individuals with autism, individuals with mental retardation and normally- 
developing individuals.” Psvchological Bulletin 124: 283-307.
Yirmiya, N., D. Solomonica-Levi, et al. (1996). “Theory of mind abilities in individuals 
with autism. Down syndrome, and mental retardation of unknown etiology: the 
role of age and intelligence.” Journal of Child Psvchologv and Psvchiatrv 37(8): 
1003-1014.
Zaitchik, D. (1990). “When representations conflict with reality: the preschooler's 
problem with false beliefs and "false" photographs.” Cognition 35(1): 1-103.
464
